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THE BRITISH  
QUARTERLY REVIEW.

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AUGUST AND NOVEMBER,  
1851.

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# THE BRITISH QUARTERLY REVIEW.

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AUGUST 1, 1851.

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- ART. I.—(1.) *The Science of Politics. Part I. The Theory of Human Progression, and Natural Probability of a Reign of Justice.* London & Edinburgh. Johnstone & Hunter: 1850.
- (2.) *Social Statics: or, The Conditions essential to Human Happiness specified, and the First of them developed.* By HERBERT SPENCER. London. Chapman: 1851.

MR. RUSKIN, in his recent severe criticism of the practices of our modern architects, makes the pithy remark, that the procedure of some of them reminds him of that of some preachers, whose sermons are always so elaborately divided into heads and sections, and at the same time contain so very little edifying matter, that they may be described as "all carving and no meat." This criticism is hardly applicable to the very remarkable work whose title appears first at the head of this article. There is, indeed, as we think, a superabundance of carving in it; but there is also a great deal of excellent meat. The author does not give his name; but, from internal evidence, we are disposed to believe that he resides, or has resided, in Edinburgh, and has studied there under Sir William Hamilton. At all events, he seems to be a proficient in that higher logic and metaphysics, the growth of the German mind, of which Sir William is, in this country, the most conspicuous representative. One of the most obvious features of the work is the unmitigated manner in which the notions and terminology of the metaphysical class-room are applied in the investigation of political subjects. This is done to such an extent as to spoil the literary form of the work. Not only is the plan of the work founded on a conception of a very philosophic kind—in which, indeed, lies its great merit: there is also

an unnecessary and almost ostentatious profusion of divisions and subdivisions into *primo, secundo, tertio*, &c.; the symbols A, B, and C, are often uncouthly introduced where the concrete expressions for which they stand would be clearer; and there is a somewhat pedantic adhesion to the use of words, which, though adopted for good reasons in the schools, are yet strange to general literature. For example, in the first page there occurs the following sentence:—‘Wherever the substantives of a science may be derived from, or whatever may be their character, they form portions of a science only as they are made to function logically in the human reason.’ And again, in page 467:—‘As there is but one universe for man to know, and but one type of intellect to apprehend that universe, it follows as a natural necessity, that if man be allowed sufficient time to reduce to scientific ordination all the cognizable substantives that exist within the range of intellection, a universal unity of credence would evolve.’ Coupled as it is with a certain clumsiness of general style, and a tendency to needless iteration, this use of the scholastic mode and phraseology will tell against the utility of the work. Ordinary readers who may take it up will find the greater part of it unintelligible and repulsive; and even those more cultured readers, for whom the author evidently intended it, and to whom the logical forms and phraseology will present no difficulty, will regret that a book containing so much good matter, and which, without the slightest sacrifice of either depth or precision, might have been made a model of philosophical exposition, has been put forth in so inelegant a shape. We say this, because we are anxious that the author should receive the high degree of honour to which he is most deservedly entitled. The book is, we repeat, a very remarkable book, and truly worthy of being read. Its defects seem to arise from the fact that the author, when he proceeded to his subject, was still very strongly under the influence of habits acquired in the course of his academic studies; from the fact that when, to use Mr. Ruskin’s simile, he sat down to dispense the meat, he had still too great a consciousness of *being* a carver, to carve easily and with moderation. The picture which the author presents of himself in the course of the volume is that of a man who, fresh from a course of logic and metaphysics, plunges eagerly into concrete and practical subjects, reads newspapers, pamphlets on slavery, and the like, discusses game-laws, corn-laws, &c.; all the while trying, not so much to master these topics by the general exercise of ability, as to reduce them by the practice of his former gymnastic. Nevertheless, it is probably on this very account that his work bears the character, so rare in these days, of being a really philosophic attempt at a

science of politics. And it completes our notion of the author, as regards the prior likelihood of this attempt, when we gather, from various intimations throughout the volume, that he is, if not a clergyman, at least a person of theological tendencies, and attached to the principles of orthodox dissent.

The main idea of the present volume, which is dedicated to Cousin, and is published apparently as the first instalment of a larger general work projected by the author, is the idea, now so common, that there is a regular progression in human affairs, a regular course which history is constrained to follow, a regular development of the intellectual constitution of man, showing itself, not in any real alteration in the elements of that constitution, but in a gradual extension of the sphere of human knowledge, and a consequent gradual improvement in the mode of human action, and gradual amelioration of the condition of humanity. He then farther asserts, herein also agreeing with all superior modern thinkers, that this progression of human affairs, this development of the human character, may be made the object of scientific study. And he seeks the clue to this science of the human progression, now universally acknowledged to be possible, in the fact, which he thinks capable of demonstration, that the various sciences into which man's knowledge of the universe is divided have been necessarily evolved, one after another, in a certain chronological order, determined by their logical relationship to each other. The following is his own introductory statement:—

‘Our argument is based on the theory of progress, or the fact of progress; for it is a fact as well as a theory. And the theory of progress is based on the principle, that there is an order in which man not only *does* evolve the various branches of knowledge, but an order in which man *must necessarily* evolve the various branches of knowledge. And this necessity is based on the principle, that every science, when undergoing its process of discovery, is *objective*—that is, the object of contemplation; but when discovered and reduced to ordination, it becomes *subjective*—that is, a means of operation for the discovery and evolution of the science that lies logically beyond it, and next to it in logical proximity. If this logical dependence of one science on another could be clearly made out for the whole realm of knowledge, it would give the outline, not only of the classification of the sciences, but of man's intellectual history—of man's intellectual *development*, where the word development means, not the alteration of man's *nature*, but the extension of his knowledge, and the consequent improvement of his mode of action, entailing with it the improvement of his condition. And if the law of this intellectual development can be made out for the branches of knowledge which have already been reduced to ordination, it may be carried into the future, and the future



progress of mankind may be seen to evolve logically out of the past progress.'—*Theory of Progression*, pp. 23, 24.

Proceeding on the principle thus laid down, the author explains what he considers to be the necessary order of the sciences. First in the series, as being the most general and simple of all, he places *logic* or *sylogistic*; understanding by this, not what Mr. Mill and some other modern writers mean by logic—namely, the science of the mode of material investigation, but that which the Germans and Sir William Hamilton mean by logic, and to which alone they will allow the name of logic, namely, the science, prosecuted from the time of Aristotle downwards, of the purely formal laws of thought. The structural laws according to which man thinks, and not the empiric methods by which man may acquire knowledge, are the objects of this science, which may therefore be described as 'the universal form of all science,' or as a 'science with blank categories,' that may be afterwards filled up with any kind of matter whatsoever. Next to logic, as being by one degree less general and simple, comes *mathematics*. Here the blank categories of logic are filled up with the simplest of all kinds of intellectual matter—namely, notions of number and magnitude; and the whole science is evolved by the operation of the laws of logic, now made subjective, upon this class of objects. To mathematics succeeds *dynamics*, or the science of forces (especially exemplified in astronomy), in which a new concept, that of power, law, or force, is superadded to those involved in mathematics, and to the evolution of which mathematics, now become subjective, serves as a means of operation. In a similar manner, the force-science is succeeded by what may be called *the matter-sciences*, including general physics, or the science of the mutual actions of inorganic bodies, considered as masses of power peculiarly conditioned; chemistry, or the science of the internal constitution of inorganic bodies; vegetable physiology, or the science of the organization and vitality of plants; and animal physiology, or the science of the organization and vitality of animals. Here also there is a rise in speciality and complexity, and a presupposition of all the anterior sciences as a subjective means of operation upon new matter of conception. And, lastly, to the matter-sciences succeed the *man-sciences*, or the sciences of human nature as such; the most special and complex of all, involving all the preceding sciences without exception, and requiring for their own evolution the pre-assumption of these sciences conjointly, in the form of a subjective instrument of farther investigation.

In this arrangement of the sciences by our anonymous author, those who are acquainted with the writings of Auguste Comte will recognise the identical classification of the sciences proposed,

for an exactly similar purpose, by that distinguished thinker, and adopted by him as the basis of his great work, the 'Cours de Philosophie Positive.' Logic is, indeed, omitted by Comte; the only logic which his peculiar philosophic system permits him to recognise being that science of the methods of material investigation to which we have already alluded as prosecuted by Mill and others, and this science having no title, of course, to stand first in the list, seeing that it can but result as a generalization from the whole actual progress of knowledge; that is, from an inductive survey of all the sciences. But, with this exception, Comte's arrangement of the sciences, under the successive heads of *mathematics, astronomy, general physics, chemistry, biology* or the *science of life*, (vegetable and animal physiology,) and *sociology* or the *science of human society*, is strictly the same as that propounded by our author, any farther difference that may appear between the two schemes being only verbal. Nay, more, the exposition of the grounds of this arrangement, as consisting in the logical connexion of the sciences, the dependence of each on the prior elaboration of that which precedes it in the series, and the greater complexity and speciality of the later sciences as compared with the earlier—all this has been gone through by M. Comte, in terms almost literally the same as those which our author uses. Hence, notwithstanding that the name of M. Comte is not once mentioned throughout the volume, we are bound to believe that our author has derived this leading conception of his work either directly or indirectly from that writer. If he derived it from Comte directly, we can only account for the omission of the due acknowledgment by the supposition that, differing as he does in fundamental respects from the general philosophy of Comte, he was anxious to avoid all appearance of connexion with one so liable to suspicion. This, however, besides being an insufficient reason in any case for the neglect of an act of justice, would have been the less necessary here, that the author has taken ample care throughout his work to show that, in general philosophy, he belongs to the school directly antagonistic to that of which Comte has constituted himself the head. Comte, it is well known, is an empiricist; that is, he acknowledges observation of phenomena as the sole source of knowledge; this author, on the other hand, believes in a metaphysic, or science of formal intuition, as preceding all the sciences of experience, and furnishing them with the grounds of a higher natural certainty. Comte denies *in toto* all doctrine of religion; this author, on the other hand, appends to the sciences of experience, as their proper termination and landing-place, a philosophy strictly so-called: in other words, a science of natural theology, leading man

on exactly to that point of knowledge and desire, at which revelation becomes a felt necessity of the spirit. Hence, he could very well have afforded to own his obligation to Comte for the notion of a necessary logical order of the sciences; the more so that he has—as we think—positively improved on that notion as it stands in Comte, by placing logic or syllogistic first in the series, instead of mathematics. It is possible, however, that the author may *not* be directly indebted to Comte for the notion in question.

The medium by which this fine notion of a necessary logical order of the sciences becomes applicable, both in Comte and in our author, as a means of speculating on the human progression, is the supplementary notion that *this order of the logical interdependence of the sciences is also necessarily the order of their chronological development*. In other words, the logical and mathematical sciences were necessarily developed first; the force and matter sciences necessarily came to be developed next; and the man-sciences will necessarily be developed last of all. This is an observation which may be verified by a glance at the actual history of the human mind. Syllogistic mathematics and rudimentary astronomy were the only sciences, properly so called, in which the ancients were proficient; the higher astronomy and the whole range of the inorganic physical sciences are achievements of modern thought, chemistry coming last in point of time; the organic sciences of vegetable and animal physiology are still in the crude state of infancy; and the sciences of human action and human history exist but as conceptions of what may be accomplished by the intellect of the future. Now, seeing that each accession of scientific knowledge—that is, each addition to the stock of human beliefs respecting the universe, necessarily involves a corresponding change in the whole mode of human action, followed as necessarily by a corresponding change in the general condition of humanity, the conclusion is, that the general condition of humanity at any one point of the historic progression is represented to us as efficiently as such a vast thing is capable of being represented, in *the state of the sciences at that point*. Thus, when the truths of the astronomical science were first laid open to the world, these truths diffused themselves as a new ingredient through the whole previously-accumulated mass of human thought, slowly altering men's conceptions about all things whatever, and thereby effecting an alteration even in their mode of practical procedure. So, also, each of the physical sciences, as it has been developed in its turn, has shot like a prolonged tremor through the *ensemble* of human affairs, as existing at the moment, producing in the first place intellectual, and, in

the second place, material and social changes. In short, the career of humanity as a whole is determined by, and represented in, the career of scientific speculation; and the highest question respecting any past age, considered historically, is the question, —At what point had science then arrived, and what were the special scientific truths then in the course of being incorporated with the mass of human credence? The question, it is true, is sometimes very difficult. It is very difficult, for example, to decide, with respect to some of the particular physical sciences—in what order they either stand logically, or were developed chronologically. Who shall at present decide whether acoustics or optics is logically the prior science, or settle the claims of magnetism as against those of common electricity? Several sciences, it appears, may be in the course of development at the same time—may be carried on, as it were, abreast. And though this difficulty, which is chiefly felt with regard to sciences still only in a state of progress, will doubtless be diminished as discoveries increase, there yet remains the immensely greater difficulty of being able to exhibit a distinct and undeniable connexion between such social changes, or changes in the general condition of humanity, as may arrest our attention, and those modifications of scientific belief which we may detect as having been contemporaneous with them, or as having immediately preceded them. That intellect would certainly be archangelic that could fully appreciate, or even slightly sketch, the social effects of the invention of the galvanic battery, or that could estimate the amount of causal relationship existing between the discovery, that the angle in a semicircle is a right one, and the subsequent battle of Marathon. Nevertheless, the fact remains true, that the law of the historic progression is essentially the same as that of the scientific evolution; that one age is generated out of another by the incorporation with that other of all the new truths obtained in the meantime by the persevering investigation of the universe; and that, consequently, if we of this age desire to find a clue to the future course of humanity, we must seek it in an inquiry into the state of our present scientific knowledge, and into the specific nature and virtue of those doctrines which are now slowly diffusing themselves through our intellectual atmosphere.

At what point, then, in the series of the sciences do we at present stand? The reply which our author makes to this question is precisely the same in substance as that made by Comte. His words are as follows:—

‘At what branch or branches of knowledge are the most advanced nations now in the nineteenth century? There are several tests which we may apply to a branch of knowledge, to ascertain whether it is or

is not a science; that is, whether it is as yet reduced to scientific ordination. 1st. It must have a definite province, so that we distinctly understand what we are reasoning about. 2nd. It must be *teachable* as a branch of knowledge. For this purpose, its propositions must be co-ordinated, so that we can know whether we are at the commencement, or how far we have progressed beyond the commencement . . . 3rd. It must be capable of subjective application. This we consider to be the proper criterion of the state of a science. If it is incapable of application, it is only undergoing the process of discovery; if it is capable of application, it is so far complete. It is then the same for all men alike (there is but *one* truth), and it becomes a means of operation whereby things are done which could not otherwise have been done.

‘We ask, then, at what sciences are the most advanced nations now in the nineteenth century? It is evident that the mathematical sciences, and the more general physical sciences, fulfil the above conditions. The question, then, is with the advanced physical sciences, and with those that follow them in the scheme of classification. Let us take chemistry as the most advanced inorganic physical science, and classify the sciences that follow chemistry in the natural scheme of classification. We have then this list—chemistry, vegetable physiology, animal physiology, man-science.’—*Theory of Progression*, pp. 207-209.

Taking it for granted, then, as an admitted fact, that all the sciences logically preceding chemistry have been reduced to a state of sufficient ordination, though still capable, of course, of improvement, and that it is in the departments of chemistry, vegetable physiology, animal physiology, and man-science, that the most productive exertions of the scientific mind are now being made, the author proceeds farther to glance at the state of these four sciences individually, for the purpose of determining more particularly how far the human mind has already performed its function with respect to them. His conclusion is, that chemistry, though still very progressive, may be regarded as having reached a tolerable state of ordination; that vegetable physiology has also some of the characters of a positive and established department of knowledge; and that it is between animal physiology and the man-science that the human mind is now struggling and labouring, like a sea on its way to the full tide. Although, therefore, the condition of humanity will undoubtedly be yet powerfully modified by the social activity of new truths, to be furnished by chemistry and vegetable physiology, as well, indeed, as by those to be furnished by the prior, though still growing sciences of electricity and magnetism; although, out of the medley of researches now going on in these sciences, facts and propositions may yet be educed that shall affect human

action in all its varieties, and alter the whole appearance and relationship of things as visibly as the steam-engine and electric telegraph have done already; still, he who would predict the 'next step' in the historic progression—he who would follow the course of human affairs to the very horizon of our present view—must have an eye also to those vague conceptions, pregnant with future social results, which are slowly rising like clouds over the field of the animal and man-sciences. Chemistry may yield truths which, improving even so slight a matter as the cookery of our cottages, or seized for the benefit of our higher arts and manufactures, may, through such a medium, affect the condition of humanity to the core; the lessons in agriculture, too, which may be derived from future rescarches into the laws of vegetation, will be so many positive alterations in all that concerns man on earth: but these changes may be as nothing, compared with the changes which will henceforward be dictated by the sciences of animal life and of social action. Above all, from the very nature of the case, one may expect prodigious social results from the prosecution of the man-science. For what is the object-matter of this science?—with what does it deal? Its matter is human nature; its 'substantives' are man, woman, good, bad, duty, crime, property, and the like; and surely if the other sciences had influence to direct and modify human action, this science will not have less. If the procedure of men and their consequent condition on earth, have been affected by what they have progressively believed about lines, circles, and triangles—about earth, water, and plants; surely their procedure and condition will be no less affected by what they may be as certainly constrained by reason to believe about themselves, their kindred, their neighbours, and their ancestors. Nay, as, in the man-sciences, new conceptions of expediency, morality, progress, and the like, come for the first time to be included, it is reasonable to expect that the modification which will take place in the procedure and condition of humanity, in consequence of the elaboration of these sciences, will be somehow higher in kind than the modifications introduced in the train of the mere matter-sciences. It will be less a merely physical, and more a moral improvement. An increase of knowledge in the material sciences,—a new truth in physics, elucidated by the research of the learned, taught to the people till they believed it, and applied to the uses of practical life,—this has been but an increase of happiness by an increase of *power*; an increase of knowledge in the moral sciences—a new truth ascertained and forced upon the reason, respecting the relations in which men stand to each other—this surely should, in some sense, issue in an increase of happiness by an increase of *wisdom and goodness*.

Here it is that the author touches on the notion of a *millennium*, and holds forth the prospect that, in the natural course of human development, a condition of humanity must be evolved deserving that name. The sense, however, in which he uses the word *millennium* is peculiar. 'In speaking of a millennium,' he says, 'we pronounce nothing whatever on the absolute amount of evil 'that is or is not inseparable from man.' In other words, in asserting that the natural course of things is leading the world onward to what may be called a millennium, all that he means is, that humanity, as a whole, is in a gradual progress towards the attainment of the best conditions which its constitution and situation, *such as they are*, render possible; and this in virtue of that natural law of development, which compels men to be ever bringing new portions of the universe within the domain of scientific knowledge, and regulating their procedure according to this increase of their convictions. In this sense—which is obviously very different from the notion of absolute perfectibility entertained by not a few minds, destitute of scientific training—the epoch of the perfect social action of any one science of the logical series, may be described as the millennium of that science. Thus, that epoch in history when the mathematical sciences had first reached such a degree of scientific elaboration that mathematical truth could exert its full effect on the procedure and condition of human beings, might very well be called the mathematical millennium. So also the epoch of the first acknowledged development of chemical science to that pitch at which chemical truth should be free, according to its limits, to influence the procedure of men, might be called the chemical millennium. And in a similar manner, when men shall have made such progress in the science of human society, that the conclusions of that science shall be equally potent over human practice as mathematical truth now is, or as chemical and physiological truth may soon be, this will be the beginning of the social or political millennium. Such a millennium, however, will also be the millennium of all the sciences, seeing that, as the science of society is the last of all the sciences, the political millennium will be necessarily also the period of the complete social triumph of all ascertained scientific truth. The procedure of men will then necessarily be in accordance with their beliefs with respect to the whole universe, human nature included; and as these beliefs, even with respect to the more complex and special portions of the universe, will necessarily be ever approaching nearer and nearer to the state of final correctness, it follows that, unless Nature is playing false with man, his condition in this world must necessarily be approaching to the utmost state of perfection compatible with what

is steadfast and invariable in the whole of the terrestrial circumstances. This last limitation, we repeat, is important, and saves the author from the reproach which justly falls on those less philosophic advocates of progress, who prophesy, under that name, the final extinction on earth of all forms of evil and misery. The progress which our author contemplates and expounds, is only a progress of man *in knowledge*, with all that that involves. Man, according to this view, is a being peculiarly constituted; placed in a universe also peculiarly constituted; and capable of being better or worse off in that universe, according as he is more or less familiar with it, and knows more or less how to adapt himself to its fixed ways: of no man or nation can it be said, that he or it has yet realized the best condition possible for him or it, if only the means of attaining it were known: this best possible condition of humanity, however, as regards the universe in which it is placed, is a goal towards which humanity is constantly tending, as its acquaintance with the universe becomes more extensive and thorough. A great advance towards this goal will, accordingly, have been made, when man shall have added to his other sciences a real science of politics. At first, men, in their dealings with the universe, blundered on in a state of universal empiricism, struggling towards their ends by mere native faculty, (often splendidly exerted,) without positive or systematic knowledge of any portion of the laws of nature; next, men, possessed of that amount of insight into the laws of nature which consists in the syllogistic and mathematical sciences, blundered on empirically in all matters pertaining to physics and morals, acting often nobly, but always, in a sense, blindly; at present, men, with a large amount of accurate physical knowledge superadded to the former, still continue to blunder on empirically in politics, often acting with zeal and skill, but substituting arbitrary notions and superstitions for definite and assured beliefs: what remains, therefore, is, that the process of discovery and investigation shall go on to its next necessary stage,—that men shall cultivate the social science, so as to be able ultimately to regulate their procedure by truth political as implicitly (the nature of man still remaining essentially the same) as they have hitherto done by truth mathematical or truth physical. This will be the political millennium, which will also be the millennium of all science. Beyond this millennium, indeed, and constituting a still more glorious portion of the human evolution, our author indicates a Christian millennium; that is, an epoch when not only shall there be a unity of scientific belief—when not only shall the truths of the whole series of natural sciences have received intellectual recognition and social application, but theological truth



also, and the truths of revelation, shall be ingrafted into the credence, and made potent in the governance of the whole race. It is with the definition of the political millennium, however—with the delineation of what he considers the next approaching epoch of history—that he chiefly occupies himself; and it is into this that we shall follow him.

It being admitted that the human mind has at the present moment advanced just so far in the series of the sciences, as to be on the verge of the science of humanity itself,—and also that the character of the times upon which we are entering will depend mainly on the results of future speculation in this science, conjoined with whatever matter of social efficacy the later physical sciences (such as chemistry, electricity, and physiology) may yet contribute,—the next question naturally is, what has been already done in the science of humanity, and what indications are there of the course it will take? Regarding the present state of politics generally, our author speaks in terms which coincide exactly with those of Comte, Mill, and all other thinkers of eminence who have expressed themselves on the subject.

‘The whole realm of political science is as yet little better than a superstition; and though humanity is perpetually making convulsive throes to escape from the evils entailed by the erroneous credence, we may rest surely convinced that those evils will never be obliterated until the human intellect has fairly mastered the theory of man’s political relations, and reduced that theory to universal application. \* \* To observe the manner in which men legislate, we should naturally be led to the conclusion, that there was *no truth* and *no falsehood* in political science. How otherwise can we explain the circumstance, that laws are perpetually undergoing a process of change? A law enacted only a few years since, is now found to be incorrect—so bad, in fact, that it must be abolished. In that law, perhaps, the interests of millions were involved; yet notwithstanding, legislators are allowed to make these vast experiments with the property and the liberties of their fellow-men, on no surer ground than *opinion*; which, in the great majority of cases, is mere presumptuous superstition. \* \* \* According to law in England, the *Episcopal* church is the true church; truth, according to law, is in the Thirty-nine Articles; the bishop is not only a churchman, but a legislator—a member of the supreme parliament, and a ruler of the state. But in another part of Britain, the Church of England is not the true church, it is a scandalous hierarchy,—because in the northern part of Britain the *Presbyterian* church is the true church; truth, according to law, is in the Confession of Faith; and the bishop, so far from being entitled to reverence, is a vile intruder on the equal rights of his brethren. In Ireland, again, (unfortunate Ireland!) *Papery*—which is, root and branch, totally false in England and Scotland—is partially legally true. And perhaps, by

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and by, it is going to be *more* true. Not that it can be true in England, because the law cannot allow *that*; but that it may be true in Ireland—or true enough, at all events, *for* Ireland—as anything does for Ireland! \* \* Again, what is the whole system of criminal legislation now carried into force in Great Britain? What is it but a great *superstition*—an arbitrary superstition—where there is no regulative principle for the intellect to rest upon? Why should one criminal be *fin*ed, another *imprisoned*, another *transported*, and another *hanged*? Is there any *connexion*, either inductive or deductive, between the crimes and the punishments? Is the allocation of the punishment based upon *any* principle that connects just such a kind, and such a quantity, with the offence? Is not the selection of the punishment *arbitrary*; that is, dependent, not on any principle discoverable in nature, but dependent on vague and groundless opinion—that is, *superstition*? \* \* Could we see things present in the same light that we see things past, we should regard the affected wisdom of legislators and lawyers with the same ridicule and contempt so lavishly bestowed on the quacks, diviners, and necromancers of a former age. Where there is no *truth* to rest upon, there can only be error or superstition.—*Theory of Progression*, pp. 226-232.

This state of anarchy and hap-hazard empiricism which we see prevailing everywhere in politics, can only be remedied by the same process which has driven anarchy and empiricism out of the physical sciences; namely, by a progressive cultivation of the science whose laws are involved—i. e., the science of humanity, or the man-science. What, then, are the present hopes of this science; how is it laying itself out in the hands of those who have begun to prosecute it; and what germs of real doctrine are there already discoverable in it?

In describing more particularly that which he designates in the general by the name of the man-science, and in laying out the divisions and provinces of this science according to the logical principle of arrangement observed throughout the whole classification of the sciences, our author calls attention to three distinct positions or attitudes in which man may be regarded, giving rise to three distinct classes of human functions, each of which furnishes matter for a separate science. I. *The functions of man as a being constituted to act upon the external world of nature.* Out of this class of the human functions, forming what the French call *l'exploitation de la terre par l'homme*, arise the various industrial arts, whereby man shapes matter to his purposes; and any science that might be grounded in this class of the human functions would, therefore, be nothing more than a theory of the progress of the industrial arts, as necessitated by the laws of exterior nature on the one hand, and the course of human wants on the other. Such a science would belong, of

course, to the general science of humanity or human development; but it would not trench on the real science of politics.

II. *The functions of man in his attitude towards his fellow-men, as a being capable of acting upon them to their benefit or their prejudice.*

These, forming what the French call the *exploitation de l'homme par l'homme*, are the objects of the political or social science, viewed generally. But man may act on man in two ways; and according as an action takes place in the one or in the other of these two ways, it falls to be considered under the one or the other of two very distinct branches of this general social science.

(1.) Man may act on man *mediately or indirectly*; that is, the actions of one man may benefit or injure another through their own inevitable consequences, even though there is no positive interference between the two, but the most perfect mutual freedom. Every man, in the pursuit of his own occupations, reacts on his fellow-men through these occupations whether he will or no; and hence there may be a science whose end it is to discover how men in society may spontaneously arrange their separate courses of life so as to play into each other's hands, and secure as much of the effect of systematic co-operation as can be attained without any exercise of mutual control. This, according to our author, is the science of *political economy*. 'The problem of political economy,' he says, 'is to discover the laws (generalized facts) which preside over human actions, where there is no direct interference between man and man.' Ten men, for example, freely prosecuting their separate occupations, may, even though they abstain from all interference one with another, yet arrange their occupations so badly as to be mutually impeding—in which case, they would be bad political economists; or they may arrange them so as to be mutually assisting and to produce the largest possible amount of general benefit—in which case, they would be good political economists. Political economy, therefore, is the science of active co-operation without interference; or, in other words, it is the science of the mutual relations of men in *utility*. It is a non-moral science; that is, it does not pronounce of any action, whether it is good or bad, in a moral sense, but only whether it is expedient. (2.) Man may act on man *immediately or directly*, by the exercise of authority, fraud, violence, or the like. This class of human actions forms the subject of *politics proper*; the problem of which, according to our author, is, 'to discover the laws (principles of reason) which ought to preside over human actions in the matter of interference.' Politics is, therefore, a moral science; it views men as naturally disposed to interfere with each other while pursuing their separate industries or modes of life, and it seeks to

decide, not by observation of results, but by an internal feeling of justice, whether, and how far, this interference is right, and what ought to be done when a wrong interference takes place. It is the science of justice, of government; of the relations of men in *equity*. But here it stops; and the relations of men in anything beyond mere equity belong to a still higher science.

III. *The functions of man in his attitude towards the Deity, or as a being living under the impression of responsibility to a higher Power.* It is obvious that men in society, besides regulating their actions towards each other by considerations of utility, i. e. *economically*, and by considerations of pure justice or equity, i. e. *politically*, may also regulate them by considerations of benevolence or piety, i. e. *charitably* or *religiously*. A man, not content with so conducting himself in the matter of his own industry as that the reflex effects of his actions upon the commonwealth may be good, and not content with treating every one about him according to his strict rights or dues, may have, moreover, a disposition to bestow gifts on his neighbours, and to alleviate their distresses and promote their welfare by acts of mercy, magnanimity, or kindness, not at all required by mere justice. Now actions of this class belong, according to our author, to the science of natural theology; which is the science, in this sense, of the relations of men in *accountability*. And this is a department of man-science altogether distinct from politics, and lying beyond it in the logical series.

Such is a condensed account of our author's views as to the proper classification of the sciences of human action; an extract or two will make his meaning, in some points, clearer:—

*Distinction between Political Economy and Politics.*—‘Political economy treats of the relations of men in social utility, and we ask, ‘What are the relations of this, that, and the other action, or system of action, in *social utility*?’ The answer to this question belongs exclusively to the science of political economy. The same action may be judged in *social utility*, or in *equity*; in the former case we are engaged with a question of political economy; in the latter, with a question of politics. Endless ambiguities and discussions arise from confounding the one science with the other. \* \* Wherever human action is not involved, there is no political economy. Whatever results from the general action of the laws of the non-human universe, does not belong to political economy. The destruction of all the sheep, for instance, and all the people, in a highland district, by a storm or by a dreadful convulsion of the elements, would in no respect enter into the science of political economy. But the abolition of the sheep and the abolition of the population by the so-called proprietor, under the sanction of British law, and the conversion of the district into a game-desert, *does* enter into political economy; and when we

ask the questions, 'Is this act socially beneficial or prejudicial?' and, 'Are the laws that grant a legal power to perform such acts by force, socially beneficial or prejudicial?' we reason in political economy. These same acts and laws may also be judged of *in equity*; but in that case we have passed from political economy into politics. \* \* \* Acts of *interference*, whether by law, or merely by the individual, belong properly to the science of politics, but they may also be legitimately judged of through the medium of political economy. In the one mode, however, we reason synthetically, as in geometry; in the other mode, we reason empirically, as if we were to infer the general properties of figures from an induction of the actual properties presented by an indefinite multitude of individual figures. The practical difference is this: by treating a question of interference by the rules of equity, we arrive at once at a conclusion; whereas, when it is treated by the rules of utility, it may require many years, many observations, and many disputations as to facts, before a conclusion can be drawn. The *equity* of the slave-trade is a question so simple, that few intelligent men could fail to settle it satisfactorily in a few minutes; but the *economy* of the trade would require, and did require, many years to settle it, and even now there are not wanting hundreds who, on *economical* principles, would defend both the trade and the condition of slavery. Although *perfect* knowledge in both sciences would, no doubt, lead to exactly the same practical conclusion, the argument of economy is sometimes set up against the argument of equity. The concise reply to such a mode of proceeding is this: 'If equity have any existence at all, its rules are necessarily *imperative*.' Deny the *imperative* nature of equity, and you obliterate all morals. It is true, however, that the argument of economy has a far more powerful influence on the world than the argument of equity. Men are not satisfied with the logical determination of right and wrong; they must have a picture as well as a specification; they must have the evils portrayed in all their malignity before they resolutely determine to amend them.'—*Theory of Progression*, pp. 234-237.

*Prevalent fallacy as to the nature and end of political economy.*—'We now turn to the mode in which political economy is usually presented. *Utility* is, no doubt, the object of investigation; but what is its *measure*, what is its criterion, what are the marks by which we may know an action to be beneficial or prejudicial? According to some writers, we should imagine that utility was measured according to the *wealth produced*. *Value, labour, capital, wages, profit, rent, &c.*, are the substantives of their science; and the *production of wealth* appears to be the end, the sum and substance, the object of their desires. We deny, from beginning to end, this view of political economy. It has some truth in it—the beginnings of truth; but such, in general, is no more the end of political economy, than the determination of the chances in gambling was the end of the calculation of probabilities. We assert—and we have no doubt whatever that this view will ultimately obtain the suffrages of all—that the welfare of *man* is the end of political

economy. To this it may be replied, that the production of wealth is the *means*; and that all economists intend to include the welfare of man as a matter of course. We deny the whole theory from beginning to end. We assert that *the production of man*, and man in a continually higher condition, is the object, the end, the ultimatum of the science. Let us suppose that one thousand families were employed in the cultivation of one hundred thousand acres of land; that they lived, maintained themselves in decent plenty, reared their families in health, industry, honesty, and those manly qualities which, among the agricultural population of Great Britain, have assumed a higher character than in any other portion of the earth's inhabitants. Suppose that this population produce only as much as suffices for the plentiful support of all the individuals. Good. There is not, on the average of twenty years, any superabundance that can be called accumulated profit. This population, according to some political economists, would be a most unproductive, most useless portion of society. We deny the fact. The population has reared and produced *men*. Suppose, again, the great body of this population should be set to spin cotton, smelt iron, grind cutlery, and weave stockings. That at these occupations, by incessant toil, they should *produce* not only as much as will support them, but one-half more. According to political economists, these occupations would be incomparably more *profitable* than the agricultural occupations, and consequently much better for society. We deny the fact, and scout the inference. The production of *man*, and of man in his best condition, is the physical ultimatum of the earth; and any system whatever that sacrifices the workman to the work—the man who produces the wealth to the wealth produced—is a monstrous system of misdirected intention, based on a blasphemy against man's spiritual nature. \* \* The fallacy is, in taking *the rents of the landlords*, and *the profits of the capitalists*, as the measures of good and evil, instead of taking *the condition of the cultivators*, and *the condition of the labourers*, (the many) as the sure index of the character of a system. \* \* The *distribution of wealth* is a question of incomparably more importance than even its *production*. \* \* Political economy may have a restricted or an extended signification. It may mean an exposition of the laws according to which man creates or produces wealth. In this sense, it is the science of *value*. Or it may mean an exposition of the laws which regulate social welfare, including the *distribution of wealth*, the public health, the public education, &c. In this sense it is the science of *social utility*, of which the production of wealth is only the first and simplest embranchment. The economists of England have strenuously adhered to the first meaning; but their place must soon be taken by men of a different stamp, who take a wider range of investigation.'—*Ibid.* pp. 238-253.

*Limitations of the Science of Politics.*—'Where *interference* is not concerned, there is no question in politics. This, then, is the *anterior limitation of the science*,—that where there is no interference between man and man, there is no question of politics. We have, then, to

determine the *posterior* boundary—that which separates it from any science that might lie beyond it. This posterior limit is likely—from the prevalence of socialist and communist doctrines—to become the great desideratum of political theory. Those doctrines, whatever may be the contempt heaped on them in England, are far more generally diffused than most Englishmen are aware of. They are now revolutionizing Europe; and no one can predict the extent of the changes that must follow them, if once they gain the complete mastery of the public mind. Instead of railing at them, however, it is much more profitable to endeavour to understand them, and to seize the fallacy on which they are based. These doctrines contain a profound truth; and, more than this, they are the convulsive cries of man's spiritual nature, seeking after a better and a holier world than is found in the present condition of society. It is *true* that men are brethren, the children of one Father; it is *true* that universal benevolence is a virtue; it is *true* that man ought not to seek his own advantage at the expense of his fellow; it is *true* that in the present system of society there are stupendous abuses, which cannot be justified. \* \* But political relations are *not* relations of fraternity. Love, charity, benevolence, and generosity, have nothing whatever to do with politics. These substantives, and the principles of action to which they give rise, lie beyond the region of politics. \* \* Political relations, so far from being relations of fraternity, or of love, or of any of those sentiments that teach us to bear or to forbear, or to give or to forgive, are relations of equity. They are relations of *justice*, which *gives* nothing, and *forgives* nothing. They are *jural* relations, and political society is a jural society. \* \* Benevolence can regulate nothing, and enforce nothing. First let me know what is *mine*, and then inculcate the duties and the pleasures of benevolence. But if *nothing* is mine, then there is not only no *justice*, but no *possibility of benevolence*. \* \* Love, benevolence, charity, fraternity, therefore, cannot enter a system of politics. No human society could be founded on them that attempts to regulate the distribution of natural property, and the allocation of that increased value which is created by the labour of individuals. Love may, to a certain extent, reign in a family; but in a state composed of a multitude of independent (although social) individuals, each producing according to his skill, energy, perseverance, and accidental opportunities, *justice* must be the regulative principle, without which the society falls either under the hand of tyranny, or falls into the equally destructive condition of anarchy and confusion. We posit, therefore, that political society is a society whose essence, end, and intention, is to exhibit, in realization, the principles of equity or justice. \* \* Although, however, benevolence has nothing to do with *politics*, it has much to do with *man*. And as it *does* lie beyond politics, its laws, whatever they are, or wherever they may be derived from, will fall to be considered at some period or other. Towards them the world is progressing, and *after* a reign of justice, there will fall, in necessary order, a reign of benevolence. This is logically

necessary. *When such a happy period may come, or whether it may come in this world, is another question.*—*Ibid.* pp. 253-262.

Now, while we admire very much the ability displayed by the author in these extracts, and in the exposition of which they form a part, and while we think many of the suggestions he there offers extremely valuable, we are obliged to differ from him very considerably as regards his nomenclature of the various man-sciences, and also to charge him with some deficiency and confusion in his views of them.

In the first place, we do not think that he has sufficiently attended to the fact, that the phenomena of human nature, which constitute the object-matter of man-science, may be studied scientifically either in the *individual human being*, or in *society*. Using the term man in its general sense, as meaning humanity in the abstract, he does not seem to reflect that, even were there but one man in the world, there might be a science of human nature, i. e. a psychology, or mental history of the individual, involving a theory of industrial progress, a theory of personal ethics, and a theory of general education, or development of the powers of the individual to their highest and best issue. Nor is this an unimportant omission. The very essence of the conception of a social science—a science of politics—is, that it is a science of the phenomena of *associated individuals*. The knowledge of individual human nature is presupposed, and the very question, the putting of which constitutes the social science an independent science, is—what new phenomena of human nature will the fact of the *combination* of men in society elicit? True, individual human nature can only be studied *in* society, so that the conditions of sociability are present even in that investigation; logically, however, the two investigations are distinguishable, and psychology, or the science of the individual mind, ought to precede the science of society, and endow it with its necessary body of initial propositions. M. Comte, indeed, in whose philosophical scheme the phenomena of mind are recognised only as phenomena of cerebral action, very naturally makes the social science follow animal physiology. In our author's case, however, even allowing for what is necessarily included in his admission of a prior metaphysic and logic, this sudden leap from the study of the animal organism of the individual man to the study of humanity in the aggregate, does not seem so legitimate. At all events, even if he could justify such a transition on logical grounds, by showing that he had previously provided in his series of the sciences for the comprehension of all that can be known of individual mind, he ought still, in clearness, to have noticed the important distinction between the individual and society, and to



have pressed upon his readers that most essential notion in the general conception of the social science—that it is the science of the actions and passions of men *in a state of combination*.

Farther, however: while we complain of the omission of this most essential notion, we would take exception also to the manner in which our author has divided the social science into branches. First, as regards *political economy*:—his definitions of this science appear to us both too large, and at the same time inconsistent with each other. This science, according to him, is the science of social utility; that is, it is the science which pronounces regarding any human action or arrangement, whether it is socially expedient, leaving the question of its equity or moral rightness entirely out of account. It is the science, he also says, of the reflex effects of human action in society, where there is no question of interference between man and man. It is the science, he again says, 'of the laws which regulate social welfare, including the distribution of wealth, the public health, the public education, &c.' Now, how can the first and third of these definitions be made identical with the second? How can public education, for example, form a topic under a science which treats only of the reflex effects of human action, where there is no question of interference? Has not the author, in putting forth these broad definitions of political economy, forgotten his own logical principle, of postponing the more complex to the more simple? How did he obtain his definition? Was it not by ideally discriminating three, or we may say four, classes of human functions, rising one above another in the order of complexity—namely, the actions of man upon the non-human world; his actions on his fellow-men, indirectly or reflexly through these; his actions directly on his fellow-men; and his actions towards the Deity? Political economy, then, according to this classification, is nothing more than the science of the indirect action of man on his fellows, through his action on the non-human world. But is this coincident with the whole science of social utility? Are there not hundreds of actions not included in this merely reflex action of man on man, through his action on matter, and yet capable of being tried on the point of social utility? Does not our author himself recognise this when he states, and that justly, that the slave-trade and the game-laws may be treated as questions of political economy? Again, may not such actions as prayer, worship, missionary preaching, and the like, which are unquestionably actions of man in his attitude towards the Deity, be also considered in their relations to social utility? True, our author may bring even such actions within the scope of his definition, by first noting that they affect man's power to act on

the non-human world, and then that, by a double reflexion back from this non-human world, they affect the condition of other men. Thus even the question whether a man ought to be allowed to spend any of his time in prayer, might be tried by the political economists; and, in fact, all human actions whatsoever might, as we hold they might, be discussed under political economy. But, in that case, what is the use of that elaborate classification of the various sorts of human relations by which our author professes to have reached the right notion of political economy; or, granting that the classification is useful, ought not our author to have so arranged political economy in his series of the sciences, as to show that it deals, not with the actions peculiar to any one of these relations, but with the actions of all the relations, considered in a peculiar point of view? It appears to us, in short, that the author, in defining political economy to be a science arising out of the relations of man to the non-human world, has really grasped a very good conception, which he has spoiled by not postponing it till he had fully completed his notion of man, by the specification of his other relations. First, let the notion of what man is be completely built up by the recognition of his moral relations to other men, and his religious relations to the Deity; and then, when man so conceived is brought into ideal contact with the physical world whence he is to draw his sustenance, a science may very well be imagined, that shall treat of the reflex effects upon society of man's action on this physical world, and this science may very well be named political economy. The problem of such a science would evidently be, How may men arrange their modes of operating upon the world of matter so as to produce the maximum of good social effect: in other words, what are the laws of efficient industrial co-operation? And this would bring us very nearly to the definition of political economy current among the best writers. Political economy, according to them, is the science of those phenomena of society which arise in the pursuit of wealth. Taking *wealth*—i. e. the possession of the means of physical well-being for a community—as the end to be attained, it inquires into the actual social methods whereby men do try to attain this end, and it aims at determining the exact social methods whereby they may attain it. In this sense, we believe it is best to confine political economy to the question of the *production* of national wealth, leaving out the question of the *distribution* of that wealth, *except in so far as this distribution is essential to new production*. Let us illustrate this point. Every community, or aggregate of human beings bound together by circumstances, whether a family, a colony, or a nation, may be considered, in one of its aspects, as a

mechanism for the production of wealth. Now, it is clear that a community may be so organized as to be either a good or a bad mechanism for this purpose. The subdivision of labour may be such, that the community does not make half as much as it might, or it may be such as to secure the maximum of possible gain. There may very well be a science, therefore, devoted to the study of society as a mechanism for the production of gain, and invested with the right of criticising every human action or arrangement whatever, in so far as it affects this end. Thus, it may be made a question, whether the existence of a slave-caste in a community is or is not more conducive to the gain of the community, as such, than the absence of such a caste—all question of right or wrong in the matter being omitted. Again, it may be made a question whether an absolute or a representative government is the more fitted to lead a community to the attainment of riches. Or, it may be made a question whether the observance of every seventh day as a day of rest is a beneficial institution, considered in its effects on the labouring power of the community. The education of the members of the community may also fall under the same head, and it may be inquired what amount, what kind, and what distribution of education are the best for the community, considered as a society of workers. So, also, the distribution of the wealth of the community, when attained; the partition of the profits, as it were, among the members; the relative degrees of comfort which different portions of the community should enjoy—whether some should retain the bulk of the wealth and wallow in luxury, and others should be kept at hard and unrelenting toil on coarse food;—all these may be made questions of expediency or in expediency, as regards the attainment of farther wealth. In short, political economy is the science of gainful occupation, and nothing more; it may discuss any kind of social arrangement whatever, but it can discuss it only in so far as it subserves or impedes the attainment of wealth; and hence its conclusions are not necessarily binding on the statesman, though he ought to know them among other things. It is the business of political economy to decide how a community may be organized so as to produce most wealth—most of the *means* of enjoyment: what *becomes* of the wealth, and whether, after all, there is enjoyment in the community, it does not care, except in so far as the mode of appropriating the wealth, and the mode of distributing the enjoyment, may affect the faculty of creating new wealth—new means of enjoyment. ‘I will tell you how, as a man, a family, a colony, or a community, you may attain the greatest amount of wealth; whether and how far this ought to be an end of your being, and what you should do with the wealth

‘when you get it, are questions with which I have nothing to do. —Yes, I have this to do with them, that, as it is my business to keep the wealth-producing mechanism in good working condition, I may find you so intent on producing wealth as to overreach yourself through sheer fatigue, or distributing your wealth so badly as to impair your capacity for acquiring more.’ Such is the language of political economy, as we understand it. And though this view of the science may detract from its nobility, it at least secures for it a clearly-defined province, which our author’s view does not.

We have a still stronger objection to the author’s definition of *politics*, or the *political science proper*. Politics he defines to be ‘the science of social equity,’ or the science whose problem it is ‘to discover the laws (principles of reason) which ought to pre- side over human actions in the matter of interference.’ ‘The science,’ he again says, ‘is confined exclusively to the exhibition of the laws relating to such interference, as is consequent on a departure from the state of non-interference, and to the exhibition of the laws (intuitions of the reason) which prohibit all primary interference.’ Now, distinctly recognising, as we do, the possibility of a science answering to this delineation, we think it quite against all analogy to call such a science by the name of *politics*. We would rather call it by some such name as the science of natural law, the science of jurisprudence, or (to keep the author’s own phrase) the science of political equity. But while we recognise such a science, we cannot see how the author can give it the place he does in his classified series of the sciences. For precisely at this point in the series, there would then be a change in the conception of the nature of what is affirmed to be a science. All the previous sciences of the series are sciences of fact, of experience—they belong to the category of *quid est?* but this so-called science of politics is, according to the author’s definition of it, a science of duty, of moral intuition—it belongs to the category of *quid oportet?* The aim of all the previous sciences is to ascertain what *is*; the aim of this science is to ascertain what *ought to be*. But this very circumstance, it appears to us, renders it impossible to give such a science the place which our author gives it in his arrangement, without contradicting the principle on which the arrangement professes to be founded. For what is that principle? That each science shall stand in that kind of logical relationship to its predecessor, which consists in a rise of complexity and speciality as compared with that predecessor, and in the necessity of presupposing all the conclusions of that predecessor in order to its own evolution. But does politics, as defined by the author, stand in this relation to

political economy as defined by him? Is the science of what ought to be, only a more complex science than the science of what is? or does the author believe that a science of equity is capable of being evolved from the science of utility, by merely moving forward a new step in the scientific elaboration? Utilitarians, indeed, may believe this, seeing that duty with them means nothing more than generalized and proclaimed utility; and hence they might make a science of politics consequent, as our author does, on a science of political economy, or rather, understanding political economy in the wide sense attached to it by our author, they might identify the two sciences. The views of Comte, too, are such as to enable him to regard the science of law or social equity, as a mere science of the *quid est*?—a mere science of generalized fact; and hence he would be quite consistent in considering this science fully provided for in his general arrangement of the positive sciences in the order of their complexity. But how our author, acknowledging as he does the *a priori* character of moral obligation, and its total independence of the question of utility, can still consistently offer us a science of equity as the necessary logical consequent on a science of utility, we cannot at all see. In short, here again we recognise a confusion arising from the attempt to overtake man, as it were, gradually and piecemeal, by a succession of sciences, stretching from the non-human into the human world, instead of making man-science proper begin only at that point where man, fully constituted, and equipped with all his faculties and *a priori* intentions, enters into immediate dealings with the rest of the universe. If this is done—if, on stepping from the field of physical into that of moral research, man be assumed at once as wholly given (all previous questions regarding his abstract or necessary duty having been discussed somewhere else), then the continuity of the scientific series will be preserved, and there will be free scope for a man-science perfectly within the category of the *quid est*? and whose aim it shall be to ascertain how man so constituted will act in a world so constituted, and what will result if he tries to act in such and such a manner. And here there is room for what we regard as most properly entitled to be called a science of politics; namely, *the science of the means whereby man in society may attain his ends, whatever these may be*. In other words, we regard politics as the large science of which political economy is a department. It is not, according to our definition, the science of the *socially equitable*, which is a science of the *quid oportet*? it is a science of the *socially possible*, which is a science of the *quid est*? Man, a being peculiarly constituted, placed in a world peculiarly constituted, and placed there in a

state of social combination, there may very well be a science whose object it shall be to determine what things can possibly be accomplished so long as the two remain together, and to prescribe means for accomplishing any one thing which it may be thought desirable to accomplish. Politics, in short, would be to society what a practical psychology and physiology would be to the individual. It is desired to bring about some special result with regard to an individual—say, to give him a thorough knowledge of Latin, to cure him of some besetting vice, or to drive him to distraction by a series of insults; in this case, it belongs to theoretical psychology and physiology to pronounce how far the result is attainable at all, and to practical psychology and physiology to point out the means whereby it may be attained—any question of the propriety of desiring such a result being a question for quite a separate consideration. So, also, if it is desired to bring about a certain result with regard to a community—say, to cultivate in it a love of the fine arts, to cure it of a practice of rick-burning, or to goad it on to rebellion; in this case, it belongs to the science of theoretical politics to pronounce how far the result is possible in the circumstances, and to practical politics to prescribe the means whereby it may be achieved; while any discussion regarding the morality of the end in view must be gone through in an investigation apart. Politics, therefore, it appears to us, is rightly enough defined as the science of government—the science of legislation—the science of the conduct of states. For though our author justly ridicules the notion of government, as implying the power of men to dictate absolutely how social life shall go on, and the notion of legislation, as implying that men are the creators of the *laws* by which society is ruled; yet that men can perform a function in society which may be legitimately called *governing*, and that men, by instituting what they call *laws*, that is, certain new arrangements conceived so as to embody an express purpose, can modify, and to a certain extent direct, the course of human affairs according to their volition, is just as true as that men can educate the individual human being, and produce effects on the individual mind which would not be produced unless they intended and attempted them. Politics, then, is, we repeat, the science of the means whereby the human will may accomplish any possible social end. True, he is not a worthy statesman or politician, who, whatever his knowledge of the means whereby social results may be produced, does not at the same time desire only to produce such results as are beneficial and noble—does not aim at governing equitably and justly; the science of what is just, however, of what social ends are beneficial and noble, is distinct from the inductive science of

politics, being a science of the *quid oportet*? In order to be scientifically precise, and not to confuse different provinces, it is best to understand by political science, not the science which defines the just, but the science which, the just being defined, shows how it may be attained, and how society may be carried on consistently with it. To give political science any other meaning, would be needlessly to contradict usage in behalf of a personal predilection, which may be gratified quite as well in a less violent manner.

To recapitulate:—That science which aims generally at the knowledge of the laws by which human affairs in society proceed—at the knowledge of the manner in which men have gone on, and always will go on in this world—at the knowledge of the coincidences and sequences observable among social phenomena, we name the *social science*, *social physics*, *sociology*, or the *science of history*; that science which (the theoretical being here only changed for the practical point of view) teaches how men may accomplish their ends in society, or, in other words, what social antecedents are necessary to produce desired social consequents, we name *politics*, or the *political science*; and that branch of politics which teaches how men in society may co-operate, so as best to accomplish the particular and exclusive end of producing social wealth, we name *political economy*. This, we believe, is the best system of nomenclature; and it leaves free space to the science of *equity* or *political justice* to erect itself in the neighbourhood.

Although we thus dissent, however, from the manner in which our author propounds his view of a possible science of humanity, as necessarily about to be developed in the general progress of human knowledge from the simple towards the complex, and as necessarily destined to produce great changes in the conduct and condition of men, we do not hesitate to go along with him, in the main, in his specification of that particular doctrine of the man-science, from which, seeing it to be now in the process of evolution, we may most surely predict coming social changes, and indicate their nature. The idea with which society is everywhere now wrestling, the idea upon which, more conspicuously than upon any other, men are exercising their strength, vaguely and almost unconsciously striving to subdue it into scientific shape, is, says our author, the idea of *justice*. The character of that epoch upon which, by virtue of our advance in the series of sciences as far as the science of humanity, we may assume that we are now entering, is, that it is to be a reign or millennium of justice. The idea of justice is that which is about to be mastered by the human intellect, which is about to be added as a new

ingredient to the mass of scientific credence, and which is about to work with revolutionary effect upon the conduct and mutual relations of men. When that idea has been fully mastered by the human race and exhausted of all its power to change and mould society, the race will next march on to the conquest of the theological idea of accountability or benevolence. Justice, however—justice, is the watch-cry of the hour; and till society shall have been organized according to justice, benevolence can plant nothing, can adorn nothing, and has, speaking scientifically, no right to act at all. What, then, is justice? Our author answers as follows:—

‘If politics be the science of justice, and justice does not admit the idea of benevolence, that idea being necessarily posterior to justice, what is the radical distinction between justice and benevolence, and where is the line of demarcation that separates them? The line of demarcation is found in the distinction between the *negative* and the *positive*. All the rules of justice are radically negative or restrictive, and present themselves in the form ‘Thou shalt *not* do.’ All the rules of benevolence are positive or expansive, and present themselves under the form, ‘Thou shalt do, or thou oughtest to do.’ \* \* *If all men were socially passive, and did not in anywise interfere with each other, there would be the perfection of justice, while there might be the total absence of benevolence. No rule of justice can ever originate an interference. All interference based on justice, is consequential; that is, the consequence of a prior act of interference, which requires to be corrected. All primary interference, contrary to the will of the person interfered with (he being of sound mind, sober, &c.), is an injustice; and though injustice is usually made to imply also some matter of detriment, pain, or loss, yet this detriment is not its essential character.*’ The essential character of injustice consists in the forcible interference of one man with another; nor is any man justified in constraining another to receive even a benefit *against his will*. \* \* The whole scheme of justice, therefore, is essentially and radically restrictive, and all its *positive* rules, or rules which justify command or interference, will be found to consist of those *which justify the restoration of things to that condition in which they would have been, had there been no interference.* That is, whenever the negative state of non-interference has been departed from, and the equilibrium of equity destroyed, justice furnishes rules for *positive* interference, whereby the negative state may be restored, and the equilibrium of equity re-established. But this in nowise affects the assertion that the principles of justice and the scheme of the science are entirely *restrictive*; because, let all society be in the negative state of non-interference, and it would remain so for ever were the rules of justice attended to.’—*Theory of Progression*, pp. 263-265.

This, then, is the fundamental idea of what the author chooses to call the science of politics—i. e. the science of social equity,



and the full recognition of which by men is to be the constituting cause of a reign of justice on earth—to wit, that justice consists in the absolute, non-interference of man with man, except for the purpose of remedying prior interference—i.e. crime; in other words, *that every man has a right, so far as society is concerned, to act as he pleases, so long as he does not interfere with the equal liberty of all other men to act as they please.* Such, according to our author, is the cardinal notion of that science, at the threshold of which the world has just arrived,—the science whose problem it is ‘to discover the laws (principles of reason) which ought to preside over human actions in the matter of interference.’ And it is in accordance with this, he thinks, that it can be empirically shown by a reference to history, that there has been a gradual evolution of this doctrine by the instinctive reason of the race from the beginning, and a gradual advance in the work of making the social procedure conform to it. Thus—

‘We maintain that the continual progress of mankind is towards *equality in the eye of the law*, and that, as men were once at the utmost extreme of inequality, they have been gradually and surely decreasing that inequality; and, consequently, that we have the evidence of past history to give us the line of progress, and the evidence of reason that, if the line continue, it must terminate in the total abolition of privilege and the establishment of absolute equality.’—*Theory of Progression*, p. 368.

‘No truth appears to be more satisfactorily and more generally borne out by the history of modern Europe than that the progression of men in the matter of liberty ‘is from a diversity of privileges towards an equality of rights;’ that is, that the past progress has been all in this direction since the maximum of diversity prevailed in the aspect of individual lord and individual serf. And, if this be the case, it cannot be an unreasonable conclusion, that, if sufficient time be allowed for the evolution, the progress of change will continue to go on till some *ultimate condition* is evolved; and that ultimate condition can only be at the point where diversity of privilege disappears, and every individual in the state is legally entitled to identically the same political functions. Diversities of *office* there may be, and there must be, but diversity of rights there cannot be without injustice.’—*Ibid.* pp. 415, 416.

Our author is by no means the first that has broached this doctrine. It may be regarded as essentially involved in the ordinary theory of the tendency of society towards democracy. And those who are acquainted with the publications of Proudhon will remember that this extraordinary writer has, in his ‘*De la Propriété*’ and elsewhere, laid down and illustrated a proposition all but identical with that of our author—namely, that it is to the assertion of the principle of justice that we are to look for the greatest of

coming social changes; that the essence of this principle consists in the recognition by every man of the equal personality of all other men; and that the whole progress of the world has been but an evolution of this doctrine of equal social rights. In another book, too, published in England since that of our author, and which has attracted, we believe, a larger share of notice—the ‘Social Statics’ of Mr. Herbert Spencer—there is an elaborate argument to the same effect; indeed, the whole book consists of that argument. The coincidence of view in many respects between the latter part of the ‘Theory of Progression’ and the whole of the ‘Social Statics’ is so striking, that it is impossible to avoid naming the one work in connexion with the other. Mr. Spencer’s manner of writing is the more clear, direct, and interesting; and, both from this fact and from the more tangible character of his aim, we should argue that his book, though really severe and philosophical, will be the more popular of the two. Our impression is, however, that those who will have patience with the more clumsy form and the more abstruse method of the anonymous work, will find the more profound things in it. Mr. Spencer’s metaphysical views are those of a more common school, and do not give him, to our mind, so large and generous a grasp as his rival, by *his* metaphysics, maintains throughout, of the whole subject of human nature. But both are remarkable works; and it is a circumstance of some importance that two writers, differing so much in their general intellectual style, should be found agreeing in certain conclusions bearing with almost revolutionary effect on the present constitution of society; these conclusions, moreover, being already in circulation in such writings as those of Proudhon.

Mr. Spencer’s aim is to establish some one fundamental law or axiom of social equity, by which the legitimacy or illegitimacy of all human institutions and arrangements may be tried. Such an axiom he finds in the principle of the absolute equality of the rights and liberties of human beings in a social state. He thus announces the principle:—

‘Whether we reason our way from those fixed conditions under which only the divine idea—greatest happiness—can be realized; whether we draw our inferences from man’s constitution, considering him as a congeries of faculties; or whether we listen to the monitions of a certain mental agency, which seems to have the function of guiding us in this matter,—we are alike taught as the law of social relationships, that *every man has freedom to do all that he wills, provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any other man.* Though further qualifications of the liberty of action thus asserted may be necessary, yet we have seen that in the just regulation of a community no further

qualifications of it can be recognised. Such further qualifications must ever remain for private and individual application. We must, therefore, adopt this law of equal freedom in its entirety, as the law on which a correct system of equity is to be based.'—*Social Statics*, p. 103.

The principle here laid down is, it will be observed, exactly that principle of social justice which the author of 'The Theory of Progression' affirms to be the cardinal principle of the political science proper. That, in social equity, no human being has a right to interfere with any other human being; and that the whole problem of politics proper consists, first, in the establishment of this law by reason, and then, secondarily, in the discovery of the rational means of remedying infractions of it, so long as it has not been reduced to full recognition in the universal practice of men—i.e. the rational means of interfering to make good infractions of the law of non-interference:—such is the proposition of the anonymous author. That, in social equity, every human being has a right to do as he pleases, so long as he does not, by so doing, traverse the right of any other human being to do the same; and that the whole function of government, so long as there shall be institutions for government at all, consists in nothing more than the duty, by laws, courts of justice, and the like, of remedying all those mutual collisions and tyrannies of men which do, and ever will take place, so long as society has not attained its perfect state:—such is the proposition of Mr. Spencer. In both authors, therefore, social crime is represented as consisting in nothing more than infractions, whether by individuals or by society at large, of the law of equal social rights. Both authors, too, while distinctly affirming the law of equality as the sole rule of the body-politic, as such, yet, at the same time, provide for the possible existence among men, as such, of a higher or more transcendental rule of moral action than that involved in this mere principle of political equity. Thus Mr. Spencer, while he will not allow that society, as such, has any right to qualify in the least, the law of equal liberty, admits, though in a somewhat dubious manner, that there may be principles of morality binding on the individual conscience as such, inducing men voluntarily, and each for himself, to limit his own social liberties. For example, he admits that though it may be socially lawful for a man to get privately drunk, it may be morally wrong in him to use this privilege. He points out, moreover, that, as men, without really trenching on the spheres of activity of their neighbours, may yet inflict pain on them through the feelings, a law might arise, voluntarily imposed by the individual on himself, so as to prevent such accidents—

which law might be called the law of *negative beneficence*; and that, again, as men, while filling their own spheres of activity, may act so as positively to increase the happiness of their neighbours, there may, in this way, arise another law, also imposed by the individual on himself—which law might be called the law of *positive beneficence*. And the author of ‘The Theory of Progression,’ as we have seen, provides for the same thing still more largely, emphatically, and philosophically, by recognising what he calls a reign of benevolence, as lying, for the human race, beyond the mere reign of justice, and attainable through it. It is essentially and logically involved, he holds, in the true theory of scientific progression, that after men shall have intellectually excogitated all that is right in mere political principle, and begun to square their actions by the same, then they will begin to excogitate (so far as the thing is scientific) all that is right in theological or religious principle, and learn to square their actions by that too. And, lastly, foreseeing in the extreme theoretic vista a limit where the scientific intellect of the race will have brought itself exactly to that point where, so far as natural means are concerned, it would have to stop or go back for want of matter, he holds forth the prospect that exactly there will it begin, in a powerful way, to attack the matter supernaturally given in the Christian Revelation, so as to reduce that, too, into the social framework, and mould society to its last finish.

Now, acknowledging much excellent speculation, and not a little that is capable of useful practical application in all this, we confess that we cannot go along with it. Our sentimental preference, in comparing the manner in which the two authors supplement their common theory, so as to anticipate objections, would certainly be for the views of the anonymous author, which, in their totality, seem to us to be far more large and generous—to have less of the character of incurable meagreness attaching to them, than those of Mr. Spencer. But, rationally, we cannot conceive the thing in his way. We have already pointed out what we consider a radical flaw in his conception of the nature of the political science. We now object to his fundamental proposition in that science, allowing him his own definition of it. We cannot agree with him that, considering politics to be strictly the theory of social equity or justice, then the first principle of politics is simply this negative one—that it is wrong for any human being to interfere with another, except to make good some prior interference of which that other human being has been guilty. We cannot agree with Mr. Spencer when, in words meaning the same thing, he affirms it to be the sole law of social ethics, that every man shall have a right to do as he pleases, so

long as he does not infringe on the equal right of all other men to do as they please. The absoluteness of this as a metaphysical axiom, or *a priori* law of human nature, (in which form both authors affirm it,) does not seem to us at all clear. It does not recommend itself to our reason as either so indisputable or so demonstrable a truth, that every man has a right, so far as other men are concerned, to do as he pleases, provided he does not come into collision with the same right on their part. We have an impression even to the contrary effect. We have a strong feeling, for example, as if there might not only be nothing wrong, but even something capably right, in an act—should ever society be in the true disposition for it—which should kidnap all the private drunkards in a community, and curtail them of at least that portion of their social liberties which had been proved invariably to end in their getting drunk. We have an impression also, for example, that the economists have at least plausibility on their side, when they maintain that, in an already over-peopled country or district, there might legitimately be vested in the community at large some power of interfering—should interference be necessary—in the spontaneous tendencies of the grown-up boys and girls to marry as soon as they could. We do not adduce these instances by way either of argument, or of suggestion of what is practicable or expedient; but only to intimate the general sense that we have, that the doctrine of absolutely equal social rights is not so evidently tenable. And there are various passages in our anonymous author—as where he hints at the possible necessity of social interference with individual liberties on the score of *decency*—which show that he, too, feels this.

The essence of the difference we feel from our authors on this point seems to be, that whereas they view the problem of the equitable constitution of society as the mere problem of securing to each of the associated individuals exactly as much liberty to do right or wrong at his pleasure as is consistent with the equal liberty of all the others to do right or wrong at their pleasure; we, on the other hand, are disposed to view the problem of the social life as a problem of high separate account, the adequate solution of which has this fine condition annexed to it, that it necessarily imposes restrictions on the individual liberty of wrongdoing, additional to those arising from the circumstance, that there are so many claimants of this liberty all living together. In other words, we do not regard the law of the right constitution of society as identical with the law of the greatest possible individual freedom to do right or wrong; but we regard this law of the greatest individual freedom to do right or wrong, as farther conditioned for the individual by the obligation on society, as

such, to do right. Hence, were we to venture on any metaphysical definition of the principle of the rights of men in society, it would be, not that all men should have equal liberty to do right or wrong, but that *all men should have equal liberty to do what is in itself right*. This is no mere quibble. It leaves ample scope for still farther extensions in the world of the principle of social liberty; for many laws, many customs, many institutions still exist, which restrict the liberty of some classes to do things undeniably right, as compared with the liberty of others to do the same things. And though it adjourns and complicates almost indefinitely, and renders vastly more dubious and difficult the problem of the equitable constitution of society, seeing that it leaves the great question, ‘What *is* right?’ to be still determined, it at the same time adds nobility and glory to that problem. It provides—and legitimately provides—for the eternal continuance in society of a kind of agency, which it is in the nature more especially of Mr. Spencer’s interpretation of the theory to sneer at—the agency of personal domination, of the compulsion of better and greater and more venerable over worse and weaker and younger men. It detains within the body-politic, as such, the high sense of celestial origin and obligation, instead of squandering that sense entirely away among the individual atoms which compose the body politic. It keeps before the mind the great truth—as we consider it—that society, as such, has a life, a destiny, a law; that society, as such, is the evolution of a divine idea; and that, as before the individual mind there is held up an imperative rule, a pattern, an aspiration, by the contemplation of which it may mould itself to its right type according to reason, so for society, as such, there exists also a prescribed term, to be conscious of which, and to shape and combine, and even thwart its component parts by the power of such consciousness, constitutes all that is noble in social existence.

Criticising our two authors with this improved form, as we deem it, of the doctrine of equal rights in our hands, we should have to weed largely among their supposed practical applications of it. With the applications of it, indeed, proposed by the author of the ‘Theory of Progression,’ we should probably find the less occasion to quarrel, that his more profound metaphysics, and his higher grasp of moral and spiritual considerations, seem to have prevented him from carrying it out to the full extent to which it might, perhaps, according to the strict letter of his definition, logically lead. The total abolition of slavery, the extension of political power to large classes of the community now debarred from it, the more general diffusion of the means of comfort among the bulk of the population, and the repeal or modification

of many unjust laws, as, for example, the game-laws, which oppose this result—such are the chief applications of the equalization-principle on which this author insists; and in much that he says, and says very eloquently, on these points, it would be hard to differ from him. It is otherwise, however, with Mr. Spencer. He, too, exhibits, and exhibits with remarkable force and clearness, many social equalizations, of a just and right species, which remain yet to be effected. We refer with peculiar pleasure to some of the remarks contained in his chapter on the present social position of women. But as his conception of his main doctrine co-exists with what we must call a narrower appreciation of the general fact and difficult grandeur of things as a whole, so his application of it is more persistent and thorough-going. The total emancipation of children from parental control; the ultimate evanescence from society of all forms of government; and the right, in the meantime, of any human being to dissociate himself from the state, and ignore all its proceedings—such are some of the conclusions to which he is bold enough to push his principle. To these and other conclusions, justly condemned, as we believe, by the shock they give to the instructive sense of mankind, it would be in the power, we also believe, of some such scientific argument as we have offered, to administer the appropriate corrective. True, all applications of a new principle necessarily shock at first, so that this may be a small matter; but false novelty may shock as well as true novelty, and the shock prohibitory may be discriminated by sure tests from the mere shock reluctant.

There is one important application of the principle of equal rights in which both writers agree. Both refusing to go to the same length as Proudhon, who denies, as every one knows, the right to private property at all—they both agree in denying the right to private property in land. They treat on this subject at length: we can but illustrate their reasonings on it by an extract from each. Mr. Spencer writes as follows:—

‘Equity does not permit property in land. For if *one* portion of the earth’s surface may justly become the possession of an individual, and may be held by him for his sole use and benefit, as a thing to which he has an exclusive right, then *other* portions of the earth’s surface may be so held; and eventually the *whole* of the earth’s surface may be so held, and our planet may thus lapse altogether into private hands. Observe, now, the dilemma to which this leads. Supposing the entire habitable globe to be so enclosed, it follows that if the landowners have a valid right to its surface, all who are not landowners have no right at all to its surface. Hence, such can exist on the earth by sufferance only. They are all trespassers. Save by the permis-

sion of the lords of the soil, they can have no room for the soles of their feet. Nay, should the others think fit to deny them a resting-place, these landless men might equitably be expelled from the earth altogether. If, then, the assumption that land can be held as property, involves that the whole globe may become the private domain of a part of its inhabitants; and if, by consequence, the rest of its inhabitants can then exercise their faculties—can then exist even—only by consent of the land-owners, it is manifest that an exclusive possession of the soil necessitates an infringement of the law of equal freedom. For men who cannot ‘live, and move, and have their being,’ without the leave of others, cannot be equally free with those others. \* \* \* The change required would simply be a change of landlords. Separate ownerships would merge into the joint-stock ownership of the public. Instead of being in the possession of individuals, the country would be held by the great corporate body—Society. \* \* \* No doubt great difficulties must attend the resumption, by mankind at large, of their rights to the soil. The question of compensation to existing proprietors is a complicated one—one that, perhaps, cannot be settled in a strictly equitable manner. But with this perplexity, and our extrication from it, abstract morality has no concern. It may by-and-by be perceived, that equity utters dictates to which we have not yet listened; and men may then learn that to deprive others of their rights to the use of the earth, is to commit a crime inferior only in wickedness to the crime of taking away their lives or personal liberties.’—*Social Statics*, pp. 114-125.

To precisely the same effect, and expressed with even more of scientific generality, are the views of the author of ‘*The Theory of Human Progression*.’

‘Nothing can be more absurd than to suppose that a past generation can make arrangements to deprive the present generation (at any given time) of its full right to dispose of the earth in the mode that is best *for the present generation*; and though the laws of Britain are utterly contrary to reason in this respect, inasmuch as lands are entailed in particular families, to whom other Britons must pay a rent for the use of the soil, we need not hesitate to affirm that, the moment a scientific method (whether inductive and economical, or deductive and moral) comes to be applied to the question, ‘Whose is the soil, and how should it be distributed?’ that moment will the fabric of English aristocracy be undermined, and the social laws of Britain will undergo a thorough regeneration. Superstition on this point may endure a few years longer; but, so certainly as men achieve equality in the eye of the law with regard to natural liberty, so certainly must they ultimately achieve equality with regard to natural property. \* \* \* The ground on which we identify the laws of property and the laws of liberty is this: when human laws accord to one man a portion of the earth as property, the essential character of such an arrangement is, that all other men are prohibited or restricted from using that portion of the earth; and,



consequently, this law is merely a law of restricting action, inasmuch as the prohibition is specific, whereas there is no injunction on the proprietor to cultivate the land, or to make it produce its maximum for the increase of human welfare. \* \* \* The question then is, upon what terms, or according to what system, must the earth be possessed by the successive generations that succeed each other on the surface of the globe? The conditions given are—*First*, That the earth is the common property of the race; *Second*, That whatever an individual produces by his own labour, (whether it be a new object made out of many materials, or a *new value* given by labour to an object whose form, locality, &c., may be changed,) is the private property of that individual, and he may dispose of it as he pleases, provided he does not interfere with his fellows; *Third*, The earth is the *perpetual* common property of the race, and each succeeding generation has a full title to a *free* earth. And the condition required is—Such a system as shall secure to the successive individuals of the race their share of the common property, and the opportunity, without interference, of making as much private property as their skill, industry, and enterprise would enable them to make. \* \* \* How can the division of the advantages of the natural earth be effected! *By the division of its annual value or rent*; that is, by making the rent of the soil the *common property* of the nation.—*Theory of Progression*, pp. 375-385.

Without entering here on the large field of discussion presented in these extracts, let us simply remark it as a fact pregnant with the most important consequences, that this doctrine of the equal right of all men to the natural advantages of the soil, is a doctrine daily gaining ground. Not only does it figure in such works as those before us; it is also becoming conspicuous as an article in the popular political creed. That the right of private property in the substance of the earth is logically indefensible, is a proposition to be heard asserted on one side, and assented to on the other, in ordinary conversation; and, as we learn from the publication of Mr. Newman's 'Lectures on Political Economy,' this proposition has even been publicly taught in a seminary for ladies. These certainly are ominous signs.

- ART. II.—(1.) *The Tragedie of Ferrex and Porrex, as the same was shewne by the Gentlemen of the Inner Temple, the xviii. days of Januarie*, 1561. Imprynted by John Daye.
- (2.) *A New Tragical Comedie of Appius and Virginia*. 1562.
- (3.) *A Righte Pitky, Pleasaunt, and Merie Comedie. Intytuled—Gammer Gurton's Needle; played on Stage not long ago, in Xt's College, in Cambridge*. 1566.
- (4.) *The Tragedie of Tancred and Gismunda, composed by the Gentlemene of the Inner Temple*. 1568.
- (5.) *Alexander, Campaspe, and Diogenes, plaied before the Quene's Majestic on Twelfth-day, by the Children of Her Majestie's Chapel, and the Children of St. Paule's*. By JOHN LYLEY.
- (6.) *The Works of George Peele*. 3 vols. 1839-47.
- (7.) *The Poetical and Dramatic Works of Robert Greene*. 2 vols. 1837.
- (8.) *The Famous Tragedie of the Riche Jewe of Malta; The Troublesome Reigne and Lamentable Death of Edward the Second; The Tragical Historie of the Life and Death of Dr. Faustus*. By XTOPHER MARLOW.
- (9.) *Memoirs of Edward Alleyne; The Diary of Philip Henslowe*. Shakespere Society.

THE importance of studying the dramatic literature of a people in order to a just and complete apprehension, not only of their intellectual, but of their national character, has been so obvious to scholars, that much time and labour have been ungrudgingly bestowed upon the dramatists of Greece and Rome. It is, therefore, a question which might well arise in the mind of the student of English literature—how is it that the writers, whose names and works stand at the head of this article, were deemed so unworthy of notice, that from the period of the Restoration until even as yesterday, they have been so completely forgotten, that during the whole of the last century the inquirer might search in vain for any record of them? And yet these writers were all the immediate precursors or contemporaries, of Shakespeare,—all belonging to the stirring era of Elizabeth, all aiding in the unexampled development of the national mind at that wonderful period, and reflecting, as in a mirror, its peculiarities;—all ‘born poets,’ too, taking place of right in Apollo’s temple, ‘with garlands, and singing robes about them;’ all morning stars in that clear dawn, clustering round that ‘bright particular star,’ and shining with a lustre only inferior to his own.

The chief cause of this neglect of our early dramatic poets may, we think, be traced to that prevalence of French criticism,

consequent on the Restoration, which flung aside all our sweet and noble early poetry for a clipt, formal style of versification, which, although rhyme, could not lay claim to aught higher, and which, bold in its blindness, chattered about 'the poetic art,' and bade the poet wait upon the critic, instead of the critic waiting duteously upon him. Thus consigned to contempt, a gross ignorance of our early poetry ere long prevailed, even among the most highly educated; and gentlemen writers talked about the rudeness of the period that gave birth to a Shakespeare, and Pope himself pointed to Waller as the first to give English verse its refinement and finish, "unconscious of the exquisite poetry poured forth in unpremeditated sweetness almost fifty years before Waller was even born. And edifying, too, it must have been, to hear the wits of Button's abusing the 'coarseness' of the old writers—even of Shakespeare himself,—the disgusting plays of Davenant and Congreve standing meanwhile in all the bravery of morocco and gold, on their bookshelves,—but unfortunately the mass of readers,—not very large, however, then,—soothly believed it; and thus works, instinct not only with fine poetry, but with noble and lofty sentiments, came to be regarded with unjust suspicion by worthy moral people, even as they had been scorned for their rudeness by the superficial *litterati* of the day.

Thus into oblivion fell some of the finest poetry in our language,—flung aside with the illuminated manuscripts of an earlier day, a prey to worms and mildew; but at length the spirit of inquiry arose, and the ancient ballads and the ancient metrical romances awakened a taste for 'old-world rhymes,' and then people began to find out that our forefathers felt and thought and acted much like themselves, save with a super-added intensity, which is the very soul of poetry; and then attention was turned to our early drama, and its rich stores were brought forth to the light, and forthwith wonder and admiration took the place of cold neglect and ignorant scorn.

The origin of dramatic poetry seems to have been singularly the same in all countries. No nursling of courts or palaces, it sprung up among the people, and it reflected their views, their feelings—even their slightest peculiarities. This popular character doubtless recommended it to the notice of the priesthood; and thus, among the ancient nations, as well as during the mediæval period, the drama was no merely pleasant amusement to wile away an idle hour, but a solemn service—a vehicle of instruction in grave and religious matters, exhibiting the deeds of heroes and demigods—in later times, of scriptural personages—while so strongly was the religious character im-

pressed upon these performances, that in England the clergy always headed the procession of the miracle-players, and the church choristers opened the play with a solemn hymn; while in Spain the self-same name '*auto*,' was used to designate alike theatrical performances, and the burning of heretics. It is necessary to bear this in mind, most especially in coming to the study of these our early dramatists, for it is only by so doing that we can reconcile many discrepancies, and perceive that much which seems to us anomalous, indeed, almost profane, in these old plays, really arose out of the circumstances under which they were written and performed.

Modern research has furnished us with many specimens of the 'miracle plays;' our earliest attempts at dramatic composition, and, with all their faults—faults, however, be it remembered, which could not be obvious to our simple-minded forefathers,—we must bear testimony to their admirable adaptation to the purpose of impressing the great outlines of Scripture history on the minds of a rude population. As to the charge of profaneness which has been brought against them, as well as against some of the early dramas, it is important to remember that a keen sense of the ludicrous belongs only to a highly artificial state of society. Thus, when Noah's wife, in answer to his earnest entreaties that she will enter the ark, soundly cuffs his ears; and Joseph, awakened from his sleep to fly into Egypt, complains of the work he must leave unfinished in his workshop, our forefathers saw but in the one instance the natural petulance of the shrew compelled to leave her gossips at so short a notice, expressed in its natural manner; and in the other the equally natural apprehension of the small carpenter that he should lose by this neglect of his customers. It is indeed very curious, to trace by what slow degrees a sense of the ludicrous grew up. The sermons of the Reformers, and those of the Puritans, too, afford many passages which, in the present day, would infallibly excite the irrepressible laughter of a whole congregation; and yet, we know that the people in those earlier days listened to the preacher with an attention, and a propriety of demeanour, which proved their sense of the ludicrous to be far less vivid than our own. There is another point, too, which we must bear in mind. Struck with the picturesque splendour of the more solemn observances of the middle ages, we are in danger of losing sight of the extreme simplicity,—even homeliness, of our forefathers' everyday life. And this homeliness was shown, not only in the mean appointments of the early drama, but in the common-place incidents, and the homely style of conversation adopted; but well may we pardon all these for the sake of the vivid traits of

character and manners which they present to us, and which we can find nowhere else.

The connecting link between the miracle play, and the regular drama, is 'the morality,' which seems to have taken its rise at the Reformation, and became eventually a powerful agent in advancing its cause. Those of Bale, are chiefly on Scriptural subjects, and indeed bear so close a resemblance to the miracle play, both in style and treatment, that they might well bear the same name; save that the virulent abuse of the papacy, and its agents, proves that they belong to an age of fierce and bitter controversy. Those of Heywood, and others, are quaint personifications of virtues, vices, and intellectual faculties; they therefore rather resemble—though, at a wide interval—those masques, on which Drayton, Marston, but above all, Ben Jonson, lavished so much splendid poetry. Of poetry, however, in these earlier productions, there is none; still, many of the personifications are drawn with a rude force, and the 'dumbe showe,' told upon our forefathers' minds in a very effective manner. 'I minde how to such a play,' says the unknown writer of 'Mount Tabor,' a religious work published at the beginning of the seventeenth century—

—'My father tooke me with him when a childe. It was called *The Cradle of Securitie*, and there was a king with his courtiers, and three ladies, keeping him in delights and pleasures, drew him from hearing of sermons and listening to goode counsell, that in the end these three ladies got him to lye down in a cradle, when they joined in a sweet song and rocked him asleepe \* \* Whilat all this was acting, there came forthe two elde men, the one in blew with a mace on his shoulder, the other in red with a drawen sworde in his hande, and so they went round with a softe pace until they came to the cradle. Then the foremost old man with his mace struck a fearful blow on the cradle, wherewith the ladies and all the courtiers vanishing, the desolate prince started up, and made lamentable complaint of his miserable case, and so was carried away of evil spirits. This prince did personate the wicked of the world: the three ladies, pride, covetousness, and luxury; the two old men, the end of the world and the last judgment. This sight took such impression on me, that when I came to man's estate, it was as fresh in my memory as if I had seen it newly acted.'

This extract is interesting, not only as showing the strong hold these early dramas took on the imagination, but as proof that even late in the reign of Elizabeth, men attended them as a mean of profitable instruction. Thus, 'the earliest regular drama was expressly written to show 'how a state knit in unitie doth continue strong against all force, but being divided, is easilie destroyed.' And solemnly was this set forth in 'the statelie

tragedie' of *Ferrex and Porrex*, the joint production of Sackville, afterwards Lord Buckhurst, and Thomas Norton, the puritan translator of some of the hymns in Sternhold and Hopkins' version. Plot there is little;—the main, indeed almost the only incident, being the father dividing his kingdom between his two sons, and the general civil war and murders which ensued. The style may well be termed stately, for the blank verse is measured and flowing; the long speeches, however, are insufferably tedious, although often presenting lofty sentiments. The following is a fair specimen:—

'Count no man happy till his end be seene,  
If ever-flowing wealth and seeming joye  
In present years might make a happie wight—  
Happie was Hecuba, the wonderfulest wretch  
That ever lived to make a mirror of;  
And happie Priam with his noble sonnes,  
And happie I till nowe !—Alas ! I see  
And feele my most unhappie wretchednesse !  
Yet O, ye goddes, if ever woful kyng  
Might move ye, Kyng of kyngs, wreak it on me  
And on my sonnes, not on this guiltlesse realme,  
Send downe your wastful flames from wrathful skies.'

Each act of this tragedy commences with music of hautboys or cornets, or 'drums and flutes,' and then follows a 'dumbe show,' to signify the chief incidents of the following scenes. Altogether it is a great advance upon the 'moralities,' and we doubt not was most attentively listened to by 'the quene's majestic' and her court, before whom it seems to have been first performed.

For a different audience was the next play on our list composed; for people who, untrammelled by classical predilections, thought, as they saw joy and grief, laughter and sadness, so mingled in human life, that the drama might as well present the same strong contrasts; and thus we have 'the tragical comedie of Appius and Virginia.' This is a very curious adaptation of classical story to modern times. Virginius, thankful for an excellent wife and daughter, is on his way to the temple to 'yield the gods their praise,' when he meets them, and after rather long speechifying intermixed with 'ensaumples' from ancient story, they all three join in singing the following quatrain:—

'The trustiest treasure in earth, as we see,  
Is man, wife, and children in one to agree;  
Then friendly and kindly let measure be mixed,  
With reason in season, where friendship is fixed.'

This domestic happiness attracts the notice of Haphazard, 'the

Vice,' who determines to break it; giving in strange doggrel a list of his various disguises, declaring, in conclusion, that he is

'As bolde as blind bayard, as wise as a woodcocke;  
As fine as fivence, as proud as a peacocke.'

Indeed, all his speeches, nonsense as they are, are curious for their abundance of 'old saws' and proverbs, which still keep their place among the common people. Judge Appius now enters; and Haphazard, who is evidently the tempting devil of the older Morality, suggests to him the means of obtaining Virginia, by pretending she is a slave. Appius promises to do so, but 'here let Conscience and Justice come; and let Conscience hold in his hande a lampe burninge, and Justice have a sword, and holde it before Appius his breste.' Each exhorts him in choice common measure, but Haphazard triumphs. The 'tragical' part is clumsily managed. Virginius strikes off his daughter's head, and carries it to Appius, when forthwith Reward and Justice make their appearance, and sentence the chief agents to death, Haphazard among the others. Then 'Fame, Doctrine, and Memorie' celebrate the praises of Virginia, and the epilogue concludes by giving some very wholesome advice to the 'right worshipful' spectators.

'To win his love that all in all hath made.

And by the poet's faining here, ensauple do you take,  
Of Virginia's life of chastitie, of duty to thy make;  
Of love to wife, of love to spouse, of love to husbände deare,  
Of bringing up of tender youth; all these are noted heare.  
I doubt it not, right worshipful, but well you do conceive  
The matter that is ended now, and thus I take my leave:  
Beseeching God, as dutie is, our gracious quene to save,  
The nobles, and the commons eke, with prosperous life I crave.'

A very similar tragi-comedy is 'Damon and Pythias,' in doggrel rhyme, and composed about the same period. In the prologue, although we are expressly told that—

'Talking of courtly toyes, we doe protest this flat,  
We talke of Dionysius' court, we meane no courte but that.'

*We* might however suppose, notwithstanding the disclaimer, that a more modern court was intended; for we have a hangman talking as familiarly of his calling as though he had served an apprenticeship at Tyburn; and a collier—the chief comic actor—grumbling at delays in taking in the king's coals, swearing by Pope Joan, and anticipating ale and roasted crabs. The higher personages do not indulge so much in anachronisms, but intersperse their long speeches with quotations in choice Latin, and

### GAMMER GURTON'S NEEDLE.

the muses sing a doleful melody, 'The whole ends with  
Songe,' which declares—

'The strongest gardes that kynge's can have,  
Are constant friendes their state to save.'

and concludes with the loyal prayer—

'The Lorde graunt her such friendes, most noble quene Elizabeth.

There are one or two similar plays, but presenting no excellencies of any kind, and which we therefore pass over, to come to that admirable picture of country life and manners full three hundred years ago, painted with the spirit and force of a 'Teniers, or Ostade'—'Gammer Gurton's Needle.' Let not the reader misapprehend the sense in which we use the term 'admirable.' There is certainly nothing to admire in the two old gammers, who pour out their abuse of each other with a force and a fluency which, indeed, reminds us of the many sarcasms of our ancient writers upon the glibness of women's tongues; nor in the coarse speeches of every character, from Tyb, the maid-of-all-work, and Hodge, the jack-of-all-trades, to the parson, dignified with the title of 'doctor,' but who is as coarse as the rest, and the bailiff, who is more willing to drink with the complainants than to do justice to their cause. But the spirit, the vividness, with which these characters are placed before us, rival the marvellous creations of Piers Plowman. Even in the minor details, a complete Dutch painting is given—where not a smoky rafter with the hanging bacon, not a rubbish-corner, not a broken porringer, not a withered cabbage-stalk, is omitted; and the old crone, her eyes bleared with the smoke, wringing her hands over the lost needle, and Tyb with her lapful of rubbish carefully searching, and the boy with his inch of candle lighting Hodge as he gropes among the ashes; even 'Gyb, her great cat,' who sits winking in the midst of the confusion, until he chases her up stairs, mistaking the shine of her eyes for burning embers, all form most appropriate accessories of the picture. But important even, in an historical point of view, are the other personages; the bailiff, so ignorant, so willing to enjoy himself easily wherever there is good ale; Doctor Rat, the parson, rude and coarse as his parishioners, not even once quoting Latin, though sometimes he terms himself 'an honest, learned clarke,' but anxious to keep on good terms with his flock, although, as he feelingly says—

'A man had better be twenty times a ban dog and barke,  
Than here amonge such a sorte, be parish priest, or clarke,  
Where he shall never be at reste; his shoes to teare and rente,  
And that which is worst of all, at ev'ry knave's commandement.



I had not sat the space to drink two pottes of ale,  
 But Gammer Gurton's sorry boy was straightwaye at my tayle,  
 And she was sicke, and I must come, to do I wot not what,  
 If once her finger's end but ache, trudge, call for Doctor Rat.  
 And when I come not at their call, I only thereby lose,  
 For I am sure to lacke thereby a tythe-pig, or a goose.  
 I warrant when the truth is knowen, and tolde they have their tale,  
 The matter whereabout I come, is not worth a halfpennyworth of ale.  
 Yet must I talke so smoothe and saye, as tho' I were a glozier,  
 Els or the yere come at an end, I shall be sure the loser.'

What a vivid picture is this of the ignorant, idle priest, taking charge of the parish for the sake of the tythes—of the hundreds of clergy, who, as the petition to parliament, presented but a few years after this play was written, declares, were incapable of preaching a sermon, but were drunkards and gamesters; 'watch-men that have no eyes, candlesticks not of gold, but clay, unworthy to have the Lord's light set in them.' Master Strype earnestly endeavours to disprove these assertions, but here the drama, written by a clergyman too (Still, afterwards bishop of Bath and Wells,), rises up in testimony, and brings the parish priest of the middle of the sixteenth century in his coarsest lineaments before us.

And then, what a portrait is 'Diccon, the Bedlam.' All readers are familiar with that fine sketch of mad Tom, 'whom the foul fiend vexes,' in *King Lear*; but Shakespeare has, in that, given us the idealism of the character, in fine harmony with the poetry, wild and solemn, of that powerful drama of wilful, but crushed, and broken-hearted old age. But in Diccon we have the reality—the daguerréotype of the vagabonds who, filching and cheating, mopping and mowing, bullying and coaxing, wandered through the country, objects of just indignation to honest men, but viewed with a strange mixture of terror and kindness by the gammers, who were amused by their stories, and frightened by their pretended madness. How merrily does this vagabond bear himself when, after having stolen poor Hodge's bacon, he sits down at Dame Chat's, with his two-quart-pottle-pot, and trowls away the hearty chorus of—

'Backe and syde go bare, go bare, bothe feete and hande go colde,'

of that well-known, spirited old song in praise and honour of good ale—Hodge all the while unconscious that the fellow to whom he is relating his troubles, is the very cause of his being dinnerless. And then the mischief he makes, charging Gammer Chat with stealing her neighbour's needle, and with stealing her 'faire red cock,' too, and eating him roasted for breakfast; then

sending Doctor Rat to spy in the hen-house, where he gets a broken head; and the general game of cross-purposes, and quarrelling, in the last act, until the lost needle is found, and then, forgetful of all their vituperations, mistress, maid, and man, neighbour, bayly, parson, even Diccon, who certainly deserves the stocks rather, so heartily agree in conclusion to bury all animosities in a pot of good ale—all this renders ‘Gammer Gurton’s Needle’ a most valuable relic of the genuine popular literature of the sixteenth century. It is curious to find that this picture of rude manners was both written by a scholar, and acted by scholars, even at the university of Cambridge; and we can well imagine, in that humour-loving age, with what hearty glee the performer, who, perhaps, but the day before had declaimed some choice oration of Cicero, wrapped himself in the coif and program gown of the old gammer, and cudgelled the man and the maid, and in rude West-country dialect, grumbled, scolded, and stormed, throughout the long five acts.

It is to be regretted that we have no other pictures as vivid of the dwellers in cities, or of the higher classes; but the public taste still pointed strongly to classical subjects, or at least to subjects of grave and solemn import. Such was ‘Tancred and Gismunda,’ composed by five gentlemen of the Inner Temple, one of whom was Sir Christopher Hatton; a stately masque rather than a drama, with no comic scenes, but a kind of *tableau vivant* preceding each act, and ‘Cupid coming out of a cradle of flowers, drawing forth, ‘in a blue twist of silk, vain hope and brittle joy; and with a ‘carnation twist of silk, fair resemblance and late repentance;’ while Mægara and her sister furies lead a dance toward the end, and foretel the ensuing tragedy. There is much very fair poetry in this play, and every word is decorous and polished; indeed, it seems well fitted to have been presented by staid gentlemen to the queen, and dedicated by them to the maids of honour, those—

‘Flowers of the prime, pearls couched all in golde,  
 Lights of our days, that glad the fainting hearts  
 Of them that shall your shining beams beholde,  
 Salve of each sore, recure of inward smarts,  
 In whom virtue and beauty striveth so  
 As neither yields——’

For dramatic conduct of his plots, and for much sweet poetry, John Lyley takes a far higher place than any of the preceding. His name has been handed down as the first teacher of that quaint and fantastic style of writing which, from his curious little work called ‘Euphues,’ derived the title of ‘Euphuism.’ There appears, however, little of this quaintness in his dramas.

The dialogue, which is always in prose, is perhaps too sententious, and abundant in similes, but yet there is much beauty, and his comic characters are far less coarse than those of his contemporaries, while his songs are unrivalled for ease and gracefulness. Here are two verses from one in 'Galathea':—

'O yes! O yes! if any maid,  
Whom leering Cupid hath betrayed  
To frowns of spite, and eyes of scorne,  
And would, in madness, now see torne  
The boy in pieces, let her come  
Hither, and lay on him her doome.

'O yes! O yes! hath any lost  
A heart which many a sigh hath cost;  
Is any cozened of a teare,  
Which as a pearle disdain doth weare,  
Here stands the thiefe, let her but come  
Hither, and lay on him his doome.'

In a finer tone is the following, from 'Alexandre and Campaspe.' What writer, even in the present day, could 'set' so elegant a fancy, in sweeter, or more flowing verse, than this song of Apelles?—

'Cupid and my Campaspe plaid  
At cards for kisses, Cupid paid  
For stakes his quiver, bow and arrows,  
His mother's doves, and team of sparrows;  
Loses them too; then down he throws  
The coral of his lip, the rose  
Growing on's cheek (but none knows how)  
With these, the crystal of his brow,  
And then the dimple of his chin;  
All these, did my Campaspe win.  
At last he set her both his eyes,  
She won, and Cupid blind did rise.  
O Love! hath she done this to thee?  
What will, alas! become of me?'

or this—

'What birde so sings, yet so does wail?  
O! 'tis the love-lorn nightingale.  
Jug, jug, jug, jug, terou, she cries,  
And still her woes at midnight rise.  
Brave prick song! who is't now we hear?  
None but the lark, so shrill and clear;  
Now at heaven's gates she claps her wings,  
*The morn not waking till she sings.'*

Contemporary with Lyley, was a brother dramatist, whose works,

if not so refined, were instinct with a far more dramatic character—George Peele, 'citie poet, and master of the pageants.' His earliest production, 'David and Bethsabe,' written in 1579, although, from its inartificial character, greatly resembling the miracle plays, presents much fine poetry. Here is a fine personification of sin—

———' thus with his sevenfold crown and purple robe,  
There he sits watching, with his hundred eyes,  
Our idle minutes, and our wanton thoughts;  
And with his baits made of our frail desires,  
Gives us the hook that hales our souls to hell.'

The following is, indeed, lofty poetry. Solomon is expressing his earnest desire 'to intermeddle with all knowledge.' This is David's answer:

'Wade not too far, my boy, in waves too deep;  
The feeble eyes of our aspiring thoughts  
Behold things present, and record things past;  
But things to come exceed our human reach,  
And are not painted yet in angels' eyes:  
For those, submit thy sense, and say—'Thou power  
That now art framing of the future world  
Know'st all to come. \* \* \*  
O heaven, protect my weakness with thy strength,  
So look on me that I may view thy face,  
And see these secrets written on thy brows.  
O Sun! come dart thy rays upon my moon,  
That now mine eyes eclipsed to the earth,  
May brightly be refined, and shine to heaven:  
Transform me from this flesh, that I may live  
Before my death regenerate with thee.  
O thou great God! ravish my earthly spirit,  
That, for a time, a more than human skill  
May feed the organous of all my sense;  
That, when I think, thy thoughts may be my guide,  
And, when I speak, I may be made by choice  
The perfect echo of thy heavenly voice.'

Peele's 'Arraignment of Paris' contains some pleasing descriptive poetry; it is rather a masque than a drama, and was performed before the queen, to whom, at the close, Paris presented the golden apple, as 'the beste and loveliest.' The 'Old Wives' Tale' was composed for a different audience, probably at command of the city authorities. This is founded on the old nursery tale—which, nevertheless, like many more of that class, may claim a most remote antiquity—of the enchanted well and the golden head, to which the handsome but scornful maiden repairs, and is punished;

while the plain but kind-hearted maiden is rewarded. Warton imagined that Milton took a hint from this for his exquisite *Comus*; but we cannot perceive any resemblance. It is very curious for the many snatches of old rhymes it contains, and the comic part is excellent for the pictures it affords of the times.

Most curious, however, as an illustration of the bitter enmity of the popular mind against the Spaniard, is Peele's next play, 'The famous Chronicle of King Edward the firste.' There is much beautiful poetry here, and much light and flowing versification in the comic parts; but the way in which it sets history at defiance—history of only three hundred years ago, too—is marvellous. The heroine is Elinor of Castile, Edward's gentle queen, whose name has been handed down by every contemporary writer with unqualified eulogy, and whose beautiful crosses still bore testimony, not only to her husband's affection, but to a nation's love. And yet, from the first scene to the last, she is represented as one of the most outrageous viragoes that even the vulgar taste, which delighted in 'King Cambyzes' vein,' could possibly have imagined. She insults her attendants, bullies the king, chooses the lady-mayoress for her wet-nurse, then kills her by setting a serpent to her breast, and finally, after endless extravagances, having called heaven to witness that she is guiltless of the murder, she sinks into the earth at Charing Cross, and rises, much to the amazement of the potter's wife, at 'Potter's hithe,' from henceforth called 'Queenhithe,' is conducted back to Westminster, where, after making a most extravagant confession, she dies. The date of this strange libel upon history is about 1587-8, and was, therefore, doubtless one of the means employed, perhaps by the higher authorities, who ought to have known better, to exasperate the popular mind yet more keenly against Spain. There are many passages to that effect scattered through it. When Elinor first appears, she speaks boastfully of Spain and with great contempt of England. Her daughter Joan's answer affords a curious illustration of the popular feeling with regard to their ruler, a feeling which was encouraged by Elizabeth more than, perhaps, by any other sovereign, and whose courteous demeanour made her almost their idol.

'Let not your honours make your manners change,  
The people of this land are men of war;  
The women, courteous, mild, and debonair,  
Laying their lives at princes' feet  
That govern with familiar majesty.  
But if their sovereigns once 'gin swell with pride,  
Disdaining commons' love, which is the strength  
And sureness of the richest commonwealth;

That prince were better live a private life,  
Than rule with tyranny and discontent.'

Public opinion had made some advance since the days of that royal brute, Henry VIII., for the dramatist to utter such sentiments so boldly and so well. Edward, too, in answer to the queen's boastful vaunts, gracefully says—

'Sweet queen, how much I pity these effects;  
This Spanish pride 'grees not with England's prince.  
Mild is the mind where honour builds his bower,  
And yet is earthly honour but a flower.  
Fast to those looks are all my fancies tied,  
Pleased with thy sweetness, angry with thy pride.'

Notwithstanding its gross falsity, this 'famous chronicle' became very popular, and doubtless did its part in inflaming the popular mind against the coming of the dreaded Armada. It subsequently took the form of a ballad, and was in that form a favourite.

Contemporary with Peele and Lyley was Robert Greene, a writer of many prose and poetical works, as well as several plays. Among the latter, his 'Orlando Furioso' contains some fine poetry; but, with the exception of his 'Friar Bacon and Friar Bungay,' and his 'Looking Glasse for London,' which he wrote in conjunction with Lodge, the remainder are but poor. 'Friar Bacon and Friar Bungay,' although founded on the popular stories of Bacon overcoming the great magician of Germany, and of his construction and loss of the brazen head, is a very fine play. Much of the blank verse is of a very high order, the characters are well brought out, and the comic portions, though whimsical, are good. Many of Bacon's speeches remind us, in their affluence of language and illustration, of Ben Jonson. Thus—

'I tell thee, monarch, all the German peers  
Could not afford an entertainment such,  
So royal, and so full of majesty,  
As Bacon will present to Frederic.  
Wines richer than th' Egyptian courtesan  
Quaffed to Augustus' kingly countermatch,  
Shall be caroused in English Henry's feasts.  
Candy shall yield the richest of her canes,  
Persia, down the Volga by her canoes,  
Send down the secrets of her spicery;  
The Afric dates, mirabiles of Spain,  
Conserves and suckets of Tiberias,  
Cates from Judea choicer than the lamp  
That fired Rome with sparks of gluttony,  
Shall beautify thy board.'

Bacon's lamentation, when, finding the evil he has unconsciously caused, he breaks his magic glass, is very fine.

---

‘it repents me sore  
 The hours I've spent in pyromantic spells:  
 The fearful tossing in the latest night  
 Of papers full of necromantic charms,  
 Conjuring and adjuring devils and fiends,  
 With stole, and albe, and strange pentameron,  
 And praying to the fivefold powers of heaven,  
 Are instances that Bacon must be lost!  
 Yet, Bacon, cheer thee, drown not in despair!  
 Sins have their salves, repentance can do much,  
 Think, mercy sits where Justice holds her seat,  
 And from those wounds the bloody Jews did pierce,  
 Which by thy magic oft did bleed afresh,  
 From thence, for thee, the dew of mercy drops  
 To wash the wrath of high Jehovah's ire,  
 And make thee as a new-born babe from sin.’

But Bacon, although he has given up all unlawful studies, appears in the last act to foretel, ‘by deep prescience,’ the future glories of England, and seldom did Elizabeth, though praised and sung by so glorious a company of poets, receive richer homage than in these lines.

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‘here,  
 Forth from the royal garden of a king,  
 Shall flourish out so rich and fair a bud,  
 Whose brightness shall deface proud Phœbus' flower,  
 And overshadow Albion with her leaves.  
 Till then, Mars shall be master of the field,  
 But then the stormy threats of wars shall cease;  
 The horse shall stamp as careless of the pike,  
 Drums shall be turned to timbrels of delight;  
 With wealthy favours Plenty shall enrich  
 The strand that gladdened wand'ring Brut to see,  
 And peace from heaven shall harbour in those leaves,  
 That, gorgeous, beautify this matchless flower.  
 Apollo's heliotropian then shall stoop,  
 And Venus' hyacinth shall veil her top;  
 Juno shall shut her gilliflowers up,  
 And Pallas' bay shall 'bash her brightest green;  
 Ceres' carnation, in consort with those,  
 Shall stoop, and wonder at Diana's rose?’

The last play of Greene's which we shall notice was written in conjunction with Lodge, and entitled ‘A Looking Glasse for London.’ Its date, as is the case with most of these old plays, is

uncertain, but we should think it was written about 1590, when there was much fear of the plague in London, and many solemn warnings, both from the press and the pulpit, were sent forth. The religious character of this curious, but in some respects fine play, is remarkable. The scene is laid, not in London, but in Nineveh, which is summoned to repentance by the preaching of 'Oseas' and Jonah. It opens with a solemn procession of Rasni the king, attended by three subordinate kings, and his first speech rather resembles 'Tamburlaine,' or 'King Cambyzes' vein,' in its extravagance; indeed, even when the prophet 'Oseas' is brought in by an angel, and let down before the king, the marvel produces no effect, and he haughtily retires with his attendant kings and two ladies, whom he seems inclined to make his wives, much to the scandal of the audience, who, unacquainted with eastern customs, always felt great indignation at this, doubtless thinking he ought to be indicted for bigamy. We next have a usurer, about to seize a poor man's cow; and he talks of his trade just as the London usurer would do, when 'Oseas' appears, and warns London to beware of covetousness. Then follow many scenes of broad humour; the drunken blacksmith, Adam, being exceedingly well drawn, though it is very whimsical to follow in his praises of good ale, 'all Nineveh hath not better, I spent eleven pennies for it, beside three races of ginger;' and his summons to the 'tapster, gentle tapster,' to cut him a fresh toast, and 'fill me the pot, for here's money; I'll follow thee as long as the ale lasts.' The next scene introduces Jonah, and the fine blank verse of his speech, and the sustained grandeur of the imagery, form a singular contrast. Portents appear; thunderbolts, a fiery hand and sword, but the wicked king heeds them not. 'Woe to the land,' exclaims the chorus—

——— 'where warnings profit nought,  
 Who say that nature God's decrees have wrought;  
 Who build on fate, and leave the corner-stone,  
 The God of Gods, O Christ, the only one!  
 If such escapes, O London, reign in thee,  
 Repent, for sure each sin shall punished be;  
 Repent, amend,—repent, the hour is nigh,—  
 Defer not time—who knows when he shall die?'

Jonah's preaching at length prevails, and the usurer enters,—

'Groaning in conscience, burthened with my crimes,  
 The hell of sorrow haunts me up and down;  
 Tread where I list, methinks the bleeding ghosts  
 Of those whom my corruption brought to nought  
 Do serve for stumbling-blocks before my steps.



The fatherless and widow wronged by me—  
 The poor oppressed by mine usury—  
 Methinks I see their hands upreared to heaven,  
 To cry for vengeance on my covetousness.'

Here, in the true spirit of the miracle play, a demon proffers him a knife and a halter; but he exclaims,—

'What fiend is this that tempts me to my death?  
 Methinks I hear a voice that bids me stay,  
 And tells me that the Lord is merciful!  
 May I repent? O then, my doubting soul,  
 Thou may'st repent, the Judge is merciful!  
 Hence, tools of wrath!—  
 For I will pray, and cry unto the Lord;  
 In sackcloth will I sigh, and fasting pray,  
 O Lord, in rigour look not on my sins!'

The favourite queen next enters, lamenting, with her ladies; then the king and his court:—

'I have contemned the warnings from above!  
 Oh! had I tears like to the silver floods  
 That from the Alpine mountains sweetly stream,  
 Or had I sighs, the treasures of remorse,  
 As plentiful as Eolus hath blasts,  
 I then would tempt the heavens with my plaint,—  
 Oh, pardon, Lord! Oh, pity Nineveh!'

The whole company then repeat, on their knees, the cry for pardon, and the king continues:—

'Let not the infants dallying on the breast,  
 For parents' sins, in judgment be oppressed.'  
*Omnes.* 'O pardon, Lord! O pity Nineveh!'  
*2nd King.* 'Let not the painful mothers travailing,  
 Nor innocents, be punished for our sins.'  
*Omnes.* 'O pardon, Lord! O pity Nineveh!'  
*The King.* 'O Lord of Heaven, the virgins weep to thee;  
 The covetous man is sorry for his sins;  
 The prince and poor all pray before thy throne;  
 And wilt thou still be wroth with Nineveh?'  
*Omnes.* 'O pardon, Lord! O pity Nineveh.'

And with no feeling of careless indifference did our forefathers look upon this rude but effective scene; for in reading the plays of this period, we must ever bear in mind that the play was no mere amusement then; that the very men who occupied the rude benches in front of the scaffold—which, without any attempt at scenery, and simply strewed with rushes, formed 'the stage'—had, when children, learnt bible history, and many a point of

'the new doctrine,' from the lips of the actor; while older men could recollect when no hired players trod the stage, but decent, worthy members of their respective crafts, 'in honour and glory of God,' took their parts in the miracle plays. Let us always guard against judging of ancient times by the standard of our own, for to this source almost every historical error may be traced. Jonah now appears with his message of mercy, and, bidding London take warning, concludes,—

'O proud, adulterous glory of the West,  
Thy neighbours burn, yet dost thou dread no fire;  
Thy preachers cry, yet dost thou stop thine ears;  
Thy 'larum rings, while yet thou sleep'st secure.  
London, awake! For fear the Lord should frown,  
I set this looking-glasse before thine eyes.'

There is little doubt, we think, that it was in anticipation of the plague that this powerful drama was written. In a former article on society at this period (No. X, p. 433), we remarked what strong hold the terrors of such a visitation had on the popular mind, and we there gave a quotation from a solemn hymn sung by the actors in Nash's 'Summer's last Will and Testament.' The date of this 'show,' or masque, from its allusions, can be easily ascertained to be 1593, when the court, and the law-courts too, removed from London in consequence of the 'sickness;' and, therefore, not only is a solemn hymn sung in the course of the piece, but the concluding 'song,' as it is termed, ends with a litany,—

'From winter, plague, and pestilence, good Lord deliver us!'

This, is also a very curious play; without plot, but consisting of an almost endless succession of characters belonging to the four seasons, each with a long speech, and some with snatches of old songs. The learning displayed in it is greater than is usual, even in dramas of this kind, intermixed, however, with much fine poetry; and altogether it exhibits a nearer approach to those beautiful compositions, the masques, than any we have hitherto met with. From an allusion to Lambeth, and from Croydon

\* The following extract from a letter of Edward Alleyne, at that time an actor, but subsequently the founder of Dulwich College, gives a curious specimen of the recommendation of 'cleanness and godliness,' from one belonging to a class which have seldom been considered very eminent for the latter. It is addressed to his 'goode swete mouse,' his wife, and refers to the 'visitation' of 1593:—'I hope in God the sycknesse may escape you, and for that end kepe your howse fayre and cleane, whych I know you will, and everie evening throwe water before youre dore, and at the back; and have in your windowe good store of rue, and herbe of grace, (wormwood,) and with the grace of God, which muste be obtayned by prayer, no doubt the Lorde will mercifullie defende you.'—*Fide* 'Life of Edward Alleyne,' Shakespeare Society.

being mentioned as the place at which it was performed, we think it probable that it was 'enacted' before Archbishop Whitgift, especially as the parts are represented to have been taken mostly by the singing boys.

There are many single plays of this period, by unknown or uncertain authors, which are worthy of notice, but which we must pass over, to afford space for the works of that true precursor of Shakespeare, Christopher Marlow. It is a curious fact, that the writer of such fine plays as 'Edward the Second,' above all of 'Dr. Faustus,' should have been first known to fame by two which passed into a very byeword for their extravagance—the first and second parts of 'Tamburlaine the Great.' These we cannot think could have been written save to please 'the groundlings,' for whose delectation 'The Spanish Tragedy,' and 'Jeronymo,' had been already composed; and soon after, that disgusting tissue of horrors, so unjustly assigned to Shakespeare, 'Titus Andronicus.' But for a higher auditory—or rather, at the bidding of his own poetic impulse—were the three plays on which his fame rests composed. The first is, 'The Jew of Malta;' and although, as a whole, faulty in conduct, and, as to the chief character, most extravagant in conception, it abounds in fine poetry. Barabas, the hero, indeed, rather resembles the wicked men and impossible tyrants in the old nursery tales than a real character. Had he been less outrageous in his revenge, he would have been a fine *tragic* Shylock; and then the spoliations of the governor, and the cool contempt with which he wrongs him, would finely have brought out the moral. Still, there is something poetical about the Jew, whose money is so abundant that he—

———'all his life-time hath been tired,  
Wearing his finger ends with telling it.'

And how poetical is his description of the wealth which he prefers:—

'Give me the merchants of the Indian mines,  
That trade in metal of the purest mould;  
The wealthy Moor, that in the eastern rocks  
Without controul can pick his riches up,  
And in his house heap pearl like pebble stones!  
Bags of fiery opals, sapphires, amethysts,  
Jacinths, hard topaz, grass-green emeralds,  
Beauteous rubies, sparkling diamonds,  
And seld'-seen costly stones of so great price,  
That one of them, indifferently rated,  
And of a carat of this quality,  
May serve in peril of calamity

To ransom great kings from captivity,—  
This is the ware wherein consists *my* wealth.'

And naturally does he add,—

'These are the blessings promised to the Jews.  
What more may heaven do for earthly man,  
Than thus to pour out plenty in their laps,  
Ripping the bowels of the earth for them,  
Making the sea their servant, and the winds  
To drive their substance with successful blasts?  
Who hateth me but for my happiness?  
Or who is honoured now but for his wealth?  
Rather had I, a Jew, be hated thus,  
Than pitied in a Christian poverty.

His first interview with the governor is very fine; and when, in answer to the hypocritical remark of a knight, that his 'inherent sin' is the cause of his losses, he indignantly exclaims—

'What! bring you Scripture to confirm your wrongs,  
And preach me out of my possession!'

the feeling of every right-minded reader must be on the side of the Jew. His remonstrances, however, are vain; he is deprived of the whole of his known wealth, and his house seized for a nunnery. Barabas has, however, treasure hidden in his house, and to secure this, he causes his daughter to enter as a 'convertite,' and by her means he obtains it. But Barabas, although doting on gold—could a Jew well do otherwise?—loves his daughter too, and thus, when he receives the bags of pearls, and jewels, he passionately exclaims:—

——— 'O my girl!  
My gold, my fortune, my felicity!  
Strength to my soul, death to my enemy;  
Welcome the first beginner of my bliss!  
O, Abigail, Abigail! that I had thee here too,  
Then my desires were fully satisfied;  
But I will practise thine enlargement hence:  
O girl!—O gold!—oh beauty, oh my bliss!'

He obtains his daughter; and now commences his revenge against the governor, whose son he entraps into a duel with a friend, when both are killed. Abigail, who had been secretly attached to the governor's son, now flies from her father's house, and enters the nunnery in earnest. The rage of the wretched old man when he hears this is appalling, but far more natural, it seems to us, than Shylock's passing gust of lamentation over his

daughter and his ducats. He seizes a large pot of rice, and, poisoning it, sends it to the nunnery. If the plot had ended here, the drama of cruel wrong and deadly revenge would have been finely wrought out; but the concluding two acts almost 'out-Herod Herod,' and Barabas finally falls into the trap he had laid for his enemies, and, exulting in the mischiefs he had caused, dies.

'The troublesome reign of Edward the Seconde' is remarkably free from the extravagances of 'The Jew of Malta.' It is a dramatic chronicle of the events of that reign; and the perverse wilfulness of the infatuated king, and the lingering affection of the neglected queen, and the haughty spirit of Mortimer, are most finely drawn. Here is a passage:—

*Edward.* 'Shall I be haunted thus?'

*Mortimer, junior.* 'Nay, now you're here alone I'll speak my mind;

The idle triumphs, masques, lascivious shows,  
And prodigal gifts bestowed on Gaveston,  
Have drawn thy treasure dry, and made thee weak,  
The murmuring commons overstretched break.'

*Lancaster.* 'Look for rebellion, look to be deposed!

Our garrisons are beaten out of France,  
And, lame and poor, lie groaning at the gates.  
The wild O'Neyl, with swarms of Irish kerns,  
Live uncontrolled within the English pale.  
Unto the walls of York the Scots make raid,  
And unresisted draw away rich spoils.'

*Mortimer.* 'The haughty Dane commands the narrow seas,  
While in the harbour lie thy ships unriggered.'

*Lancaster.* 'What foreign prince sends thee ambassadors?'

*Mortimer.* 'Who loves thee but a sort of flatterers?'

*Lancaster.* 'Thy gentle queen, sole sister to Valoys,  
Complains that thou hast left her all forlorn.'

*Mortimer.* 'Thy court is naked, being bereft of those  
That make a king seem glorious to the world:  
I mean thy peers, whom thou shouldst dearly love.  
Libels are cast against thee in the streets,  
Ballads and rhymes made on thine overthrow!  
When wert thou in the field with banner spread?  
But once! and then thy soldiers marched like players,  
With garish robes, not armour; and thyself,  
Bedaubed with gold, rode laughing with the rest,  
Nodding and shaking of thy spangled crest!'

**This is fine:**

'The griefs of private men are soon allayed,  
But not of kings. The forest deer, being struck,  
Runs to an herb that closeth up the wounds;'

But when the imperial lion's flesh is gored,  
 He rends and tears it with his wrathful paw,  
 And highly scorning that the lowly earth  
 Should drink his blood, mounts up to the air:  
 And so it fares with me!

There are many passages perfectly Shakespearian; thus,—

'Your majesty must go to Killingworth.

*Edward.* 'Must! 'tis somewhat hard when kings *must* go.'

*Leicester.* 'Here is a litter ready for your grace.'

*Edward.* 'A litter hast thou? Lay me in a hearse,  
 And to the gates of hell convey me hence.  
 Let Pluto's bells ring out my fatal knell,  
 For friends hath Edward none.'

And this:

'For what are kings, when regimen is gone,  
 But perfect shadows in a sunshine day.'

The finest play of Marlow, indeed the finest by far of any, save Shakespeare's, is his 'Tragical Historie of the Life and Death of Dr. Faustus.' Justly to appreciate this fine play, and to apprehend the stricken awe with which its representation was witnessed, we must keep in mind the unparalleled devotion to learning which marked the age of Elizabeth, and the unfaltering faith with which men believed that the secrets of the invisible world might be wrested from the demons, or even from 'the angels of the spheres,' by the persisting importunity and resolute will of the scholar. Ere entering upon 'Dr. Faustus,' it may be as well to remind the reader that a belief in magic was not in that age confined to the lower classes; that while the wretched old woman might be pointed out as a witch, many a learned professor was believed to possess knowledge as forbidden, though of a loftier kind. That Cornelius Agrippa actually conversed with spirits, was the faith of the university as well as of the village green; and that this Dr. Faustus was actually carried away by the devil, was a fact which few graduates either of Oxford or Cambridge would then refuse to believe. When, therefore, Marlow wrote this play, it was not with the mere careless feeling of one about to revive an old story because it possessed a poetical interest, or because it would excite wonder; but we have little doubt that he believed the tale firmly: and as in several contemporary plays the reigning vices of the times had been denounced, so in this, the chafing of the restless spirit, challenging Providence, and determined at all hazards to obtain unhallowed power, was what he sought to exhibit—and thus to place before the aspiring scholar the same warning, which had already been placed in a similar manner before other less influential classes.

The play opens with Faustus musing in his study. He looks around—what shall he learn next? He has mastered Aristotle; he has become so famous a physician, that through him ‘whole cities have escaped the plague;’ he has gone through the civil law—Justinian can teach him no more; he has exhausted the learning of the ancient world,—what is there left but divinity? and with that name vexing questions arise in his heart.

——— ‘the Bible, Faustus, view it well!  
*Stipendia peccati mors est.* Ha!  
 The reward of sin is death! that’s hard:  
*Si peccasse negamur, fullimur:*

and then the question thrusts itself in,—

‘Why then belike we *must* sin,  
 And so consequently die!—  
 Ay, *must* we die an everlasting death?  
 What doctrine call you this? *Che sara, sara,*  
 What will be, will—divinity adieu!’

Then the thought of forbidden knowledge arises, and he finely exclaims—

‘Oh, what a world of profit and delight,  
 Of power, of honour, of omnipotence,  
 Is promised to the studious artizan!  
 All things that move between the quiet poles  
 Shall be at my command. Emperors and kings  
 Are but obeyed in their several provinces;  
 But his dominion that exceeds in this,  
 Stretcheth as far as doth the mind of men:  
 A sound magician is a demigod!’

He takes up the forbidden book of spells, and then the good angel and the bad enter.

‘O, Faustus, lay that damned book aside  
 And gaze not on it, lest it tempt thy soul,’

is the address of the good angel.

‘Go forward, Faustus, in that famous art,  
 And be on earth as Jove is in the sky,  
 Lord and commander of the elements,’

is the bidding of the evil spirit. The demon has now laid his strong hand upon the one importunate desire of Faustus,—love of power; and thus, in his succeeding fine soliloquy—which we regret we have not space to extract—there is no vulgar thirst after wealth or enjoyment, not even of lofty station: but the desire of commanding *spirits* is the idea on which he dwells, until

he is prepared to pay even the awful penalty of his soul! There are thunder, and lightning, and demons; and he reads the spell, '*Sint mihi Dii Acherontis*'—a long and an appalling one, all in its original Latin—and Mephistophilis enters. Faustus ratifies the compact in a very fine scene, where, on puncturing his arm, the blood stops, as though to give a last warning. But Faustus is determined; and for twenty-four short years of unlimited power he gives the bond, and receives Mephistophilis as his attendant. The scholar-feeling of that day is well brought out here. Faustus does not immediately command the spirit to work wonders for him, but sits down to question him about 'philosophy,' and more especially those vexing points, the state and prospects of the fallen angels. But *our* Mephistophilis is no doubting, sarcastic spirit like Goëthe's. He is more scriptural, for he 'believes, and trembles;' and thus, when Faustus asks him wherefore he came so readily, he replies:—

'When we hear one rack the name of God,  
Abjure the Scriptures, and his Saviour Christ,  
We fly in hope to get his glorious soul.'

'How camest thou out of hell?' is the next question, and how fine the answer:—

'Why this is hell, nor am I out of it.  
Think'st thou that I, that saw the face of God,  
And tasted the eternal joys of heaven,  
Am not tormented with ten thousand hells  
In being deprived of everlasting bliss?  
O! Faustus, leave these frivolous demands.'

But the eager scholar persists, and then, in answer to the again-repeated question, is this Miltonic passage:—

'Hell hath no limits, nor is circumscribed  
In one self-place; but where we are is hell;  
And, to be short, when all the world dissolves,  
And every creature shall be purified,  
All places shall be hell that are not heaven.'

Mephistophilis then gives him a conjuring-book and leaves him.

Again Faustus sits in his study, and misgivings and relentings steal over him; and he is half inclined to renounce his fatal gift. The good angel enters, and then the bad: but then Mephistophilis appears, and they are seen deep in discourse of 'philosophy.' He next determines to view the world; and straight, as the chorus tells us—

'Did mount him up to scale Olympus high,  
Drawn by the strength of yokèd dragons' necks.



He views the clouds, the planets, and the stars,  
From the bright circle of the hornèd moon,  
Even to the height of *primum mobile* :

and that in the same magic equipage he is gone to view the kingdoms of the earth. Faustus then enters, and in a fine speech gives a description, not unlike that in 'Paradise Regained,' of the countries he has seen. He now wills to visit Rome, and see the triumph of the Pope over the vanquished Bruno ; and his attendant, who certainly is no papist, offers with much glee

To dash the pride of this solemnity,  
To make his monks and abbots stand like apes,  
And point like antics at his triple crown ;  
To beat the beads about the friars' pates,  
Or clap huge horns upon the cardinals' heads.'

Faustus does not allow this, but he releases Bruno from chains, and sends him back to Germany by an attendant spirit. He next requests to be made invisible, and the spirit bids him kneel down,—

' Whilst on thy head I lay mine hand,  
And charm thee with this magic wand.  
First, wear this girdle—then appear  
Invisible to all are here ;  
The planets seven, the gloomy air,  
Hell, and the furies' forked hair,  
Pluto's blue fire, and Hecate's tree,  
With magic spells so compass thee,  
That no eye shall thy body see.'

The scene at the Pope's feast, where Faustus invisibly snatches the dishes and cups from the table, might amuse our forefathers, but certainly is unworthy so fine a drama. The same may be said of the succeeding comic scenes, where Faustus cheats the horse-dealer, and places horns on the head of the scoffing young noble. In better taste is his appearance before the emperor, and his exhibition of Darius and Alexander in dumb show before him, and the banquet of summer-fruit which he presents in mid-winter to the duchess.

The next scene is of a higher mood, and from thence the action goes on without flagging. The time has almost expired, and he gives a gallant supper to his student friends ; and, in answer to their request, shows them 'that peerless dame of Greece,' Helen, who forthwith passes along to the sound of sweet music. The scholars now take leave with thanks—

———— 'and for this blessed sight,  
Happy and blest be Faustus evermore!'

An old man next enters—one who has known him long—

‘O, gentle Faustus, leave this damned art!  
This magic that will charm thy soul to hell,  
And quite bereave thee of salvation.’

Faustus, for the last time, relents; when his attendant demon appears, and reassures him. ‘O stay,’ persists the old man,

‘I see an angel hovering o’er thy head,  
And, with a vial full of precious grace,  
Offers to pour the same into thy soul;  
Then call for mercy!’

‘Faustus. I do repent, and yet I do despair!  
I’ll strive with grace for conquest in my breast.’

The struggle is very fine; but the old man leaves him; and the tempter secures his prey with fresh promises. Faustus now asks for Helen ‘to be his paramour,’ and attended by Cupids she appears to him. His speech is very beautiful: this is part—

‘Was this the face that launched a thousand ships,  
And burnt the hapless towers of Ilium?  
Sweet Helen! make me immortal!  
O thou art fairer than the evening air,  
Clad in the beauty of ten thousand stars;  
Brighter art thou than flaming Jupiter,—  
More lovely than the monarch of the sky.’

And now the fatal night arrives, and he sends for his scholars. The homely prose of this scene suits well with the subject, and the plain speaking is solemn as the loftiest blank verse.

‘Faustus. O gentlemen!

2nd Scholar. What ails Faustus?

Faustus. Ah! my sweet chamberfellow, had I lived with thee, then had I lived still. Look, sirs! comes he not, comes he not?

2nd Scholar. O, my dear Faustus, what imports this fear?

3rd Scholar. He is not well, being solitary. ’Tis but a surfeit, sir; fear nothing.’

Faustus. A surfeit of deadly sin! that hath lost body and soul!

2nd Scholar. Yet, Faustus, look up to Heaven, and remember mercy is infinite.

Faustus. But Faustus’ offence can never be pardoned. O, gentlemen! hear me with patience, and tremble not at my speeches. Remember, I have been a student here these thirty years; O! that I had never seen Wittenburg; never read book! And what wonders I have done all Germany can witness; yea, all the world! for which Faustus hath lost both Germany and the world, yea, heaven itself!—heaven, the seat of God, the throne of the blessed, the kingdom of joy!—Hell! sweet friends! What shall become of Faustus, being there!

They urge him to pray. He replies,—

'Call on God? whom Faustus hath abjured! whom Faustus hath blasphemed! O! I would weep, but the devil draws my tears. Gush forth blood instead! yea, life and soul; I would lift up my hands, but they hold them!'

Can we question that such appalling scenes spoke home to the hearts and consciences of our forefathers? The students at length leave him, and determine to spend the night in prayer; and for the last time Mephistophilis enters, exulting—

'O thou bewitching fiend, 'twas thy temptation,'

he cries. Mephistophilis answers:

—— 'I do confess it, Faustus, and rejoice;  
'Twas I, that when thou wast i' the way to heaven,  
Dammed up thy passage; when thou took'st the book  
To view the Scriptures, then, I turned the leaves  
And led thine eye. What! weepest thou?  
'Tis now too late, farewell;  
Fools that will laugh on earth must weep in hell!'

The good and the bad angel now enter, the latter to take up the song of exultation, the former to pour his last wail over the lost scholar.

'O! thou hast lost celestial happiness!  
Pleasures unspeakable, bliss without end,—  
Hadst thou affected sweet divinity,  
Hell, nor the devil, had had no power then.  
Hadst thou kept on that way, Faustus, behold  
In what resplendent glory hadst thou sate  
On yonder throne, like those bright, shining saints,  
And triumphed over hell—that hast thou lost!  
And now, poor soul! must thy good angel leave thee!'

The clock strikes eleven; and Faustus stands in agony—for but one hour remains to him. His long soliloquy, rising into the finest poetry, to which the lamentations of the fallen spirits in Pandemonium read but as a fine piece of declamation, is fearfully appalling. We gave a short specimen in the article before alluded to (No. X. p. 436), but duly to estimate this wonderful passage it should be read as a whole, although we think it would be difficult for the most iron-nerved reader to do so without absolute horror. In religious force, it most resembles Bunyan's awful exhibition of the lost soul, in his fearfully powerful treatise—but it is too solemn to be coolly criticized. The catastrophe now takes place; and after a night of horrors the scholars come in, and see the limbs of the wretched Faustus scattered around. They collect the remains, and while shudder-

ing at his fate, determine, since he was so great a scholar, to give them honourable burial, and the whole concludes with a warning—

'That may exhort the wise,  
Only to wonder at unlawful things.'

In reading over this wonderful drama, the recollection of the modern 'Faust,' so highly and so justly lauded, came vividly to our minds; and we found it a very interesting task to compare them together. And most truly is the spirit of the sixteenth century, and of the eighteenth, brought out in both. Marlow's 'Faustus' is the aspiring, enthusiastic student of the age of deep learning, of unmatched scholarship, of that overmastering thirst for knowledge, which scarcely lingered to count the cost, so it were but attained. Goëthe's 'Faust' is the questioning, doubting, fastidious student, dissatisfied even with the learning that has made him so renowned, and he sits discontented in his study, talking of 'pestilent philosophy,' and turning away from his books, like the sickly, sated epicure, who loathes the dainty banquet that so tempted him but yesterday. The rise of doubt in their minds is equally distinct. Faust opens the Bible, and reads, 'In the beginning was the Word,' and vague speculations arise in his mind, just as they might do in an age of general scepticism. But *our* Faustus seizes at once upon the doctrine of necessity—'why then belike we *must* sin,' and straightway every vexing question of 'Providence, foreknowledge, will, and fate,' chafes in his mind, urging him to fling aside the volume of salvation. The attendant demons, too, are singularly discriminated. The modern Mephistophilis is the mere scoffing, jeering spirit, not too refined, but amusing himself equally among the drunken crew in the wine cellar, as in the study of the solitary musc—a low-company-loving devil, after all, just such as Retsch has imagined him, with leering eye, and a vulgar grin. But the Mephistophilis of Marlow, is the bitter, malignant spirit; and his earnestness, which in the earlier scenes so contrasts with the haughty scorn of his victim, is in far better keeping. The being who had actually tasted the bliss of Heaven, and had fallen, could never be in mood 'to sit in the seat of the scorner,' and thus, when Faustus in his bravado laughs at future punishment, the lost spirit sternly exclaims—

'Ah! think so still, till experience change your mind.'

To the modern reader, the want of human and relative interest will perhaps urge him to yield the palm to Goëthe's 'Faustus.' It is true we have no Margaret—indeed, no female character to attract our sympathy; but then, is not the solemn interest of the

main incident weakened by this? There needed not an especial tempter, nor the horrible solemnity of the blood-written signature, to enable a young student to attract, seduce, and forsake a mere country girl! But Marlow's 'Faustus' is all along wrapt in high musings: what were the pleasures of ordinary life to him, who with all the exclusiveness of overmastering attachment had devoted his whole existence to study? And thus he stands before us the type of the scholar of that age, when men shut themselves up in their studies, and toiled sixteen hours a day, and called it paradise. It was to enthusiasts like these that the solemn warning of Faustus' 'tragedie' was presented.

Still, Marlow has nothing to compare with that finest scene, where the solitary student, a prey to agonizing feelings, which rise almost to madness, clutches the goblet of laudanum, and then—at that very crisis of his fate—the Easter bells fling out their sweet music on the hushed midnight; and the chorus of angels chant 'Christ is risen,' awakening recollections of his all-trusting childhood, that flash like gleams of sunlight on the thunder-cloud, until he dashes the goblet from his lip, and stands lost in fond remembrance of

'The deep stillness of the Sabbath calm,  
The heartfelt fulness of the Sabbath bell.'

In *this* scene we willingly award the palm to Goëthe.

But yet, in the conduct of the plot, and in the concluding scenes of the elder 'Faustus,' how sustained is the interest, compared with that of the modern 'Faust.' After all the magic apparatus, what does Faust do?—even on the Walpurgis night, he is a mere spectator, and 'Old mother Baubo' holds as important a station as he. And the final scene: all interest for the hero is lost in poor Margaret, while his earnest endeavours to save her, bring him again within the pale of human sympathy, and he seems to us a mere erring youth, to be punished by bitter earthly suffering, rather than by the tremendous forfeit of his soul. Here, again, how finely is the character of the sixteenth century, in comparison with the eighteenth, brought out. It was not 'out of the depths' of a solemn belief, that the great poet of Germany wrote; his faith faltered, and with it his genius. But Marlow was in solemn earnest. And this it is that renders the dramatists of Elizabeth's day so important as illustrators of the period. They were no showmen with lamp and mirror, and well-chosen apparatus, coolly exhibiting their 'dissolving views' to the children, all-believing, who gazed, and wondered, and shuddered; but the story was true to the dramatist, as to them. The tale of the barter of the human soul had been falteringlly whispered

beside their cradles; they had looked bodily upon the witch as she passed along, known by name, and hated of all. At the university,—for all these dramatists, however their after-life was spent, had graduated there,—although the *form* of the popular faith might change, still the substance was the same. In the mists of that early morning, all was indefinable; and all things, like the giant shadows of the Brocken, took strange shapes; what wonder, then, that men with so many marvels around them should fix no bounds to their belief? Still, the age by some superficial writers so much scorned, because it was the age of faith in the supernatural, was also the age of firm faith in the Scriptures; and thus, it is delightful to meet—in most unexpected juxta-position—with quotations and allusions, which the gentlemen wits of queen Anne's days would have termed most fanatical, and the sober church-going people of the Georgian era, rank methodism. No one, we are sure, can properly estimate the religious character of the age of Elizabeth, unless he diligently studies the old dramatists.

The subject is of great interest, and although we have exceeded our limits, it is far from being exhausted, for we shall find in the dramatic poetry of this reign, and still more in that of the succeeding reign, traits of character and pictures of manners to be met with only there, combined with some of our finest poetry, and, more important still, a reflection of the moral and intellectual character of the period—which we can obtain from no other source.

ART. III.—*Christian Socialism, a Lecture.* By J. M. LUDLOW, Esq.  
London.

MR. MACAULAY, in his 'History of England,' has drawn some vivid comparisons between past and present ages, as regards the condition of the poor, and decides unequivocally in favour of the present. Mr. Carlyle, on the other hand, in his work on Chartism, says: 'Hitherto, after many tables and statements, one 'is still left mainly to what he can ascertain by his own eyes, looking at the concrete phenomenon for himself;' and comes to just an opposite conclusion. Statistical science has failed to supply us with any sufficient guidance in instituting a comparison between subjects involving so many considerations as the past and present condition of particular classes of men. History, also, throws but little light on the subject of the poor in earlier ages, at all suited to our present inquiry. While it furnishes us with

the records of wars, and famines, and pestilences, and of the miseries which have followed in their train, we fail to discover any satisfactory record of the social and industrial condition of the labouring classes. It is true that it affords us sufficient light to enable us to discover that in most of the conditions which constitute the moral and the physical well-being of the greater portion of the community, the present age is in great advancement; but we want proof that it is so with the whole.

The modern ideas of liberty preclude us from thinking any state preferable to our own which retains in bondage the bodies of men, and subjects them to the will of a master. The free exercise of the will is so sweet to human nature, that no sacrifice seems too great in order to secure it. The poorest subsistence, with the free control of one's actions, is deemed preferable to luxury with bondage. But it does not at all follow, because feudal bondage has passed away, and the bodies of men are no longer the chattels of the baronial estate, that therefore men are free. There are thousands of our fellow-countrymen who are under a sterner and far more cruel yoke than was ever imposed by the feudal lord. What bondage can be more terrible than that in which the handloom weavers are held? Their numbers are computed at eight hundred thousand, the principal proportion of whom are compelled to work from morning till night for a miserable pittance of from four shillings and sixpence to seven shillings per week—a sum capable of supplying but the smallest means of keeping body and soul together. Then there are the journeyman tailors, and the sempstresses, and the agricultural labourers, all of whose means of subsistence are decidedly inferior to those of the ancient serf, and with less certainty of attainment; for the baron was forced to feed his serf, and, at least, to keep him in as good condition as the farmer of the present day keeps his horses. But the employer of modern labour has no responsibility of this kind: he looks not at the health of his servant, not at his powers of endurance, but at the quantity and the quality of the work done.

Revelations have been recently made, of a state of wretchedness and suffering in our cities and towns, of which the country generally had no just conception, and which our statistics had not reached. They show that the revolutions in the processes of arts and manufactures which have been effected by science, while they have wonderfully increased the trade and the resources of the country, and the amount of remuneration to the highly skilled artisan, have had a proportionate influence in lowering the condition of the partially skilled, or the mere labourer. They give double power to the graphic words of Mr. Carlyle in his work on Chartism:—

'Half a million of handloom weavers, working fifteen hours a day in perpetual inability to procure thereby enough of the coarsest food; English farm labourers at nine shillings and at seven shillings a week; Scotch farm labourers, who in districts the half of whose husbandry is that of cows, taste no milk, can procure no milk; all these things credible to us: several of them known to us by the best of evidence, by eyesight. With all this it is consistent that the wages of 'skilled labour,' as it is called, should in many cases be higher than they ever were: the giant steam-engine in a giant nation will here create violent demand for labour, and will there annihilate demand. But, alas! the great portion of labour is not skilled: the millions are and must be skillless; hewers of wood and drawers of water; menials of the steam engine, only the *chief* menials and immediate *body* servants of which require skill. English commerce stretches its fibres over the whole earth; sensitive literally, nay, quivering in convulsion, to the farthest influences of the earth. The huge demon of mechanism smokes and thunders, panting at his great task, in all sections of English land; changing his shape like a very Proteus; and infallibly at every change of shape *oversetting* whole multitudes of workmen, and as if with the waving of his shadow from afar, hurling them asunder this way and that, in their crowded march and course of work or traffic; so that the wisest no longer knows his whereabouts. With an Ireland pouring daily in on us, in these circumstances; deluging us down to its own waste confusion, outward and inward, it seems cruel mockery to tell poor drudges that their condition is improving.'

It is to be feared that the improved condition of our *skilled* artisans will lead men to think that the same influences which have brought about so great an improvement in one class, must cause a proportionate benefit to all classes; but this is by no means the case. Skill is fast monopolizing all labour, and is reducing the field for the unskilled to the smallest limits. Skill, with the machinery which it has created, enables one man to do the work of hundreds; and in the fierce competition which arises from the limited amount of work to be done, the least skilled are inevitably beaten, and reduced to the lowest condition.

The official returns of the number of able-bodied paupers, relieved during the period between 1842 and 1848, show a steady increase, more than in proportion to the increase in population; and when we take into account the exertions that have been made of late years to purge the system of parish relief of abuse, which abuse must have had great effect in swelling the returns of former years, the increase is truly alarming.

But the pauper returns are, however, not the gauge of the amount of wretchedness endured by the poorest of our population. The character of the English labourer is such as to induce him to suffer the severest hardships before he can bring



his mind to subject itself to the ignominy of entering a poor-house.

In taking the amount of money wages earned by a labourer in England, as the standard of his recompence, it must not be forgotten that all the articles of food are dearer here than in any other country in Europe; and that though he were willing to live upon the cheapest and the coarsest food, yet, as the greatest profit is derived from the cultivation of the first qualities of food, the lower qualities are not produced, so that he is restricted to the purchase of the best, or to starve. Therefore, in instituting a comparison between the past and the present, we must consider the difficulties of obtaining subsistence generally. We find that in the past, the labourer's bread was black, and his food generally of a bad quality; but we do not find that that food failed to afford a healthy subsistence, nor that it was limited in quantity, (except in times of famine, when the whole community suffered,) nor do we find that the man who was willing to work failed of obtaining sufficient for all the wants of animal life. His sufferings arose more from his gross immorality and his unwillingness to work. But in the present day, the distinguishing feature in the sufferings of the poor is the inability of the willing workman to earn sufficient to supply the common wants of life, and also the uncertain tenure of his occupation. The competition with skill and its inexhaustible resources, renders occupation in this thickly populated country as a shifting quicksand, on which no hope can be built of securing an independent subsistence; but it hurries whole communities of beings from active industry into hopeless idleness: thenceforward to form the masses from which are enlisted the army of gin-drinkers and criminals, which so fearfully blacken our social records.

But we are told that they who are unable to keep up in the race with industry and skill, must be left behind! Such is to be the doom of the millions of our population who, born of parents themselves totally unskilled and ignorant, and whose daily toils yield scarcely sufficient to support life, are precluded from the hope of ever rising above the rank of the rudest labourer. It is not necessary here to say one word in condemnation of such a mode of solving this difficulty. But it should be remarked, that to close our eyes to the miseries and the sufferings of any class of our population, is not even a safe course to pursue as regards ourselves. The experience which France before the revolution, and Ireland in later days, afford, teaches us that neglected wretchedness, instead of quietly dying out, increases in proportion to its misery, and finally struggles with the upper classes to drag them down to its own level.

There is, however, a growing conviction in the minds of most thinking men, that a very different solution of the difficulties, under which the labouring classes suffer, from any which has yet been proposed, will have to be found before long.

The many social and communistic schemes that are advocated, both on the continent and in this country, with so much enthusiasm, show, in some measure, to what extent the subject has occupied the minds of men of science and literature, and have caused some of the strictest competitive economists in this country to pause and to inquire, whether such schemes may not possess, hidden under much error and falsehood, the germ of a truer theory of labour than has yet been dreamed of in our philosophy.

It is not until the physical condition of our poor has become improved, that we can ever hope to grapple with the great question of secular and religious education. Were we to build schools, and furnish them with teachers, sufficient to accommodate the whole population, the poorest and the most ignorant portion—that which it is the most needful to educate—would be unreached. It is a primal law of nature—the strongest instinct in organized beings—to require first the means of sustaining animal life; and when deprived of such means, the highest intellectual and moral faculties stoop to the measure of an animal instinct, and thus become extinguished; nor can they be rekindled, until the animal be satisfied. We admit that by some better appliances than are now at work, you may fill the limited number of schools that are at present in existence, but it will be with the children of the comparatively well-paid class of workmen; who, having themselves attained to some measure of education, appreciate its value, or who can afford decent clothing in which their children can appear at school. But that class whose extreme ignorance keeps them at the bottom of society, or whose wretched poverty, by denying them the merest necessities of life, sharpens their animal instincts, and renders them prone to be suspicious of the intentions of all benefactors but those who supply their animal wants, would throw back with a taunt all other beneficence.

The great work which lies before us is, first to raise the physical condition of our labouring classes; and they will then not only be in a position the better to appreciate the advantages of education for their children, but they will be enabled to pay for it, and to retain them at school to a later age than the present necessity of sending them so young into factories and other occupations admits of.

The public mind is now divided between two great parties, holding directly opposite opinions respecting the means by which the market for labour is to be rendered perfectly healthy; the

one being the social and co-operative, the other the *laissez-faire* and competitive.

With respect to the first, it is said that there is no reason why the enormously productive powers of a large population, aided as they are by all the appliances of science and of art, if properly divided and apportioned, so as to secure an equal balance in production, should have any other effect than that of raising the condition of the whole body of producers. It is said that labour and skill alone produce, that therefore they should be the largest participators in profit, and that capital, which is but hoarded labour, though necessary to assist in production, if it received its proportionate profit, would have but a very small amount allotted to it. Whereas, under the present *régime*, capital carries off nearly all the profit, and labour is left to the consequences of a remorseless competition, produced by the want of a proper understanding between its several divisions.

It is not our intention to enter upon the many theories that have been put forward with so much zeal, for the purpose of effecting a perfect organization of labour. They most of them, if not all, must fail, from the fact of their treating labour as though it were merely a productive machine; instead of their taking into account the whole human constitution, with all the passions and prejudices, the hopes and fears, that belong to it. Many of them, in fact, necessitate so perfect a state of heart, of knowledge, and of obedience, in the whole mass of society, as would, if possessed, render any organization whatever unnecessary, for all would then work with perfect harmony without it. Only a slight attention to this subject should be enough to show, that the co-operative principle, in any given trade, would be of the proposed value only as all of that trade should become parties to it, so that there may not come to be a new competition between association and association, in place of the old one between master and master. This could follow only from one of two causes, viz.—such a state of intelligence and virtue among the workmen as it would be most utopian to expect; or from a strongly despotic intervention of the state. That intervention must determine the associations that shall be, the rate of productiveness that shall be, and everything else that shall be; and thus our passion for a co-operative theory ends in our becoming machines—creatures governed in all things by a will foreign to our own!

There is one great mistake under which most social theorists of the present day labour, and that is, in their estimate of the amount which capital appropriates of the produce of labour. It has been stated upon good authority, and after due inquiry and

calculation, that the bulk of British manufacturers—those who employ the great body of our labouring population—seldom realize more than ten per cent. upon the capital employed, which is divided thus: five per cent. for the market value of money, and five per cent. remuneration for the talent, the anxiety, the risk, the enterprise, and the time expended by them, upon which the success of their several establishments depends.

There are very few who would object to so moderate a profit—it is, indeed, small, when we take into consideration the natural profit which results from the employment of a high order of skill upon matter generally. And the reason why it is not larger must be found in the fact, that competition for employment exists as keenly in the highest divisions of skill generally as in the lowest—that it is felt as much between master and master, as between masters and men. The days of monopoly, whether arising from privilege or from secrecy, are ended in England; everything is now open to the free use of all who have the faculties proper for taking advantage of the opportunities of advancement. It is the ignorance of these facts that has led many social reformers into error. In France, where the social theory held by many of the members of the Provisional Government after the revolution of 1848 had the opportunity of being tested, there was a good illustration of the fact, that when any particular branch of industry is open to all competitors, the profits of masters fall to the ordinary market value for skill. National workshops were established, and among others a tailors' workshop, where employment was given in the manufacture of dresses for the Garde Mobile. Now, before the orders were issued to this workshop, a tender was received from a private tailor to contract for the whole amount, so that the government had a guide as to the cost of the work upon which they were about to enter. This contract price, however, was not sufficient to cover even the cost of labour and material in the national workshop, although no profit was received by any one, beyond the ordinary rate of wages.

The failure of this, as well as of many other schemes of a like nature in France, may be attributed to the fact, that in them the individual superiority of energy and skill is not taken cognizance of, and proportionately rewarded.

The experiments that have been tried in England, of co-operation on the part of artisans, for the purpose of securing to themselves all the profits of labour, paying to capital only a market rate of interest, have in many instances proved successful in a pecuniary point of view. This may be accounted for by the fact, that the several associations have been established at a

period when public attention is more than ordinarily excited, by the late French Revolution, to inquire into the condition of the labouring classes, and interested and alarmed by the revelations which have been coming so vividly before them; so that the associations have secured the support and patronage of a large class of benevolent persons. To this must be added, the advantages derived from the economy of association when judiciously planned. The members secure to themselves all the profit of their calling, without dividing any portion of it with middlemen; they give to capital only its market rate of interest, and each workman, feeling an individual interest in the prosperity of the concern, works more heartily, and consequently more thoroughly.

Whilst the principle of association among the working classes bears in it much that is good, and which will probably work a great revolution in their social condition, by calling into actual operation the virtues of self-reliance and frugality, it will not only not effect, but it would be a great evil if it did effect, the object held in view by the social theorists of the present day—the annihilation of competition.

Competition we take to be part of a natural law, brought into exercise the moment we become associated in industry among our fellow-creatures, and based upon the constitution of human nature. From the fact that the Deity has given to men endowments differing in intellectual and in moral power, as well as a common desire to be governed by their own individual will—which will is not in accordance with the universal law of nature—we argue that competition cannot be annihilated. Supposing that the principle of co-operation were universally established, would not the inventive genius of individuals tend to bring about competition? So soon as machines were invented for the purpose of economizing labour, would they not immediately make the man who possessed them a competitor for a larger portion of work than he had hitherto enjoyed? Would he not expect to profit by his inventions in some way or other? And if the trade association to which he belonged agreed to buy them of him, and to make them common property, would they not immediately, by diminishing the amount of work to be done by hand, throw some of the members out of employment, or cause the whole to be partially idle? Would this be a desirable state of things? And is it likely that an industrious man, with a large family, would be content to remain idle half the day, when the amount of his earnings was not greater than the man who had no family?

Again: suppose the whole industry of the nation were brought into ~~so~~ complete an unity of purpose, and the passions and the

ambition of men were so successfully brought under control, that a perfect organization of labour upon the co-operative principle were thoroughly established for once; how would the allotment of hands be made, and their division among the several branches of industry effected, so as to secure a balance of production exactly apportioned to the wants of the whole community? And how would the prices of each be fixed without competition? These must be settled by an imperial power; otherwise the most pleasant of industrial pursuits would be overwhelmed with hands, whilst the disagreeable would be utterly neglected. But competition, by here stepping in to regulate remuneration by the law of supply and demand, counteracts the inducements afforded by pleasantness of occupation, and apportions the due amount of labour to unpleasant pursuits.

We have said that some of the working men's associations which have been formed have succeeded in a pecuniary point of view, for the reasons stated. But they have not so succeeded without competition. They are established for the purpose of competing with the master manufacturer, for that amount of profit which he has hitherto enjoyed, and for dividing it among the workmen: which amount is nothing more than a legitimate compensation for the amount of his responsibility, and for the talent brought to bear upon his business in offering inducements to his customers, the public, so as to persuade them to purchase of him at a price that will leave him his profit. Such inducements may be of different kinds, and suited to the different fancies of different customers. The working men's associations have succeeded only in so far as they have complied with the common rules of trade. They have catered for public patronage with a new story in their mouths. They have appealed to the sympathies of the charitable. They have given guarantees as to the quality and character of their goods, endorsed by a long list of patrons and promoters, which the public have accepted, and which have been sufficient to establish their credit as good tradesmen. They have done all this with little risk to themselves; and the result will be, that their competition, if their schemes continue to succeed and to spread, will reduce the profits of the ordinary tradesmen to a level with the salary of their managing man, if they do not drive him completely out of the field. But this we do not anticipate; we can hardly imagine that these associations, managed by men with a fixed salary, can successfully compete with the talented and ingenious master, whose intellect and resources are stimulated by the certainty of reaping the full profit arising from their exercise.

Co-operation then, partially adopted, in any community, can-

not get rid of competition. It merely directs it into new channels. That which renders it successful in trading associations will be adopted by the ordinary tradesman. When the public sentiment shall have become so influenced as to render the great majority of buyers the patrons of well-paid labour, another requisite besides price and quality will determine the value to them of a commodity; and the tradesman will be forced, in self-defence, to adopt the principle of paying remunerative wages. Thus it will be with all the distinctive features of the associations; the tradesman will adopt them immediately he finds it necessary to secure customers, until his profit shall become so small as to drive him out of the trade.

Whilst competition has been considered the great destroyer of good wages, it appears never to have entered into the minds of its opponents, to inquire as to what it is that has rendered competition in the present day so remorseless; they seem to forget, that had there been full employment for every man, competition could have had no power to reduce wages; that the number of operatives must first have outgrown the amount of work to be done; and that co-operation cannot increase that amount, but must tend to draw a greater number of hands into the trade that adopts it, from its offering greater inducements than ordinary; until the portion of work that each can obtain will be so small, that the amount of individual earnings will be reduced to the smallest pittance. On the other hand, co-operation, although it cannot increase the amount of work to be done, will, if it eventually be found capable of removing competition between the workmen themselves, prevent any great fall in the rate of remuneration for the work that there is to be done: for it has been found, in districts where wages have fallen below the amount sufficient to supply the necessities of life, that each man, to make up the deficiency, is obliged to execute a greater amount of work, and also to find employment for members of his family,—whom he could previously afford to see unemployed,—to the prejudice of the legitimate labourers, who are thus thrown out of employment, again to compete at farther reduced wages for work. This appears to be the most frightful phase of competition. It is to this that we trace the extreme sufferings of large classes of workers by hand; their reduced remuneration necessitating harder labour, and that at the expense of their fellow-workers.

There would be no limit to the fall of wages in this country, where there is a large surplus of unemployed labour, were it not for the existence of the poor-laws. In many places, it is the Union which fixes the price of labour; for so soon as it falls

below the possibility of its affording subsistence, the Union furnishes the deficiency.

Let us now turn to the competitive principle, and endeavour to discover whether agriculture and commerce in England, if left unrestricted, are capable of affording permanent remunerative employment to the increasing masses of our labouring population.

Remuneration for labour consists of different degrees in different ages, according to the wants and habits of a people. The savage in a state of nature, with no want save that of satisfying the appetite for food, if engaged in the cultivation of the soil, would consider himself remunerated when his crops were sufficient to supply him and his family with food. He knows of no necessity for clothing, nor for any of those accessories which a civilized life entails; he need not, therefore, set aside any portion of his produce to exchange for them. But in a state where other wants besides that of food require to be supplied, the remuneration for labour must be proportionately higher. In England, at the present date, it is necessary that the land should yield sufficient, not only for food, but also to exchange for clothing, and to cover the expenses of a dwelling; besides which, land being proprietary, and the protection of a good government afforded, a portion has to be set aside for rent and taxes, as well as to pay interest on the capital which is necessary for the purchase of utensils, and the supply of the necessaries of life until the harvest be gathered.

If, therefore, the produce of land in England fail to meet these demands, which are imperative, its cultivation can never be remunerative. It matters not that you protect the agriculturist from competition by levying a duty upon foreign produce—which is, in other words, to render him the recipient of a bonus, drawn from the unprotected branches of industry in the country, for every bushel of corn that he produces; it is true that you thus secure to him a better price for what he has to sell, but not a larger quantity of it. The cultivation of the land is still as unremunerative to the country. The surplus available for food, after the producers have been fed, will be as small as though it had no price; and though this enhanced price, which is consequent upon protection, will prevent land from going out of cultivation, it is but a clumsy and expensive mode of employing surplus labour, by the cultivation of land, the produce of which, without the bonus, would not be sufficient to afford subsistence to such labour.

It should ever be the aim of a good government to take care that the burdens which it imposes or sanctions, should throw no obstacle in the way of their being felt equally by all the divisions



of industry. For supposing the nature of the country to afford equal facilities for the production of all the means of ministering to the wants of civilized life, the only cause that can operate to prevent their equal and profitable development, is the ill apportionment of the national burdens; and the point at which all must cease to be profitable is, when the country becomes too small for its population.

When this country drew the whole of its corn supplies exclusively from within itself, the burdens peculiar to land were divided equally among the consumers, insomuch that they enhanced the price of the produce accordingly; but immediately any part of those supplies were introduced from abroad, these burdens fell upon the agriculturist, in proportion to the fall in price produced by such introduction. Tithes are therefore now a very oppressive burden upon land, for which there is no corresponding tax upon manufactures; and church-rates, from the mode of levying them upon rents, also fall unfairly upon agriculture; as the amount of rents in rural industry bears so enormous a proportion in the cost of production, beyond what it does in the industry of cities and towns.

We must not omit the question of the poor. In cities and towns, from the nature of the occupation pursued, abundance of labour stimulates employment. But this is seldom the case in rural districts, to any great extent. And the reason is obvious. The manufacturer is seldom checked by the want of the raw material; it is supplied in steadily increasing quantities, with the demand which cheap labour excites; but land cannot be supplied in the same way. Increasing population, therefore, after it has reduced wages to the very lowest point at which it is possible for a labourer to exist, accumulates in the unions, and the burden of its support is thus thrown upon the land. The employment of a greatly increased number of hands upon the land, beyond a certain limit, would not relieve its burdens, seeing that labour in agriculture, as compared with manufactures, bears but a small proportion in the cost of its produce; and it is very much to be questioned whether, in those cases where farming is remunerative, it is rendered so by the extra number of hands employed, or by the adoption of machinery in the place of manual labour, and the practice of the most rigid economy.

The greatest difficulty, however, against which agriculture has to contend in this country, is the dearness of land. It is unlike the staple commodities which form the basis of manufactures; it cannot be transported from market to market, according to the demand for it; therefore they who need it must themselves be

transported to the spots where it is located, and to be obtained the cheapest. But as men are unwilling to leave their homes, with all their associations and comforts, to endure the hardships of a new country, their numbers will always be sufficient to render competition for farms such, as to prevent the fall of rents while there is any hope of obtaining a livelihood. Land-owners will not reduce rents to the farmers, nor will farmers increase the wages of their assistants, so long as farmers and assistants are more in number than are required for the amount of cultivation to be carried on. We do, indeed, here and there, hear of landlords remitting part of their rents; but in these cases it is because they are unwilling to displace tenants who have occupied the land for years, or because their particular property has become depreciated—not the general market value of land.

Rent being that amount of the produce of land, which remains over and above, after the payment of all the expenses of cultivation, would be entirely regulated by such surplus, in those cases where the cultivators bore the smaller proportion in relation to the quantity of land to be cultivated; and immediately any portion failed to produce such surplus, the loss would fall upon the owner of the land, or the cultivator would remove to such land as would, by its superior fertility, leave a surplus for the payment of rent. But in England the cultivators bear the greater proportion, and the consequence is, that rents are not so regulated, but by the competition which arises among cultivators to obtain a field for the exercise of their industry.

The question may here be naturally asked, why does competition for farms continue, when their cultivation ceases to afford remuneration? and an answer may be sought in the fact, that the real causes of agricultural depression are as yet understood but by a few; and that the majority of farms are rented with a vague impression that relief will be afforded by some means or other. There is also at present a great deal of speculation in farming, carried on by men of capital, in the shape of vast expenditure upon draining and 'high farming;' and the opinion is becoming general, that under that system agriculture will prove remunerative; and the results of the experiments that have been tried will go far to justify the impression. But we must not lose sight of the fact, that success has been secured by the use of machinery in every operation where it could be made available to economize labour, and at a period when that labour which is employed is remunerated by starvation wages.

The adoption of machinery in the place of manual labour, with the view of economizing the cost of production, appears to be totally inconsistent with true economy, when the labour thus dis-

pensed with is equally sustained, and in idleness, out of the produce of the land, through the medium of the poor's-rates. Supposing all the farmers in an union were simultaneously to adopt the use of a particular piece of machinery, by which they dispensed with the assistance of three out of every ten of the labourers they had hitherto employed; and supposing that, at the same time, there were five *per cent.* of the labouring population in the union workhouse, driven there from the impossibility of obtaining their livelihood by labour, the rate of wages having fallen to the lowest point capable of affording subsistence, and rendering competition for employment at lower wages impossible; could there be any saving by such a course of proceeding? We think not. It would be an actual loss, to the extent of the cost of the machinery, and of the expense of working it. Machinery, however, is never adopted simultaneously. The most enterprising and far-seeing man adopts it first, and continues to reap the benefit of his enterprise, whilst his neighbours bear their proportion of the expense of sustaining the labourers discharged by him, and thus thrown upon the union. They are, in self-defence—both on account of the increased rates ensuing, and of the advantageous position in which he is placed for competing with them in the sale of their produce in the market—obliged to adopt machinery also; and when they have all done so, they are, as we have before seen, in a less advantageous position than when they were without the machinery.

It is thus that machinery operates in all cases where it is applied for the purpose of reducing the cost of production, where manual labour had been previously employed. Its effect is to reduce the rate of wages, and in those instances where, as in agriculture in England, the nature of the work upon which it is employed does not admit of unlimited extension, the reduction is permanent; and it eventually throws the surplus labour upon the poor's-rates.

Machinery is, nevertheless, more than ever essential to our national position, for, notwithstanding our excessive supply of labour, it is dearer in England than in any other country in Europe. Although remuneration for labour has fallen so low as in many instances to verge upon starvation, it bears a greater proportion to the cost of production here than elsewhere. And since we have abundant evidence that this cannot arise from a scarcity of labour, we must attribute it to the only other cause that can account for it—namely, to the high price of food consequent upon the scarcity of land and high rents, and to the existence of a poor-law, which, as we have before said, prevents wages from falling below a standard that precludes starvation.

Machinery, however, with its adjuncts, coal and iron, by enabling us to produce those necessities of life, which do not require territory, so cheaply as to supply them to the foreigner, at a price sufficiently below what they cost him to produce, as will pay for the carriage to and fro, besides all the risks and expenses of trade, furnishes us with the means of purchasing corn and other necessary produce from abroad, to make up our deficiency. Without these means of purchase, it is hard to conjecture what would be the state of the millions of human beings that crowd this small spot of territory, or how we could pay for the enormous amount of foreign produce of all kinds, upon which we are now so absolutely dependent.

But let us not buoy ourselves up with the idea, that foreign trade is capable alone of delivering from bondage those large masses of our labouring population, of which we spoke in the commencement of this article. The trade of the country no doubt will continue to have occasional seasons of prosperity, when the number of the unemployed will be sensibly diminished; but when we make allowances for this, and draw an average from the cycles in which the periods of depression move, we cannot but look with dismay at the future. For we must not lose sight of the fact, that whilst we are improving our position for trading with the foreigner, in reducing the cost of manufactures by farther extending the use of machinery, we are depriving a greater number of our population of employment, and precluding them from becoming *purchasers* of the fruits of our trade. Nor can we hope that the same effect will follow the continued substitution of machinery for manual labour that followed its first introduction,—namely, that of creating a collateral demand for the displaced workman. At first it was used for merely the rougher arts, but now it bids fair to take the place of even the most difficult and refined, and in so effectual a manner, as a few years ago would have been pronounced an impossibility.

The possibility of opening fresh markets abroad, sufficient to give employment to the whole of our increasing population, rendered so intensely productive by machinery, is of the remotest order. Wherever we can now find a market, there our trade is pushed, until remuneration falls so low as to yield but the smallest inducement to continue it, notwithstanding the cheapness of our production. The want of means on the part of our unemployed to become purchasers of articles of import, renders the market for them so limited, that there is little temptation to the foreigner to push his trade with us. The desire to trade is nearly all on our side; we are so anxious for markets for our enormous production, that in almost every instance we send so abundant a supply, that

the reduced price which ensues renders the exchange for foreign produce vastly against us, and the foreigner gets all the advantages of our reduced cost of production. As proofs of this fact, we have only to point to the prevailing condition of our foreign trade generally. No sooner does a market yield much more than will cover the cost and charges upon goods, than it is sure to be followed by a glut; and the experience of most of our merchants is, that if foreign trade will yield a profit, after deducting the market rate of interest, and a commission of two and a half per cent. upon an average of several years, it may be considered good.

If the productive power of foreign nations were as great as ours, and there were as many amongst them scrambling for a small profit, there might be some hope that the advantages of commercial intercourse would be fully reciprocated. But such is not the case. Territory generally is plentiful with them, but capital or labour, and sometimes both, are scarce; so that they fail to produce anything like the surplus that we produce for the purposes of foreign trade: hence we frequently find, that instead of the excess of our exports to them being paid by an excess of produce or by bullion, the price of our commodities falls, until the cost of our foreign produce is virtually enhanced ten, fifteen, or even twenty per cent. above what it need have been had we kept that extra amount at home. Any permanent increase in the amount of bullion in this country must be attributed to the result of the purchase, directly or indirectly, by bullion-producing countries of British manufactures, and not to the effect of the balance of exchange being generally in our favour.

If such is the state of our foreign trade whilst so large an amount of our population are unemployed, and the greater number of those that are employed receive so scanty a remuneration, what would be the result to the country if the whole of our able-bodied men were fully employed, and machinery were carried to the highest state of perfection? Why, with the present producing power of the foreigner, we should only be giving to him the full advantages of our extra production. The fact is, England has prided herself too much upon her capabilities of becoming the workshop of the world, without taking into consideration the possibility of other nations not giving her full employment; we have first to make them willing to do this, and then to take care that they have the means of paying us for it. Those that are willing are but as a drop of the bucket, when we require the whole to assist us. And those that could have the means of paying us if they would, are not willing to shut up their own manufactories, and to become agriculturists and producers of raw materials only, because we tell them they ought.

Here, then, lies the great difficulty against which the industry of England has to struggle in working its enfranchisement. In endeavouring to overcome it, we have been led into those acts of violence and oppression against weaker and comparatively defenceless nations, which have damaged our reputation not a little. But the best energies of our country must be directed upon a broader and far more enlightened principle than has hitherto been followed, if we are ever to obtain the great object we have in view. It is to be feared that our *practical* commercial morality—though perhaps superior to that of any other country in the world—is by no means of a very high standard. We too often close our eyes to the sources whence are derived the commodities which are given in exchange for our merchandize. We have studied, in nearly all of our transactions, only the immediate gain to ourselves, regardless of the interests of the people with whom we have traded, and of the remote consequences of our intercourse. But no trade can be carried on for any lengthened period which is not mutually advantageous. The prosperity of our customers is participated in by us; and thus it is, that commercial intercourse will eventually bind together, in one common interest, all the nations of the earth. We believe it to be a great error to suppose that trade necessarily tends to weaken the moral sense; it is the ignorance of his true interests that leads a man into any transaction not consonant with honourable dealing.

Hitherto we have given the whole of our attention to the production of the articles of export only; and we find that that alone cannot supply a sufficient field for our population; it remains for us now, therefore, to turn our attention to the production of the articles of import, and thus contribute to a balance of industrial pursuits, and to a distribution of the necessaries and comforts of life among our starving idle ones.

How, then, is this to be done? By colonising, as did the Romans, when they found their territory too small for their population, and as it has been the invariable practice of man, whenever he has outgrown his means of subsistence. But it is evident that the same elements which wrought the complete success of the Roman colonies do not exist with us. For the Romans to colonise—a people so accustomed to military discipline, and to the hardships, the wandering, and the excitement consequent upon a life of ceaseless campaigns—was but to gratify, in a manner but slightly modified, that restless spirit of enterprise, which appears to have been necessary to them that their life might be endurable. They also bestowed upon their colonies all the rights and privileges of the

parent state, and in many cases even more; thus holding out inducements to the noble, the talented, and the wealthy, to adopt them as their homes, and to contribute at once all the elements of the most complete success and prosperity.

How different is it with us! In the first place, we are essentially a domestic people; we hate wandering for wandering's sake; to leave our friends, our homes, and all their associations, requires the strongest of all inducements: indeed, we believe that nothing but sheer ruin and starvation would drive any, but the very few, from their homes to our colonies. Emigration is almost synonymous with banishment. Our colonies, instead of being fostered and taken care of by the mother-country, are subjected to indignities, placed under torture, and almost driven to rebellion by her selfishness and misrule—by her jealousy of her patronage and of her power: the consequence is, that they fail to draw to them the wealthy, the talented, or the educated; they languish under poverty, and the absence of all the essentials that would render them an attractive home for Englishmen. Few take up their abode in them with a view to a permanent settlement; nearly all look forward to a time when, having realised wealth or independence, they may again return to the land of their fathers; so that, as the colony makes its wealth, instead of retaining it for the development of its resources, it is withdrawn to the mother-country, already plethoric with the amount of her capital.

It is the injustice and misrule of our colonial administration which turns the tide of emigration from these shores to the United States. An emigrant in the United States, after his short period of probation, is admitted to all the honours of citizenship; he feels that he and they alone who dwell in his adopted country, can have the power to make laws affecting its interests; this at once secures his confidence, and encourages his enterprise; few, if any, ever leave it; and its accumulated wealth is retained to open fresh fields of adventure before them, and to congregate, in an almost incredibly short period, all the comforts and refinements of an advanced civilization.

Thus we fail to reap the full benefit of the emigration which already takes place from among us: instead of the transplanted labour finding employment in those fields of industry which nature would point out, and which would at once be the most profitable to itself and to the mother-country, it is frequently diverted to the production of those articles which we are so anxious to supply, but which the individualism of a foreign state so erroneously, but so generally, deems it its interest to foster by heavy protective duties.

It may appear very plausible to argue that the progress of intelligence upon the subject of free trade will work its own irresistible way, in forcing all foreign nations to the adoption of the same commercial policy with ourselves, and thus bring about the natural and legitimate division of industry throughout the whole earth. But who is to decide when so great a revolution is to be brought about; and whether, when that period shall arrive, we shall find ourselves in the van of the manufacturing legions? Who is to say that our Transatlantic cousins, with their restless energies, their splendid country and its inexhaustible natural wealth, and a greatly multiplied population, will deem it their interest to abolish protection, until they are fully convinced that they can cope with us in every industrial enterprise, when we Englishmen could not, until our population had so increased, and the condition of the country generally had become such, as to threaten us with starvation?

Our case is urgent; we must not wait till then. Having decreed the necessity of obtaining food from abroad, we must take care that we have a sufficient quantity, and that we can buy it for what we have to sell. If foreigners will not supply us as abundantly and as cheaply as we need, but will do what they can to raise its price to us, and to depreciate the value of our payments to them, we must render ourselves as independent of them as may be, by erecting our colonies into attractive homes, and by directing the flow of labour, capital, and talent into them, for the purpose of developing their resources.

The reform of our colonial administration must be one of the first subjects to demand our attention; to remove all those political objections which render the British rule less attractive than that of the United States, and to bestow upon the colonists the fullest political privileges and independence that are enjoyed at home. The next step to be taken will be that of imitating the United States, by engaging in the construction of extensive public works with capital raised at home, under guarantee of the State, for the purpose of giving immediate employment to emigrants, and for making accessible those rich and almost limitless tracts of fertile country, which are at present valueless on account of the want of cheap and direct communication with shipping ports. There have been several plans proposed for constructing railroads through the vast Canadian wilds, at a merely nominal cost, by granting to contractors certain portions of the land through which the line passes, and which would thus be rendered valuable and marketable by the opening of so quick a means of transit, and by the settlement of the numerous labourers that would be disbanded, each in the possession of a small capital of saved wages, when the line was finished.



It is upon works of this nature that employment is afforded to the hordes of Irish emigrants, which have been for some time leaving their native country for the United States, to the infinite benefit of both countries and of themselves.

A great boon might also be bestowed upon the colonies, by the establishment of loan companies with British capital, which the legislature may promote, by such laws as would tend to facilitate the conveyance of property as security to the lenders. And here we would remark, that few subjects deserve so much the attention of the commercial and the moneyed classes of England, as that of the discovery of a method by which the capital of the country might find profitable employment in assisting the development of the natural resources of other nations, and by this means not only tend to prevent those speculative murrains which so frequently devastate our commercial world after a glut in the money market, but, by increasing the resources of our customers, render our foreign trade more extensive and profitable.

When an extensive and certain source of employment shall have become opened in our colonies, it will then remain for us to turn our attention to the formation of a national scheme of emigration, in order that gratuitous transport, and other necessary facilities, may be afforded to that class which, from their total inability to assist themselves, have hitherto been excluded from leaving their country, but which their own interests, as well as that of the country, require should be the first to emigrate. Whether such a scheme shall become part and parcel of a new poor-law, or whether it shall stand distinct and alone, will be of comparatively small moment; but that to levy a rate for the purpose of conveying our able-bodied paupers, whom we cannot employ here, to a sphere where they will be rendered independent, and where their labour will be turned to the most profitable account, and even to force them to go, will be more irrational, or less possible of being carried out, than our present poor-law and its workhouse test, we think remains to be proved.

In proposing any solution of the difficulties in which the labour question in England is involved, we would be particularly careful to avoid the danger of imitating those continental theorists, who point to the State as the source from whence relief is to flow. In England, especially, the legislature is nothing more than the instrument by which intelligent public opinion is made to take a practical form, and to embody itself in deeds; therefore whilst, in the present instance, we believe that it is through the State the most essential measures of relief must flow, we would particularly insist on the necessity of individual exertion, for the purpose of eliminating and disseminating true principles for the formation and direction of public opinion.

Again, whilst we believe in the necessity to raise the physical condition of our poor before their moral and their spiritual welfare can be very greatly improved, we would disclaim all intention of teaching, that upon material prosperity moral good will naturally follow *without effort*. Such would be against all experience. The heart of man will still be as selfish and debased as ignorance and passion ever made it. All the Christian virtues will require to be exercised with as much diligence, in seasons of the greatest prosperity as now, to dispel vice and ignorance, only their spheres of activity will be enlarged; obstacles that have proved an effectual barrier to their progress among the most wretched and debased will be removed, and the success which will attend the labours of the benevolent will be such as to revive the drooping, and to give to the weak strength.

In conclusion, we would say to all who are anxious for the removal of our social diseases, that though it may not be possible to see their way clearly out of the labyrinth which surrounds them, yet, that all may work successfully in the several spheres in which they are placed by following conscientiously the injunction—‘Whatever thy hand findeth to do, do it with all thy might:’ and that there is no absolute solution of our social difficulties but in the maxim, that each should do unto others as he would that others should do unto him. It is in the power of all to act in the spirit of this rule—of communities and of individuals—and the measure in which this is done, is the measure in which we may expect to see the evils we deplore ameliorated and abated, if not entirely removed.

ART. IV.—*Wilhelm Hauff's Sammtlichen Werken.* Stuttgart: 1846.  
Complete Works of WILHELM HAUFF.

SURELY there is nobody who does not love fairy tales, whether they will admit the weakness or not. Any personage so unfortunate would seem to us to have very dubious claims to humanity. He may be made of iron, glass, silver, gold—a composition of them all—anything but flesh and blood. To one so afflicted it may be a mystery impenetrable, that human beings can make such fools of themselves as to go writing stories about things no reasonable mortal ever saw or heard. It cannot possibly occur to him, that in all the wonders of enchanted forests and talking streams, of elves, mannikins, and kelpies, there is a truth as real as—for lack of a comparison—the hopeless sterility of his own

nature. If one part of the matter seem more ridiculous to him than another, it is the rhodomontade about 'voices in nature,' and 'spirits in streams,' &c.—'Trash; who ever heard anything of the sort? I know I should not like to hear such talkings wherever I may go.' The gentleman need scarcely be anxious on this score. When he strolls into the country, seldom enough, all he sees is, that the crops are flourishing, and bearing a distant harvest of golden guineas, the jingling of which is the only sound which in any way affects him, save, perhaps, the whistle from a successful railway the other side the hill, in which he is a shareholder. His aversion to anything poetical or abstract is unbounded, and most respectable. Wherefore, to any such iron or golden reader who may by some strange chance have accompanied us thus far, we would give conscientious warning,—to the end of this paper, it is our solemn purpose to hold commerce with some of the most unheard-of German elves and kobolds; and, moreover, to defend the same against all human assailants. Furthermore, we have no intention of talking anything but nonsense throughout, and if a glimmering of common sense should appear occasionally, we beg that it may be attributed solely to the printer. Thus the knights of the iron heart, knowing what they have to expect, may please themselves about shutting us up in disgust, and taking a beneficial nap, or accompanying us with invincible gravity and superb contempt.

Wilhelm Hauff ranks honourably among the writers of the Romantic School in Germany. The names of most of those writers, and many of their works, are now somewhat familiar to English readers; there still remains much to be said and written respecting their rise and influence as a school. If we could but lay our hands on Achim von Arnim's philosopher, we might, with his assistance, be able to set forth a learned disquisition on its rise and progress. This model German was deputed, together with a Frenchman and an Englishman, to write an essay on the camel: the Frenchman paid a few visits to the Jardin des Plantes, and soon accomplished his task; the Englishman started off direct for every known haunt of the animal, and carefully studied its nature and habits; the German, closeted in his study, retired within himself, in order, from the depths of his moral consciousness, to create the *idea* of a camel. Now, to possess a moral consciousness, which, upon receiving due attention, would reveal to us the whole idea of the Romantic School, with its many bearings and its complex origin, we should doubtless find to be very convenient, but for that, one must needs be a German; as we, being of the race called English, are of course only able to give the result of our investigations respecting its name, place of abode, external characteristics, and general mode of life.

The writings of the Romantic School of Germany exerted an influence on the literature of that country which is felt down to the present time, although the reactionary enthusiasm by which it was called forth and sustained has long since died away. The boasted infidelity and fierce republicanism of the French revolution occasioned a strong reaction in Germany, and was one of the many causes to which the school owed its rise. When, however, the political element became unduly prominent, the writers lost ground and popularity. Romanticism fell into disrepute, as a synonym for all that was ultra in religion, politics, poetry—everything in fact. Then came a second Anglo-mania; Byron and Walter Scott were in all hands, as Ossian, Sterne, and Smollett, had been a generation before. To the influence of the Romantic and English Schools combined, we owe the writings of Alexis, Schefer, Lewald, and Wilhelm Hauff.

The word romantic, like many others in all modern languages, has outlived its original signification, and made to itself a new one, from the associations that have gathered round it in process of time. But as to what its present meaning is, we are as fairly in the dark as an accomplished writer of our day, who says respecting it:—‘I have tried in vain amongst German, French, and English writers, to discover one who seemed to have any definite idea attached to the word, and have never been able to get at anything nearer than this,—viz. that Classic Art is Pagan Art, and Romantic Art is Christian Art.’ Such a definition we would not lay down as infallible. For our present purpose, suffice it to say that Amadis, the first *Romant* so called, took its name, in the sixteenth century, from the romance-language in which it was written. The word then came into use in reference to all wild tales of the same sort, especially those of the middle age, and from thence to designate anything unnatural, visionary, and fantastic. In the present day, we are accustomed to employ it in senses remote enough from its first meaning. The revival, therefore, of the poetry of the middle age very naturally caused the authors of it to be stigmatised with the epithet romantic; and party spirit afterwards gave it a wider signification, as a term of reproach against every variety of pietism, hypocrisy, priestcraft, and political despotism. It will be no matter of wonder that this revival should partake of even more than the usual amount of enthusiasm and extravagance characterising such reactions, when we remember the total stagnation of poetic life at that time. We hear on all sides of our own age as being one of unmitigated common-place—that the voice of the muse is lost in the whirl of the steam-engine, that nobody reads poetry, and few write any worthy the labour of perusal. It is true we now travel

in railway carriages, with portmanteaus and handboxes, instead of riding on 'steeds gaily caparisoned,' with solitary state, through forests undesecrated by the axe of civilization; ladies are to be seen on foot with umbrellas, or riding in cabs, instead of being invariably upon 'white palfreys,' accompanied by pages, and in constant danger of being eaten by dragons. Nevertheless, we would not give up all hope. Take courage, oh ye croakers! respect the age in which you live, and learn the lessons of Wordsworth, Tennyson, and Mrs. Browning. Be thankful, indeed, that you are not given up to the tender mercies of such as Haller and Brocke, with their unspeakable dryness and verbosity; to the sugar-and-water poetry of Hofmannswaldau, Christian Weise, and Lohenstein; or to that war of criticism between Gottsched and Bodmer, like the dispute of polar bears for the sovereignty of an iceberg, but which, from the slippery nature of the ground, results only in a general sharpening of the claws. It is not reasonable to suppose Poetry could survive such an accumulation of horrors. She fled in dismay, and only again made her appearance at the birth of Goethe.

The great aim of Goethe was to raise the mind of that period from the dead level of prose and bad taste, into which such leaders had been the means of bringing it; to restore Poetry, after her long exile, to her ancient place in the hearts of the people. This also was the sole object of the Romanticists, and was, we think, more immediately attained by them than by Goethe. The popular tales and old national traditions revived by the Romantic School, awakened more general interest than those classic subjects to which Goethe was so anxious to raise the public taste. Comparatively few of the uneducated would appreciate the beauties of his *Torquato Tasso* and *Iphigenie*, while no amount of the unintelligible in *Faust* would suffice to scare away the sympathy of a German reader. A national subject is a fine centre, round which may be drawn, by a skilful hand, all the highest and kindest sympathies of a people. Goethe, however, too soon turned away to the classic idealism of the ancients, and left an open field, from which the Romanticists, good husbandmen in the main, toiled long and earnestly to produce even a scanty harvest. Goethe and Schiller sought, by the revival of the antique, to fill up the widening gulf between the ideal and the actual; to bring poetry back into its proper home—into every-day life; while the Romanticists endeavoured to accomplish the same end by means of the poetry of the middle ages. This tendency toward the antique, though in direct opposition to that of the Romantic School, was nevertheless not without its influence on many of their writers, as we see in Holderlin and the Schlegels.

They failed, however, to learn from it any lessons as to the clothing of their ideas in more definite and artistic forms. That was a matter which troubled them but little. Their 'fantastic phantasy' led them frequently beyond the bounds of all æsthetics. To them, imagination was all and everything. So far, indeed, from uniting the ideal and the real, they trampled on the visible, the actual, with scorn and disgust, while offering devout homage to everything abstract and subjective. There was a prosiness and tangibility about every-day society as it then existed, with which they felt genius could have no sympathy. To them it was lifeless, vapid, unproductive. They drew their lessons and their ideas less from it than from within their own minds. In all their works the main points are purely subjective. Just here and there they condescend to make use of the life beyond them, as an accessory—a mere filling up of the picture. They found a life worthy the name only in the poetic region of their own imaginations. And, truly, most wondrous storehouses are these. Nature can lose but little in such descriptions as we have given us by Tieck, Fouque, Jean Paul, and Novalis. There is the early freshness of the summer morning over every picture; a life which seems visible and audible to us as we follow them through the forests, over the mountains, and down into the mines. Everything they touch seems to have a sort of magical radiance, which dazzles as one reads. And then we all know so well those mountain spirits, singing gently among the feathery larches, and laughing along with the merry stream down below. We read on, and seem to hear the voices of old companions, bringing back happy days; our hearts are full of images long forgotten, of yearnings after a something distant and unknown; the present fades away, the past becomes dim, and we only seem to feel—

'How sweet it were, hearing the downward stream,  
With eyes half shut, ever to seem  
Falling asleep in a half dream!  
To dream and dream, like yonder amber light,  
That will not leave the myrrh bush on the height;

\* \* \* \*

To muse and brood, and live again in memory  
With those old faces of our infancy  
Heaped over with a mound of grass—  
Two handfuls of white dust within an urn of brass.'

We close the book, and behold, it was a dream! It is for the critic in green spectacles to look through this magic veil and show us the many incongruities, the inartistic forms which it conceals. As a principle, the Romanticists will sacrifice every-

thing to the poetry of feeling and of nature; it is their life. They are full of what has been called 'inarticulate poetry.'

This region of beauty is, however, often disturbed by an element of restlessness and discontent, an undisguised irritability at the follies of human nature, especially as manifested in those days at *Æsthetical tea parties*, and other similar entertainments. Another jarring element, also, is the infusion of the terrible in their writings: it destroys all harmony and repose, and ends almost invariably in fatalism or mysticism: fatalism, such as we afterwards find so repulsive in the dramas of Werner, Grillparzer, and others, or the inconceivable mysticism in which Novalis loses his Heinrich von Ofterdingen—a chariot of fire, in which author and hero ascend, or at least disappear beyond all mortal ken.

The Germans are well known to excel us in the weakness of story writing. But in those more elaborate fictions which require a skilful plot, and vigorous well-sustained characters, we must plead guilty to the pre-eminence. Though we have not the exuberance of childlike fancy, half dream and half grave truth, which so delight us in Tieck, Hoffmann, Andersen, and Hauff, we are able to develop the different characters, and harmonise the varied events of a long history, cementing them into a continuous and attractive whole, with a power and elegance to which Germans never attain. Their stronghold in the province of fiction is in the Märchen or Novelle, shorter tales, which go in only a small space, detached events of a history, which require a more vivid imagination to give them colouring, and become attractive by rapid changes, and by the skilful introduction of the main point of the story. The success, indeed, of a Novelle, may be said to be in proportion to the manner in which the turn of the story is introduced, and whether it be in due accordance with the previous events and with the characters concerned in them. Their novels from Goëthe downwards are, with very rare exceptions, the same mass of feelings, incidents, and descriptions, often forced into unnatural companionship, and often scarcely held together by any ostensible links save the book-binder's twine. Jean Paul sins beyond any other in this respect. His exhaustless imagination supplies him with ideal characters, which he endeavours to bring into some sort of harmony by a marvellous and rather wearisome apparatus of ventriloquists, wax figures, extraordinary resemblances, and other awkward and inartistic contrivances. Over the whole are scattered broad-cast his fine descriptions, with their unrivalled imagery; his deep truths of the heart, and the sudden flashes of satire, unsparing, but soon forgiven. His keen shafts are directed by a loving

eye, and not the darkest pictures of humanity can lessen his warm feeling of brotherhood for the whole race. He fails, however, most signally, in his attempts to blend the ideal with the real, or to place his fictions among works of art. The writings of the romanticists are to be found in every conceivable form—poems, romances, dramas, ballads—anything. But the Märchen is the great favourite with them, and by far the best suited to their marvellous flights of fancy. That nothing is too wild, too mad for a Märchen, we have abundant proof.

Wilhelm Hauff's first work was a Märchen-Almanach for 1826. And he appears to have been especially in his element among the wonders of these tales, as he came back to them every year, bestowing on them the exuberance of wit and fancy which had not found a place elsewhere. Of this first series the principal story is 'The Caravan,' during the progress of which, many others are introduced: 'The Severed Hand' is, we believe, the only one of these which has been translated. The second series, called the 'Sheik of Alexandria,' is written on the same plan, and contains the incomparable fairy tale of 'Nose the Dwarf.' This is certainly one of the most charming and luxurious pieces of nonsense ever written—perfectly refreshing after a day's toil among stern realities. One half the world, doubtless, might not agree with us in the opinion, but nevertheless, we think the translator of it conferred a benefit on society among us. 'The Inn of the Spessart' occupies the third and fourth series, and in no way lessened the reputation which the author had already gained by his easy and humorous style of narration. In fact, his tales are rather told than written; there is a fireside ease about them which is very delightful. You feel instinctively that Jean Paul's advice to writers who have nothing to say was lost on him; he never could have been reduced to the expedient of sitting a few hours under a hot sun.

The influence of the romantic school upon Hauff appears to have been rather negative than positive. It preserved him from many of the faults into which those writers had fallen, but did not lead him to select any of their works as models for imitation. He had the same exuberance of imagination, the same eye for the failings of humanity, and the same earnest desire to raise it to an appreciation of the noble and the beautiful. Beyond this there is little similarity.

The first contrast which occurs to us, though very obvious, should nevertheless be spoken with due veneration—namely, that he certainly has more sound common sense than we are disposed to attribute generally to that school, and his turn of mind is as practical as one can reasonably expect from a poet.



His emotion is deep and sincere, but rarely verges on the sentimental. Neither are we annoyed by that besetting weakness among the Germans, of driving feeling into bathos. We find this even in Jean Paul, who frequently makes the reader laugh when he ought to cry, or else leaves him in doubt as to which demonstration of feeling may be most reasonably expected of him. Though natural and agreeable in his style, he has not the grace and elasticity of Von Arnim, yet he is decidedly superior to him in the arrangement of his plots. With Hauff, these are generally well laid, and naturally developed. He does not trust for his *dénouements* to some extravagant agency which may chance to occur to him at the moment, and be forthwith appended in defiance of all æsthetic canons. The faults of his compositions in an artistic point of view we are disposed to attribute rather to his extreme youth than to any incapacity for a clear and harmonious arrangement of his ideas. He has none of the terrible conceptions of Hoffmann, who would write at midnight till his blood grew cold and his head dizzy with the fearful phantoms of his own imagination; but on the contrary, his natural amiability and cheerfulness seemed to have a magic power in preserving him from that morbid restlessness which tormented the whole school, driving Hoffmann to madness, and hurrying Novalis and Holderlin to an early death. A moderate exercise of control saved Hauff from the vagaries of an imagination run wild, after the manner of Brentano. In descriptions of character and active scenes he displays great graphic power and considerable humour, but from descriptions of nature he wisely abstains. There are few landscape painters like the Romantics. Hauff has no power to lead us, like Fouque, through soft golden evenings and fearful spirit-haunted tempests, or, like Tieck, to force us to believe in the spirits of the flower and the rock, still less to impress us with the grandeur and mysteries of nature as Novalis alone can do. Before Novalis even the profound and striking allusions of Jean Paul must yield; they will ever fail to affect our hearts so lastingly as do the grave, fervent teachings of this great worshipper of nature.

Hauff's reputation was first permanently established by his 'Memoirs of Satan.' Though the existence of that remarkable person is doubted, and even denied, by so large a portion of the Teutonic race, we nevertheless find him figuring very largely in their literature. And our author will, perhaps, suffer considerably in the estimation of some of our readers, when we make a statement which it were vain to conceal, to the effect that he deliberately undertook to edit the Autobiography of the existence whose qualities are supposed to find their fitting

emblem in darkness. The work consists of a series of papers scarcely connected, and branching off at the close of the second volume into a wild Italian tale, in which we entirely lose sight of his hero. We have many most amusing pictures of society, though certainly somewhat overdrawn. Hauff's views of life were far more healthy and rational than those held by the Romanticists. The faults and follies of humanity, though he saw them plainly enough, could not embitter his kindly disposition and make him turn away, after the manner of that school, with contempt and aversion, to a hermit life in a world of his own creation. With unparalleled boldness he hung up startling pictures of real life, and sent his satire, shaft after shaft, unerringly into the weakest points, while none escaped. This was a daring thing for a student at two-and-twenty, but his talent could not be denied, and the critics behaved very well on the whole. The Autobiography commences thus:—

‘All the world, now-a-days, reads or writes Memoirs; in the drawing-rooms of small and great cities, in the restaurants and casinos of middle-class towns, in the smoking-rooms and taverns of the little ones, every one speaks only of Memoirs, judges only according to Memoirs, and, in fact, talks like Memoirs. Yes, it really seems as though for the last twelve years nothing remarkable had been achieved except Memoirs. Men and women seize the pen in order to record to mankind that they also lived at a remarkable period—that they also once moved near a sun, which lends a halo of consequence to their otherwise probably unimportant persons. Crowned heads, not content to have risen above their former grandeur, when, as in the picture-bibles, they went to bed with their crowns on their heads—not content with flying from one end of Europe to the other, for the assurance of mutual friendship—write Memoirs for their people, telling them their history and their journeys. The present world has become the past; it has received a new standard by which all things are judged—the standard of Memoirs.’

Any one at all acquainted with university life, will perhaps not be surprised that the subject of these memoirs commenced his career by studying at the renowned university of ———. Rejoicing in abundant means, a handsome wardrobe, and the name of Von Barbe, it was no wonder that on the first evening he should be politely received, in the morning become a confidential friend, and the second evening embrace, ‘brothers till death.’ The remarkable gift which the Germans have of making friendships is well-known, but still it does not surprise us the less. Imagine a man leaving the university with about a hundred and fifty portraits of his most intimate friends in his portmanteau! These touching souvenirs are gene-

rally little detestable silhouettes, bound round with gold paper to connect the glass and papered back, on which may be inscribed the special characteristics of the hundred and forty-ninth bosom friend. The friends are generally taken in costume under every possible variety of hair and cap. Among the ladies, also, this amiable weakness is equally prevalent. As an example of the promptitude with which these ties are formed, we once heard the following. Two young ladies meet for the first time at an inn; one of them exclaims, 'A sudden thought strikes me! Let us swear eternal friendship.' The friends embrace affectionately, murmuring, 'Auf Ewig.' But to return. Here is a description of Herr Von Barbe's companion into the town—a medical student.

'He was a tall, well-made man of five-and-twenty; his hair was dark, and might formerly have been cut according to the present fashion, but now, to save the expense of a barber, hung untidily round his head; he often took the trouble, however, to dress it back off his forehead with all his fingers. His face was handsome; the nose and mouth especially well and delicately formed. The eye had much meaning; but what a strange impression his face made;—it was burnt red-brown by the sun, a great beard grew from the cheek-bones down to his chin, and round the finely-cut lips was a reddish Henri-quatre. The play of his features was at once fearful and ridiculous. The eyebrows were drawn together in gloomy wrinkles; the eye looked out sternly and proudly, and measured every thought with a loftiness and a dignity worthy of a prince. Respecting the lower part of the face, that is, the chin, I could come to no proper conclusion, for it was down in the cravat. To this article of dress the young man appeared to have directed far more care than to the rest of his attire. It consisted in about half-a-foot of black silk, which extended from the chin *inclusive*, to the breast-bone *exclusive*, and thus formed an elegant fortification upon which the head rested. The head was surmounted by a small piece of red cloth, in the form of an inverted flower-pot, which he balanced against the wind with considerable dexterity; it looked absurd, almost, like turning a small wine-glass over an extensive cabbage. I had studied Zacharii's 'Renomist' too well not to know that as soon as I exposed myself in the least, his respect was lost to me for ever. I therefore studied his wrinkled brows, his grave, pondering eye, as much as possible; and after the first hour, had the pleasure of discovering that he decidedly preferred my company to that of the 'Philister und dem Florbesen,' in German, an old professor and his daughter, who completed our party. In another hour, I had already confessed having studied at Kiel with some success, and before we reached ———, he had promised me a 'fine Kneipe'—that is, to get me a respectable lodging, and bring me into society.'

Our incognito gets a good deal puzzled with the extraordinary manners of the students, and their language, so different to all rational German. He says, also, that 'Over their glass of beer they often fell into singularly transcendental investigations, of which I understood little or nothing. However, I observed the principal words, and when drawn into conversation, replied with a grave air—Freedom, Fatherland, Nationality.'

He attends the lectures of a celebrated philosopher, whose profundity of thought and terseness of style are so astonishing, that the German world set him down as possessed; the critical student, however, differs somewhat from that conclusion, observing—

'I have borne a great deal in the world—I have even entered into swine (Matt. viii. 31, 32), but into such a philosopher? No, indeed! I had rather be excused! What the good man brought forward in his unpleasant voice, was to his hearers as good as French to an Esquimaux. Everything must be properly translated into German before it became clear that he was not more capable of flying than other people. But he looked very large, because out of his inferences he had concocted a Jacob's ladder, and adorned it with a mystical varnish. Upon this he clambered up into the blue ether, promising to call out, from his luminous elevation, what he saw; he ascended and ascended, pushed his head through the clouds, looked into the clear blue of the sky, which is greatly prettier as seen from the green ground than up there, and saw—like Sancho Panza, when he rode to the sun on a wooden horse—beneath him the earth as large as mustard-seed, and the men like flies, above him—nothing.'

The professor of theology, as might be expected, does not escape without an infliction of satire, even more stinging than this. A few chapters further, we have a humorous account of a rencontre with the Wandering Jew, 'Unter den Linden;' and of how they go to an æsthetical tea-party (those marvels of Berlin), how the venerable Israelite, becoming oblivious of the customs of the age and country, drives his companion into an abyss of ingenious excuses, in order to palliate the ruffled dignity of the Frau Wirthin. One or two stories are then introduced, half tragical, half satirical, and we hear no more of the autobiographer.

Hauff's next production was the satirical work, called 'The Man in the Moon.' It was commenced in sober earnest; but at the advice of many of his friends, he turned it into a skilful persiflage on the style of Claren. The rapid sentimentality and licentious taste which had grown up under such writers as Kotzebue, Meissen, and Claren, roused the indignation of our author, and other thinking men. They saw the works of Goëthe, Schiller, and the Romanticists, thrown aside as re-

quiring 'thought;' while plays and novels of the very worst tendency, both morally and intellectually, were in the hands of all—from the courts of the petty princes down to the poor apprentice and the half-starved needlewoman, who could ill spare the price of the dim candle by which they read. Throughout the 'Man in the Moon' the satire is admirably sustained; and yet the whole is not made so perfectly ridiculous as to preclude the possibility of our taking an interest in the story. The hero is one Graf Emil Von Martinez; and the heroine generally goes by the name of 'Idchen,' 'lockenköpfchen,' 'täubchen,' or some equally endearing appellation.

Were the 'chens' and 'leins' to be taken out of the German language, Claren's stories would inevitably fall to pieces, for almost every noun is thus 'abbreviated,' as the Germans call it. This magnificent hero of six foot seven, contrives to shoot an innocent man in a duel, which deed he afterwards has cause to regret, inasmuch as the ghost of the departed Antonio visits him every night at twelve o'clock. A church is the only place he cannot enter. This terrible history, of course, gives to the hero an interestingly pale face, with 'a shade of profound melancholy,' and as the fatal hour approaches, the 'gloom deepens on his noble brow,' his eyes assume an unwonted ferocity, and sparkle 'like wheels of fire,' &c. Everybody is at their wit's end to find the mystery which hangs over the 'charming, well-dressed, melancholy, fascinating stranger.' The heroine is especially untrifling in her exertions to fathom the same. She is not unsuccessful; and towards the close of the first volume we have the following scene:—

'The sexton soon appeared; he silently opened the large creaking door of the church, and motioned to both figures to enter. The lesser one appeared to hesitate, as though afraid to enter the raven darkness of the cathedral; but as the sexton went before with his lantern, she became more courageous, and followed; yet she looked out from under her shawl at every step, as though fearing to see something horrible peep from behind the great pillars.

'At the altar they stopped. The sexton pointed to a broad projecting pillar, from which one could overlook the altar and great part of the church, and there the two muffled figures took their place. Moreover, the lantern gave so little light, that without approaching nearer, one could scarcely distinguish the sitting figures at the pillar from the surrounding darkness. Meanwhile the hammer in the tower was heard to whirr, taking breath for the stroke; the first stroke of midnight rolled with hollow voice through the church, and immediately rapid footsteps were heard approaching the altar from the middle aisle. It was Martinez and his servant.

'He was disturbed, as he always looked at night, the former seated himself upon the steps of the altar.

'At first he looked silently before him; he wept and sighed, as in that night when the sexton had first seen him, and cried in a sad and bitter voice: 'Art thou still unreconciled? Canst thou not yet forgive, Antonio! His voice sounded loud and full through the vaulted roof of the church; but scarcely had the last echo died away, when a voice pure as silver, clear as a bell, like that of an angel from heaven, cried, *'He has forgiven!'*

'Joyful terror penetrated the count, his cheeks reddened, his eyes sparkled, he stretched his right hand to heaven, and said, 'Who art thou, that bringest me pardon from the dead?' A rustling was heard at the projecting pillar, a dark figure stepped forward, the count retreated a step, trembling; his hair appeared to stand on end; his gaze was riveted upon the movements of the approaching figure; it came nearer and nearer; the soft light of the lantern fell upon it: a few steps and—the dark mantle dropped, a seraphic being—Idchen, with the dove-like spirit of a celestial angel, hovered towards the count; he was sunk in an involuntary abstraction, still believing he saw a being of a higher world, until the sweet well-known voice awoke him out of his amazement.\*

'It is I,' she whispered, as she came quite close to him, the courageous, angelically-beautiful maiden; 'it is I who announce to you the forgiveness of the dead. I bring it you in the name of God, who is a God of love and not of torment, who forgives a mortal when he sins out of weakness and precipitation, if with true penitence he seeks to reconcile the judge. This is my faith; it is also yours, and you will not disgrace it. But thou,' she added with a solemn voice, turning to the chancel of the church, 'thou who didst fall by the hand of a friend, if thou hast still claims on this remorseful heart, then appear in this hour, let us see thee, or else give token of thy presence!'

'Deep silence was within the church—deep silence without in the night; not a little breeze stirred; not a leaflet moved. With a transporting smile, with the triumph of conviction in her beaming eyes, Ida turned again to the count. 'He is silent,' she said; 'his shadow returns no more—he is reconciled!'

'He is reconciled!' shouted the count, till the church echoed again. 'He is reconciled, and returns not again! Oh, angel of heaven—you, you, have banished him; your faithful friendship for me, unfortunate; it is as high, it is as pure, as Antonio's faithfulness and generosity; it has reconciled the bleeding shadow. How can I thank you——'

'Speechless, he again seized the tender little hand, and pressed it to his beating heart: his joyful smile, his transported——'

It really is no use—this scene is too magnificent and too touching for us. We give it up. Of course the 'little angelic ringlet-headed Ida' becomes Frau Gräfin, in the second volume; and Antonio returns quietly into his grave.

We have not space to discuss the several '*novellen*' of Hauff. 'The Picture of the Emperor,' is generally considered the best,

though we could give our reasons for differing from this opinion. It is to the influence of Scott's writings that we owe the historical novel of 'Lichtenstein,' and as being among the very first—we might almost say *the* first—of that class in Germany, it may be as well to give a brief account of it.

Uelrich von Wurtemberg fell under the ban of Maximilian in 1519; and through the Suabian League and William of Bavaria, his estates were entirely confiscated. For fifteen years he was an exile, and his son Christoph a close prisoner. The latter at last effected his escape, and Uelrich, after the dissolution of the Suabian League, regained his possessions through the instrumentality of the bold landgrave, Philip of Hesse. The story of 'Lichtenstein' commences in 1519, with the entrance of the Suabian League into Ulm. There are some very graphic pictures of the manners of the time, and of the busy scenes and changes brought by each eventful day, but all so mixed up with the different characters of the story that we cannot readily make extracts that would be entertaining. Here is one, however, relating to a wealthy bachelor of the sixteenth century:—

'Herr Dietrich had a large house, not far from the cathedral, a beautiful garden at Michelsberg; the furniture of his house was in the best order, the great oaken chests were full of the most exquisite linen, spun by many generations of grandmothers and their maids in the long winter evenings; the iron box in his bedroom held a considerable amount of golden guilder. Herr Dietrich himself was a handsome substantial man, who always walked bedizened and bebuckled, with a sedate becoming air, into the senate; he had a tolerable understanding for household and municipal duties, and was of very ancient family.

\* \* \* As a near relative, Herr Dietrich had early access to the house of Herr von Besserer, especially to-day, as his many duties would excuse a morning visit. He found the young ladies at breakfast. Sadly, indeed, would our ladies of the present day have missed an elegant service of painted china, and the chocolate cups after the fashion of the most beautiful antique vases. But if it be true that grace and dignity cannot be concealed under the lowliest garb, then we may confess, with more courage, that Maria and the laughing Bertha breakfasted that morning on beer-soup. \* \* 'I see very well, cousin,' began Bertha, 'you would like only too well to taste some of our soup, as your nurse has only given you children's food this morning; but you may drive that idea out of your head instantly; you deserve punishment, and must fast—'

'Oh, how long we have been expecting you!' interrupted Maria.

'Yes, indeed,' added Bertha, 'only don't imagine it was exactly yourself we wished for—no, entirely the news you have.'

'The state secretary was accustomed to be received in this manner

by Bertha; therefore, in order to propitiate her for not having satisfied her curiosity the previous evening, he began to retail his news with the greatest exactitude; but Bertha interrupted him. 'We know,' said she, 'your long stories, and, indeed, saw nearly everything that passed ourselves from the window; and of your revelations last night, where they say things went on strangely enough, I will hear nothing; so just answer my questions.' She placed herself before him with comic gravity, and continued: 'Dietrich von Kraft, secretary of a noble senate, did you see among the League troops, who entered the town yesterday, a young and exceedingly polite gentleman, with long light-brown hair, a face not so milk-white as your own, but no less handsome; small beard, not so smart as yours, but yet handsomer; light blue scarf with silver?'

'Oh, that is no other than my guest!' cried Herr Dietrich. 'He rode a large brown horse, wore a blue doublet, slashed on the shoulders, and lined with light blue?'

'Yes, yes—only go on!' cried Bertha. 'We have our own reasons for asking about him.'

'Well, then, that is George von Sturmfeder, a handsome, agreeable youth. Strange!—he observed you also as he entered the town.' And now he told what had occurred at the dinner; how he had been struck by the fine figure, the commanding and attractive manners of the youth—how accident made them neighbours—how he liked him better and better, and at last led him to his house.

'Now that was very good of you, cousin,' said Bertha, when he had finished, and offered him her hand; 'I do believe that is the first time you ever dared to have a visitor. But the face of old Sabine must have been worth seeing, when Junker Dietrich brought home a guest so late.'

'Oh, she was like the dragon at St. George! But when I gave her figuratively to understand it might be possible that I should some day lead home my beautiful cousin—'

'Oh, get you gone!' replied Bertha, blushing deeply, and endeavouring to withdraw her hand; but Herr Dietrich, to whom his cousin had never seemed so handsome before, held it still tighter. Maria's graver image lost weight every second, and the scale of the merry Bertha, who now sat opposite him in silent confusion, gained visibly in the eyes of the happy secretary.

'Maria had meanwhile silently left the room, and Bertha gladly took this opportunity of turning the conversation.

'There she goes again,' said she, looking after Maria; 'and I'll be bound she goes into her room and weeps. Oh! yesterday she cried so passionately that it made me quite miserable!'

'What is the matter with her?' asked Dietrich, sympathizingly.

'I know no more of the cause than I did before,' continued Bertha. 'I have asked and asked again, but she only shakes her head, as though there was nothing to be done. 'The unhappy war!' was all the answer she gave.'



“Is her father still resolved to go back with her to Lichtenstein?”

“Yes, indeed,” was Bertha’s reply. “You should only have heard yesterday how he abused the League as the troops entered! Well, he is heart and soul with his duke, so we will let it pass. But as soon as war is declared, he will set off with her.”

“Herr Dietrich appeared to be very thoughtful. He rested his head on his hand, and listened in silence to his cousin.

“And think,” she continued, “yesterday, after the troops came in, she wept so incessantly! You know she was always grave and sad, and I have often found her in tears. But she was so inconsolable yesterday—as though the entrance of the troops had decided the whole destiny of the war! I do not think she cares much about Ulm, but I suspect,” Bertha added, mysteriously, “she has some secret love affair troubling her.”

“Ah! certainly! I have noticed it a long time,” sighed Herr Dietrich; “but what can I do about it?”

“You?—what you can do about it?” laughed Bertha, whose face lost all shade of sadness at these words. “No! truly her grief is no fault of yours. She was just the same before you ever set eyes upon her.”

“The honest secretary was very much ashamed at this assurance. In his heart, he really believed it was the separation from him which affected Maria, and her melancholy image was beginning again to preponderate in his inconstant heart. But Bertha would not leave off teasing him about his absurd idea, until the object of his visit suddenly occurred to him; and she sprang up with a cry of delight, when her cousin gave her the news of the dance at the Senate House in the evening.”

George von Sturmfeeder is the hero, and Maria the heroine of this story. They meet at Tübingen, at which university George was studying. Anxious to obtain his bride in the speediest manner possible, he leaves his literary studies, and enlists on the side of the Suabian League, not knowing that Maria’s father, Herr von Lichtenstein, is a staunch adherent of the persecuted Ulrich of Wurtemberg. On learning more fully the plans of the League, and the unscrupulous manner in which they had already parcelled out among themselves the duke’s lands, George begins to have some doubts as to whether he is not going hand in hand with oppression rather than justice. At this time he meets unexpectedly with Maria, in Ulm, and learns, to his dismay, that both she and her father are firm allies of the duke. Maria employs all her influence to convince him of the righteousness of the duke’s cause, and to prevail on him to leave the service of the League, as he has not yet taken the oath.

Meanwhile the heads of the League—Jörg von Truchsess, Franz von Sickingen, George von Frondesberg, Von Breitenstein,

and others—finding George von Sturmfeder an intrepid youth, and moreover the son of a brave knight, who had fought and fallen by their side, distinguish him with many marks of favour. They summon him to their council. George obeys, resolving to declare the change in his sentiments, and to quit their service. Von Truchsess, the spokesman of the council, is a rough, obstinate man, with a most inflammable temper, kindling at a word of contradiction. He furthermore had entertained a spite against the Baron von Sturmfeder, which he hopes now to wreak on the son. He offered to George the honourable office of spy upon the movements of the duke, stating that his knowledge of the country round Tübingen, and other qualifications, highly fitted him for the post. A momentary hesitation irritates Von Truchsess, and when George firmly declines such an honour, he launches out into a volley of most unknighly abuse; to which George replies by instantly renouncing his connexion with the League, on the ground of personal insult. Before his friends in the council have time to arbitrate, our sensitive and impetuous hero has made the best of his way out of the Senate House. In a few hours he finds himself a prisoner. A word, however, from his friend Von Frondesberg procures his release, though bound not to take arms for fourteen days.

After various adventures, he gains access to the Stalactyte Cavern, near Lichtenstein Castle, where the duke is concealed. George supposes him to be only a follower of Uelrich, who has lost all in his cause. They become close friends; and a line from the nameless exile procures for George such a welcome from Herr Lichtenstein as he had never hoped to obtain. Every night the duke is privately admitted into the castle, and regaled with wine and a warm supper, luxuries which his cavern does not afford. In the course of time, it is arranged that when the duke has collected an army, and George enters Stuttgart at his side, he may then claim Maria as his bride. All of which duly happens. Uelrich, not yet wise by experience, suffers himself to be led, as before, by bad counsellors into severities which alienate the affections of his people, just at a time when he could only hope for security through their hearty co-operation. The League again overrun the land. The slender forces of Uelrich are completely routed; he escapes with one or two followers, but is pursued and closely beset upon a narrow bridge. George von Sturmfeder seizes the green mantle by which the duke was known, puts it on, and urges him to leap the bridge into the river; this he does in safety. George is led a prisoner before the League, who are enraged enough at the mistake made. Uelrich is forced to fly the country, and our hero and other knights are allowed to return to their respective castles on a sort of parole.

Our limited space scarcely admits of our doing justice to the characters and incidents of the story; they are varied and well introduced, and, we are happy to say, not painfully perfect. Among much that reminds us forcibly of Walter Scott, we nevertheless find the *German* authorship very apparent in these volumes. In a German production only should we have found the giant story given at vol. ii. p. 60.

The 'Phantasies in the Bremen Wine Cellar,' is a curious fragment we must not quite overlook. Most people have been made aware, through the instrumentality of small geography books of blessed (?) memory, that Bremen is one of the Hanse towns, and, moreover, situated upon the River Weser. But from neither Goldsmith nor Pinnock do they learn that it is a quaint picturesque-looking place, with several well-grounded ghost stories pertaining to it, and also a fine venerable Senate House. Having been among the earliest towns that embraced protestantism, its ghosts are orthodox theologians, not canonized saints with all sorts of perverted doctrines, but, in fact, no other than the very twelve Apostles themselves. To be intelligible; this same Senate House, a gothic building, richly ornamented and in excellent preservation, covers a long range of vaults and stone corridors, some half furnished, and used by the senators, some divided into small compartments, where parties of the town's-folk often resort in the evenings to taste the Rhine wine, while one large vault, at a distance from all the rest, contains the marvellous company of the twelve Apostles; and another, the huge vat called the *Rose*, whose wine is valued at a guinea a drop. The senate very rarely grant permission for this wine to be tasted, and it is esteemed the very highest honour for a citizen to receive one or two bottles from them in acknowledgment of some important service. Somehow or other Hauff gained permission to go and taste it straight from the barrel. No man in his right senses would have thought of going to spend the night of the 1st of September in the Bremen Rathskeller, but our author was in a strange mood, and went. What he recounts of that night, when locked in there by the old servant, is too long for us to tell. He does not like to be disbelieved as a mere fabricator of ghost stories, and therefore entitles his interview with the spirits of the Apostles as a 'Phantasy;' but, if our readers were to see that underground region at midnight, we think they would feel quite prepared to undergo any amount of supernatural revelation.

We cannot but look upon it as matter for great regret that a youth like that of our author, of so much talent and promise, should have been followed by no maturer manhood, by no fulfilment of the many hopes it had held out. He was attacked by a

nervous fever, and died, after a short illness, in November, 1827, at the age of twenty-five. Scarcely a year before his death he married a cousin, to whom he had been attached from his boyhood. During this long courtship he seemed to take a chivalrous pleasure in combating the obstacles which rose to their union, and even conjured up imaginary ones that he might have the constant gratification of struggling with and overcoming them. His father died while he was very young, and the care of his education devolved principally upon his elder brother, Dr. Hermann Hauff, whose name ranks honourably among German geologists. Hauff's lyrical productions are not numerous. As a specimen, we offer a translation of a very general favourite, which is constantly sung in Germany to one of their beautiful popular melodies.

## THE TROOPER'S MORNING SONG.

Morning-red,  
Dost light me to the early dead?  
Soon the trumpet-call will blow,  
Then must I my life let go,  
I and many a comrade true!

Scarcely thought  
Ere his life's delight was nought,  
Yestern on his snorting grey,  
Through the bosom shot to-day,  
In the grave so cold to-morrow!

Soon, alas!  
Stately form and fairness pass.  
Boastest of thy cheeks of silk,  
Rosy-red, and white as milk?  
Ah, the roses wither all!

Therefore, still,  
Yield I me as God may will;  
Now then I will bravely fight,  
Then if I am cold to-night,  
'Tis a gallant trooper dead.

ART. V.—*Letter to the Directors of the London Missionary Society, on the present State of their Institutions in the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope.* From the Rev. JOHN PHILIP, D.D., Superintendent of the Society's Missions in South Africa, Cape Town. 1848. pp. 66.

THE interior of Africa—What is the great obstacle to its evangelization? To this subject we invite attention, for on the right solution and practical application of this question depends the welfare of a continent. The experiments which have been made for the civilization of Africa have been deeply interesting. The originators and conductors of the different expeditions have been actuated by noble motives; their efforts have been characterized by great energy; and their failures deserve at least the sympathy of all who wish well to our race. But it is to the evangelization of Africa we now direct our thoughts. The success which has followed the labours of the agents of the London Missionary Society, among both Hottentots and Bechuanas, show that there is no insuperable barrier to the evangelization of large masses of the population. And now that we are shut out from the Niger, the new opening presented to us in the south by the discovery of the Lake Ngami, and adjacent rivers, offers the pleasing prospect of another highway into the interior of the continent. Will this discovery be rendered instrumental in dispelling the black cloud of mystery which veils the dark interior from the rays of the sun of righteousness? We think it might; and that, too, not by raising expensive expeditions, or even by very materially increasing the contributions which flow into our missionary societies.

But before entering fully into that question, let us glance at the moral status of the people. That of the aboriginal Hottentots was awfully degraded; no missionary, however, acquired their vernacular tongue sufficiently well to ascertain in what their primitive faith consisted. With the Bechuanas it has been different. Mr. Moffat honestly believed that he found them destitute of the idea of a God, of a future state, and the proper conception of sin; and he placed a veto on all future attempts at a reversal of his judgment. *A priori* reasoning was exploded by Bacon, but not *a priori* observation, and Mr. M. gives us the key to his, in quoting the Rev. W. Roby's interpretation of the passage in '*Romans*,' which, in all probability, swayed his judgment. In opposition to his caveat, we would respectfully urge that there was a possibility of inquiries being made among the same race,

in localities as much removed beyond Kuruman as that locality was beyond the sphere of Dr. Vanderkemp's labours. But granting that those who came into the country first had an advantage over those who have more recently commenced their inquiries, the testimony of intelligent natives, who can well remember what their ideas were before they ever heard of missionaries, is surely worth examination. That testimony is invariably, that there was a knowledge of a supreme being who made all things, and to whom all events not clearly traceable to natural causes were uniformly ascribed. 'Death,' for instance, 'by the visitation of God,' in contradistinction to death from natural causes, was invariably expressed as, 'he was killed by God only.' A character both of malignity and benevolence was ascribed to Him. The phrases, 'God has no heart,' or is unkind: and 'How good God is'—('Merino o molemo yan,')—have been in the language from time immemorial, and we have never met an intelligent native who would admit that the knowledge of Merino, or God, came by the missionaries. The remark of a pure heathen, in relating an event which transpired before missionaries came north of the Orange River, may here be quoted. He happened to reach another tribe on the morning of the day in which a party of his own people had swept off a large number of their cattle. The people, exasperated by their loss, decreed his death; but he stood on the defensive, with his shield on one hand, and his spear in the other. Had he thrown his spear he would immediately have been overpowered; and being a brave man, the curses they heaped on him in order to induce him to do so were almost insupportable. But 'God whispered to me,' said he, '*don't throw, and saved my life.*'

Their ideas of sin were essentially the same as among ourselves: doing or working wrong, adultery, theft, murder, witchcraft, &c. And when we find that a man has received the name 'boleo,' or 'sin,' fifty or sixty years ago, because a murder was committed at the time he was born, it seems pretty evident that the true idea of moral evil has not been introduced by missionaries, for they have not been in the country much more than thirty years.

Their ideas of a future state have been more vague, but the universal diffusion of the fable of the Chameleon and Lizard, shows that even the knowledge of that has not been lost. The Barimo (gods) sent a message to man by the chameleon—('Bathu ba re shua, ga ba ele rure—bathu boca:')—'When men die, they do not become annihilated—they will return again.' But Matsien (an evil agent) sent another message by means of the lizard, to the effect, that when men die they do become annihilated. The swift lizard outran the slow-paced chameleon,

and came first to men; and his message was first received as being first given. Taking this in connexion with the usual phrase in reference to one who is dead—‘He has gone to the God;’ and the fact that even Bushmen address the dead, and take leave of them as if they were actually in existence; it can scarcely be asserted that they have no notion of a future state.

They are, however, degraded to as low a level as human nature can well reach. It can truly be said of them, that their consciences are seared; and nothing can exceed the *sang-froid* with which they can speak of the murders which they themselves have committed. The elements of the story of Solomon and the Harlots, and the murder of Abel by his brother, remain among them; but fewer fragments of the wreck of their primitive faith have floated down the stream of time than has happened to any other people. Their faith is mere opinion—exceedingly vague—and it imparts no energy of soul. Retaining the human craving for an infinite soul-satisfying good, they have deified themselves and their cattle. It seems necessary that men should adore something; and each Mochuana has his own hymn of praise, which he first publicly rehearses when circumcised. These hymns are essentially self-adoration. Among these people, and others whose moral status was very similar—viz., the Hottentots,—more success has resulted, in proportion to the money expended for their evangelization, than among any other people in the world. Their chief peculiarities are slowness of spiritual perception and conviction. The system under which they formerly existed imparted no mental energy; it rather exhausted their minds. Is the new system, or that in which they are treated as *protégés* of missionary societies, likely to yield a different result? We entertain grave doubts on the point. But let us take a view of the Hottentot missions, including those of Griqua Town and Philipolis.

The former condition of the people of these missions is well known, and need not be reverted to, except to say that it was one of the deepest degradation. Many were in a state of slavery, and they have been raised to a state of freedom. Thousands, too, have attained the liberty wherewith Christ makes his people free. The loathsome, ignorant savage, has, by means of these missions, been transformed into the respectable peasant and the intelligent artisan. There are, no doubt, exceptions, but the inhabitants of these missionary institutions can, as a body, be fairly called moral and industrious. That they have attained their present status by means of European benevolence, is an undoubted fact; but whether they can be maintained by the same agency, without inflicting grievous wrong both on the Hottentots themselves and

the heathen beyond, is more than questionable. We say that wrong will be inflicted on the heathen beyond, because the stream of benevolence ought to flow on to them, and not be absorbed by the southern extremity of the continent. Others, however, think, that if the present supplies from Europe were withheld, the Hottentot nation would retrograde into barbarism. The Rev. Dr. Philip, whose soul seems to yearn over those for whom he has effected so much, in contemplating the possibility of the colonial missionary institutions being required to support the gospel among themselves, makes the following remark:—‘True religion would disappear with the missionary institutions, should they be broken up at this stage of the process from bondage to freedom, from heathenism to Christianity.’ *This stage of the process*, means a point in a course of instruction already twenty, thirty, forty, or even fifty years long. Dr. Vanderkemp began some of these institutions in 1801: and of course during that time, the experiment has had full sway even on the youth of the country. We sympathize with the venerable doctor in the tenderness with which, as a nurse, he cherisheth his children, and in the earnestness with which he deprecates any measure which might by possibility hinder the harvest from being gathered into the garner; but we submit, his feelings are very much akin to those of our pious ancestors who left endowments to certain churches, in the pious belief that they thereby secured the perpetuity of the gospel. ‘Here,’ he says (viz., in the missionary institutions), ‘as might be anticipated, civilization first began its course among the natives of the colony, and here the work must for many years to come be continued, or the majority of them are lost for ever.’ And one reason assigned for the opinion is, ‘the European possesses all the land, power, and authority.’ Are the salaries of missionaries—which, after a people have grown up under the course of gratuitous secular and religious instruction, partake essentially of the character of *endowments*—really necessary to the perpetuation of the religion of Christ? The majority of the constituents of the society paying these endowments, hold that Christianity, when once implanted in the heart, has vital energy to perpetuate itself; and it is not considered a misfortune that the artisans and peasants, who constitute that majority, are not possessors of lands. It is, at least, not considered any disability in them, either to support the gospel among themselves at home, or to help to propagate it abroad. Observe the state of these people for whom the Christians of England are expected to

• Pamphlet named at head of article.



furnish gratuitous instruction for many years to come. We quote Dr. Philip's pamphlet—

'Take Hankey as an example: the population is 650 souls, of whom 130 are able-bodied men. Thirty-five of these are described as wood-cutters, and they have a forest in the neighbourhood, in which they exercise their calling; one part of which is sawing planks, which sell well at Algoa Bay. Forty are described as small farmers: i. e., by cultivating as much land as they choose, at a nominal rent, that land being irrigated by a tunnel made at the public expense, and exceedingly fertile. The size of the patches under cultivation varies from two to eight acres. At the time the missionary made the report, there were nearly 300 acres under cultivation. These forty small farmers added to their means of subsistence by the hire of oxen and milch cattle. Ten are described as masons, and forty-five as labourers or farm servants. These people are stated to possess one thousand horned cattle, of which there are more than thirty spans\* of draught oxen, each span numbering ten or twelve. They have several hundreds of sheep and goats, fifty horses, fifteen wagons (a new wagon costs from 60*l.* to 70*l.* or 80*l.*), and twenty ploughs. They have, moreover, a good and ready market for their produce in Algoa Bay.'

Mr. Taylor of Theopolis, writing to the *Patriot*, at the commencement of the last Caffre war, mentions that the people of that station lost property valued at thirty thousand pounds! Mr. Read, senior, writing to Dr. Philip, in the pamphlet above referred to, describes his people as in equally comfortable circumstances with other institutions. They have wagons, oxen, breeding cattle, horses, sheep, poultry, substantial houses, and good clothing; their children are educated—indeed, this is asserted, and truly so, to be the case with all the missionary institutions. At Kat River, too, they have 80 or 100 sawpits employed; and out of a population of 5000, 3000 are teetotallers, and these teetotallers can earn twenty, thirty, forty, and even fifty dollars per month. It is clear, then, from the unbiassed statements of the best friends of these people, that they are in decidedly more comfortable circumstances than people of the same name in either England or Scotland. And then, the proportion of converted people in these villages is much larger than can be pointed out in any of our English villages. Of a population of 650 souls at Hankey, 271 are members; and in other places—as, for instance, Kat River, Philipolis, Griqua Town, &c.—the proportion of members, as compared with the population, is much larger. But then, these members contribute handsomely to the Missionary Society. If we leave out of view the amount received by them annually, we might consider the contributions respectable; but when we know that such a station as Hankey receives 316*l.* of the Society's

funds (amount for 1847), contributions amounting to 100%. or so assume quite another phase. And this is the system carried on in all the other institutions. The contributions never approach the sums expended on them; consequently, in so far as giving to the heathen is concerned, these missions have as yet given absolutely nothing. They annually absorb more than sufficient to carry the light of the gospel into the centre of the continent. We do not require larger contributions from England. We only ask for the real heathen, that the stream of benevolence already flowing be not absorbed by professing Christians situated on the exterior of the continent. We do not blame the directors of the Society, nor yet the missionaries of these people; but we submit, that the system of fostering our *protégés* by perpetual supplies from Europe, is unfair to the heathen who have not yet heard the name of Jesus. And here we shall be met by the outcry—‘Abandon the stations! Leave them as sheep without a shepherd! The people will revert to their former state: nay, the majority will be lost for ever.’ The outcry would frighten many who have small confidence in the inherent power of Christianity to perpetuate itself. Paul, however, thought he had rather done the Corinthians a wrong, in not compelling them to support him. And we incline to think, if three thousand teetotalers could not maintain their own minister, they must be a sorry race. Two hundred and seventy-one members, most of them farmers and artisans, not able to support that gospel to which they owe their all, but absorbing 200% of the Society’s funds annually, seems to indicate some serious defect. It perhaps lies here: Deprive a people of the practice of managing their own affairs, and you deprive them of the power of so doing. After they profess faith in Christ, not to enjoin upon them the practice of supporting their own pastors, is to preclude them from the capacity for self-government. If the duty is not enforced, they acquire the habit of looking to the supply of teachers as a matter of course; and possessing a good supply of enlightened instruction without expense, they value it less, and themselves much more. They acquire the habit of looking to another to prompt them in all religious matters, except those of mere routine, and have their faculties only half developed. They trust to the central European authority in religious matters; have small reverence for the opinions of their countrymen—viz. native teachers, though these are derived from the same source as are those of the European, and hence they present the phenomenon of a people in perpetual leading strings. The Missionary Society, so long as the present system is kept up, is virtually a go-cart to them, and until it is abolished the full energy of Christian men will never be developed.

We have great confidence in the essential vigour of Christianity. It blooms in imperishable youth wherever it is untrammelled by the wisdom of men. Sow the seed, and it never dies. The Divine Spirit will see to it. A few years ago, Baptist Noel sounded his trumpet on 'concentration,' and it seemed a mighty discovery: had missionaries only been concentrated on certain points, instead of being scattered over the world, the millennium would long ere this have dawned. The French missions in Africa seemed a case in point. People were carried away with the idea that it was a thing proved beyond all dispute. If we concentrate our missionaries, we shall have quick and large returns for a small outlay—a most taking idea for a mercantile community. Concentration, in this sense, is a mere figment of the brain. The outlay of time and money is very much alike, as to the numbers converted in Africa, whether you have only two agents or twenty. Let us examine the Kuruman mission, and, if experience is worth anything, we may be instructed by it. The available strength of that mission has seldom ever been more than two. They commenced in the vicinity of the Kuruman, and directed their attention chiefly to the Batlassi. No visible success attended their labours for nearly fifteen years. The seed, however, was sown, and the experiment which was performed for our instruction ended in the Batlassi leaving the missionaries, dividing into four or five parties, and settling in different parts of the country. Mr. Moffat mentions in his work, that the first success which attended their labours after the departure of the Batlassi, was among a small tribe of Calala, called Bachuene, and a number of refugees from the interior, who remained on the Kuruman. The seed sown in the hearts of the Batlassi must vegetate; one party had settled at Lekatlong, another at Boregelong, another on the Paal River, and another at Taung, &c. After the party settled at Lekatlong had some time for reflection, they actually sent a deputation to Griqua Town to beg instruction: the brethren there being unable to spare one of their number, the people themselves fell upon the plan of sending some of their number stately to the missionaries to receive instruction; and, when they returned to impart the little they had received, others were sent to receive a fresh supply; and when the Griqua Town missionaries first visited them, they were delighted to find many suitable for membership. They, of course, immediately formed them into a church. The visits of the missionaries, subsequently, were chiefly for the purpose of examining candidates and receiving them into fellowship; and before a European missionary came to settle among them, there was a church of upwards of one hundred members. And

by whose agency was this effected? Clearly by that of the Holy Spirit operating on the seed sown in their hearts at Kuruman.

Churches were formed also at Liniopeng and Boregelong in a somewhat similar manner, only there the people sent back and begged instruction from the very teachers they had left. The distance has always prevented the two missionaries at the Kuruman from visiting them frequently; but the work has gone on. No year passes over without additions to these churches. The Divine Spirit has never suffered His own work to drop. There is another very considerable church formed in connexion with the Kuruman, but as it is in the vicinity, it has always enjoyed the stated visits of the missionaries. Now, taking the amount of success which has followed the long-continued labours of the Kuruman mission, the available strength of which has rarely exceeded two, there is no mission in Africa which can be compared to it. Time seems an essential element in African success. The work is never forced by either numbers or money. The younger missionaries have as yet had no success, although they have been in the country nearly ten years. The apparent exceptions occur among those who have entered into other men's labours. The experience of the past seems to say, that central stations ought to be formed as foci of light to the dark masses around, and no European ought to go where a native church is already formed. There ought to be an entirely onward movement of the missionary corps in Africa. We do not require a larger amount of contribution from England. We want the missionaries to take their place in the missionary field. Government supplies abundant secular education for every soul in the colony. The colonists generally avail themselves of the government schools, and why not the coloured people? They don't seem to be desperate out-and-out voluntaries; and, if the missionary institutions must be superintended by any society, why not commit them to the care of the Colonial Missionary Society? The true missionary field begins at the Kuruman. The colony is better supplied with the means of instruction than any part of England.\*

\* We give this paper precisely as it has reached us from the far interior of the country to which it relates. We leave it to the candid consideration of our readers—only stating, that the religious endowment tendency in our missionary operations which it discloses, has long appeared to us as a matter requiring much more attention than it has hitherto received.—EDITOR.

- ART. VI.—(1.) *The Life of Edward Baines, late M.P. for the Borough of Leeds.* By his Son, EDWARD BAINES, Author of 'The History of the Cotton Manufacture.' Longman. London: 1851.
- (2.) *Historical Sketches and Personal Recollections of Manchester; intended to illustrate the Progress of Public Opinion, from 1792 to 1832.* By ARCHIBALD PRENTICE. Second Edition. Gilpin. London: 1851.

No Englishman can forget that period in the history of his country, when the two great shires of York and Lancaster were at deadly feud, and Plantagenet and Somerset were struggling for the crown. Our present business is not with times so long gone by; but we cannot help contrasting them with those later times, in which, under very different circumstances, the same two shires honourably distinguished themselves, on the side of parliament against prerogative, and of liberty against oppression.

History is for the most part a chronicle of suffering, for history especially treats of change, and progress; and man, politically as well as spiritually, is only made perfect through suffering. In the history of the great struggles even of this century—between light and darkness, between right and might—there are abundant instances of suffering, some of them of so intense a nature as to be scarcely credible. Time draws a kindly veil over the scenes of human misery as they recede into the Past, and often the distant conflicts of our race seem surrounded only with a halo of glory; but as yet *these* conflicts are all palpable to us. We stand upon the very scenes, among the very actors and survivors of them, and should be able to mark the relations of cause and effect with advantage.

In the old times when the Wars of the Roses occurred, the Third Estate in the realm was of very little account. Abject and uneducated, the 'faithful' commoners of England were chiefly regarded as a higher sort of cattle; fit only to till the soil, or, if so ordered, to wrap themselves up in iron cases, and risk their lives for the glory or emolument of their superiors. But at the commencement of our century it was totally different. Men had slowly discovered, in the course of ages, that there is no essential superiority in any one human being over another—especially no hereditary superiority; that divinity does not necessarily hedge a king; that God is above all kings, and the chiefest laws to be obeyed are His, and not man's; that none of His

laws countenance injustice or persecution. They had also discovered that the true church of God consists of the people who obey and serve him, and not by any means of priests or ministers alone; that, in fact, there may be a church without any priests at all. Out of these and like discoveries, all made with toil and purchased by suffering, had sprung strange results. The relative position of the three estates had shifted.

But the two higher estates, jealous of changes which would not bring them any new powers, but rather diminish what they already possessed, had done all they could to stem the tide of progress, and to turn it *back*. Many of the nightmare institutions of feudalism were as dead as the old warriors who had plucked the fatal Roses in the Temple-garden; but many remained—and to these they clung.

In 1774, Lord Caernarthen boasted, as an argument against American freedom, that ‘America was at least as much represented in Parliament as Manchester, which had made no complaint of a want so imaginary!’ The representation of the two great divisions of the commons was, indeed, in those days most defective. It was not even in accordance with the old theory of the constitution, established when they were of very small or no importance; they could not state their desires and grievances to the king, in the great conclave of the nation. The time was coming, however, when freedom should be claimed in Manchester as boldly as it had been claimed in America.

The labouring classes were even worse off in this respect than the middle classes. These could, and did, make their wishes and opinions felt in many ways, but their humbler brethren could do very little. It seemed as though oppression was safe when it was practised on them. Almost every hand was against them.

In the gross folly of those times, it was considered dangerous to entrust the working classes with knowledge. The clergy of the state church—who forgot then, as they are still too apt to do, that they are in reality employed, and paid wages by the nation, to instruct the nation—the aristocracy, and magistracy, and ministry—all the upper castes of society wished and did their utmost to keep the ignorant as ignorant as possible—to reduce them as far as might be to feudal slavery once more. It was an old plan; but thanks to the sterling portion of the middle classes, it had been defeated in the olden times, and it was defeated still. The dissenters, true children of the old puritans, did what they could to instruct the ignorant; and by their means knowledge was sufficiently wide-spread to make the accomplishment of the endeavours of these friends of darkness more and more difficult

as time sped on; while the French Revolution had so far operated by this period, as to make every attempt to do work of that nature somewhat dangerous as well as difficult.

But the right-hearted folk who thus stood between the tyrants and their victims, had their own difficulties. To be what was called a Reformer in those days, was to be the mark for every sort of contumely and insult; but to be a Dissenting Reformer, was to be the mark for every sort of persecution. Not a few of the clergy of the establishment, seeing that the people deserted the churches when talented men preached in chapels, naturally concluded, that if such men multiplied, the nation would in time become a nation of chapel-goers, and *their* wages for doing nothing be sooner or later stopped. But not being talented men, for the most part, themselves, they did not think of stirring in their proper sphere, and competing with the dissenters; they rather preferred to get assistance from the temporal arm, and to persecute the troublesome reformers. Accordingly we find the stupid old cry, 'The church is in danger,' echoing through the history of that time; while 'Church-and-King' mobs were got up and incited—in some cases by the authorities themselves—against the 'Levellers,' 'Jacobins,' 'Infidels,' 'Traitors,' 'Incendiaries,' and 'Miscreants,' as the band of good men and true were called; and if they did their work badly, some excuse was found for letting the attorney-general loose upon the offenders, in places where subservient juries could be found.

Our criminal code was a disgrace to civilization in those days. Almost every offence was punishable by death; and prisoners on trial for their lives were not allowed the aid of counsel. The Test and Corporation Acts were extant. Trials under the Game Laws were horribly frequent. The brutal slave trade was still allowed, though Defoe had denounced it a hundred years before, and great and good men had since laboured earnestly to have it suppressed.

The intellectual freedom which we now enjoy almost prevents us from being able to realize the dwarfed condition of intellectual existence then. From the times of Milton and Penn to those of Junius and Horne Tooke, the doctrine that all men should be allowed to speak freely what thoughts they had in them, was proclaimed by the intelligent. But the practice was never fully allowed. Mr. Pitt had seen the rising power of the press, and used it. Other statesmen tried to cramp its liberty and retard its progress; and, towards the close of the eighteenth century, the partial freedom which Defoe had done so much at the beginning of it to win, was almost taken away. In 1771, the Lord Mayor of London and Alderman Oliver made a determined stand for

the liberty of the press, and were sent to the Tower for resisting the Serjeant of the House of Commons in his attempt to execute a warrant against some printers for reporting the speeches of members of parliament! In 1792, Fox's Libel Bill was passed, the consequence of which was, that in 1795 Lord Eldon was able to boast of more prosecutions for libel in three years than for twenty before. And not only was the free utterance of opinion suppressed by law, but the bigots of that time called in the aid of taxation too, so that the stamp on newspapers, which in Queen Anne's time was a halfpenny on a half-sheet, and a penny on a whole one, became, before the close of the century, fourpence on every newspaper.

But our intellectual condition as a nation was not dwarfish as regarded periodical literature only, as contrasted with its present fair proportions; but it was altogether smaller as regarded books and larger publications. We find Mr. Baines quoting Charles Knight as witness that, from 1792 to 1802, the annual number of new books published in Great Britain was 372; whilst M'Culloch states that an average of four years ending with 1842, gave 2149 volumes of new works then annually published in Great Britain!

This, then, was the state of matters at the dawn of the nineteenth century. There was a great body of people in the realm who had no representatives in parliament—at the same time that belief in the Divine Right of kings, in God-anointed governors, was among the dead or dying creeds of mankind. There was an aristocracy or second estate, which did *not* consist of men superior to their fellow-subjects; but who, on the contrary, availed themselves of all the petty advantages of power to commit injustice. And there was a church, which, while it proclaimed in its liturgy that the service of God is perfect freedom, used a temporal power which it ought never to have possessed, to persecute any who dared to act on this her own proclaimed tenet. Wrong and injustice had the upper hand, and it might have gone hard with men of truth in struggling with them, had not the press, the fourth estate, suddenly sprung into new being and joined them, when the two parties met face to face.

The first years of the century were years of war. To fight the French was, with the then rulers of the kingdom, the surest proof of patriotism. 'Give peace in our time, O Lord!' was the prayer in established churches morning and evening 'during the year';—'Help us in any and every way to raise regiments!' was the counter-prayer beyond the church walls. The country was stimulated into a state of bloodthirsty excitement, and the mania was in no part more rabid than in Lancashire and Yorkshire.



'All the youth of England were on fire.' Volunteer corps were raised and tendered to the king, in fear of refusal sometimes, owing to their number. The softer sex joined in the general madness. They made clothing, and cockades, and standards for the soldiers. They urged on their sons and husbands, their brothers, and all others whom they could influence. Nor was treasure wanting. Twenty-two thousand pounds were subscribed in a very short period in Manchester alone. The pride, pomp, and circumstance of war were paraded before men's eyes, and for a while all was enthusiasm and glory. But our share in the wretched quarrels of that time was in a great measure uncalled-for; and in due time the recoil came.

It is evident, in the dealings of God with man, that national calamity always follows national guilt. There is no eternity for nations. Individuals may be punished hereafter, but nations must be punished here. And, accordingly, England's criminality in this seeking after and courting war was punished; the results of the punishment have come down even to us. A succession of bad harvests was sent, and bread became fearfully scarce. Taxation increased. Wages fell. The treasure which was wanted in trade, and which, in it, would have supported thousands of Englishmen, was lavished for the destruction of Frenchmen. A great paper currency was set up to take its place, but it only *pretended* to represent money, and did not even represent property, and was found worthless in every tightness of the money-market. Credit almost ceased; trade languished; and at last, when the re-action of popular feeling came, and enthusiasm for war died out, Starvation, the great teacher, was suddenly found in the midst of the people.

In tracing the history of these modern times, one of the chief agents must be kept in mind—money. But it was not the only one. Had Pitt understood men as well as he understood money, his schemes might have succeeded: it is estimated that his sinking fund would have liquidated the whole national debt before 1846. But he did not see that man was no longer stationary, but progressive; and while he, in common with many other statesmen before and since, treated the people like mere chess-pieces, and expected, as of old, that they would submit to the treatment, they suddenly burst out into wild life: reform was demanded and obtained, and his financial measures were scattered to the winds.

We are not now about to discuss those measures, or the policy of a state of national debtorship, that is apparently to last for ever, or end in national insolvency. Mr. Alison, and the respectable but retrogressive gentlemen who declaim in *Black-*

*wood*, see the ruin of our British constitution as its ultimate result. It is enough for us to say, here, that we disagree with the said gentlemen as much about this as we once did with one of their number about the Scottish Cavaliers. They are ever pointing to the past; and in agriculture, and all other branches of trade, would have men hampered, as was the case of old, instead of being free.

Many sensible men, especially among the non-conformists, had foreseen and warned the people of the ruin which always stalks the chief camp-follower of war; and they had opposed the popular frenzy to the best of their ability. But for some years they had no success. The nation was mad upon the subject, and, like a mad man, would not hear reason. In 1807, however, when the narrow-minded orders in council were issued, the object of which was to shut that part of the continent which was under Napoleon's influence, from all trade with us, the stagnation of commerce became so intolerable, that in Lancashire and Yorkshire, where it was most felt, the operatives broke out into riots, and destroyed factories and machinery, and in some cases life too. It was evident that, at that time, *they* were the real sufferers by the wars. Mr. Brougham, then in his early prime, was employed by the manufacturers of Manchester and other great, and, for the most part, unrepresented cities, to state their grievances before the House of Commons; this he did in the most masterly way, but the orders were not recalled till 1812, when distress had accumulated on distress, and when to have held out longer might have caused the destruction of all.

In these twelve years, the positions of the estates of the realm towards each other had shifted again; and the fourth estate—the Press, so long kept under by the stern hand of power, had, as by miracle, sprung up to a new manhood. The minds of the working population, especially in Lancashire and Yorkshire, had thrown off the spell which had held them in stupid torpor during the inane ages; and they were now far advanced on the road to freedom. Wise and energetic men had sown truth broadcast among them; and though enemies had, as it were, gone over the corn lands with tares, and much error had taken root, it was not sufficient to choke the truth as it grew kindly in its new soil. Its growth was rapid, too;—want and misery ripened the fields to a very early harvest. Brutality and ignorance were yielding day by day before knowledge; the right of all men to freedom of opinion began to be understood; and as these sturdy men—so newly awakened—gazed on the rising glories of the day, they cast away the things of darkness for ever.

We say that the fourth estate had attained to a new rank and

position. We have alluded to the decrepit state of journalism at the commencement of our century; this is the place to speak of its improvements and progress.

Newspapers had been the vehicles for retailing news chiefly, and not opinions. This was especially true of journals in the provinces. There the scissors played the part of the pen; and in choosing his extracts from the London news lay the chief talent of an editor. Reporters were rarely employed. Very scanty reports, if any, were given of county meetings, and even of assizes; whilst leading articles were almost unknown. There was not, probably, a single country editor, from Land's End to the celebrated residence of John O'Groat, who gave an original opinion in his paper from one year's end to another.

But by 1812 this was all reformed. The newspaper had, in great measure, taken the place of the preacher, and was the silent instructor and guide of the people. Foremost amongst those who raised the provincial journals of England to eminence and respectability, was Edward Baines, of Leeds, the life of whom, by his son, is named at the head of this paper.

In a hurried sketch of the history of two great shires during the most eventful period of our national existence—where matter is so abundant, that the chief difficulty is to know what to *reject*—it is impossible to speak at any length of individuals. But we cannot refrain from pausing here for a few moments, to pay a special tribute of respect to this excellent man, before we proceed to speak of events in which he played a somewhat prominent part. His life was one of eminent honour and usefulness, and the son who has here recorded the events of it has performed a duty of much delicacy and difficulty with great wisdom and ability.

Edward Baines was a man who carved out a path for himself by his own good conduct and energy. Unlike Sir Fowell Buxton, so far over-lauded by Mr. Binney and others on this account, he had no Gurneys, or Hanburys, to patronize or aid him. Born of respectable but not wealthy parents, he was apprenticed, at sixteen years of age, to a printer in Preston. Business, however, becoming slack, he went to Leeds, and finished his apprenticeship in the office of the 'Leeds Mercury.'

In this place his industry, good conduct, and obliging disposition, won the esteem and confidence of his employers; and his biographer pursues, 'he laid the foundation of future success as 'a master, in the thorough knowledge and performance of the 'duties of a workman.' It was the ambition of his youth to follow the example of Benjamin Franklin, who had married a Preston lady; and there was much of Franklin's character about

him. But Providence had other work in store for him, and in a different sphere to Franklin's.

No sooner was his apprenticeship over, than he commenced business on his own account; a sure proof of his determination to succeed. We see, even in the whirl and war of London life, where nothing *seems* so serious as it is, such thousands of young men stop in their career at this point, that we cannot give a surer proof of Baines's self-reliance than his starting for himself the day after his apprenticeship expired, in a place where the bustle would not have been sufficient to have concealed failure. The habits of irresponsible action become like fetters on our young men generally; every year adds new links to them, and, at last, those who might have risen to independence if they had dared to give their talents a trial, sink into respectable old book-keepers, and dwindle away existence in stupid obscurity.

Soon after this, Mr. Baines married a young townswoman, whose excellent and pious character materially influenced his own, and helped to turn him from Franklinism to Christianity. Three years after his marriage, viz., in 1801, he became the proprietor of the 'Leeds' Mercury.'

This journal was an old established one, but under the joint influence of editorial dulness and public distress the circulation had sunk to about seven hundred copies when Mr. Baines purchased it. Under his management, however, it immediately rose. He published leading articles; a thing, as we have said, almost unknown in the provincial press. He employed reporters. He enlarged the paper. He filled its columns with as much variety and useful matter as possible, advocating every society that had benevolence, or, above all, education in view. A man of liberal opinions and feelings, he ardently desired the prosperity of the country—he saw that the people were not governed aright; he believed that they would eventually govern themselves, and to prepare them for self-government as a body, he saw that education was as necessary to them as it is to individuals.

He took great interest, in 1807, in the contest, so long memorable in Yorkshire, between Lord Milton and the Hon. Henry Lascelles, for the representation of that county. After a fifteen days' poll his party won the victory, Mr. Wilberforce and Lord Milton being returned. But that triumph was dearly bought. Never was the defective state of national representation more glaringly shown. The total number of voters was just above twenty-three thousand, and yet the contest cost the victor and the loser upwards of a hundred thousand pounds a-piece.

In 1811, Lord Sidmouth brought forward his infamous Dis-

senters' Bill. It was found highly inconvenient that dissent should spread so fast as it was doing; that the people should, especially in our manufacturing districts, be leaving the Establishment in such large numbers. If the whole nation was to desert it, how could it be still the National Church? and if only the great majority even of the nation should leave it, how could it hope to be allowed to enjoy the enormous wages it received under the pretence of being the church for all? Is it not a venerable institution, was the cry of folly; apostolical? traditional? maternal? and the rest: it would be a thousand pities if its career were to be brought to a sudden close; so many men would be thrown out of employment, too, in that state of things, — poor men, whose peculiar education had rendered them unfit for other occupations. It was determined, therefore, to make an effort against dissent, and under such pressing circumstances a pretext was soon found.

It appeared, on Lord Sidmouth's showing, that during thirty years there had been at least eighteen mistakes made by applicants for licence to preach, in spelling the few words descriptive of the profession of preaching the gospel. It appeared, on the Bishop of Durham's testimony, that the sectarians assembled in barns, or rooms of private houses, 'or in other buildings of the most improper kind.' And the witnesses, doubtless, spoke truth. The land contained many myriads of people who had somehow learnt, that the gathering of two or three together in Christ's name, was quite sufficient consecration even for a vulgar barn.

On these, however, and like grounds, it was attempted to pass a bill requiring a certificate from six substantial and reputable persons, before licence to preach should be given; so that the holders of power would have it optional to grant licences, or to withhold them. Can we not imagine that the apostle Paul, having lost caste among the 'substantial and reputable' men of Corinth, and become a tent manufacturer for the time, would have failed to get *his* licence to preach there if he had applied? Fortunately, these same illiterate men had done their work too well, and the friends of darkness were foiled.

It is well for the Establishment that Nonconformity is, by its very nature, individual, while its opponents are collective. Congregationalists believe that church government is the business of each church; they acknowledge no priest but Christ; and, consequently, it is somewhat difficult to make a visible and political whole out of the many parts. Long may it continue to be so; and long may we remain personally uninterested, whether in synodal action in the Establishment, or conference-intolerance out of it.

But this want of political unity has been unfortunate in some respects: it has been one reason for the tardiness of our emancipation from protestant bondage. If our forefathers had used the real power which they possessed in James II.'s time, when the Church of Rome was in one scale, and that of England in the other, and their weight decided the question, they could have obtained more freedom than we enjoy even now. The Church of England would have been undone, had not the nonconformists joined cause with it, preferring its tyranny to that of Rome. And the gates of the universities might have been rent open in those days, and civil disabilities all abolished; but want of worldly unity was want of worldly power, and nonconformity lost more than a century and a half through the very agency which, in a spiritual view, is its chief strength.

But Lord Sidmouth's bill was at once so insulting and tyrannical, that the country would not suffer it to pass. It gave the magistrate,—whether a bigoted layman or a fox-hunting parson,—an upholder of the game-laws, or an enemy to all progress,—power to impede men in the use of that freedom which was guaranteed at the Revolution of 1688. And public opinion rose at once against it, declaring, in accents that could not be mistaken, that religion should not be chained in this way at all events to the State; and seeing the storm that darkened, as in a moment, the whole sky, and seemed almost about to pour on his head, Lord Sidmouth suffered the bill to be negatived in the second reading.

We now come to the most serious part of our recent history. Almost ruined by wars, and driven desperate by hunger, the operatives of Lancashire and Yorkshire were only saved from revolt, in 1815, by the education which had been spread among them. But even education did not suppress indignation, when, in that year, the monied classes, having thrown off their income-tax, got the iniquitous Corn-law passed, by which the importation of foreign grain was prohibited, till the price of English wheat was 80s. per quarter; and many serious riots happened. This was the monster whom Cobden scotched and Sir R. Peel killed, and for whom we hope there will be no resurrection.

But, in consequence of the anger roused by this measure, the ministers of that time pretended to fear revolution, and succeeded in suspending the Habeas Corpus Act. To excuse this, dangerous plots were discovered; but the plots themselves were previously made by government spies, who urged on the poor and desperate to courses they would never otherwise have pursued, and then betrayed them. This was the most detestable of all Lord Castlereagh's miserable doings.

The man Oliver is unhappily an historical character. A more worthless and guilty wretch has perhaps never breathed, since the days of Titus Oates. He used to pretend to be a delegate from London and other Reform Associations, and having fabricated messages from them, to the effect that they were about to rise on the government, simultaneously with the country branches, he would inflame some poor creature to the utterance of dangerous sentiments, and then inform against him and all present. The result was, in a few cases, Death; in many, transportation; and, in 1837, some of those whom he had trepanned, and whom a servile bench and jury had condemned, were wearing out their lives in unmerited exile.

He succeeded in Derbyshire, and partly in Yorkshire, but he could not succeed in Lancashire. Mr. Prentice, of whom we shall hear more presently, had, with others, set the Lancashire men on their guard. The warnings of such men—men whose protection of the oppressed inspired confidence in them—were widely spread, and the education they had so freely sown, produced its good fruits now. Physical force reformers were despised as tools of government. In Yorkshire it was different; demagogues abounded there, and the whole country was in alarm lest their speeches should be the expression of the popular feeling, which it was most industriously stated was for revolution. But there were many clear-headed men, who knew that the popular feeling was not for revolution, but for reform, and who were resolved that the government should not prevent the accomplishment of that reform by instigating rebellion. Amongst these was Edward Baines. The narrative of his bold exposure of Oliver the Spy, which overthrew at once the government schemes, is one of the most interesting passages in his son's book.

‘On the 13th June (1817) Mr. Baines received a letter from his friend Mr. James Holdforth, who, on his way to Manchester, had heard facts at Dewsbury, which showed that a government emissary, named Oliver, had been attempting to entrap Mr. James Willan, a printer of that place, to attend a meeting, where ten persons had been arrested. Mr. Baines at once took a chaise and went (accompanied by one of his sons, the present writer) to Dewsbury, to investigate the facts. He repaired to the house of his friend, Mr. John Halliday, jun., where Mr. James Willan and, at his instance, Mr. John Dickenson, linen-draper, attended. There the plot was laid bare. Mr. Willan proved that Oliver, who represented himself as a delegate from the Radicals of London, had several times for the space of two months endeavoured to seduce him into acts of violence and situations of danger; and that he had especially urged him to attend a meeting of ‘delegates’ at Thornhill Lees on the previous Friday; at which meeting

ten poor men were arrested by a party of military, under the command of Major-General Sir John Byng. Willan, who was a conscientious man, and a professor of the principles of the Society of Friends, indignantly repelled every invitation to violence, and refused to attend the meeting. The ten prisoners had been conveyed with Oliver himself to Wakefield, for examination by the magistrates; but at that town Oliver was seen by Mr. Dickenson *at liberty, and in communication with the servant of General Byng*; and on inquiring of the servant, Mr. Dickenson learnt that Oliver had been at his master's house at Campsall a few days before. From this and other facts, the character of the emissary was evident.

'Mr. Baines returned to Leeds, and published a full and clear statement of the whole of the facts, with the names of all the parties, in the *Mercury* of the following morning. \* \* \* The effect of this disclosure upon the country was electrical. On the following Monday, the statement in the *Mercury* was read by Earl Grey in the House of Lords, and by Sir Francis Burdett in the House of Commons, and the Prime Minister, the Earl of Liverpool, admitted that Oliver was an emissary from the Home Office. A feeling of the liveliest indignation pervaded the country. It was soon found that every one of the conspiracies or outrages by which the nation had been alarmed had been instigated or promoted by spies. It was shown, that not only had they encouraged insurrection by pretended concurrence, but had earnestly recommended it to innocent and peaceable men, and taken prodigious pains to weave the web of conspiracy. The conduct of the spies was natural: they lived upon conspiracy, and therefore it was their business to create, if they could not find it.'

This party, as we have shown, wishing to prevent religious freedom, tried to do so under the most shallow pretexts. They tried to prevent reform by making it appear that reformers were revolutionists; and now, prior to recording the misery which the infamous Corn Law brought on the people, we shall see the same system of jesuitry practised towards the political reformers of a higher grade. Many of the disciples of Ignatius Loyola still appear to the world as disciples of quite another master, and the Society of Jesus are not the only Jesuits.

In 1818, the ministry, having failed with their spy system, allowed the repeal of the suspension of the Habeas Corpus. But the reformers in Manchester, to show that the Lancashire men were utterly guiltless of the plots laid to their charge, petitioned the House of Commons that inquiry might be made into the conduct of the government officers, before an act of indemnity should be passed, preventing those who had been falsely punished from getting redress. This was called 'the Petition of the Twenty-seven,' and was understood to have been got up by Mr. John Edward Taylor, afterwards editor of the *Manchester*



*Guardian*. The debate on this petition ended in a triumph for ministers; but it was resolved to punish Taylor, if possible. The will soon made a way.

On the 1st July of that year, according to Mr. Prentice, whose most interesting account of the business we condense, a Mr. Greenwood, at a meeting of commissioners of police for the appointment of assessors, seeing Mr. Taylor's name on the list, invited objection to it; and during conversation, accused him of being the author of a handbill that, he said, 'caused the Manchester Exchange to be set on fire, in 1812.' On hearing of this, Mr. Taylor sent 'a message' to Greenwood, through Mr. Prentice; but it produced no sort of 'satisfaction:' on which Taylor wrote a fiery note to his traducer, in which he informs him that he has 'proved himself a liar, a slanderer, and a scoundrel.' After this, Mr. Greenwood having repeated his accusation, Mr. Taylor published a letter in *Cowdroy's Gazette*, referring to the correspondence, and stating that a copy of it should lie at the printer's for public inspection.

The grand jury at Salford Quarter Sessions, on 27th October, found an indictment against Taylor, for libel; but the character of the court of quarter sessions at Salford, being pretty notorious, Mr. Taylor obtained a writ of *certiorari* to remove the indictment into the Court of King's Bench. The trial took place at the Lancaster Spring Assizes, on the 29th March, 1819.

Taylor resolved to undertake his own defence, and Scarlett, afterwards Lord Abinger, was employed for the prosecution. The latter was brief and *nonchalant*. 'It would be a mere waste of time,' he said, 'to enter into the details of circumstances which cannot be the subject of your consideration, or at all influence you in the verdict you are to pronounce. All you have to do is, to inquire if Taylor wrote the letter, and if its contents are libellous.' This was the point which Taylor seized. Turning from Baron Wood to the jury, he told them that they were sole judges of the law as well as of the fact. He protested against the doctrine of the courts, that the truth of a libel constitutes an aggravation of the charge. He declared himself willing to justify every word he had written; and repelled the charges of malice, falsehood, and wickedness, brought against him in the indictment; demanding that proof to support these charges should be put in. He concluded with a plain unvarnished appeal to the jury to remember the provocation he had received, to consider what would have been their own conduct, and to do as they would be done by themselves.

Mr. Scarlett then foolishly allowed him to bring forward his witnesses; foolishly, because Greenwood's case was of course a

bad one, if the merits of it were discussed. But he had the 'reply;' that fatal power of saying a few last words, which may alter the whole features of the case in a juror's memory—and he used it well. But Taylor's points had hit the clear and honest intellect of one man, John Rylands. The other jurors were of the old school of loyalists, and were disposed to return a verdict of 'Guilty,' at once. John Rylands, however, thinking for himself, and thinking honestly withal, would not agree to such a verdict. Taylor was evidently not a guilty man, but an injured one; and he, for his part, would give a 'verdict accordingly.' There was a minority of ONE: so the jury retired.

The day wore on, but they did not return. Other cases were brought forward and gone into; Taylor and his friends hearing, by snatches, the witnesses and pleaders in them, but impatient for their own verdict, and turning their heads at every sound in court, to see if the jury were returning. The time came, however, for dismissing the court, and still they made no sign. Prentice and the others went to their inn; returned to learn if any sound had been heard from the dungeon where the jury were; but no—as he says, 'the men might have been dead for aught they could learn or hear.'

'Thus they paced the streets of Lancaster,' he writes, 'hour after hour. It was a wild howling night, with continued blasts and hail-storms. Sometimes we stood and watched the window of the tower which contained the jury, and contemplated their condition on such a wintry day and night as that had been, confined and kept so many hours without food, or drink, or tobacco, or coal, or candle-light. Thus, at intervals of half-an-hour, an hour, and so on, more or less, we sauntered backwards and forwards, hearing the Lancaster clocks strike hour after hour. A few of our number determined to go yet once again, to have a few words with the keeper of the door, with whom by this time, from their numerous visits to him, they seemed to have become familiar acquaintance. They went this time rather with a view to bid the man good-night, or have a few more last words, than with any expectation that there would be any move or stir before morning; when suddenly, while they were talking with the door-keeper, there was a most unearthly yell—'Open the door!' then a confused bustle; then their familiar, with whom they had been speaking, became authoritative,—'Oh, get away, gentlemen, the jury are agreed!'

And accordingly the jury issued from their den; and being marshalled in due order, were led by a bailiff through the streets of Lancaster in the dead of the night, to the judge's lodgings. Taylor and the rest followed close behind, and when they arrived at the lodgings, went up-stairs with them. Mr. Prentice is quite racy on the scene,—

'There was a stand-still on a large open landing, the size of the vestibule below. Here the door was gently opened, and into a moderate-sized bed-room, up two stairs, went the jury, attended by their companions who represented the public and shire, where, with undrawn curtains, bolt upright in his night-cap and bed-clothing, sat Baron Wood. Think of the spectacle!

'Silence, gentlemen,' said the officer.

'Gentlemen of the jury, answer to your names.'—They answered.

'Gentlemen of the jury, are you agreed on your verdict?'

'We are,' said the foreman, firmly, in a tone which indicated he had achieved a victory.

'How say you, gentlemen—is John Edward Taylor guilty or not guilty?'

'In the dimness of the light of that room—for there was but a small chamber-lamp—and the oddness of the scene passing before the eyes, it would be difficult for any person to convey to another the sensation of that moment which intervened between the question and the answer.

\* \* But when John Rylands of Warrington pronounced, with a triumphant emphasis, 'He is *not* guilty,' there arose a burst of exultation notwithstanding the privacy of the place, which made the whole house ring. I am not aware that the judge uttered a sentence; but the officer begged imploringly for silence, and all parties, both spectators and jury, got as quick as possible into the street, where the echoes of the old town told tolerably loud and frequent—the fact that the verdict was, He is not guilty.'

It now became known, that when the jury had retired, John Rylands urged his views in favour of the accused, which were received impatiently; and after a long discussion, the sturdy foreman threw his coat into a corner and lay down upon it. 'If you will insist on a verdict of guilty,' he said, 'I will go to sleep, and consider about it in the morning.' His example was followed by others, apparently as determined on their side, and it became a question of endurance. The servile were not so enduring as their antagonist, and at last the majority gave way to the minority; and for once, truth was declared to be no libel.

We have thus shown, by a few examples selected from many, how the governments of our own century tried, by underhand and jesuitical means, to repress reform in religion or politics, and how they were defeated. We now come to a time when they changed their tactics. They had discovered that their opponents were men of greater honesty and more talent than themselves; and, that if the contest was suffered to be one of intellect, they must infallibly be beaten. Coercion was their only other resource; and coercion was tried, but it ultimately failed too. It seemed to be the will of God that no means or weapons used against progress should prosper.

The history of Peterloo, or the massacre of the 16th August,

1819, at St. Peter's Field, Manchester, is one of the saddest in the annals of our country. We do not intend to defend Hunt. He was an impudent demagogue, who did more to hinder reform than to assist it. But he broke no law in calling the public meeting in St. Peter's Field. The multitude that assembled was enormous—no notice having been given by the magistrates to forbid the meeting—and consisted of the great body of the population of that unrepresented town, anxious to show, in any constitutional way, their grievances and wants. It was a high holiday; men took their wives, and sisters, and children; the sixty thousand people were all unarmed and all peaceable, exercising the right of free speech which they inherited from their fathers, and seeking to do no more, when, suddenly, loud screams were heard from the outskirts of the crowd, and shots, and a troop of cavalry and yeomen were seen charging into the vast assembly, and striking with their sabres right and left. It was a frightful scene. Women and striplings, old men and children, were mercilessly swept down and trampled on by the horses, while the hussars and yeomen cut at the throngs about them with their swords like men insane. 'Eleven persons were killed; six hundred wounded; sixty thousand carrying to their homes the recollections of that fatal day; poverty and misery in every cottage; deep distress, attributable to heavy taxation and a law prohibiting the importation of food—was there no wild revenge for the injuries inflicted?' says Mr. Prentice, 'no retaliation with the dagger for the cruel and wanton assault by the sword? There was not. The population of Lancashire had faith in the just administration of the law. Its working-men, rough in manner and rude in speech, but shrewd, intelligent, and possessing much of the generous qualities of the Anglo-Saxon race, would not stoop to cowardly assassination.'

But, as we said, the career of progress was not to be stopped by means like this. It was, indeed, checked, but only for a moment; and then, the very obstacles recalling all its strength, it returned to the charge, forced the barriers, and broke them down. Where one reformer suffered, a hundred sprang into his place. Liberty was up and newly armed, and, putting the trumpet to her lips, she went out against tyranny, and bade its dead arise. And, at every call, the dry bones quickened into life,—the thoughtless became reflective; the careless, alert; the dull, bold. The mind of man, like the eagle, dashing away the old beak which had been the growth of ages, by that very process, painful though it was, renewed its youth; and then, with new desires and new aspirations, soared into ever higher regions, in larger and larger circles, growing more splendid and glorious as it shot upward on the wing.

The subject crowds upon us, but we must close this part of our sketch. From the day of Peterloo, progress was steady. In a few years it became rapid and triumphal. In 1828, the Test and Corporation Acts were swept away by Lord John Russell, a fit prelude to his reform-bill in 1832, when Manchester obtained a voice in the national councils. That after the passing of this bill the nation should pause, as for a short breathing space before venturing on new achievements, was to be expected from the caution of the national character. But the pause was only momentary. It did not come from any distrust of the high destinies in store, but from fear of jeopardizing the successes of the past by too much haste in clutching at what was due only from the future.

Before we turn for a moment to notice the vast strides which have been made by Lancashire and Yorkshire in other departments, we have a few brief remarks to make on the two books which have suggested this paper, in addition to those already made.

Like Mrs. Malaprop, we dislike 'caparisons,' and shall not, therefore, however much tempted by the similarity of their subjects, compare the works together. Mr. Prentice's 'Recollections' is a book which every man interested in his country's history ought to possess. Vigorous, racy, and for the most part sound, he brings scenes and incidents before the mental eye with the vividness of the novelist, whilst at the same time he gives minutiae, and facts, and dates, and names, with the care and precision of the historian. As a man, he has done abundance of work, and for the most part well. He must have been often voted very troublesome by the representatives of the higher estates in Manchester. Did any one encroach on right of way—Archibald Prentice's name is on the list of requisitionists. Did any of the brutal old church-and-king people get up prosecutions against the honest and bold—Archibald Prentice was ready to aid the weak. Were secret meetings held, and the resolutions put out as if by the men of Manchester—Archibald Prentice is among the protestors. When what he truly calls 'the farce of election' was going on in 1826, he took the pains to collect evidence upon the subject of the representation of the people. He found that the population of one hundred boroughs, each returning two members, was 185,197, whilst that of Manchester alone was 187,031. And he would not be quiet with his discovery. Far and wide he circulated a list of these boroughs; and at every instance of class legislation out it came, to show that nothing better could be expected. Men committed it to memory, he says, and taught from it as from a text. He was one of the founders of the Anti-Corn-Law League. But to enumerate his

doings is impossible here: we would most strongly advise our readers to look at the history of them as given in this volume.

As regards Mr. Baines's life of his father, we have already spoken in its praise. Fault may be found with it, as to the key in which the whole of it is pitched, but we look with much greater relish at the beauties with which it abounds. We may leave the faults to the anxious and atrabilious searchers for fault.

From the time when Mr. Baines unmasked Oliver, he rose more and more in public estimation. As a young man, he had possessed considerable humour, and he found it a useful assistant to common sense. He was merry and wise. He used all his energies in the promotion of the cause of truth, too, whether in civil or religious aspects; and assisted in all ways to promote the prosperity of Leeds. This important town was enfranchised under the Reform Bill, and at its second election he was returned as its member. And he deserved the distinction. His battle with the world had taken place there; and he had not rested satisfied when he got the victory, as so many do, but had done what he could to help others on. We cannot enter upon his parliamentary life, but, having already referred to the stamp-duty, placed on newspapers by the narrow-minded statesmen of the close of the last century, we may notice the reduction of that duty to one penny while Mr. Baines sat for Leeds. As regards his private life, it was happy and serene; and when death summoned him away from it, in his seventy-fifth year, he was ready for the change. He had served his God in the spirit in which he had served his country, and in pure and steadfast faith he entered calmly on his rest.

Lancashire and Yorkshire are essentially *the* manufacturing districts. Since the year 1640, Manchester has been the centre of the cotton manufacture. Here quaint and portly old Fuller saw, in 1662, the wonderful results of combination and industry, and saw them with surprise. Here De Foe saw, in 1727, cause to record his wonder at the great size and business of the place. But it was not till 1769, that the invention of spinning by rollers, patented thirty years before by John Wyatt, of Birmingham, and reproduced, or invented, by Arkwright, was called into operation, and changed the system of cotton manufacture altogether. To this succeeded great numbers of improvements; among others the application of steam, the invention of the power loom, and, above all, that organization of labour which is now known as the factory system. Would that our legislators would leave that same factory system alone, except as regards children, and allow labourers in this trade, as in all others, to make their own arrangements as to the hours of labour.

In the matter of population, Lancashire and Yorkshire have made extraordinary progress. A large increase of inhabitants is generally a proof of improving circumstances and condition. And we believe that all improvement comes mainly from education and employment.

The first requisite of a people who would be free is education. With the spread of sound knowledge we see the advance of freedom. Among the chief teachers of sound knowledge is Invention; and here we see Lancashire and Yorkshire lead the way. But there are others; and here again we find Lancashire in the very van of progress. The first railway in England was that between Manchester and Liverpool, at the opening of which Huskisson was killed. It is a singular thing that Mr. Edgeworth proposed this mode of transit as far back as 1802; not with reference to steam, but to horse power. Mr. Baines gives a very interesting digression on this subject.

There were other teachers, also, from these manufacturing districts. We have named one, but we must name it again, whose efforts have not been confined to England, but have spread with missionary zeal over the world. The Anti-Corn-Law League began in Manchester. The results of its success can hardly be estimated yet; but amongst them, one of the highest and the best is, that free trade is becoming the means of almost universal intercommunication among the nations of the earth. English freedom, English laws and customs, are becoming everywhere known; and English example will, ere long, we hope, be everywhere followed.

But let us not become nationally proud. We stand in need of yet greater improvements ourselves; and it will be the worse for us if, having done so much, we now fall back. The old spirits of darkness are not dead. The higher estates are not all reconciled to the rising power of the lower ones; and many among them would, if they could, still check the rapid course of freedom. Protection, Puseyism, Sentimentalism, Romanism, Young Englandism, all have this end in view. It is the part of those on whom another spirit has fallen, to throw their weight into the better scale, doing their utmost to *forward* the great work of human progress.

- ART. VII.—(1.) *Index Librorum Prohibitorum*, Sanctissimi Domini nostri Gregorii XVI., Pontificis Maximi, jussu editus. Romæ: 1841. Ex Typographia Reverendæ Cameræ Apostolicæ; cum Summi Pontificis Privilegio. (The Index of Prohibited Books, published by the Command of our Most Holy Lord Gregory XVI., Supreme Pontiff. Rome: 1841. With Supplements.)
- (2.) *Index Lib. Prohibit.*, juxta Exemplar Romanum, &c. Mechliniæ: 1838. (The same Index of Prohibited Books, according to the Roman Copy, published at Malines, in Belgium, in 1838.)
- (3.) F. A. ZACCARIA. *Storia Polemica delle Prohibizioni de Libri*. Rome: 1777.
- (4.) G. PEIGNOT. *Dictionnaire Critique, Littéraire et Bibliographique des Livres Condamnés au feu*. Paris: 1806.
- (5.) J. MENDHAM. *The Literary Policy of the Church of Rome*. Second Edition. London: 1830.
- (6.) R. GIBBINGS. *An Exact Reprint of the Roman Index Expurgatorius, with a Preface*. Dublin: 1837.

THE controversy with Rome is gradually becoming the great controversy of the day. Two antagonistic principles are at issue—the authority of Christ and the authority of man—divine reliance and human reliance—the rock of ages or the seven hills. From the days of the Son of Man on earth, indeed, these principles have been in collision; but frequently the collision has been slight or partial. The events of the last three centuries—events called forth by Luther's noble exertions—have brought them into full prominence and broad contrast; and the political and social tendencies of the present generation aggravate their hostility, and force on a deadly combat. Around those principles congenial powers arrange themselves. On the one side stand sons of light, on the other side stand sons of darkness. England holds the banner in the midst of the former; Austria leads the van of the latter. Meanwhile the Pope, benefiting by the alarm struck into the hearts of tyrants by the revolutions of the year 1848, offers a centre of resistance and onslaught to all the espousers of re-action throughout Europe, and is straining every nerve, first to sustain existing despotisms, and then to make his own yoke co-extensive with political enslavement. A conspiracy against the liberties of the world is fostered in the Vatican. Every day accelerates the issue—the Bible or Tradition? the Messiah or the Pope?

What, then, ought to be our modes of attack? Where is the



vulnerable point in our enemy? We speak of assault, because we hope Protestants are not so blind as to continue on the defensive. Already too much and too long have they, in these days, held that position. With Luther's cause in their hands, they must follow Luther's plan of warfare. It was by daring and ceaseless attacks that Luther shook the walls of Babylon.

But it is with a wary adversary we have to do. Armed at all points, Rome is ever on the watch. The experience of many ages has made her cautious as well as strong. Yet in reality is she weak, very weak; her strength is weakness, for her foundation is a lie—that lie is her huge assumption of infallibility. 'Rome never has erred, never can err.' This is the declaration which she makes in the face of the world. Here lie at once her strength and her weakness. A bold lie is a good thing for a bad cause; the bolder, the more ready and the greater its success; but in the same proportion is the danger of detection, and the disgrace of the consequent exposure. If, however, Rome is infallible, protestantism is wrong. But if Rome is not infallible, Rome is without foundation and must perish. This, then, is the point to which the friends of biblical religion should direct their attention. In this particular should they aim to disabuse the minds of catholics; and that the rather, because here an issue of fact is raised—an issue on which it is possible to say 'yea' or 'nay' on clear and tangible vouchers. That which is infallible does not err. Has Rome erred? We now limit our affirmation to one point—Rome has erred in her policy towards error. Let us explain. Rome has a certain system of opinions and practices, the reception of which she makes essential to salvation. This system has been questioned and assailed. Instead of answering the questions and repelling the assaults, Rome has done her best to ignore the one and suppress the other. Argument she met by force, eloquence she destroyed in the flame, and liberty she trampled down in prisons. It is, however, with one feature of her violence that we now wish to deal—her literary policy—how she has borne herself towards attempts to undermine or bombard her citadel by material in this shape. We wish to contemplate Rome in the presence of free thought and free speech. What is her attitude? Is it a becoming, a wise, an effectual attitude? In self-defence she doubtless puts forth her best resources. Here, if anywhere, her infallibility will be displayed.

Fortunately, on this point we possess authentic materials. Rome herself puts into our hands the fullest and the most cogent evidence. She has published a list of books which she forbids to be read, and so has given us the best means of learning what she fears, and how she constructs her self-defence.

We refer to her INDEX. The Roman Index is of two kinds: there is the 'Index Librorum Prohibitorum,' the catalogue of forbidden books; and there is the 'Index Librorum Expurgandorum,' the catalogue of books to be purified or freed from error; the latter is sometimes called the 'Index Expurgatorius,' and is, though erroneously, spoken of as identical with the former. But the catalogue of forbidden books contains writings which must not be read at all; the catalogue of books to be corrected contains writings which may be read, when they have undergone the required revision. Forbidden books are forbidden to all the faithful, whatever their state or condition in life. But as Rome has no rule without an exception—save her infallibility; and, as in the days of Catiline, so now, all things are on sale there, a dispensation may be obtained to read prohibited books. The licence may be procured for money. The licence is given to such as are to sit in judgment on suspected or condemned productions. The essence of this proceeding is secrecy, and accordingly the genuine Roman edition of the Index is itself a forbidden book. Yet the penalty for an infraction of the law is excommunication. That penalty at one time of day brought with it not only the privation of spiritual blessings, but heavy civil disqualifications and severe bodily pains. In those Catholic countries where the secular arm continues to execute the behests of the spiritual power, excommunication involves something more than the curse of the church, and may lodge the offender in the dungeons of the inquisition. In lands where Protestantism predominates, or where, as in France and the United States, special immunities are enjoyed by Roman-catholics, their spiritual masters are obliged to be satisfied with incorporeal punishments. If, indeed, we go back to the days when Rome had Christendom under her feet, we behold her committing to the flames both the writers of obnoxious books and the books themselves; and when, in later times, her power became restrained, she continued to burn books, no longer being able to burn their authors.

The commencement of this literary police has a very early date in the spiritual despotism of the Romish Church. The supervision was considered a part of the pastoral care, so soon as sacerdotal pretensions gained head, and received the sanction of the State. Usurping councils and tyrannous individuals, as early as the fourth century, took on themselves to decide what Christians should and what they should not read. With the growing power of the bishop of Rome this mental despotism grew. At length, the censure of books came to be considered as a function of the episcopal office, and a right of the universities. By prohibition and the flames were the writings of the early heresiarchs

—Arius, Eutyches, Nestorius, and others—encountered. A canon of the council held at Carthage in the fourth century, forbade the reading of heathen works, while those of heretics were submitted to episcopal perusal and jurisdiction. At a synod held in the year 399, under Theophilus, at Alexandria, all the writings of Origen were interdicted. The fiery warfare against mental freedom was carried on from century to century—but not without resistance. Especially in certain districts of France and Italy, the spirit of gospel liberty maintained itself in existence, in the face of the sternest opposition. As early as the twelfth century, the Waldenses possessed at least portions of the Bible in the vernacular tongue, and their privilege in that matter called forth from Pope Innocent III. one of the first recorded displays made by Rome against the unrestricted study of the Scriptures. The official documents whence we gather this information, show that at their date the local ecclesiastical authorities were accustomed to exert a supervision over books, were afraid of the Bible, and in special cases took counsel of the Pope himself. In the actual instance the pontiff directed that the Scriptures should be consumed in the fire.\*

The discovery of printing brought a new era, and with it new exigencies. Thought became very prolific and very active. With a sort of instinctive hardihood it assailed the ecclesiastical corruptions, which, having been accumulating for ages, then presented a mass of repulsive foulness. Error and deformity in the church received no quarter from the press. All the resources of learning and wit were brought into the field. Poetry and prose were alike put in requisition. What theology left undemolished, was assailed by history, and false philosophy withered away under the breath of scorn. The lives of the clergy, as well as their religious opinions and observances, became the butt of ridicule and the subject of argument. In a word, to attack the Pope and his adherents became the fashion of the day; all the fresh vigorous thought of the times was directed against Rome.

Protection was necessary. The papal Babel had been struck with lightning from heaven. Ruin was inevitable, unless means of defence could be found. With a view to defence, the inquisition was founded, and Jesuitism was set on foot. Yet books are invisible essences; they exert a hidden power; they answer no summons; they travel secretly, and therefore travel whithersoever they will. What was to be done? Of old, when copies were few and scarce, the flames could easily destroy a work; but now, books were multiplied by thousands, and dispersed throughout

\* Innocentii III. Epist. Ed. Baluz i. ii. 141, 142. Decret. Gregor. I. v. cit. 7. c. 12.

the Christian commonwealth. A new exercise of spiritual despotism was required. Sacerdotal authority must supply itself with a shield, by inhibiting the perusal of books whose circulation could not be prevented. Hence the Index. After Sixtus IV., in the year 1471, and at a later period Alexander VI., had ordained that, without an express ~~papal~~ permission, no book should be printed, Leo X., in the year 1515, (Conc. Later. Sess. x.) decreed that 'no book should be carried through the press which had not been previously examined and approved by the bishop, or the censors appointed by him.' The reasons assigned for the ordination are of a nature to show that already printing had proved troublesome and pernicious to papal and priestly influence. It was not easy to put the press into irons. The young giant resisted vehemently, and it required all the force of the Council of Trent to effect the purpose. There the safety of Rome was made a subject of deliberate and solemn consideration. The old requirements were sanctioned, new restrictions were imposed. A copy of the manuscript of every book intended for the press was, according to its behests, to be laid before the spiritual superior. The author's name was to be subjoined. The work was to be inspected by official censors, and only to be printed in case of receiving their approval. The bishops were even to visit printing houses and bookshops, in order to scent out heretical books. And all who printed, sold, or read forbidden works, were subjected to excommunication. Lists of such works already existed. The necessity of a new, fuller, and solemnly sanctioned list became every day more pressing as books multiplied. And the Council of Trent, taking the matter into their most serious consideration, referred it to the final decision of the pope, and made such arrangements as led to the formation of the official Index of the Roman See. Thus, to cite the graphic words of John Milton, were

—'brought forth or perfected those catalogues and expurging indexes, that rake through the entrails of many an old good author, with a violation worse than any could be offered to his tomb.

'Nor did they stay in matters heretical, but any subject that was not to their palate, they either condemned in a prohibition, or had it straight into the new purgatory of an index. To fill up the measure of encroachment, their last invention was to ordain that no book, pamphlet, or paper should be printed (as if St. Peter had bequeathed them the keys of the press also as well as of Paradise,) unless it were approved and licensed under the hands of two or three gluttonous friars. For example:—

“ Let the chancellor Cini be pleased to see if in this present work be contained aught that may withstand the printing.

“ VINCENT RABBATA, Vicar of Florence.’

“I have seen this present work, and find nothing athwart the catholic faith and good manners: in witness whereof I have given, &c.

“NICOLO CINI, Chancellor of Florence.”

“Attending the precedent relation, it is allowed that this present work of Davanzati may be printed.

“VINCENT RABBATA, &c.”

“It may be printed—July 15.

“FRIAR SIMON MOMPEI D’AMELIA, Chancellor of the

“Holy Office in Florence.”

‘Sure they have a conceit, if he of the bottomless pit had not long since broke prison, that this quadruple exorcism would bar him down. I fear their next design will be to get into their custody the licensing of that which they say Claudius intended, but went not through with. Vouchsafe to see another of their forms, the Roman stamp:—

“Imprimatur, if it seem good to the reverend master of the Holy Palace.

“BELCASTRO, Vicegerent.”

“Imprimatur.

“FRIAR NICOLO RODOLPHI, Master of the Holy Palace.”

‘Sometimes five imprimaturs are seen together, dialogue-wise, in the piazza of one title-page, complimenting and ducking each to other with their shaven reverences, whether the author, who stands by in perplexity at the foot of his epistle, shall to the press or to the sponge. These are the pretty responsories, these are the dear antiphonies, that so bewitched of late our prelates and their chaplains with the goodly echo they made; and besotted us to the gay imitation of a lordly imprimatur—one from Lambeth-house, another from the west end of Paul’s; so apishly romanizing, that the word of command still was set down in Latin; as if the learned grammatical pen that wrote it would cast no ink without Latin; or perhaps, as they thought, because no vulgar tongue was worthy to express the pure conceit of an imprimatur; but rather, as I hope, for that our English,—the language of men ever famous and foremost in the achievements of liberty,—will not easily find servile letters enow to spell such a dictatory presumption Englished.’—(*Milton’s Arcopagitica*, pp. 60, 61, Bohn’s Edition.)

A board, under the title of ‘The Congregation of the Index,’ was appointed, and this board continues in existence and in operation to the present hour. With this board, under the presidency of ‘the Master of the Holy Palace,’ lies the duty of inspecting, licensing, and prohibiting books; and by its authority have been formed and published (under restrictions) the several editions of the official ‘Roman Index,’ which, from time to time, have been put forth in reprints by catholic authorities in different parts of the world. At present, ‘The Congregation of the Index’ consists of several cardinals and theologians; the latter bear the name of *Consultores*, or advisers. The cardinals are

thirteen in number, among whom, in the year 1848, were Micara, Mezzofanti, de Bonald, Schwarzenberg; and among the Consultores in the same year, was cardinal, then bishop Wiseman.

It is the duty of the theologians to examine suspected books. Their report is handed, by the master of the Sacred Palace, to the College of Cardinals; who, having pronounced thereon in a common sitting, finally submit each book to the judgment of the supreme pontiff. The papal verdict is pronounced either in the 'Index,' or, in cases of importance, by a special bull. From time to time supplements are added to the 'Index,' and, as convenience suggests, these supplements are incorporated in a new and authoritative edition. In their judgments on suspected works, 'The Congregation of the Index' receives aid from certain rules which, being sanctioned by the Council of Trent, are still of the highest authority in the Roman church. The first rule declares that all books which, before the year 1515, were condemned by the popes, or by the œcumenical councils, remained under the ban, though they might not be inserted in the 'Index.' The second is a sweeping rule, proscribing, without limit or qualification, all the writings of heretics who have existed since the year 1515, express mention being made of Luther, Zwingli, Calvin, and others. The third and fourth rules lay down the law regarding the use of the sacred Scriptures; to this effect—translations of the books of the Old Testament may, at the discretion of the bishop, be conceded to learned and pious men, and to them only; nor are they to be conceded to such except as means for the elucidation of the Latin Vulgate which, in the catholic church, holds the position of the Hebrew originals; but versions of the New Testament made by reprobated authors, are universally prohibited, as involving great danger to faith and morals; and generally, versions of the Scriptures in the mother-tongue even though formed by catholic scholars, are to be entrusted in the hands of the people only in special cases, in which the bishop or the inquisitor may be fully satisfied that they will occasion no harm; whoever, without an express permission shall read or sell the Scriptures in the vulgar tongue, is pronounced incapable of receiving absolution of sin, until they have delivered their Bibles into the hands of the ordinary; nor are the regular clergy to purchase or peruse the Scriptures, except they have first obtained leave from their superiors. Other rules (they are in all ten) prescribe that the same course shall be pursued in regard to works written in the Vernacular, and on the points at issue between Roman-catholics and their opponents, as is to be observed in respect of the sacred Scriptures; that works, the general tenor of which is good, but in which is

found anything which favours heresy, impiety, divination, and superstition, are first to be expurgated and then to be permitted; that booksellers shall keep catalogues of all the works they have on sale, which shall be open to the proper authorities in order to prevent the circulation of any heretical writings; other persons who may bring books into a city or town are to report them to such authorities, and 'let no one dare to lend to any person to read, a book which he himself, or any other person has introduced, unless a licence has been first obtained from the clergy;' even permitted books may, if it seem good to the bishop or the inquisitor, be prohibited; and infractions of the laws and usages made and provided in the case are to be severely punished, either by excommunication or in any other manner 'at the will of the bishops or inquisitors, according to the nature of the delinquency or contumacy.' Other directions prefixed to the 'Index' enjoin spiritual persons to keep a constant watch over the productions of the press, in order that they may report suspected books, and, by furthering the prohibition of dangerous books, may prevent injury to faith and morals; bishops, too, are required to exact from their people a list of all prohibited books in their possession; none of which are they to read unless by special permission; and whatever in any case they may find in reading, of an heretical tendency, they are immediately to report to their spiritual guides. Of things to be reported and then to be condemned, are propositions which are 'heretical, erroneous, savouring of heresy, scandalous, offensive to pious ears, rash, schismatical, *seditions* and blasphemous;' 'such as introduce some novelty contrary to the rites and ceremonies of the sacraments and contrary to the usages and customs of the holy Roman church;' also, 'dubious and ambiguous words, which may lead the minds of readers from the right catholic sense to wicked opinions;' moreover, 'Scriptural terms not faithfully cited or taken from the depraved versions of heretics,' and 'those which are perverted to a meaning opposed to the common judgment of the catholic fathers and teachers;' nor are any 'epithets honourable to heretics to be passed over, nor words which detract from the character of *priests* and *princes*.' Furthermore, 'propositions are to be expurgated which are hostile to the liberties, immunities, and jurisdiction of the church,' as well as 'instances which assail ecclesiastical rites, orders, and persons.' Of the works of heretics, express condemnation is passed on several classes—such as liturgies and service-books; apologies in which their errors are set forth and vindicated; Bibles printed at their expense, or furnished with their annotations; the hymns and the catechisms of heretics; their formularies of faith, discussions,

and synodal acts. Passing over many other details, we subjoin some additional information respecting the Sacred Scriptures, and, in order that we may avoid the possibility of a mis-statement, we translate literally from our authority.

‘When about the commencement of the present century the Protestant Bible Societies began to disseminate the Sacred Scriptures in all languages and among all classes, the ancient regulations which restricted the reading of the Bible were renewed. Pius VII. (1816, 1817); Leo XII. (1824); Pius VIII. (1829); and finally Gregory XVI. (1844); issued wise decrees against the Bible societies which flooded the world with innumerable Bibles. All Bibles then are interdicted which are not acknowledged as correct by ecclesiastical authority, and the reading of the Bible is allowed only to those laymen who are recognised as sufficiently instructed and are provided with approved Bibles. The first limitation is justified, or rather enjoined by the duty of the church to keep the word of God pure and unfalsified; and the second finds its reason in the Sacred Scripture itself, which in so many places is so ambiguous and so hard to be understood, that even a Protestant theologian describes it as the book wherein each person seeks and finds his own peculiar views. Nay, even the greatest immoralities and crimes have been justified by texts from the Bible, and lauded as acts pleasing to God, as appears in the history of heretics from the Adamites down to the Sects called forth by Luther’s novel theories of belief, and the hypocrites of the present day.’\*

The last edition of the Index, with the accompanying supplements, contains above FIVE THOUSAND works, all of which lie under the pontifical ban. But, as appears from the foregoing statements, this number is but a small portion of the writings which Rome has prohibited. Whole classes of works have been condemned. In general, all the religious writings of Protestants are forbidden, together with all the editions of the Sacred Scriptures which they have put forth. Thus, MYRIADS of volumes bear the brand of Papal condemnation. Nor are they merely religious and moral works that Rome has forbidden; Protestant literature in general, and much of Catholic literature, is pronounced dangerous, if not deadly. This is a huge fact—an almost incredible fact. But the full character of the fact can be known only on an acquaintance with some instances. We turn from these general statements to the Index itself. Let its contents declare what sort of works Rome has denounced.

In general, it may be affirmed that all books and writings intended or calculated to question, oppose, or invalidate any doctrine or usage, any institution or class of men, any privilege or

\* *Allgemeines Kirchen-Lexicon*, von Aschbach, vol. i. 728.



person connected with the Roman-catholic Church, have been put into the limbo of the Index. And, specially, thus have been encountered works whose specific object was the exposure of the errors and evil practices of the Papacy. The Index itself shows how timid and how sensitive Rome has been in the presence of her assailants. In her alarms, she has thrown her shield before her outposts, as well as concentrated her forces around her strongholds. Defending her tiara, she has also defended the cloister; and, solicitous for the wealth and pomp of her cardinals, she has manifested anxiety for the pauperism of her monks. With special care has she fostered the sanguinary inquisition, and protected crafty, servile, and subservient jesuitism. Hence is it that we find in the Index so many works whose aim is the exposure and correction of religious abuses in either the head or the members of the Catholic Church. Yet these are only a very small portion of the writings which Rome has proscribed, because hostile to her pretensions—for Protestant attacks are condemned in the mass; and most of those books which bear the censure of the Index, on the ground of their anti-papal tendencies, are from Catholic pens. It is an unconditional obedience that Rome requires. No lip must move but to utter the prescribed accents. The slightest deviation from Papal orthodoxy, entails disgrace, and, perhaps, infamy. Not that Rome itself is changeless. For very many centuries she has been making additions to her formularies, her liturgies, her usages, her police. Equally has she varied in her forms of opinion. Roman unity is a mere dream. Some Protestant Bossuet will one day write 'The Variations of the Church of Rome,' which will prove not fewer nor less minute than the variations of the Reformed Church. From gross Atheism, through misty Pantheism, on to Arminianism, Calvinism, and Antinomianism, has 'the rule of faith' passed in the practice of the supreme pontiffs and their court. Hence, like the courtiers of Henry VIII, the adherents of the Papacy, in order to avoid the condemnatory Index, have been obliged carefully to watch the movements of the ecclesiastical weathercock. The orthodoxy of one pontificate was the heresy of the next. In this age, jesuitism is in favour—in that age, it lies prostrate under a Papal Bull. The church, if infallible on the whole, is fallible in particulars; or rather, taking its own view of the matter, she is, in each case, in each generation, infallible, though always in movement through dissimilar phases of philosophical and theological opinion. However, let it be observed that Rome's answer to accusations is the Index. Regarding friends as enemies, the moment they attempt to correct her faults, she seizes them, and consigns them to perpetual oblivion. For an answer, she utters a reproach; instead

of confutation, she gives a prison. Under the pretence of preserving the flock from contamination, she shuts out all the fresh breezes and the sunshine of heaven from the fold, and keeps the sheep ever nibbling at the thin and arid pasture which for centuries they have trodden on. Does such a course betoken infallibility? Is such a course infallibly right? Then why, in other matters, is it thought proper to answer opponents? If, with one voice, humankind declares that charges should be investigated and rebutted, then, with equal unanimity, does the world condemn the leading policy, the essential characteristic of the Index. If defamation, instead of replication, would be accounted folly and vice in great social issues, can it, in religion, be a result or a token of infallibility? In truth, such a course is a manifest indication of conscious weakness. Accused persons keep silence only when they fear that, by attempting a defence, they may betray their guilt. The beleagured city that does not return the fire of its assailants, abandons the cause it is appointed to maintain. The whole Index is one continued testimony of the want of faith on the part of Rome. Clearly the Popes do not believe their own doctrines; they have no confidence in their own system; they are devoid of trust in Providence; they declare that error, if fairly matched against truth, will gain the victory, or that, what they call truth, they hold to be error. An infallible church is infallible in its means as well as its results; and is that discipline infallible which, requiring a passive and servile acceptance of foregone conclusions, proscribes inquiry, suppresses or prevents mental activity, and so produces a doltish stagnation of mind which ends in spiritual paralysis?

But the contents of her Index puts Rome in direct antagonism with the great lights of the civilized world. Among its condemned authors, we find the names which are most distinguished in the several departments of knowledge. Not only in religion and theology, but in the sciences, Rome here acknowledges by her own lips, that the first men are her adversaries. This is an important fact; let us establish it. A few instances must suffice. In theology, what greater names than Wycliffe, Luther, Melancthon, Calvin, Cranmer, Parker, Sherlock, Tillotson, Usher, Whitgift, Whitby, Grabe, Outram, Pearson, Polus, Prideaux, Simon, Turretin, Abauzit, Michaelis? Yet these are proscribed. In general scholarship, the writings of the following men are tacitly declared to be incompatible with the safety of the papal throne, namely—Scaliger, Walton, Buxtorf, Cardan, Campanella, Savonarola, Picard, De Dieu, Fleury, Hottinger, Lightfoot, Mead, Selden, Stephens, Scapula, Van Dale, Castalio, Dupin, Henry More, Bayle, Cudworth. Nor do the historians

escape; though while the sceptical Gibbon is omitted, the catholic Sarpi is condemned; as if Rome had less fear of positive infidelity than truth-telling in regard to her own proceedings. Of eminent historians, there stand in the Index branded as heretical and false—Ginguéné, Guicciardini, Bayle, Hallam, Burnet, Robertson, Hume, Sismondi, Llorente, Salvador, De Potter, Vertot, Villiers, Goldsmith, Raynal, Burnet, Maimbourg, Millot, Mosheim, and others. The philosophers, as might be expected, meet with no mercy. Of them there are proscribed—Bacon, Bentham, Pascal, Malebranche, Occam, Puffendorf, Leibnitz, Des Cartes, Condorcet, Darwin, Helvetius, Hobbes, Fontenelle, Hume, Locke, Kant, &c. Defenders of Christianity have their representatives in the Index, in the persons of Grotius, Addison, and Soame Jenyns; Newton leads the astronomers; Swift, Steele, Lady Morgan, are among the martyrs of polite literature; and the poets suffer in the persons of Dante, Boccaccio, La Fontaine, Beranger, and Milton. How ‘Pamela’ can have offended the Holy Office, we know not, but here in the Index, a sort of theological Lady Godiva, does that virtuous lady stand exposed. Even the innocuous Benjamin of Tudela has in some way merited the pontifical pillory. And while the wise and holy men of the Congregation have found heretical pravity in such grave writers as Baronius, Basnage, and Bull, they have thrown the veil of their authority over the profligate lives of such as Madame de Maintenon and Ninon de l’Enclos. Proscribing Protestantism as a mass of falsehood, they condescend to an express condemnation of the minor sectarians in the persons of Socinus and Barclay. Indeed, with an anticipatory resemblance to the steam-engine, they are capable at once of the greatest and the smallest efforts, and with equal ease condemn the Magdeburg Centuriators and detect an heretical film in Victor Hugo, like a fly caught in amber. The minuteness of their attentions is amusing; take an instance or two. In Sanctis Pagnini Thesaurus Linguae Sanctae stand the words, *Auctor Epistolae ad Hebraeos*; instead thereof, they order to be put, *S. Paulus*, assigning as their reason, ‘for the heretics of this day deny the Epistle to be by Paul, and therefore speak of its writer as ‘the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews.’ In a Latin translation of the works of Xenophon, they require the obliteration of the names of Camerarius, Castalio, Gesner, and others, as being the names of heretics! What heresy has to do with Xenophon’s writings, who can say? As little within the province of these inquisitors, one would think, came such a book as this, which was condemned on the 20th of June, 1844, namely, *Histoire des Sciences Mathématiques in Italie*, &c.—‘History of the Mathe-

‘matural Sciences in Italy, from the revival of letters to the end of the Seventeenth Century. By Guillaume Libri.’ It may not be without its use if we subjoin the form of condemnation in a particular case. Let it be that of a Spanish book, condemned on the 18th of August, 1841. The form, in substance, runs thus:—

‘The Sacred Congregation of the most eminent and most reverend cardinals of the Holy Roman Church, appointed against heretical pravity, having sat in judgment on a book submitted to their inspection, entitled, &c.: decreed and determined that the said book is to be condemned as injurious to the Roman pontiff and the holy apostolic see, and as captious, scandalous, and favouring schism; consequently it has condemned and condemns, has proscribed and proscribes, the work, and commands that it be put into the Index of prohibited books. Therefore, let no one, whatever be his rank or condition, dare or presume to publish, read, or possess in any place, or in any language, the aforesaid condemned and proscribed book; but, under the pain of excommunication, and other penalties legally provided, let each account it his duty to deliver it to the ordinary, or to the inquisitors of heretical pravity. His holiness having heard a statement of the foregoing, approved this decree, and ordered it to be published.’

Such, then, is the Roman Index; and such is a specimen of the works which it holds up to infamy. In the very act an issue is joined of the highest consequence, not only to Rome, but to the world at large. That issue is this—the Sacred Congregation of the Index against the intelligence of their race. We say the intelligence of their race, for nothing less than that is represented in the condemned names which appear in the pages of the Index, and which, in part, have been cited in preceding lines. In order that the nature of the issue may be exactly understood by the reader, let him be on his guard against the delusion that lurks under the general term, ‘the Congregation of the Index.’ The constitution of that body we have already described. It is simply a committee of some twenty persons. In a protestant point of view, it is this and nothing more. Let it be supposed that, contrary to the general rule of public business, which is always apt to fall into the hands of one or two, the whole of the board attends in several sittings, and that every member reads a work before he gives his vote; and let it also be supposed that the supreme pontiff himself peruses the books on which he pronounces the final condemnation, then, in support of a decree of the Congregation, there are the opinions of some score of individuals. They shall be learned, good and pious men. We will not urge the perverting and discolouring effect of their position. We will suppose them free from the sway of self-interest, and undisturbed

by passion. We will let their educational prepossessions go for nothing. Twenty 'good men and true'—twenty Christians of sound minds and pure hearts, and varied learning—agree in giving a testimony against Newton's doctrines on light, colour, and attraction, or Brucker's 'History of Philosophy.' What is the worth of such a verdict? Does that verdict set aside the laws of reflection and refraction? When the inquisition compelled Galileo to pronounce the earth stationary, was not the aged astronomer right in declaring—*aside*, as the play-goers have it—'It does move though, for all that'? And is not the decision of the learned men of all nations and all faiths, except the catholic, in favour of Brucker, sufficient to outweigh the condemnation of the Index Committee? In many of the proscribed names, it is the judgment of the world at large that opposes the judgment of the Congregation. Could the competent judges of the whole earth be polled, how vast the majority that would reverse the sentence which placed Bacon, Locke, and Bentham, in the Index. In some sense, the poll has been taken. Witness the return in the universal popularity of these writers. Where can you go in the civilized world without finding copies of their works? and who but they are the great authorities in the several topics of which they treat? Tacitly a verdict has been given: the Pope against the *Novum Organon*. Every one knows the judgment. We say, then, that the Papacy in the Index furnishes means for its own condemnation. The Index shows that for the last three hundred years, the greatest minds in the world have been opposed to Rome. The voice of intelligence condemns Popery, for Popery itself proves that it has enemies, not friends, in the chief representatives of that voice. On which side, then, will the reader take his stand? On which side will the final victory be? What is the logical value of that infallibility which is denied by the greatest poets, philosophers, historians, and theologians of the last three centuries?

The Catholic may reply, that the twenty members of the Index are guided by the spirit of God. How does he know that? Is this more than a groundless assumption? If the Saviour's rule is admissible, 'By their fruits shall ye know them,' then the contents of the Index condemns its authors. And where is the spirit of God the more likely to be found? On the side of some twenty priests?—or on the side of the great lights of the human race? Besides, could it be the spirit of God which condemned Newton's 'Optics'—a work which is now universally received as a demonstration of the Creator's modes of acting in one province of his universe? But we go further, and affirm, what all impartial men will approve, namely, that the members of the Congre-

gation were very likely to be under the control of a spirit far inferior to the spirit of God, seeing that they were judges in their own case. In most instances it was their own credit, their own creed, their own influence, their own position, their own wealth, that was at stake. Under such circumstances, an adverse judgment was altogether to be expected. Surely even Catholics cannot be insensible to such considerations. Let them, then, observe the contrast there is between the twenty jurors of the Index, and the many thousands who have borne, and are daily bearing, the clearest and the fullest evidence against their fundamental principles, and their habitual practice.

Those, however, who are familiar with the proceedings of the court of Rome, know very well that the purity of motive, the high-mindedness, and the solid learning, for which we have given the Index Committee credit, are not the ordinary springs of action in the Vatican. Of corrupt courts, the court of Rome is most corrupt. Foreign influence, intrigue, and bribery, hold the first rank among its moving powers. We will prove our assertion by an instance. Among the names recorded in the Index stands that of the virtuous, benevolent, amiable, and pious Archbishop Fenelon. How came this to pass? In the face of a voluptuous and licentious court, Fenelon published a work, his '*Explication des Maximes des Saints*,' which, from the pure, lofty, and angelic tone of its religion, was a real, though not intended, reproach to the king and his courtiers. Already had those Sybarites commenced a crusade against the spiritual doctrines set forth in the *Explication*, by assailing, incarcerating, and eventually worrying to death, Madame Guion, with whom those doctrines first found expression. Required to join in persecuting that amiable enthusiast, Fenelon, like a true man and a faithful Christian, stood firmly by her side, and did his best to ward off the poisoned arrows that were aimed against her. This fidelity earned for him the active hostility of the king, Louis XIV., of his paramour, Madame de Maintenon, and of the celebrated Bossuet, the friend and adviser of both. Actuated by the lowest passions, they raised the cry of heresy against Fenelon, and spared no pains until they succeeded in causing his book to be condemned by 'the Sacred Congregation of the Index.' It was not an easy task. The Pope, Innocent XII., was averse to the condemnation of the book. At the first voting, the cardinals were equally divided; and it was only by dint of artifice, intrigue, and threats, that the French court overcame the court of Rome. Nay, such was the repugnance of the Pope and other eminent personages in Rome, that they yielded only to the extreme step taken by Louis XIV., in threatening, if his

wish for Fenelon's condemnation was not complied with, to renounce the papal authority, and like Henry VIII., set up a church on his own account. What spirit was it that actuated proceedings such as these?

The heretical pravity of Fenelon consisted in a high, if somewhat mystic, spirituality. Scarcely greater has been the offence of other authors who have fallen under the censure of the Romish church. Indeed, like the good word of a bad man, it is only her praise that consistent friends of the gospel should fear. In the beginning of the seventeenth century Antonio de Dominis published a work entitled '*De Republica Ecclesiastica*.' The work was burnt by the inquisition, as well as censured by the theological faculty of Paris. Happily the author was dead; but sacerdotal malice outlives its victims. The body of Dominis was exhumed and committed to the fire, together with the work. What was the offence? The volumes (three in folio,) contained principles of toleration and maxims favourable to the independence of secular princes. Reliable authorities speak of the author as one of the most illustrious victims of the Inquisition, and as a learned man occupied with the project of bringing about a union of Christian communions. Carranza, Catholic archbishop of Toledo, does everlasting penitence in the Index for having written what he terms a '*Christian Catechism*' (1558). The work was at first approved by the Inquisition; then it was censured; then pronounced harmless by the Council of Trent (1563,) and finally excommunicated. In which of these acts was the church infallible? Carranza was a model of patience. Apprehended in 1559, by order of 'the holy office' in Spain, he remained in prison there during eight years; then he was conveyed to Rome, where his incarceration was longer and more severe. He was put on his trial in 1576, and though convicted of no certain heresy, was required to recant. The same year he died. The people, despising his oppressors, kept the day of his interment as a holy day, and honoured his corpse as that of a saint. The learning of Dupin is universally known. His '*Bibliothèque Universelle*' has a place in the Index. The following are 'the errors' which occasioned this honour—1. The author invalidates the worship of hyperdulia, which the church pays to the Mother of God; 2. He favours Nestorianism; 3. He weakens the proof of the primacy of the holy see; 4. He ascribes to the fathers errors regarding the immortality of the soul and the eternity of the pains of hell; 5. He speaks of the fathers with too little respect, &c. Palaeus, in the early part of the sixteenth century, professor of Greek and Latin at Sienna, at Lucca, and at Milan, was in the last city arrested by the

order of Pius V., and carried to Rome. Put on his trial, he was found guilty of having spoken in favour of the Lutherans, and in terms of disrespect against the inquisition. As a punishment he was hung, strangled, and burnt at Rome in 1566. While the papacy proscribed works of learning, and stopped tongues with the halter, it feared raillery, saw peril in a joke, and so put under its ban Erasmus's 'Eulogium of Folly,' and the 'Epistolæ Obscurorum Virorum,' ascribed to Hutten, to Reuchlin, and to others. Our specimens of the soundness and authority of the judgments of the papal officials shall be concluded with one supplied by Peignot ('Dictionnaire Critique, &c., p. 256):—

'In Styria the censorship of books is carried on in a manner that is very singular, and which shows that the duty is not confided to very enlightened men. One of these censors condemned as heretical two books, of which one was entitled 'Principles of Trigonometry,' and the other, 'The Destruction of Insects.' The censor thought that trigonometry was nearly related to the Trinity, and took the insects for Jesuits.'

The Index, moreover, is a standing proof of its own futility. Of all the books which it brands, how many having in themselves a principle of life, have fallen into desuetude and oblivion? Works of small ability the Papacy could afford to disregard; and works of great ability it has not even by the Index been able to suppress. What does its proscription of the works of the great ecclesiastical reformers manifest, save its inane and harmless malice? Truly a *Brutum Fulmen* is this Index—a *telum imbelles sine ictu*. The old lion here opens his jaws in wrath, but only to show that he has no teeth. Milton is still read, though here proscribed. With Voltaire the Congregation carried on a constant war. As fast as he published books, they hastened to put them into the Index. Did their zeal hinder the spread of Voltaire's writings, or retard for a day the first terrible French Revolution?

Nay, rather, the Index was the best advertisement which infidelity could desire. The celebrated 'Encyclopédie' of Diderot and Dalember was assailed by the ruling powers. Proscription was tried; the efficacy of the Index was put into request. A universal excitement ensued. The forbidden work was everywhere sought after. All must possess, if not read, that which was on every one's lips. The restrictions were of necessity removed, and an immense impulse given to the circulation. If the philosophers had expressly engaged Satan to aid them in their work, they could not have acted more for their purpose than did the Congregation of the Index. In fact, no advertise-



ment is of value equal with that which is given by an ecclesiastical denunciation. The only thing that heretics should deprecate is silence and neglect. The great object of their desire should be a good bonfire. The fame of the author of the 'Nemesis of Faith' was set up when his book was burnt by the Oxford wittings. Every one felt that his must be a very bad, and therefore a very attractive, probably also a very instructive book, when it was good enough for Puseyite doctors to burn. Happily, this is a very rare instance. The answer of the flames has long since fallen into disuse in the Church of England. Yet there was a time when that church showed, for its age, a considerable aptitude in the fiery warfare. Witness one of its last feats in this way. One of its own sons, the learned Dr. Whitby, having already gained distinction by writing against Popery, ventured, in his 'Protestant Reconciler' (1683), to plead for a brotherly treatment of dissenters. Straightway a 'church-and-king storm' arose. Oxford—always the head quarters of bigotry—sat in judgment on the book, which it censured. In pursuance of this censure, the work was burnt in the quadrangle of the university schools. Whether or not this condemnation made the fortune of the work, the bookseller's ledger could alone disclose. We lean to the negative, for some spirit is necessary on the part of the persecuted, if they would make their suffering issue in any good; and Dr. Whitby, yielding to the evil genius of his patron, Bishop Ward, was weak enough to publish a retractation, which, as one specimen of the good old times, and as a contrast to the refractoriness and contumacy of many churchmen now, we here transcribe:—

'I, Daniel Whitby, doctor of divinity, &c., having been the author of a book called 'The Protestant Reconciler,' which through want of prudence and deference to authority, I have caused to be printed and published, am truly and heartily sorry for the same, and for any evil influence it hath had upon the dissenters from the Church of England established by law, or others; And whereas it containeth several passages which I am convinced in my conscience are obnoxious to the canons, and do reflect upon the governors of the said church, I do hereby openly revoke and renounce all irreverent and unmeet expressions contained therein, by which I have justly incurred the censure or displeasure of my superiors; and furthermore, whereas these two propositions have been deduced and concluded from the said book, viz.—1. That it is not lawful for superiors to impose anything in the worship of God that is not antecedently necessary; 2. The duty of not offending a weak brother is inconsistent with all human authority of making laws concerning indifferent things: I do hereby openly renounce both the said propositions, being false, erroneous, and schismatical; and do revoke and disclaim all tenets, positions, and assertions, con-

tained in the said book, from whence these positions can be inferred. And whereinsoever I have offended therein, I do heartily beg pardon of God and the church for the same.'

What a humiliation! How galling the tyranny which little and narrow minds often exert over their superiors! How painful to think, that those superiors should ever forfeit their claim to superiority by succumbing to evil powers. How huge, too, the guilt of Rome, who by her Index, her censure of books, her Inquisition, her burnings, set the example, and gave encouragement to this persecuting principle; which, alas! has not yet vanished from the visible church. Our only comfort is that God brings forth good out of ill. Great powers are tried and strengthened, if they are not produced in affliction. The funereal pile of Huss kindled up a new light for the whole world. Reformatory works would remain in obscurity, but that they are placed in the Index, or burnt by the Sorbonne. Instances, indeed, there are not a few, in which the flames of priestcraft succeeded in destroying the whole, or nearly the whole edition of a proscribed book. Even in such cases, however, sometimes the public had its revenge. The 'Christianismi Restitutio' of Servetus was all but entirely destroyed by the hands of the public executioner. The book became, in consequence, famous; an exact reprint was put out, which was so sought after, that it has long been among very rare books. A Frenchman, by name Mothe-Le-Vayer, published in the seventeenth century a work entitled, 'Traité de la Vertu des Payens.' The copies remained on the shelves, and the bookseller made complaints to the author. 'Do not be anxious,' was the reply of the latter; 'I know a secret by which to procure a sale.' Accordingly, by indirect means, he got the work condemned. Forbidden by authority to be read, the work found readers on all sides; and both author and bookseller soon had reason to rejoice at the existence in France of an ecclesiastical censorship.

Equally subversive of its own purposes is the Index in another way. Its avowed aim is to prevent danger and injury to faith and morals. And so far as it secures secrecy, it may not altogether fail. That secrecy it studiously effects. Copies of the Index are difficult to obtain. Vogt, in his 'Catalogus Librorum Rariorum,' remarks, under the head *Indices, Libr. Prohibit. and Expurgand.*—'These works may be numbered among rare books, and especially the editions of the Expurgatory Indices, which are put out on pontifical authority, because they are carefully concealed. Consequently we in the republic of letters are yet without a history of prohibited books.' The Index which Pope Paul IV. commanded to be prepared, was

forbidden by the inquisition to be read. In some instances, too, the civil powers have, for their own safety, forbidden the papal Index to be circulated in their dominions; as was done in Austria by Maria Theresa. So far, however, as these prohibitory works make their way into society, they aid the progress of the very evils they are intended to prevent. Such is the infallibility of Rome. The Pope, with the Index in his hand, going from country to country to oppose heresy, resembles an unwise physician, who should carry with him and communicate the contagion of the disease which professedly he meant to cure. For it so happens that books cannot be condemned unless you give their titles. Now the title of a book is the key to its contents. Nay, sometimes a title is itself suggestive of feelings as well as thoughts. Hence is it that your true book-worm finds deep and varied pleasure in perusing catalogues. A catalogue of books is full of associations, full of memories, full of emotions. There the poor student can for the moment make himself rich in literary treasures, and the wealthy student is reminded of his own valued possessions, and directed to more precious acquisitions yet to be made. And there, too, may the low-minded, the lascivious, the revengeful, the sanguinary, indulge their passions at a very small cost, whether of time or money. In these things aid is afforded by the Index, which supplies in its pages the titles of forbidden books; and frequently, as if to minister the more effectually to evil, translates into Latin—a universal language—titles which, being in French, German, Italian, or Spanish, very many readers could not otherwise understand. Do you, reader, want a naughty book in any particular branch of literature, procure a copy of this *sacred* Index. There you may satisfy your curiosity, or gratify your passions, or feed a morbid imagination, by being put into the way of obtaining works the very existence of which you would not have known. If, somewhat perverse in disposition, you have a certain hankering after heresy, study the Index. If, from a laudable love of fair play, you would read the most effective attacks that have been made on Rome,—or learn ~~what~~ latitude Rome allows to her intellectual children,—or ascertain what kind and what extent of free inquiry Rome tolerates or encourages,—study the Index. A large handful of forbidden fruit Rome there supplies. Nor is her bounty restricted to any one palate. Of late, the cardinals seem to have had a taste for voluptuous reading, for among their recent prohibitions are the works of George Sand and De Balzac, duly enumerated for the special information of all inquirers.

Let the reader review these facts, and then pronounce a judg-

ment on the validity of the claim which Rome makes to infallibility.

There are two positions into which Rome should never put herself; she should never reason—she should never appeal to Scripture. An infallible church should stand on her assumed infallibility. Having entered into that stronghold, she should remain there as quietly as may be, contented with repelling assailants, and making hostile incursions. The moment an infallible church asks reason for a guarantee, she discloses her fallibility and betrays her cause. Every act of reasoning involves a ‘no’ as well as a ‘yes,’ and every subject on which a negative may be given, can have only a probable affirmative. But the probable excludes the infallible. The only answer, at the best, that reason can make to the appeal of Rome is, that Rome *may be right*, but this implies also that Rome *may be wrong*. Where, then, is her infallibility? Of all things, surely it is the most absurd to suppose that an infallible church can stand on a fallible foundation, such as on all sides reason is admitted to be. A fallible judge pronounces a necessarily infallible sentence! Yet Rome tries to persuade mankind to yield to her the supervision of literature. Her aim is to coax men to allow her to put out their eyes at her pleasure. ‘You fancy you have sight, but are ‘really blind; come, I will gouge you, and then you will see ‘excellently. Take me as your guide, and, I promise you, you ‘will want no other. In your fallibility, admit my infallibility, ‘and then you will doubt no more. You want light? pluck out ‘your right eye, and you will see very well.’ The cogency of such reasoning we do not put to a formal proof. Its essential absurdity is manifest. No more than a clean thing can come out of an unclean thing, can the deduction of a fallible mind be infallible?

But Rome attempts to extort a justification from Scripture. Does not the Bible record how bad books were burnt at Ephesus? (Acts, xix. 19.) What an impudent appeal is this! Yes, such a record is in the book of the Acts of the Apostles; but it speaks of a deed the very opposite of that in justification of which Rome makes the reference. The act there is voluntary—purely voluntary; coercion is the essence of what Rome does. The growth of the word of God in Ephesus had dissolved the corrupt charms of magic, which men and women by thousands had come to regard as a deadly cheat, and therefore of their own accord did they bring their magical formularies of all kinds, in which had been their hope, to sacrifice them in a burnt offering on the altar of their new, real, living, and saving faith. The parallel of this act would have been, that the Encyclopedists having, by the

power of reason and the force of Scripture, been convinced that Rome was identical with Christianity, and that Christianity was of God, came forward spontaneously, and said, 'These volumes which we have written are hostile to God and deadly to man; in your presence, O Supreme Pontiff, we make them a holocaust; thus perish everything that impeaches your infallibility, or threatens to disturb your throne.' Instead of converting unbelievers, Rome first incarcerates, and then—when she can—burns them; she silences heretics, and says they are confuted; her answer to an accusation is the Index. Out of the hands of her assailants she wrests their weapons, and having consigned them to the flames, shouts 'Victory,' exclaiming in justification, 'Thus did the apostle Paul.' Great need has such a fraudulent teacher to make it a fundamental doctrine, that her pupils shall take Scripture in that sense, and that sense only, which is put upon it by the church. Great need has she to make the rule by which she is to be judged. Otherwise, as in the case before us, by Scripture her arts and practices must be condemned. But then, what is the logical value of such an appeal? scriptural evidence? the word and the will of God? Say, rather, thy own word, thy own will, given in evidence. Rome, thou corruptest thy judge; thou dictatest the verdict; thou thyself hast written 'acquittal,' when truth and justice demanded 'condemnation.'

Beyond a doubt, the primitive church encouraged the freest use, as of speech, so of books. The old Hebrew literature was everywhere the subject of unrestricted appeal, in the claims of the earliest teachers of the gospel on men of Hebrew blood. Not much versed in heathen literature were the apostles, but Paul's example shows that, so far from being shunned, denounced, and destroyed, pagan authors were brought forward to give evidence for God and Christ. As separate Christian Scriptures came into existence, they were sent to the churches for whom they were designed, were intercommunicated between churches in different parts of the world, were treasured up, copied, diffused; were collected, and eventually made into one great whole; which, in combination with the older Scriptures, became, in time, the great spiritual treasure of Christendom, the common rallying point, the one universally-recognised and reverently-honoured court of appeal. In and by unqualified mental and spiritual liberty was the church of Christ founded and established in the world. That liberty must be restored where it has been taken away, and maintained where it exists, otherwise the gospel cannot 'have free course and be glorified.' But freedom in the church is death to Rome.

Let Protestants be consistent; let them be Protestants indeed;

let them revere in act, as well as in word, 'the sufficiency of Holy Scripture.' Let there be no Protestant index of prohibited books. Let there be no Protestant shackles and cramps for the human mind. If, as they ought to do, Protestants hate Rome as the abomination of abominations, let them take good heed lest, by Romish practices, they do the work and promote the cause of Rome; lest they prepare a people for Rome; and lest, deserting the Lord Jesus Christ, they send others, if they go not themselves, into the arms of the Pope. Never since the days of Luther was there an era, when it was more important that the friends of Christianity as it is in Christ, should learn exclusively of him, follow him implicitly whithersoever he leads, and at the same time study to be 'of one heart and one soul.'

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ART. VIII.—(1.) *The Correlation of Physical Forces*. Second Edition.

By W. R. GROVE, M.A., F.R.S. London: Samuel Highley.

(2.) *An Introduction to the Atomic Theory*. Second Edition. By

CHARLES DAUBENY, M.D., F.R.S. University Press, Oxford.

MAN is placed by his Creator upon the surface of a wonderfully-constituted globe—congeries of atoms, united into a sphere in virtue of some hidden forces—which forms one of a system chained to, and moving around, a common centre—the sun. This group of planets—each one revolving at great rapidity upon its own axis, and rushing onward in its orbit in obedience to the operation of harmonious laws—still, notwithstanding the immense distances at which they are separated from each other—moves forward through space a mighty unity, under the influence of an attractive power, which resides in some mysterious mass—the probable centre of the stellar creation.

How microscopically small does man appear when compared with the immensity of the universe! How infinitely large does he become, when regarded as a being gifted with a mind capable of embracing the material creation. That creature into whose nostrils the Creator breathed the breath of life, and he became a living soul, was placed in the midst of the organic beauties of a young creation, and commanded to subdue them. Man cannot create—but, as a task on which to exercise his mental powers, the creation is spread out before him, and he is permitted to fathom the profoundest depths of matter and its laws, to discover the mysteries of all that is created, and thus to lift himself upward in the scale of intelligence.

It has been beautifully said, God has spoken to man in two voices—the voice of revelation and the voice of nature; the exalted spiritualities of the first we have not now to discuss, but the interpretations which science has given to the latter demands our most attentive consideration.

A small fragment of rock—a stone picked up on the roadside—if we read its sermons aright, may be regarded as an exemplar of the great planet of which it forms a part, as far as its physical constitution is concerned. We may, by mechanical means, reduce this stone to infinitely fine particles; yet every grain of dust, howsoever small it may be, is a compound body: by chemical agency we can still further decompose those particles and resolve them into what, in the present state of our knowledge, we regard as ultimate elements.

Hence we arrive at the facts that, by some Force, Power or Principle, the combination of dissimilar parts is effected; and that by another cause, the aggregation of similar molecules is produced. Cohesion, or aggregative attraction, is the term by which we express our knowledge of the molecular forces, and affinity, or chemical attraction, that by which we seek to explain the mystery of combination.

During the mechanical and the chemical change, other phenomena are developed.

HEAT is excited by mechanical power, and by increasing its intensity we produce incandescence, evoke or excite LIGHT.

The slightest chemical change gives rise to a peculiar order of disturbance which we call ELECTRICITY; and in modified conditions GALVANISM and MAGNETISM. By experiments, which it is not necessary now to describe, it has been determined that we can, from this amorphous mass—of whatsoever physical constitution or chemical character it may be—develop all those principles or powers—it therefore appears, that they are all in some way concerned in determining the *state* of matter.

These physical forces, as they are now usually denominated, are regarded as the active agents of creation; and notwithstanding the dissimilarity in their effects, they are, by many philosophers, regarded as modifications of some great primary cause or principle. The author of the ‘Correlation of Physical Forces’ has placed this hypothesis in the strongest light; he has given it the powerful support of his correct knowledge over an extensive field of inductive research, and the advocacy of an earnest and able pen. We cannot, therefore, put the matter more clearly before our readers than in Mr. Grove’s own words:—

‘The position which I seek to establish in this essay is, that the various affections of matter which constitute the main objects of

experimental physics—viz., heat, light, electricity, magnetism, chemical affinity, and motion, are all correlative, or have a reciprocal dependence. That neither, taken abstractedly, can be said to be the essential or proximate cause of the others, but that either may, as a force, produce the others; thus heat may mediate or immediately produce electricity, electricity may produce heat; and so of the rest, each merging itself as the force it produces becomes developed: and that the same must hold good of other forces, it being an irresistible inference that a force cannot originate otherwise than by generation from some antecedent force or forces.

‘The term force, although used in very different senses by different authors, in its limited sense may be defined as that which produces or resists motion. Although strongly inclined to believe that the other affections of matter, which I have above named, are, and will ultimately resolve, into modes of motion, it would be going too far at present to assume their identity with it; I therefore use the term force, in reference to them, as meaning that active principle inseparable from matter which induces its various changes.’

The accurate appreciation of this is most imperatively required, if we would fairly examine the question—decidedly the most important problem of physical science now before the world—can motion produce force? Is motion the cause of heat, light, and electricity? That we may not mistake our author, or misrepresent him, we give, in another quotation, the continuation of his argument.

‘I have said, in reference to the various forces or affections of matter, that either of them may, *mediately* or *immediately*, produce the others, and this is all I can venture to predicate of them in the present state of science: but I will venture, as an opinion, formed after much consideration, that science is rapidly progressing towards the establishment of immediate or direct relations between all these forces. Where at present no immediate relation is established between any of them, electricity generally forms the intervening link or middle term.

‘Motion, then, will directly produce *heat* and *electricity*, and electricity, being produced by it, will produce *magnetism*, a force which is always developed by electrical currents at right angles to the direction of those currents, as I shall subsequently more fully explain. *Light* also is readily produced by motion, either directly, as when accompanying the heat of friction, or mediate, by electricity resulting from motion: as in the electrical spark, which has all the attributes of common light, its sole difference being, as far as I am aware, the position of the fixed lines in its spectrum—a difference which obtains with light emanating from different sources, or seen through different media. In the decompositions and compositions which the terminal points proceeding from the conductors of an electrical machine develop when immersed in different chemical media, we get the pro-



duction of *chemical affinity* by electricity, of which motion is the initial source.

'Lastly, motion may be again reproduced by the forces which have emanated from motion; thus the divergence of the electrometer, the revolution of the electrical wheel, the deflection of the magnetic needle, are, when resulting from frictional electricity, palpable movements reproduced by the intermediate modes of force, which have themselves been originated by motion.

'If we now take **HEAT** as our starting point, we shall find that the other modes of force may be readily produced by it. To take motion first, this is so generally, I think I may say invariably, the immediate effect of heat, that we may almost resolve heat into motion, and view it as a mechanically repulsive force, a force antagonist to attraction of cohesion or aggregation, and tending to move the particles of all bodies, or to separate them from each other.'

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'Let us begin with **MOTION**,—the most obvious—the most distinctly conceived of all the affections of matter. Visible motion or relative change of position in space is a phenomenon so obvious to simple apprehension, that, to attempt to define it, would be to render it more obscure; but with motion as with all physical appearances, there are certain vanishing shadows or undefined limits, at which the obvious mode of action gradually disappears, to detect the continuing existence of the phenomena, we are obliged to have recourse to other methods of investigation, and we frequently apply other names to the effects so recognised.

'Thus, sound is motion; and, although in the earlier periods of philosophy the identity of sound and motion was not traced out, and they were considered distinct affections of matter—indeed, at the commencement of the present century, a theory was advanced that sound was transmitted by the vibrations of an ether,—we now so readily resolve sound into motion, that to those who are familiar with acoustics, the phenomena of sound immediately present to the mind the idea of motion—*i. e.* motion of ordinary matter. Again, with regard to light, no doubt now exists that light moves, or is accompanied by motion. Here the phenomena of motion are not made evident by the ordinary sensuous perception; as, for instance, the motion of a visibly moving projectile would be, but by an inverse deduction from known relations of motion to time and space; as all observation teaches us, that bodies in moving from one point in space to another occupy time, we conclude, that wherever a continuing phenomenon is rendered evident in two different points of space at different times, there is motion, though we cannot see the progression. A similar deduction convinces us of the motion of electricity.'

'As we in common parlance speak of sound moving, although sound is motion, it requires no great stretch of imagination to conceive light and electricity as motions, and not as things moving. If one end of a long bar of metal be struck, a sound is soon perceptible at the other

end. This we now know to be a vibration of the bar; sound is but a word expressive of the mode of motion impressed on the bar; so one end of a column of air or glass subjected to a luminous impulse gives a perceptible effect of light at the other end; this can equally be conceived to be a vibration or transmitted motion of the transparent column.'

These quotations expressing fully the great points of this hypothesis, we may now venture to advance to the consideration of the truths of science, and to examine the support which these give to, or derive from, the philosophy of this school.

The illustrious Boyle wrote an essay to prove that there was no such thing as *absolute rest* in nature, and beyond all doubt he was correct. Every variation of temperature—and these are constantly occurring—each change in the electrical state of bodies in proximity—and these oscillate unceasingly—produces motion, the particles constituting the mass moving from or towards each other. Yet, notwithstanding these insensible motions, and those of which every fragment of this great sphere partakes in the grand system of its several revolutions, it must not be forgotten that matter has certain evident properties impressed on it. These are thus described by Sir John Herschel, whose authority we are glad to enlist in our argument.

'Matter, or that, whatever it be, of which all the objects in nature which manifest themselves directly to our senses consist, presents us with two general qualities, which at first sight appear to stand in contradiction to each other, *activity* and *inertness*. Its activity is proved by its power of spontaneously setting other matter in motion, and of itself obeying their mutual impulse, and moving under the influence of its own and other force; inertness, in refusing to move unless obliged to do so by a force impressed externally, or mutually exerted between itself and other matter, and by persisting in its state of motion or rest unless disturbed by some external cause. Yet, in reality, this contradiction is only apparent. *Force being the cause and motion the effect* produced by it on matter, to say that matter is inert or has *inertia*, as it is termed, is only to say that the cause is expended in producing its effect, and that the same cause cannot (without renewal) produce double or triple its own proper effect. In this point of view, equilibrium may be conceived as a continual production of two opposite effects, each undoing at every instant what the other has done.'—*Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy.*

It is not merely an axiom in mechanical philosophy that a mass of matter cannot move itself, it is a truth impressed upon the mind by the continuance of ordinary observations. This applies with equal force to the huge boulder of granite resting upon the hill side, 'in its immensity secure,' to the lightest dust upon

the wing of the most delicate moth, or to the most attenuated of gaseous bodies; to move them, a force must be applied which shall be greater than that *inertia*, in virtue of which the body is at rest. If moving under the operation of any applied force, it is only brought to rest by the opposing influence of some other force: as, for example, a ball projected from a cannon by the force of the explosion of gunpowder would move on for ever, but that the resistance of the air is constantly opposing a force equal to the velocity of its motion, and the mass of the earth, exerting its attraction of gravitation, pulls it towards the surface.

Matter cannot move itself, and therefore to regard the physical forces as *modes of motion*, is only moving the question still further from us, and launching our philosophy into a wide sea in search of the *primum mobile*, under the influence of which the effects heat, light, electricity, and chemical agency, appear as resultants.

A succinct examination of the present state of our knowledge in relation to the operation of the *physical forces*, or, according to an almost forgotten yiew, of the *imponderable elements*, will enable the reader to discuss with more satisfaction than he could otherwise do the logical merits of the deductions of this view of the correlation.

Admitting, without stopping to examine the merits of the several theories of Newton, Boscovitch, and others, that matter consists of certain ultimate atoms, let us reflect on the conditions under which these are known to exist.

There is a power by which a stone thrown off from the earth's surface returns back to it; this is gravitation. Our inductive science assures us that it is by this principle that the moon is sustained at a fixed distance from this planet, and our globe chained to the sun. The truth of the Newtonian law has received the fullest confirmation, in the discovery of the planet Neptune rolling on the very outbounds of our solar system, after its existence had been inferred from the circumstance that a remote star, Uranus, was suffering some unexplained perturbations when moving in a certain division of its orbit. This power, so universe-embracing, is seen to draw a suspended plummet towards the rocks of the cliff over which it may hang, and to influence logs of wood floating on a still lake, or globules of water resting on a greasy glass plate; and there is little doubt but that power which we call cohesion, by which the particles of matter are aggregated into masses, is but gravitation acting through insensible distances.

Amidst the mysterious operations of molecular forces, we discover several peculiar sets of phenomena. Capillary attraction, exosmose and endosmose, catalysis and epipolic force, are names

by which we have distinguished peculiar effects, all of which are referrible to the influences surrounding every particle of matter, modified, however, by the conditions under which the phenomena are produced. In capillary attraction, we have fluids rising above their ordinary level in fine tubes of glass, or any solid material. In endosmose phenomena, we find fluids forced through the fine pores of membranaceous matter, and we know that this process is constantly going on within our bodies in the operations of assimilation. In catalysis, we have mere contact setting up similar chemical actions in different bodies; and, under the term of epipolic force, we attempt to describe the power which condenses, on the surfaces of solid bodies, any gaseous or fluid medium by which they may be surrounded.

This peculiar class of phenomena demands a little further explanation to render it familiar. To select a striking example—if a piece of charcoal is heated in a close vessel, so as to collect the air which escapes from it, we shall find that it has condensed within its pores twenty or thirty times its own volume; and if, having driven out all the air it contains, we plunge it into a vessel of ammoniacal gas, it will absorb ninety times its own volume of that aëriform fluid. It has been proved by the researches of Dutrochet and others, that every solid surface exerts this condensing force; and that the operations of porous bodies, such as charcoal, are only rendered more striking from the circumstance, that they exhibit a much greater extension of surface, owing to their porosity. An attentive consideration of these phenomena will lead to the conclusion that, in all probability, they are but modifications of cohesive force, which molecular power is a peculiar agency surrounding each atom, or a function of matter, the connecting links of which have not yet, however, been developed by experimental research. Certain it is that matter, whether solid, liquid, or gaseous, is constituted of infinitely minute parts, which are more or less closely connected, according to the operation of the antagonistic force—heat.

In water we have a very familiar illustration of the three conditions. Ice (*solid water*); liquid water, and *steam* (*vaporiform water*.) Below 32° Fahr., water exists as ice; we bring the block of ice into a room having a temperature of 80° Fahr., it thaws—reducing during that operation the temperature of the room—but until every bit of ice has become water, the temperature of the fluid never rises above 32°; all the heat which has been absorbed remains latent or hidden, and is employed in maintaining that physical state—liquid water. This is placed in a graduated vessel, and heat is applied to it; with every increment of caloric the water expands. We infer that the particles are

forced off from one another, the interstitial spaces between them are enlarged, and they move with yet greater freedom than they did in the more condensed condition. At length, the temperature having increased to a certain point, when the ordinary thermometer indicates  $212^{\circ}$ , boiling commences. Beyond this point, under the ordinary circumstances of atmospheric pressure, the temperature does not increase, all the additional heat being expended in the conversion of water into steam.

There are some peculiar phenomena connected with the different physical conditions of water which require yet further investigation. The subject has engaged the attention of Faraday, Henry, and Donne, and the results obtained are very remarkable.

When water freezes without being disturbed, the resulting ice is found full of air-bubbles. If, however, it solidifies when in a state of agitation, the ice will be perfectly free of air. In the process of condensation, all gaseous matter has been squeezed out; in one case, it has been entangled by the crystals of ice—in the other it has, owing to the disturbance, been set free.

If with water, previously to its undergoing refrigeration, we mix any chemical compound—alkali or acid, the most intense colouring matter, or the most virulent poison—and during the process slightly agitate it with a feather, it will be discovered that the ice is colourless and tasteless—alkali or acid, colour or poison, have all alike been rejected—and in the centre of the mass these will be found in a concentrated state. Frozen water, when obtained under the required conditions, is this fluid in its highest state of purity—far more so than distilled water, which always contains air, and sometimes organic matter.

Water which does not contain air appears to possess some physical differences from ordinary water. If ice free of air is carefully thawed, the resulting *airless* water will not boil at  $212^{\circ}$  Fahr.; the temperature may, indeed, be raised to  $270^{\circ}$  without ebullition, but a little beyond that point it *explodes*, the entire quantity being converted into steam by one effort. M. Donne is disposed to refer many steam-boiler explosions to this cause. He finds that water, by long-continued boiling in closed vessels, may be deprived of much air; that such water may be subsequently heated considerably beyond the boiling point without ebullition; but that if a drop of ordinary water is brought in contact with it in this state, explosion ensues. The explanation given, which refers this to the *presence* of air merely, is not satisfactory. We have physical conditions of a novel order, dependent upon some new arrangement of its particles; conditions, indeed, analogous to those of carbon, phosphorus, sulphur,

iron, &c., which are grouped under the general term, *allotropism*. We know that carbon exists in three conditions. The stick of charcoal or the lump of coke, the mass of plumbago, and the light-refracting gem, are all of them but forms of one element. If we burn the diamond in a close vessel, we convert it into carbonic acid; if under the galvanic arc, we change it into a lump of coke. Phosphorus is highly combustible, the slightest attrition causing its ignition; but if this curious element is exposed to the action of a moderate heat in a perfectly close vessel, it passes from its ordinary waxy state and yellow colour into a pulverulent condition, possessing a red colour, and it is no longer easily ignited. This peculiarity—the discovery of Schroeder—has been rendered available in some processes of manufacture with great advantage. A similar condition may be induced in iron, and some other bodies. The allotropism of iron—the discovery of Schoenbein of Basle, afterwards investigated by Sir John Herschel, is sufficiently curious to claim peculiar attention. The phenomena attendant on the change of state are well described by Dr. Daubeny, in his ‘Atomic Theory,’ from which we quote.

‘Thus, if an iron rod be raised at one extremity only to a red heat, it will not be acted upon by nitric acid of the specific gravity of 1·35. This immunity from the action of the acid may even be imparted to a second rod, if brought into connexion with the first.

‘Thus, if the heated wire be made to touch a second, and both be plunged into the same acid, neither will be acted upon. The same immunity is obtained if an iron wire, plunged into nitric acid, be simply made to touch a wire of platinum.

‘The same wire, if made the positive electrode of the galvanic battery, is not acted upon by the acid, though it transmits the galvanic current, and consequently decomposes the water present, whilst, on the other hand, it is vehemently attacked by the same acid when in connexion with the negative electrode.

‘Hence, the effect would seem to depend upon the electrical condition of the metal at the time being, but it is curious, that the same effect is produced by simply immersing it for a few moments in acid, after which the action entirely ceases; and that it may sometimes be renewed by various mechanical methods, as by rubbing it with a copper wire, with glass, or in other ways.’

We are not ourselves disposed to refer these peculiarities to electrical conditions. The amount of evidence appears in favour of that view which refers the phenomena to a change in those molecular forces of which we know so little. It is, however, the fashion of our philosophy to refer everything which is not understood to electricity; and too frequently it rests satisfied with

having labelled a fact; careless whether the description is a correct one, provided it agrees with some received theory.

Up to this point we have considered phenomena which have no direct part in Mr. Grove's discussion on the 'Correlation of Physical Forces.' They perform most important offices in the great phenomena of nature, but, as being clearly principles which are not in any way affected by the conditions of motion or rest, they have been excluded from the argument.

*Chemical action* becomes, after those agencies which determine molecular constitution, the most important subject of consideration, and as being exceedingly difficult to circumscribe within any law of motion, its phenomena are very loosely dealt with in the 'Correlation of Physical Forces.' Indeed, the only way in which many of the difficulties have been treated, is that species of special pleading which endeavours to involve an opposing point with doubt. For example, take the following:—

'The equivalent ratios in which the greater number of substances chemically combine, held good in so many instances that the atomic doctrine was believed to be universally applicable, and called by some a law; and yet, when we follow it in the combinations of substances whose mutual chemical attractions are very feeble, we find the relation fade away, and we seek to recover it by applying a separate and arbitrary multiplier to the different constituents. By doing this, chemists may make every combination assume in expression an equivalent form; but they have passed from the original law, which contemplated only definite multiples; and the very hypothetic expressions of atoms, which the apparently simple relations of combining weights led them first to adopt, they are obliged to vary and to contradict in terms, by dividing that which their hypothesis and the expression of it assumed to be indivisible.'

It is evident that the author of this passage is but very imperfectly acquainted with chemical philosophy. The law of equivalent ratios is more firmly established by every advance of our knowledge. It is readily admitted that there were many—and there are a few—instances in which the *known* combination of a compound led to the necessity of dealing with the anomaly of half an atom. The refinements of analytical research are rapidly clearing away those difficulties which arose from the imperfections of experiments—and the theory of John Dalton stands unshaken. Well may Dr. Daubeny, in his 'Atomic Theory,' say that it '*stands foremost among the discoveries of the present age, for the universality of its applications, and the importance of its practical results; holding the same kind of relation to the science of chemistry which the Newtonian system does to that of mechanics.*' Referring to this theory, the eminent author of the 'Philosophy

of the Inductive Sciences,' says,—‘That they could never have been clearly understood, and therefore never firmly established, without laborious and exact experiments, is certain; but yet we may venture to say, that being once known, they possess *an evidence beyond that of mere experiment. For how, in fact, can we conceive combinations otherwise than as definite in kind and quantity.*’

Dr. Daubeny, in his new edition of ‘An Introduction to the Atomic Theory,’ has with great industry and ability collected all the facts of modern science which support the Daltonian hypothesis. His view of the relative merits of Mr. Higgins and Dr. Dalton is so satisfactory, that we quote it at length:—

‘It has been contended that we owe to Mr. Higgins, formerly of Pembroke College, in my own university, and afterwards Professor of Chemistry to the Dublin Society, the first enunciation of this latter fact; as in a work published by him in 1789, entitled, ‘A Comparative View of the Phlogistic and Antiphlogistic Theories,’ he distinctly states, that one ultimate particle of sulphur and one of oxygen constitute sulphurous acid, whilst one ultimate particle of sulphur and two of oxygen constitute sulphuric acid; and, moreover, that in the compounds of azote and oxygen the ingredients are to each other in the proportion of 1 to 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 particles respectively.

‘It must also be allowed, that he adheres, throughout the work in question, to the corpuscular hypothesis, supposing matter to combine particle to particle, though in this latter respect the merit is not exclusively his own, as he merely followed in the wake of preceding chemists, who, if they thought at all upon the subject, generally leaned to the opinion, that chemical combination took place between the ultimate molecules of matter, and not, according to the Kantian doctrine, owing to a mutual penetration of one substance by another. But although the definite proportions in which bodies combine afford, as will be seen hereafter, the most satisfactory proof we possess of the existence of atoms, it must not be taken for granted, that the adoption of such a view necessarily presupposes a recognition of the former principle, nor does it appear that Mr. Higgins had a clear perception that the several combining quantities of each substance bore any fixed numerical relation one to the other, or that he had brought together any facts in support of such a position. Indeed, it may be collected from other passages, that he supposed combinations between bodies to take place in all proportions within certain prescribed limits, a notion utterly inconsistent with any clear apprehension of the principle in question.

‘Had he struck out these ideas a few years later, the case might have been different; for as their correctness could then have been substantiated by an appeal to facts, his genius might possibly have overleaped the boundary that separates the point to which we are led by his speculations from that afterwards attained by Dr. Dalton. As it was, the want of precision which then prevailed in chemical analysis



would have rendered it impossible to collect a number of instances sufficient to establish the law as holding good universally; whilst from the cursory manner in which Mr. Higgins, in the work alluded to, makes mention of the relation between the proportions in which bodies combine, and from his never returning to the subject until the principle had become generally adopted amongst chemists, we are led to infer that he was not at the time sufficiently alive to its importance to have attempted to follow it through those cases to which it might even then have been extended. In the year 1808, Dr. Dalton published the first volume of his 'New System of Chemical Philosophy,' in which a brief outline was given of those notions respecting the constitution of matter, which it appears, from Dr. Thomson's statement, he had explained to him and others, both privately, and through the medium of the public lectures, for some years antecedent to that date. In this work he appeals to the numerous cases then ascertained, in which a definite relation was found to exist between the combining quantities of different substances, as serving to establish the general law, that when two bodies combine, the union takes place betwixt their component particles in the proportion of 1 of the first to 1 of the second, 1 of the first to 2 of the second, 1 to 3, and so on.

'If this be allowed, it will follow, that from the relative weight of the elements constituting any given compound, that of their ultimate atoms may be inferred; and hence, when either of the same ingredients occurs in a known proportion in other bodies, the number of its atoms present in them may admit of being determined.

'He therefore states, that it is one great object of his work 'to show the importance and advantage of ascertaining the relative weights of the ultimate particles, both of simple and compound bodies; the number of simple elementary particles which constitute one compound particle; and the number of less compound particles which enter into the formation of one or more compound particle.

'To illustrate these views, he has placed at the end of his volume a plate, in which thirty-seven bodies, including most of the supposed chemical elements, are represented by appropriate symbols; and in the explanation annexed, the weights of their atoms are given according to the above mode of calculating them.

'In the second volume of his work, published in 1810, he confirmed these views by facts derived from a consideration of the compounds of oxygen with hydrogen, azote, carbon, sulphur, and phosphorus, which were shown to combine in such definite proportions, as might be reconciled to his principle; and the investigations of Berzelius, Thomson, and others, have since extended the same to all classes of chemical compounds whatsoever.'

With Mr. Grove, we are quite prepared to admit that the present state of organic chemistry is one of doubt and confusion; but this proves, not the defect of the theory of combining proportions, but the unfortunate facility which exists for ringing

almost endless changes upon the hydro-carbon combinations. The result of this has been, that every tyro, eager to make a discovery, has become an organic chemist, and perplexed the science with such compounds as the *chloromésitate of methyline*, and *sulphomethylo-sulphuric acid*,—and such ingenious formulæ as— $C_6H_7NO_4$ ,  $HCl$ ,  $PtCl_2 + 2HO$ , and others which are purely speculative arrangements.

The combinations in nature are simple; these may be capable of combining one with another, and the organic radical, acting the part of an element, may combine as a single atom with another compound, or even series of compounds, giving rise to new forms. Still but three or four simple elements are united in definite proportions; and the theoretical groupings which the organic chemists so much delight in tend only to produce confusion. When some master mind shall boldly sweep away the whole system of binary constituents, and lead the chemist back to nature, we may hope to see the science recovering from the embarrassing state, which clogs its progress as completely as perpetual motion stopped the advance of mechanics, and phlogiston the improvement of physics.

Howbeit the chemical combination of bodies does not appear to have any necessary connexion with motion as a *cause*, although in chemical action we have motion as an *effect*; and as the result of the disturbance produced by that motion, the development of heat, or of electricity. Here is, then, something like evidence of correlation; and let us embrace the opportunity of placing the evidences in its favour in the most striking form.

A boy rubs a brass button on a deal board, until it becomes hot enough to blister the skin to which it is applied. Forests, by the attrition of the branches of trees, have been set on fire; the Indian twirls one piece of wood around another until they both take fire; and the blacksmith hammers his little rod of iron upon the anvil until it becomes red-hot—with this he lights his sulphur match, and kindles the fire of his forge. In these, and in many similar examples, there are some grounds for the hypothesis, that *motion* has been changed into *heat*. The *sensation* of heat has evidently resulted from the motion employed; but where is the evidence that the cause producing it—the caloric, or principle of heat—has been merely the conversion of motion? Mr. Joule, in his ‘Memoir on the Mechanical Equivalent of Heat,’ deduces from his experiments, that a fall of 772 lbs. through the space of one foot, is able to raise the temperature of a pound of water through one degree of Fahrenheit’s scale. All these experiments, however, are of the same character as those of Count Rumford; who proved that, in boring a brass cannon, so much

heat was liberated as, in a comparatively short time, brought a measured quantity of water to the boiling temperature. The boy and button are still the exemplars of the higher-class experiments; and in endeavouring to show the fallacy—as we conceive it to be—of referring the effect, heat, to motion as a cause, let us ask ourselves, 1st, What is motion? and, 2ndly, What is it that is moved? We believe every one will reply, that motion is the result of a *force* applied: and in the present case one of two things occurs—either the particles of solid matter, being moved, develop heat; or this principle existed among the particles of solid matter, it was moved, and thus rendered sensible. Some difficulties surround the problem, which are well put by Mr. Mill, in his ‘System of Logic,’ when treating of induction and the four experimental methods. He says:—

‘As another example, let us take the phenomenon of heat. Independently of all hypothesis as to the real nature of the agency so called, this fact is certain, that we are unable to exhaust any body of the whole of its heat. It is equally certain, that no one ever perceived heat not emanating from a body. Being unable, then, to separate body and heat, we cannot effect such a variation of circumstances as the foregoing three methods require; we cannot ascertain, by those methods, what portion of the phenomena exhibited by any body are due to the heat contained in it. If we could observe a body with its heat, and the same body entirely divested of heat, the method of difference would show the effect due to the heat apart from that due to the body. If we could observe heat under circumstances agreeing in nothing but heat, and therefore not characterized by the presence of a body, we could ascertain the effects of heat from an instance of heat with a body, and an instance of heat without a body, by the method of agreement; or, if we pleased, we could determine by the method of difference what effect was due to the body, when the remainder, which was due to heat, would be given by the method of residues. But we can do none of these things; and without them the application of any of the three methods to the solution of this problem would be illusory. It would be idle, for instance, to attempt to ascertain the effect of heat by subtracting from the phenomena exhibited by a body all that is due to its other properties; for as we have never been able to observe any bodies without a portion of heat in them, the effects due to that heat may form a part of the very results which we affect to subtract, in order that the effect of heat may be shown by the residue.’

Those, therefore, who infer that the body moved is the cause of heat, have no better support for their hypothesis than those who suppose heat to be a positive entity, associated with the body. Experimental evidence does, however, carry us a little further than Mr. Mill appears to imagine. We have the evidence

that heat is a force antagonistic to cohesion, and that by its influence a solid may be made to occupy infinitely larger space, its particles being driven apart by its repulsive force. That heat does exert a repelling power is proved by the experiments of Boutigny. Water flows freely through the meshes of a metal sieve, but if we make the wire gauze brightly red-hot, and maintain it in that state, we may fill the sieve with water, and not one drop will run through the interstices. If we coil a platinum wire so as to form a sort of wire funnel, and make this red-hot, we may fill it with water, and notwithstanding that wide spaces exist between the wires, not one drop of the water will flow out as long as the wires are kept incandescent. Again: if a mass of metal is brought to a white heat, and plunged into a vessel full of cold water, the metal will continue to glow with a silvery luminosity in the centre of the fluid, a space being clearly seen between the hot metal and the water. As the metal cools the space diminishes, and when it is reduced to a certain point, the water suddenly touches it and begins at once to boil. Upon such experiments as these, and others showing that the operations of chemical affinity are entirely suspended at elevated temperatures, was founded the conclusion that such a degree of heat might be produced as would not burn, in the ordinary manner, organic bodies. This has been proved; and Boutigny, Professor Plucker, of Bohn, and others, have found that they could plunge their naked arms into baths of incandescent metal, without suffering from the influences of this fiery ordeal,—the repulsive action of heat, and the atmosphere of vapour which surrounds the arm, being a sufficient protection. In Plucker's experiments he found, when he washed his arm with æther previously to the immersion, that the sensation was one of extreme cold, produced by the evaporation of this volatile spirit.

There are other experiments of a similar character to these, which our space has only allowed us to indicate, proving that the principle, or force, which we call heat, has the property of repelling the particles of bodies in whatever physical condition they may be. This is the kind of evidence which is afforded by induction, in support of the view that heat is something independent of the body with which it may be united.

A body becomes hot, and eventually it becomes luminous. Is heat converted into light? The theory of undulations gives one set of vibrations to produce heat, and another to develop light—the motion of a mysterious, all-diffusive æther being the thing moved in each instance. It has been proved that all bodies begin to give out light at the same temperature—about  $1000^{\circ}$  of Fahrenheit. Heat and light obey many of the same laws: they

are both capable of reflexion, refraction, and of polarization. They are not, however, in their radiant states, susceptible of these results in the same degree. Heat radiations are much less bent by the prism than light radiations are: they are not equally absorbed by bodies, and the same body is not equally permeable by the heat and the light radiations; indeed, many substances which are transparent to light are opaque for heat; and others, as black Mica, which obstruct nearly every ray of light, allow the calorific radiations to pass them most freely. The experiments of Dutrochet have shown that the rays from *red hot* iron are intercepted by a plate of crown glass; whereas those which proceed from *white hot* iron are not stopped by the same medium. It must be conceded that this is strongly in favour of the hypothesis, that the intensity of heat is in an exact ratio with the rapidity of its undulations, and that these becoming more and more rapid, are eventually converted into light. Upon this view, it is clear, that if we continue to increase the intensity of heat, it must eventually cease to act as heat,—*that is to say, we may make a fire so hot that it will not burn.* Towards this point we are evidently approaching in the experiments of Boutigny, and it does not appear to be improbable that we may eventually solve this very important problem.

Mr. Grove has given us a very interesting experiment on the decomposition of water by heat. Any substance capable of supporting an intense heat, and incapable of being acted upon by water or either of its elements—such, for instance, as platinum or iridium—being raised to a high point of ignition, and then immersed in water, effects its decomposition—bubbles of permanent gas ascend from it, which will be found on examination to consist of mixed oxygen and hydrogen, in the proportion in which they form water. Dr. Robinson has shown that the heat required to effect this decomposition is  $= 2386^{\circ}$ . Davy proved, by a series of very conclusive experiments, that when hydrogen and oxygen are mixed they combine to form water at a temperature of about  $800^{\circ}$ . Heat, therefore, in this case, acts differently upon the elements according to its intensity: in one case producing composition; in the other, decomposition. Dr. Robinson has cautiously suggested that the decomposition may be due to actinic-chemical influence, excited by heat when its intensity goes beyond a certain point.

‘Carrying out this view,’ says Mr. Grove, ‘it would appear that a sufficient intensity of heat might yield indefinite powers of decomposition, and there seems some probability of bodies now supposed to be elementary being decomposed, or resolvable, into further elements by the application of heat of sufficient intensity; or, reasoning con-

versely, it may fairly be anticipated that bodies which will not enter into combination at a certain temperature, will enter into combination if their temperature be lowered, and that thus new compounds may be formed by a proper disposition of their constituents when exposed to an extremely low temperature.'

Hoping that every point which goes strongly to support the view, that mere mechanical force is converted into heat, has been fairly stated, we proceed to view the question from another point. Every fact we have stated, and numerous others of an allied character, prove that the atoms constituting a mass are moved further from each other by every increase of temperature, and this repelling power is exerted so strongly under certain circumstances, that even chemical affinity is suspended by it. Now it does not appear that any modification of motion could possibly produce this result. When heat is radiating it moves, in all probability, in waves; but in saying that these waves are heat, precisely the same mistake is made as when Mr. Grove says 'sound is motion,' which, it will be readily perceived upon examination, is not a true expression. The ear is the organ which appreciates sound; the mouth—a vibrating string, or pipe—the source of sound: the air between them being the medium. We occasion a vibration at the source: this is communicated through the air; the waves beat upon the membrane of the ear, and sound is the result. The pulses of the thin air are the cause of sound; but these undulations are not the audible principle. Motion is the means of conveying sonorous waves; but to say that motion is sound, is clearly illogical.

Heat appears to be a peculiar subtle principle diffused through all nature, and determining by its action on matter, and by the re-actions of matter again on it, the conditions of every body, whether solid, fluid, or aëriform, according to the physical character of any surface, as it regards structure and colour; so is this agency more or less condensed or absorbed by it, and any disturbance producing a movement of the particles of which a body is constituted, whether produced by physical powers or mechanical force, effects the disturbance and consequent development of its power. That the quantity of heat produced bears an exact ratio to the force applied to produce it, is certain; the balance of forces is most uniformly maintained, and that mechanical power which is developed by man results from the change of state of an equivalent of muscle, and the result obtained is exactly equal to it. A pound of coal undergoing combustion produces a sufficient amount of heat to generate steam capable of exerting a certain power; and to gain the same power by any other means, an equivalent proportion of some

agency must change its condition in the same manner as does the coal in the process of combustion. Mr. Joule has very carefully and accurately determined the mechanical equivalent of heat; but it is sadly narrowing our perceptions of the grand elements of creation to stop at that point which declares heat to be motion.

The differences between light and heat are many: in action, the phenomena of these principles, or forces, are not very dissimilar; but, although heat does appear in some cases to pass into light, we should be rash to admit their identity. They may be the result of modifications of a common cause, but let us not allow speculation to run too far in advance of fact.

From the consideration of heat, Mr. Grove advances to that of electricity, and we may, without quoting largely, sufficiently indicate his views. A rod of glass is rubbed, and the result is electrical attraction and repulsion. A plate of glass is turned so as to rub against cushions and flaps of silk (the electrical machine), and we have the phenomena of *electricity*—attraction and repulsion; of *heat*—in the combustion of metal wires; and of *light*—in the spark freely developed. *Chemical action*—in the battery—produces voltaic electricity; and this again occasions the evolution of heat and of light, the production of magnetic phenomena, and it effects again *chemical decomposition*. In these operations Mr. Grove sees correlation marked distinctly in every step.

It is well to consider, in the first place, what we know of electricity, and of its diffusion through matter. The researches of Faraday on this subject are amongst the highest examples we possess of inductive research, and from these we select the following remarkable passages:—

‘Now it is wonderful to observe how small a quantity of a compound body is decomposed by a certain portion of electricity. Let us, for instance, consider this and a few other points in relation to water. One grain of water, acidulated to facilitate conduction, will require an electric current to be continued for three minutes and three quarters of time to effect its decomposition, which current must be powerful enough to retain a platina wire  $\frac{1}{104}$  of an inch in thickness red hot, in the air during the whole time; and if interrupted anywhere by charcoal points, will produce a very brilliant and constant star of light.

‘If attention be paid to the instantaneous discharge of electricity of tension as illustrated in the beautiful experiments of Mr. Wheatstone and to what I have said elsewhere on the relation of common and voltaic electricity, it will not be too much to say that this necessary quantity of electricity is equal to a *very powerful flash of lightning*. Yet we have it under perfect command; can evolve, direct, and employ it at pleasure; and when it has performed its full work of

electrolyzation, it has only separated the elements of a single grain of water.

‘On the other hand, the relation between the conduction of the electricity and the decomposition of the water is so close, that one cannot take place without the other. If the water is altered only in that small degree which consists in its having the solid instead of the fluid state, the conduction is stopped and the decomposition is stopped with it.

‘Whether the conduction be considered as depending upon the decomposition or not, still the relation of the two functions is equally intimate and inseparable.

‘Considering this close and twofold relation—namely, that without decomposition, transmission of electricity does not occur; and that for a given definite quantity of electricity passed, an equally definite and constant quantity of water or other water is decomposed; considering also that the agent, which is electricity, is simply employed in overcoming electrical powers in the body subjected to its action; it seems a probable and almost a natural consequence, that the quantity which passes is *the equivalent of, and therefore equal to*, that of the particles separated; i. e., that if the electrical power which holds the elements of a grain of water in combination, or which makes a grain of oxygen and hydrogen in the right proportions unite into water when they are made to combine, could be thrown into the condition of a current, it would exactly equal the current required for the separation of that grain of water into its elements again. This view of the subject gives an almost overwhelming idea of the extraordinary quantity or degree of electric power which naturally belongs to the particles of matter; but it is not inconsistent in the slightest degree with the facts which can be brought to bear on this point. To illustrate this I must say a few words on the voltaic pile.’

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‘What an enormous quantity of electricity, therefore, is required for the decomposition of a single grain of water! We have already seen that it must be in quantity sufficient to sustain a platina wire  $\frac{1}{164}$ th of an inch in thickness, red hot, in contact with the air, for three minutes and three quarters, a quantity which is almost infinitely greater than that which could be evolved by the little standard voltaic arrangement to which I have just referred. I have endeavoured to make a comparison by the loss of weight of such a wire in a given time in such an acid, according to a principle and experiment to be almost immediately described; but the proportion is so high, that I am almost afraid to mention it. It would appear that 800,000 such charges of the Leyden battery, as I have referred to above, would be necessary to supply electricity sufficient to decompose a single grain of water; or, if I am right, to equal the quantity of electricity which is naturally associated with the elements of that grain of water, endowing them with their mutual chemical affinity.’



Mr. Grove views the phenomena of electricity as something very different from what is to be understood from the above—

‘The electric spark,’ he says, ‘the brush, and similar phenomena, the old theories regard as actual emanations of the matter or fluid—electricity—I venture to regard them as produced by an emission of the material itself from whence they issue, and a molecular action of the gas or intermedium through or across which they are transmitted.’

‘I think I shall not be unsupported by many who have attentively studied electrical phenomena, in viewing them as resulting not from the action of a fluid or fluids, but as a molecular polarization of ordinary matter, or as matter acting by attraction and repulsion in a definite direction.’

We confess our inability to understand how matter becomes invested with polarity by motion—how that which was inert—incapable of exerting any force in any direction—should, by being moved, become at once imbued with the power of attraction and repulsion. That there are difficulties around the received theories of electricity is most freely admitted, and without doubt with the advance of our knowledge they will be materially modified, if not entirely rejected. In connexion with voltaic electricity the question of polarity has been considered by Dr. Daubeny when treating of the electrical theory of chemical action. As the remarks of the Professors Graham and Daubeny are worthy of all consideration and bear much on the subject under discussion, we quote them from the ‘Introduction to the Atomic Theory.’

‘Professor Graham, in his ‘Elements of Chemistry,’ has attempted, by following up views which Faraday put forth with respect to the theory of the voltaic pile, to bring under the same general law the phenomena of chemical and of inductive affinity.

‘In the statement given of them he has abandoned altogether the idea of electricity being concerned, remarking, that we have just as much right to attribute electrical attraction to chemical affinity, as chemical affinity to electrical attraction.

‘Nevertheless, as it cannot be denied that an attraction, however produced, does take place between the masses of two bodies at the very time when a chemical affinity is exerted between their particles; and as it has been assumed, that the former species of attraction is due to a particular fluid called electricity, it may render our views more intelligible, if we adopt the ordinary hypothesis, which regards electricity as the agent in both series of effects. Let us, then, suppose that every particle of matter possesses a definite amount of electricity, which in a passive state is equally distributed over its surface, but which is liable to be displaced and determined to particular poles, by the contact or near approach of certain foreign bodies. This destruction of the electrical equilibrium is owing to what is called polarity,

and it is therefore through its operation that ordinary chemical affinity arises. But it may happen that the disturbance of the balance of the two electricities is too slight in a particular instance, to render the resulting attraction between the particles of the body powerful enough of itself to overpower the counteracting force of cohesion.

‘In such a case, of course no chemical union will take place.

‘But if at the same time that we disturb the equilibrium of the electric fluid in the particle alluded to, we also produce a similar polar condition in it by bringing it into connexion with a body susceptible of an opposite electrical state to its own; as, for example, when we bring together a piece of copper and of amalgamated zinc, immersed in an acid which evinces no action upon the latter when alone, we may readily conceive that the affinities of the metal for the solvent may be so far augmented as to overcome the resistance which had before nullified its operation.

‘In this manner it may be possible to reduce to one and the same law ordinary chemical attraction, and that augmented form of it which is produced by electrical induction; just as—to use Professor Graham’s own illustration—attraction always exists between the magnet and steel, owing to the induced polarity caused in the latter when in proximity with the former; but this attractive force in the magnet is rendered more intense by bringing its poles into contact with a bar of iron, as in the common horse-shoe magnet, in which it is well known that the poles are both rendered stronger by being in juxtaposition with the opposite poles of the bar which connects them.

‘Thus whilst modern discovery compels us to recognise a distinction between the physical properties of matter and their chemical ones, inasmuch as the former are essential and inherent, the latter connected in some unexplained manner with the number, proximity, and arrangement of their particles, and even induced in some cases by agencies manifestly extraneous, there is at the same time nothing to contradict the belief that the conditions on which depends the capacity of being effected in this manner, are in themselves as permanent, and subject to laws as fixed and definite as those which seem more directly to belong to their constitution and nature.’

That something—a substantive agency—does exist beyond any of the gross forms of matter with which we are acquainted is proclaimed by every fact; and that there are ‘*more things in heaven and earth than are dreamed of in our philosophy*,’ must be apparent to every mind attentively surveying the operations of the great physical forces. Even beyond that universal force which binds the planetary and the stellar systems into a mighty unity,—which regulates equally the situation of the solar system in space, and the shape of the dew-drop upon a flower,—there are evidences of still superior powers upon the operations of which the peculiar phenomena of gravitating attraction depends.

The researches of Faraday have naturally led him to look to

magnetism as the source of gravitating attraction; but we cannot regard these speculations otherwise than as the ingenious exercises of an industrious mind. Magnetism must be regarded as a great disposing force. We have evidence in proof of its operation in determining, under some conditions, molecular arrangements. Let us briefly glance at some of these. Under the ordinary conditions, a body which is magnetic has two dissimilar poles or ends; these we call its north and south pole, in relation to the poles of the earth. A bar of iron, being a magnet freely suspended, places itself in a certain position, pointing towards those poles which are the points of magnetic convergence. Or, if two such bars are freely suspended, they will attract each other by their dissimilar poles, and repel each other by their like poles; and supposing a magnetic bar to be hung above a U shaped bar, also a magnet, the bar will arrange itself so as to unite the two ends of the U. The north pole of the straight bar approaches the south pole of the U bar, and the south pole the contrary. Iron is the remarkable representative of a magnetic body, and some three or four other metallic bodies are found to possess similar magnetic properties to it. There are, however, a very extensive class which are magnetic after another condition. These are called dia-magnetic bodies. To this class belongs all those bodies which allow ordinary magnetism to pass through them freely—such as glass, bismuth, silver, and organic bodies in general. These bodies possess polarity; but it is a polarity of a different order from that already described. Instead of attracting by one and repelling by the other pole any other magnetic body, they repel all such equally by either pole. If between the U shaped magnet, bars of any dia-magnetic body are suspended, they place themselves at right angles to the line which joins the two poles; and indications have been obtained, which show that such bodies, free to move under the influence of the earth's magnetism, place themselves at right angles to the magnetic meridian.

It has been shown that the salts of magnetic metals crystallizing within the influence of sufficiently powerful magnets, arrange themselves in obedience to the law of magnetic attraction. They form curves of the same order as those produced when iron filings are sprinkled near the poles of a magnet. The salts of mercury, silver, and the like, when crystallizing under similar circumstances, observe a reverse order of arrangement; all the crystals have a tendency to place themselves along lines forming curves which flow from the magnetic poles, rather than towards them.

From the researches of Faraday, Plucker, Becquerel, and

others, it is shown that nearly all the bodies constituting the material universe are in one or the other of these magnetic conditions. We may therefore infer that molecular, and particularly crystalline condition, is regulated by the operation of these forms of magnetic force. Magnetism is regarded by Mr. Grove as a power dependent also on motion, because it is induced by the lateral action of an electric current.

‘Electricity directly produces *light* of the greatest known intensity. It directly produces magnetism, as shown by *Ørsted*, who first directly proved the connexion between electricity and magnetism. These two forces act upon each other, not in straight lines, as all other known forces do, but in a rectangular direction; that is, bodies affected by dynamic electricity, or the conduits of an electric current, tend to place magnets at right angles with them; and, conversely, magnets tend to place bodies conducting electricity at right angles to them. Thus, an electric current appears to have a magnetic action in a direction cutting its own right angles; or, supposing its section to be a circle, tangential to it; if, then, we reverse the position, and make the electric current form a series of tangents to an imaginary cylinder, this cylinder should be a magnet. This is effected in practice by coiling a wire as a helix or spiral, and this, when conducting an electric current, is to all intents and purposes a magnet. A soft iron core, placed within such a helix, has the property of concentrating its power, and then we can, by connexion or disconnexion with the source of electricity, instantly make or unmake a most powerful magnet. The representation of transverse direction by magnetism and electricity, appears to have led Coleridge to parallel it by the transverse expansion of matter, or length and breadth, though he injured the parallel by adding galvanism as depth. Whether a third force exists which may bear this relation to electricity and magnetism, is a question upon which we have no evidence.’

By disturbing the polar arrangement of a magnetic bar, as by making the armature revolve in front of the poles, we produce electricity; and such arrangements are now employed as permanent sources of that power, as applied in the processes of electro-plating.

The operations of light, and of the solar rays, in producing chemical changes, have been fully discussed in a previous Number of this Journal. The phenomena of luminous action are without doubt due to the disturbance of a luminiferous ether. Mr. Grove says—on the motion of matter—that, when at rest, we have no light, but that, excited, even gross substances give out luminous radiations, and these are always accompanied by that principle of actinism which produces chemical change. The extent of this power to produce decomposition has scarcely yet been appreciated. Mr. Fox Talbot has just announced the discovery of a

photographic process, by which an absolutely instantaneous impression is made upon an albuminized glass plate. The words of a printed page, placed upon a wheel set in most rapid revolution, have been, when illuminated by the flash from the discharge of a Leyden jar, printed upon the prepared tablet without a blur upon the edge of any of the letters. The influence of the solar radiations on matter are very imperfectly known. Faraday has proved oxygen to be magnetic, as iron is; and he has shown that its magnetic intensity varies with the temperature, thus referring the variations of terrestrial magnetism directly to the influences of solar-heat radiation on the oxygen of the atmosphere.

That these phenomena are manifested during the disturbances of that equilibrium of force which nature is constantly endeavouring to maintain, is certain. But that motion is to be resolved into heat, light, electricity, and chemical action, is not tenable.

By a force applied, these great principles are evoked, and any of them, being rendered active, are themselves the cause of motion. There cannot be motion without a mover, and a thing to be moved.

The prime mover may be indeed found; but, if found, motion ceases to be a cause. Indeed, under whatever view we examine the phenomena of the physical forces, we are compelled to regard them as the great causes, of which motion is only the ordinary effect. The correlation of the physical forces is in many points rendered probable; but we have these forces, in numerous instances, standing in antagonism to each other, and neutralizing the peculiar phenomena which belong to each individually. It is, therefore, as logical to suppose the existence of separate entities—*imponderable elements*—performing the work of creation in obedience to the laws which the great Creator of the universe has established, as to suppose them to be the result of Motion which, however far off we may remove it, must have resulted from the operation of Physical Force applied.

ART. IX.—*The Creed of Christendom: its Foundations and Superstructure.* By WILLIAM RATHBONE GREG. 8vo. pp. 307. Chapman. London: 1851.

JUDGING from appearances, we should be disposed to say that English Unitarianism is about to become extinct. Not extinct, in the sense of failing to present to us a class of persons claiming to be regarded as Christian ministers, or congregations claiming to be regarded as Christian worshippers; but in the sense of

ceasing to hold a creed at all distinguishable, in the matter of it, from that of Bolingbroke or Gibbon, of Thomas Payne or Richard Carlile. Inspiration, miracles, the resurrection of Jesus, the supernatural in every form in Christianity, are denied more and more commonly and openly every day, by parties who had their place, not long since, within the old Unitarian landmarks. What is graver still, imputations are now cast by many such persons on the character of the Sacred Writers, and on the contents of the Sacred Volume, as foul in substance, if not in language, as the lowest scribes in the service of infidelity have ever committed to writing. Men, indeed, are still found in Unitarian pulpits, and in Unitarian churches, who deplore this downward course of things, and are doing their best to stay it; but this class consists, we fear, of a minority only, and a minority becoming daily less.

We wish our readers to imagine for a moment that they see a man robed as a minister of religion, in the pulpit of an elegant ecclesiastical structure. The preacher begins by assuring a limited, but well-dressed and fashionable auditory, that it is one of the great mistakes of the modern church to suppose that, by placing ourselves in the age of the apostles, we place ourselves in connexion with Christianity in its purity. It is not so. On the contrary, it is hard to conceive of men more filled with prejudices, and with prejudices more hostile to the religion of Jesus, than were the men who are known to us as his earliest disciples. Such, in fact, was the ceaseless blundering of these parties, both as to the letter and spirit of the system of which they professed themselves the special teachers, that we should no more think of looking to them, though bearing the name of apostles, for a true presentation of the religion of Jesus, than to the towerings of a Hildebrand, or the visions of a Swedenborg. The preacher assures you, accordingly, that, in his judgment, Christianity has been preserved in the world, not so much by means of the apostolic wisdom as in defiance of apostolic weakness—in spite of the attempts of these misguided men to give to it everywhere a Jewish cast and spirit—in spite of their favourite notion about the end of the world, as to come in the time of that generation, and of their narrowness, intolerance, selfishness, asceticism, and much beside. Instead of learning implicitly from them, it behoves us to subject all their teaching to a suspicious and rigid scrutiny. In place of our being judged by their word, their word is to be judged by us. In place of sitting passively at their feet, our first duty is to separate between the fragments of truth they have transmitted to us, and the accumulations of error and absurdity of their own which they have mixed up with it. For such a task we are much more competent than they. The mists

of Jewish misconception which rested so thickly about them have no place with us. We can see as they could not see. Even towards Jesus, our position differs widely from theirs. They boasted of being his servants; that is, in the language of that time, his slaves. As a consequence, it was a part of their weakness to call him Lord—a term which denotes the holder of the slave. We take no such ground. We have chosen Jesus, he does not choose us. He is the leader it is our will to follow, and we follow him willingly.

Now the above is not a picture of the imagination. The preacher on the occasion was a man of the first eminence in his sect; the auditory embraced some of the most educated and wealthy families in one of the great centres of our opulence; and judging from the manner in which the whole was listened to, by both sexes, and by youth and age, the fair inference is, that the discourse was by no means of an unusual complexion. Judging, too, from the tone in which the Unitarian press is wont to hail the appearance of such works as those of Mr. Froude and of Professor Newman, we have felt obliged for some time to suspect that the partition separating between Unitarianism and Deism in the last century has scarcely an existence at present, with many who still retain the name of their predecessors. Much in private talk has tended to force this suspicion upon us, but we must confess we were not fully prepared for such discoursing as the above from an influential Unitarian pulpit.\*

We scarcely need say, that the gentlemen who are pushing their speculations to such extremes—the extremes of a mere Naturalism—have a full right so to do if so inclined. But having so done, that they should still claim to be recognised as Christian

\* Two books are just now on our table by Unitarian ministers, which are much more conservative of the historical in relation to Christianity than we should have expected from such quarters: and which contain a large amount of ethical truth, beautifully expressed—mixed up, of course, with interpretations of the sacred text, and with many opinions, which are by no means our own. The works we refer to are—‘*St. Paul’s Epistles to the Corinthians: an Attempt to convey their Spirit and Significance.*’ By JOHN HAMILTON THORN. Fcp. pp. 408.’ And ‘*Christian Aspects of Faith and Duty.*’ Discourses by JOHN JAMES TAYLOR, B.A. Fcp. pp. 346. Chapman. London.’ But moderate and just as is the tone of these productions on many points, the names of their authors stand committed to a course of periodical criticism on subjects of this nature, which, without the slightest measure of unfairness, may be described as in its drift saying—we deem it far better that the thinkers of our time should relinquish all idea of the supernatural in Christianity, become mere deists, or something even less definite or harmless, than that they should remain within the precincts of orthodoxy. Now we have ourselves little doubt as to the effect of the bias thus indicated on the future of the party indulging it. For the most part, the said thinkers will choose what is thus suggested as the wiser point of the alternative before them, and, bidding adieu to Unitarianism, as being scarcely more tenable than Evangelicism, will find their proper level and resting-place much lower down.

believers, is a circumstance not quite so intelligible to us, nor exactly accordant with our notions of fitness. The antecedents of the author of the volume at the head of this article, in common with those of many of his compeers in the same department of polemics, have forced thoughts of this nature upon us.

Mr. Greg is a gentleman whose character and position will secure him a cordial greeting from the party to whom he has given in his adhesion by this publication. Many of the writers of this class, who, with the friendly aid of Mr. Chapman, are now obtruding their neatly-printed volumes on the public attention, are birds so unfledged, and of such feeble wing, as to be little deserving of attention. But the time has come in which men of some mark do not scruple to take their place among the apostles of Naturalism, and are giving forth their new gospel in a style carefully adapted to the philosophical and literary tastes of the age. We can easily imagine, that in the region of the doubters of all sorts there is just now no small exultation. Every few months, or even weeks, sends forth some new champion in this cause, and 'the cry is still, they come.' It is true, there is little novelty in the preaching of this new school of propagandists; but it is something new to find the old story set forth in open day by such men, and in such mode. Nothing of this nature, to anything like the same extent, has had place among us since the epoch of English Deism in the last century. The reaction in favour of Christianity which took place in this country subsequently to the first French Revolution, appears to have greatly subsided in many quarters, and literary men are giving themselves to the labour of writing down revealed religion with a zeal and confidence worthy of Toland or Gibbon. There is, beyond a doubt, a much more prevalent and powerful feeling of religious life in connexion with Christianity in our time than in the times of the writers just named; but if the men who now sympathise with Christianity are much more numerous, and much more energetic, than in those days, so is it with the men who are adverse to that system. The matters now coming into high debate everywhere, and in relation to which we have a long and angry war before us, involve all the Life-questions of our faith and hope as Christians.

Mr. Greg states in his preface, that his work was finished two years since, and that it is not given to the world now without some misgiving. But his work contains, as he believes, some gleams of thought which others have missed; and he argues, that the man who supposes that he has some truth to communicate, though it be but a few fragments, should set it forth, that if truth it may fructify; if not, it may come to nought. We submit,



however, that inasmuch as the drift of this volume is to annihilate the authority of the Hebrew and Christian Scriptures, this half-doubting and excuse-seeking mood is not by any means sufficient to warrant a man in giving himself to so responsible an undertaking. In addition to which, from the books which Mr. Greg cites, and which he no doubt has read, he cannot but know that the novelty of his argument, so far as regards its main points, goes within a very small compass, if it can be said to exist. In some instances he has put his case naturally, clearly, and forcibly; but in others the thing has been better done by men who have gone before him. His second and main reason for becoming an author in this walk is given in the following terms:—

‘Much observation of the conversation and controversy of the religious world, had wrought the conviction that the evil resulting from the received notions as to scriptural authority has been immensely under-estimated. I was compelled to see that there is scarcely a low and dishonouring conception of God current among men, scarcely a narrow and malignant passion of the human heart, scarcely a moral obliquity, scarcely a political error or misdeed, which biblical texts are not, and may not be, without any violence in their obvious signification, adduced to countenance and justify. On the other hand, I was compelled to see how many clear, honest, and aspiring minds have been hampered and baffled in their struggles after truth and light, how many tender, pure, and crying hearts have been hardened, perverted, and forced to a denial of their noble nature and their better instincts by the ruthless influence of some passages of Scripture, which seemed in the clearest language to condemn the good, and to denounce the true. No work contributed more than Mr. Newman’s ‘Phases of Faith’ to force upon me the conviction, that little progress can be hoped for religious science or charitable feeling, till the question of biblical authority shall have been placed upon a sounder footing, and viewed in a very different light.’—p. viii.

Now, in common with Mr. Greg, we deplore that so many minds should err and suffer in this manner, through a misapprehension of the meaning and authority of Scripture. But it would have been well, we think, if our author had stopped to inquire, whether any other instructor has been found to elevate the human mind to just and ennobling conceptions of duty, and of the Supreme Being, at all on the same scale with the Bible. The *uses* of the Bible were a part of his subject, as well as its *abuses*. What it has done, no less than what it has failed to do. Well would it have been, we think, if he had borne more steadily in mind, that the issue natural to his labours is to destroy the wheat with the chaff—to burn up the precious grain along with the thorn and the briar. This being in imagination done, it would have been no more than consistent in a philosophical inquirer

if he had been careful to urge—indeed to *iterate* the question—*what next?* The wise man does not create a vacuum without foreseeing, with something like certainty, how it will be filled. In this case, what is there to make its appearance that has not already been? That reign of Naturalism, which Mr. Greg so earnestly covets, we see—see in its nature and its fruits—in the popular religions of all mankind, where there is not the direct or indirect influence of revelation. With nothing beyond that same system to act upon the condition of humanity, and with the same humanity to be acted upon by it, what may we, with the least reason, expect, but the old result over again? It is not the purer morality, and the purer theism, possessed by Mr. Greg, and for which he is mainly indebted to Christian influences, affecting him in a thousand ways through the past, that is to be placed on the one side, and all the misconceptions of truth and duty, and the mischiefs of them among professing Christians, on the other. The comparison does not lie there. Naturalism never made a community of men like Mr. Greg. The comparison to be made in this case is between humanity at large, under the incoming of the old heathenism, the worship of nature, with only slight modifications; and humanity at large, as we now see it, under the influence, more or less, of a scriptural authority. The man who could expect the general state of things produced by Naturalism to be better than the general state of things produced by Christianity, even in its least perfect form, must be a man past reasoning with. The short-comings and perversions of Naturalism, as affecting men generally, must be put side by side with those imputed to Revelation. It will then be seen, that if the latter has left its thousands unhealed and deluded, the former has left its tens of thousands in that condition. If all that can be said against the actual Christianity of our own time, or of past times, is to be raked together after this manner, then the same should be done in reference to the religions of the earth to which man has given existence apart from Christianity. Men have always possessed Mr. Greg's Naturalism. The natural bible, which our author so much values, has been ever with them. Its pages have ever been before them—in the open heavens, and the broad earth; or rather, their own spirits have been it. And what has been the result? Let that Augean stable—the history of paganism, ancient and modern—answer. It follows, accordingly, that if the Bible of the Christian is to be discarded because it is not better secured against misinterpretation and misapplication, the Bible of the Naturalist should be disowned with still greater emphasis, inasmuch as that has been far less secure against such false readings and bad uses.

We find it as a fact in history, that wherever the Bible of the Christian is *most* in the hands of the people, men rise proportionately in everything intellectual, moral, and spiritual. Is not this very strange, if the *characteristic* tendencies of the book be such as Mr. Greg attributes to it? The inverse of this, upon our author's theory, should come before us. Christian nations should be less wise, less pure, than the nations which have not had the depressing tendencies, the heavy drawbacks of Christianity to contend against. Protestant communities, as being fully exposed to the denaturalizing and depraving influences of the Scriptures, should fall far below catholic communities, where—in harmony with Mr. Greg's principle—the greatest care is taken to save the people from the many mischiefs to be expected from a free access to our sacred records. In short, Mr. Greg's doctrine would seem to be—the farther from the Bible, the nearer to all good. It is manifest, however, that facts and theory in this case are stubbornly at issue; and we suppose our author will hardly be prepared to say, with the complacent Frenchman—'so much the worse for the facts.' The truth is, Mr. Greg, like many more, has allowed his mind to become so occupied with the evils mixed up exceptionally with revealed truth in the world, as to have failed to appreciate its broad and potent influences for good on the human spirit generally. When our author shall have demonstrated that the laws of nature ought not to be accounted as authorities, seeing that men cannot be secured against bringing the morbid elements of their being to their readings of them, it will be time enough to insist that the lessons of revelation should be little heeded, seeing there are disturbing forces which in a measure prevent men from reading even those lessons correctly. Christianity does not affect to perfect, but simply to *amend* the condition of humanity, at least in so far as our condition in this world is concerned.

Mr. Greg, indeed, flatters himself that when the claims of the Bible to anything supernatural shall have been annihilated, and when even the common people shall have learnt to regard that volume much as it is now regarded by himself and his philosophical friends, the authority of the book, even for the poor, will be all that it is desirable it should be. His words are these—

'The more religion can be shown to consist in the realization of great moral and spiritual truths, rather than in the reception of distinct dogmas, the more the position of these classes is altered for the better. In no respect is it altered for the worst. Their creeds, that is, their collection of dogmas; those who do not or cannot think for themselves, must always take on the authority of others. They do so

now—they have always done so. They have hitherto believed certain doctrines, because wise and good men assure them that these doctrines were revealed by Christ, and that Christ was a teacher sent from God. They will in future believe them, because wise and good men assure them of their truth, and their own hearts confirm the assurance. The only difference lies in this—that in the one case, the authority on which they lean vouches for the truth; in the other, for the teacher who proclaimed it.

‘Moreover, the Bible still remains, though no longer as an inspired and infallible record. Though not the Word of God, it contains the words of the wisest, the most excellent, the most devout men, who have ever held communion with Him. The poor, the ignorant, the busy, need not and will not read it critically. To each of them it will still through all time present the Gospels and the Psalms,—the glorious purity of Jesus, the sublime piety of David and of Job. Those who read it for its spirit, not for its dogmas—as the poor, the ignorant, the busy, *if unperverted*, will do—will still find in it all that is necessary for their guidance in life, and their consolation in sorrow, for their rule of duty and their trust in God.’—pp. 241, 242.

That is, our plain people will come under much more wholesome influences from the Bible, than at present, when they learn to regard it as being only in a small part true, and in the greater part false—nothing being easier than that they should imagine for themselves, by the aid of the Gospels, a far better and a far more trustworthy Christ than the Evangelists have given them; and digest for themselves a far better and more trustworthy Old Testament than has come to them from the hands of Moses and the Prophets! Talk of credulity—the credulity which can swallow that, can swallow anything. But Mr. Greg, with the inconsistency not unnatural to a man who, while snared in a fallacy, is still a man of some breadth of view, and some honesty of purpose, corrects himself on this point. In a note to his preface, he says—

‘All who have come into contact with the minds of the uneducated classes are fully aware how unfitted to their mental condition are the more wide Catholic and comprehensive views of religion which yet we hold to be the true ones, and how essential it is to them to have a well-defined, positive, somewhat dogmatic, and above all, a divinely attested and *authoritative* creed, deriving its sanctions from without.’

It is even so. It is because what Mr. Greg calls the ‘dogmas’ of the Bible have come to men in a ‘divinely attested and *authoritative*’ form, that they have come with so much power. But our author seems to overlook the fact, that the advantage peculiar to the dogmas of revelation, as coming to us thus attested, belongs in an equal degree to its ‘moral and spiritual truths.’ These

truths, no less than the dogmas which are of such small account with Mr. Greg, have had their special weight from this source; and it remains to be shown that they would have been all that they are in history, without such speciality. If, moreover, it be a fact, that the 'uneducated classes'—that is, the bulk of mankind in all lands and in all time—must have 'a well-defined, positive, somewhat dogmatic creed, deriving its sanctions from without,' is it probable, we ask, that the one form of communication to mankind, admitted to be the only one by which the great majority of them can ever be affected religiously, is just the one form which the Divine Being has been especially careful not to adopt, having restricted Himself, on the contrary, to the mode of teaching simply by natural laws, which laws, the philosophical only, and very few even among them, are found capable of interpreting to any certain and wholesome moral purpose. What is this but in effect to say, that the Creator has been careful not to address His creatures in the way *most* adapted to make them religious, and to speak to them in that way only which is *least* adapted to such ends. The plan of proceeding, which it is confessed would have been the most efficient, is rejected; that the plan which must of necessity be the least efficient, may be all in all. Capacity implies object. Want, in God's creatures, when at all wide-spread, supposes the existence of provision for it somewhere. But here the capacity exists, and the object is withholden. The want is real, but the supply is left to come in the shape of a fraud. We must be excused if we suspect the lights of being false which would lead us into such quagmires.

Our author supposes that his being a layman has been of some advantage to him in prosecuting an inquiry of this nature. Ministers of religion of all descriptions he regards as committed men, ever in danger of looking to consequences, so as to become in a great degree proof against evidence. We are not such novices in the study of human motives as to say there is no ground for such an insinuation. But in the case of not a few of this class, we see men who were once of the laity, and who have become ministers from choice—from conviction. It is no more than candid to suppose, that the conviction which disposed these men to become ministers, is the feeling which sustains them as such. If men of power, they can rarely be ministers for the sake of the pelf. It may be that they remain what they are from a conviction which has only deepened with years, as the natural result of the kind of reading, and the kind of thought, proper to men in such a vocation. On the other hand, your layman giving himself it may be with little breadth or system, and only through fragments of time, to such investigations, is in danger of being led astray by false

guides. Here, as elsewhere, inexperience commonly takes its penalties along with it. Long exploded errors may be mistaken for startling truths. What is new to himself, our lay brother may conclude must be new to all the world. He may straightway be filled with a passion for authorship; and a volume which is to revolutionize a continent—half the globe—may turn out to be, as to its substance, a very old-fashioned and harmless affair. Some proofs as to the possibility of all this have come before us very recently. In fact, nothing can well be more wearisome than the iteration of common-place and often-answered objections, which, mainly from this cause, are now daily pressed on our attention. There is a class of men who *ought* to understand these subjects better than other men, and, in general, they *do* so understand them. For ourselves, the longer we live, the more are we satisfied that the creeds of men come less from their heads than from their hearts. Now it belongs to the ministers of religion—if men at all in sympathy with their office—to become familiar with the moral and emotional wants of humanity in a degree peculiar to themselves. They see the needs of human nature in these respects as other men do not see them. They should know, accordingly, how to judge concerning the nature of the solace and hope necessary to the rest of the human spirit, as other men may not judge of them. The probabilities, in consequence, as to a truthful issue in reference to such speculations, are not all on the side of the layman; there are others fully as weighty which lie on the contrary side, and, in the average of cases, it is not easy to say what the turn of the scale in this respect may be.

Towards the conclusion of his preface, Mr. Greg presents a vivid picture of the suffering through which some minds are said to pass in giving up their traditional—that is, their Christian—prepossessions, in favour of a more philosophical creed. More than one description of this sort has been given to the public of late; and we not unfrequently hear in private of the martyrdom said to be endured in this shape by some of the most virtuous thinkers of our age. Now, we do not mean to say that there are not minds which suffer somewhat in the way described—minds which surrender their early faith, such as it was, with a measure of sincere and painful reluctance. But, to judge wisely in such cases, we must not only look on what is involved in the relinquishment of the old, but on what goes along with the adoption of the new. The pain of the former act may be greatly outweighed by the pleasure of the latter; and the whole process, accordingly, while highly belauded for the spirit of self-sacrifice supposed to pervade it, may be little else, after all, than the result of a subtle selfishness. The affections which cluster about the bygone, however real, may

be feeble, compared with the passions which soar towards objects which are higher and in advance. The pleasures of memory may be sweet, but the pleasures of anticipation may be sweeter. Affections which have respect to the past may be wounded, may become the seat of much suffering; but the pride of the present,\* which masters them, may be stronger than they—more pleasant to the soul, more beloved than they. There may be regrets, and something more, in separating from an old faith and old fellowships; but there may be the contrary of regret, and something more, in the embracing of a new faith, and in the formation of new fellowships. To cease to believe with the many, may be to feel that we are no longer lost in the common herd; while to believe with the few, may be to rise in imagination to a level to which the few only can attain. If the external authority and the external certainty of a special revelation are gone, it is, it may be, that a high stoic self-reliance may come into its place. The Bible is no more; but it is that the man may be a Bible to himself. Priest-hoods are at an end, but it is that the emancipated thinker may be his own priest. Temples are ignored, but it is that the one place for worship may be the temple not made with hands. Is there nothing fascinating to the towering thought and strong passion of the human spirit in all this? Is not this to be as a god, not only *knowing* good and evil, but capable of *making* them at pleasure? Deep in the soul of some men is the loathing of dependence and restraint from any voluntary agency beyond their own; and almost any price would they pay to be thus free from all such subjection. The heart of man, as truly as the physical universe, abhors a vacuum; and whenever Christianity is given up—given up it may be with some pain, it is, we suspect, because something more welcome is seen to be ready to come into its place. On the whole, our sympathy with the class of persons who place themselves before us in the interesting situation of the martyr in this respect, is not quite so fervent, nor quite so indiscriminate as the sufferers themselves appear to expect. In certain cases, we think we see in these brilliant examples of sanctity, not only something like a *willingness* to go wrong, but effort—even desperate effort—made in that direction. No man familiar with this department of literature can read Mr. Greg's publication, marking the character of the book he cites, and from which he has taken his material, and the manifest bias with which he looks at evidence through his whole argument, without feeling that it is,—must be, thoroughly agreeable to him, upon the whole, that he should be the pure Naturalist he has become.

We have said thus much on these preliminary topics on account of the slight and unsatisfactory manner in which Mr. Greg has

touched upon them, and because they are topics which meet us at the threshold of his argument. The main purpose of his treatise is thus stated by the author:—

- ‘The three conclusions which I have chiefly endeavoured to make clear, are these—that the tenet of the inspiration of the Scriptures is baseless and untenable under any form or modification which leaves to it a dogmatic value; that the Gospels are not virtually faithful records of the sayings and actions of Jesus, but ascribe to him words which he never uttered, and deeds which he never did; and that the apostles only partially comprehended and imperfectly transmitted, the teaching of their Great Master. The establishment of these points is the contribution to the progress of religious science which I have attempted to render.’—*Preface*, pp. 8, 9.

The first question here, then, is that of Inspiration. According to Mr. Greg, the common doctrine on this subject is ‘baseless and untenable, under any form or modification which leaves to it a dogmatic value.’ We often find it intimated that this doctrine is about to become the subject of a perilous controversy in this country. Some able men advert to it in a way which seems to indicate that they think the whole question needs to be examined anew; that the commonly received notions in relation to it cannot be final; that a testing time must come, and will probably come soon; and that the consequence may be a change of religious opinions among us at present little anticipated. Younger men have taken up this note, and in significant hints suggest their foresight of a storm which will unsettle much that *is*, before settling the things that *shall be*. Judging from what we see and hear, we should suppose that our Christian communities are living as on the verge of a volcano:—that nothing but the tenderest forbearance on the part of their opponents can explain the fact of their having so long existed as they now do; that to put an end to their hereditary dreams, and to cause the Bible to become to them quite another book than they have hitherto supposed, it is only necessary that proper measures should be taken to lay bare the traditional fictions on which the doctrine of Inspiration rests, and with that doctrine to sweep away a host of follies naturally allied with it. The insinuation is, that the evidence in favour of this doctrine is the most slender and unsatisfactory imaginable—while the arguments opposed to it are of the most formidable description. There is policy in this method. It is easier to suggest or to assume than to reason; and, in many cases, more is done by the former processes than by the last. But for ourselves, we must be allowed to say, that we should loathe existence on the terms supposed; and, next to the self-reproach we should feel in such a case, is the pity we feel for those



who would have us believe that they *could* do so much to free us from the thralldom of our prejudices, but who are wanting in the courage, or in the regard for truth, that should prompt them so to acquit themselves towards us. Gentlemen, we do not covet your forbearance—we simply pray you to be honest—to do your duty. If we are not greatly deceived we know where we stand; and we feel bound to say, that we should be very sorry had we no better reasons to assign in favour of the Inspiration of the Scriptures, than those we often find urged as warranting doubt on that subject; for we have often felt amazed as we have thought on the weight of the doctrine on the one side, and on the lightness of the notions which have sufficed to make some men sceptical concerning it on the other. Mr. Greg is no craven on this subject; he has his convictions, and he gives them to the world, along with his reasons for believing as he does. Our business is with these reasons.

In the first paragraph of this treatise, where some effort is made to give this common doctrine clearly, we meet with a considerable mixture of misconception and confusion—such as certainly does not promise well for the issue of the investigation which is to follow. Persons who believe in the doctrine of the Plenary Inspiration of the holy Scriptures do not say that ‘*every* dogma of religion, *every* idea of Deity, *every* conception of Deity, therein asserted, came from God, in the natural and unequivocal sense of ‘the expression.’ What they say is, that all doctrines, duties, and facts set forth in Scripture *on the proper authority of the sacred writers*, should be received as truth—truth secured as such by a divine influence. But on this matter we shall say more in another place. The italics in the above quotation are ours.

Mr. Greg reduces the argument on which the inspiration of the Old Testament is supposed to rest to five heads. The first of these is—‘that these books were received as sacred, authoritative and inspired writings by the Jews themselves.’ One fallacy in our author’s reasoning in this connexion, consists in his assuming, that to make it appear that the evidence from this fact is not so decisive as to supersede the necessity of any further evidence, will be to show that as evidence it must be wholly without value. His notion seems to be—and it is a common one with writers of his class—that in relation to a biblical question, each section of your evidence must be so complete as to be in itself everything, or it is nothing. Some of our readers will account this strange reasoning, but to such effect precisely *is* the reasoning of our author.

Another fallacy here takes this form—the Jews rejected the man as an impostor, whom their own Scriptures had delineated

as the Messiah. Having erred so memorably on that point, the inference deduced is, that there is no point on which the judgment of such a people should be of any weight. But does Mr. Greg reason after this manner in other cases? When a nation has erred, according to his view, in one of its judgments, does he straightway conclude that all the judgments of that nation must be of no sort of worth or authority? When an individual so errs, does he deduce this general inference then? If so, where is the individual, where the nation, that has not so erred, and in so doing become in all things erratic? Had the Jews been as decisive in the rejection of the doctrine of Inspiration as they were in the assertion of it, would Mr. Greg have treated their testimony as without value in that case? Anything but that. Indeed, Mr. Greg has been careful to make the very most of the fact, that the Jewish notion of Inspiration was not precisely that most common among Christians. The determination of our author manifestly is, that the opinion of the Jew shall be of no weight, in so far as it is in favour of the doctrine of Inspiration; but that it shall be husbanded, even to the last grain, in so far as it can be shown to be at all at variance with modern notions on that subject. The Jews regarded the books of Moses as being more fully inspired than the later books of the Old Testament, and believed that men not included in the list of the canonical writers were sometimes under such influences. Now this theory of degrees in Inspiration, is interpreted as fatal to the entire doctrine; it being clear, we are told, that there can be no degrees in infallibility. But did it never occur to Mr. Greg to ask himself, whether a lower degree of Inspiration might not be as accurate—as truly infallible, for the lower purposes intended by it, as a higher? Did the thought never occur to him, that the fuller Inspiration adverted to might have had respect to a *fuller* presentation of truth, and not at all to a more trustworthy, a more *correct* presentation of it?

We admit at once, that it should by no means be supposed that the opinion of the Jews as to the Inspiration of their own Scriptures is of itself sufficient to prove the reality of that Inspiration. But we maintain, on the other hand, no less distinctly, that to do as Mr. Greg has done—to say, in effect, that the authority of the Jew in relation to this question is of no value, because it is not of itself sufficient to place it for ever at rest; and then, in the face of such reasoning, to accept of this authority most scrupulously when supposed to be in favour of our author's theory, and to reject it as scrupulously when found to be against that theory—this, we think, is a course of proceeding not exactly consonant with sound logic or gentlemanly fairness.

The second ground for the popular belief in the Inspiration of the Jewish Scriptures adduced by Mr. Greg is, 'That they repeatedly and habitually represent themselves as dictated by God, and as containing his *ipsissima verba*.' This our author meets simply by saying it is not true: the prophets do not make that claim, and if they did, it would be of no value. Now we admit that the Old Testament writers do not claim, except in a few rare instances, that the very words they use, as well as the substance of what is conveyed by them, should be received as from the Lord. But while we regard the phrase, 'the word of the Lord,' as used, according to a very common figure of speech, in reference mainly to the message delivered, and with little or no reference to the language in which it is communicated, we demur strongly to the conclusion that the prophets are not to be regarded as speaking by Inspiration at all, because the Old Testament Scriptures do not anywhere set forth this doctrine precisely as Mr. Greg thinks it should have been if it were true—viz., by saying, in so many words, 'that they are, *as a whole*, dictated by God.' The question with us is—Do these men claim to be *God-directed teachers of their fellows*? We care little about the *form of words* in which this claim is made. Do they so speak that men would naturally understand them as claiming to be *divinely guided*, so as to be *the teachers of pure truth*? That they do thus speak, is, as we hope to show, so clear, that the man who shall question it, may be said to be a man past reasoning with. Whatever may have been the precise nature of the influence under which these men delivered themselves, it is plain that it was in effect such, that they expected their message to be received as being in its substance from God, and not from man merely. It is nothing better than a quibble, in our judgment, to allege that they should not be understood as speaking to us with the authority of Inspiration at all, except as they are careful to assure us on all occasions that it is under this influence they have spoken. This would be to expect these gifted men to employ themselves in guarding against weaknesses of conception into which even the weakest could scarcely have fallen. The prophetic spirit is a burthened spirit—it is not in its nature that it should be diverted from its object by attempts to anticipate objections of so captious and frivolous a description.

But Mr. Greg assures us that no form of words in which this claim should be made by the writers of the Old Testament would be with him of any value. That must be proved 'from independent sources,' and, so proved, all profession of their own on the subject 'becomes superfluous.' Now, we admit that no assertion of their own, if taken alone, would be sufficient to establish such a claim. But here Mr. Greg falls into the fallacy

which pervades his whole argument—viz. that of supposing that there is no such thing as cumulative evidence. He does not see—or at least does not seem to see—the difference between *evidence* and *proof*. Evidence, with him, must be demonstrative, or it is nothing. He disdains the service of any fact, which does not do, in relation to his object, all that needs to be done. But in a series of facts the evidence supplied may be various, both in kind and degree, and it by no means follows, because the evidence of no one fact taken separately is decisive, that the evidence from the whole, taken conjointly, may not so be. The aim of our author is to reduce the evidence supplied by each fact in his series to the smallest possible amount, and then he glides quickly to the conclusion, that as the parts, taken as such, are insufficient, so the whole, taken as such, must be insufficient. But do men ever deal with evidence after this manner in a court of law? Would Mr. Greg, to use his own language, reason thus ‘on any other than a biblical question?’ We may admit that even the ‘cumulative’ evidence on this topic does not amount to demonstration—does not become such as to leave no virtue to believing, by reducing it to a necessity. But this is no more than may be said of all moral reasoning. The Supreme Ruler has left to us room enough to call up ‘historic doubts,’ and metaphysic doubts to boot, if it should be our pleasure to live much in such company.

The third argument in favour of the inspiration of the Jewish Scriptures mentioned and rejected by Mr. Greg, is, ‘that their contents proclaim their origin and parentage, as displaying a ‘purer morality, a loftier religion, and altogether a holier tone, than the unassisted, uninspired human faculties could, at that period, have attained.’ On this statement our author does not attempt to reason, he contents himself with assertion, and his assertion is, that while many parts of these writings ‘contain ‘views of Duty, of God, of Man’s relation to Him, which are ‘among the purest and loftiest that the human intellect can ‘grasp’—the contents of the volume, taken as a whole, present ‘the most fatal argument against its inspiration *as a whole*.’ The portions of the Old Testament, both theological and moral, to which exception is taken, are described by Mr. Greg as having ‘long been the opprobrium of orthodoxy and the despair of ‘theologians.’ But we think we may fairly turn the scale here, and describe those portions of the Hebrew Scriptures, in relation to such subjects, to which exception *cannot* be taken, as having ‘long been the opprobrium of the Sceptic, and the despair of the ‘Naturalist.’ For pitiable have been the attempts made to account, on merely natural principles, for the origin of the noble

views—‘of Duty, of God, and of Man’s relation to Him’—which we there find. Strange that, placed as in the midst of the nations, and open to incursions from the strong on every hand, this comparatively feeble people should be seen perpetuating themselves in a state of separateness from all around them, and, so far as regards their views concerning the nature and object of religion, as rising above all. Strange—passing strange—that a people who fell, in nearly all respects, so far below the great nations of antiquity with whom they were contemporary, should be found thus transcending them all, not only in the ancientness of their records, but in the moral and religious intelligence so prominent in those records. Mr. Greg’s attempt to deal with this inconvenient fact does not occur in the connexion of his argument now under consideration, but in a subsequent chapter; and on reading that chapter we feel bound to say, that we find little in it that can be placed to the credit of his intelligence or his candour.

Mr. Greg’s theory is, that the views of the Divine Nature in the earlier Hebrew Scriptures are often anthropomorphic and unworthy : that the Hebrew conceptions of the Supreme Being present nothing more than the natural and gradual development of ideas on that subject; and that for a long interval the professed worshippers of the God of the Old Testament were not even Monotheists. Their topics present a wide field, and go far into the question of inspiration—of course we can touch on them but briefly.

It is admitted that the Divine communications made to Adam, to Abraham, and others, are said to have been made by one who speaks in human language and with the human voice; by one who sometimes manifests himself under a human appearance; who condescends to be reasoned with by men; who changes his purpose in answer to prayer; is angry, and becomes placable through such influence; and who, in short, is subject to processes of thought, and fluctuating passions, in common with ourselves. Now no intelligent man can doubt that in all this there is a wide divergence from the literal truth : but the point to be determined is, whether such modes of communication, in such circumstances, may not have possessed a fitness to convey a large—we may say, the largest possible—amount of real truth. If not the best in itself, may it not have been the best for the time, and for the people whom it chiefly concerned? Mr. Greg does not need to be reminded, that our most advanced conceptions of the Divine Nature can be nothing more than approximations towards the truth—and, in the case even of the most gifted, must be very faint approximations at the best. It would be a dark day with us, if

God did not know how to bear with the weakness of us all much better than we know how to bear with the weakness of each other. One great requisite to the successful study of Old Testament theology is a humane temper; and the next great want is, a cultured imagination—such as may enable us to place ourselves truly in the circumstances of those ancients. We have often observed, that the men who have taken the most hostile ground on this subject have been, for the most part, signally wanting in such qualities. They have been much too subjective to excel either as historians or philosophers. With much boasting about large and free thought, their besetting sin has been narrowness.

The view present to the mind of Abraham or Jacob of the world we live in, was not exactly that of Strabo or Columbus. Nor was the universe, to their perceptions, what it has since become to Newton and La Place. The world, as known to the men of that time, was a narrow territory; and even the remotest stars were but as neighbour lamps set up to do them service. As earth and heaven to them were by no means what they are to us, so their views concerning the Maker of them both might naturally be very different from our own. Nor will it avail to say, that our metaphysical conception of Deity should be quite independent of physics,—inasmuch as history shows it to have been a law of man's nature that he should climb by the seen towards the unseen. The following passage, bearing on this point, from a publication which is not so well known as it deserves to be, is as true in the main as it is beautiful.

‘We look on a gross anthropomorphism as an error of the rudest times, yet there seems to have been a condition of the mind below even this, and where the object of worship could not so much as boast similitude to a human being. The barbarian has looked upon a stone—an uncouth figure representing nothing, a misshapen block—as the source from which his good and ill fortune were to be derived. Religion, at this stage, appears little more than a strange blunder of physics. But the analogy between a human being and the supernatural power, whose interference was sought or deprecated, could not be long absent. The idol assumed more decidedly and uniformly the figure of man. Amidst propitiatory gifts and sacrifices, and absurd ceremonies, the idea grew—promoted by the fears of the criminal, and the expectations of virtue, and the general love of justice, and the policy of states, and the reason and interest of all men—that *moral conduct* was the surest means of obtaining the favour of these supernatural rulers of human destiny, to whom was committed in an especial manner the care of unrewarded goodness and unpunished crime. Meanwhile, poets liberated the god from its stationary wood or stone, and, refashioning its limbs, peopled the air and the earth with

divinities. Philosophers either added to the confusion, as in Egypt, by putting forth dark enigmas of their own under the forms of popular idolatry; or else rising, as in Greece, entirely above the superstition of their countrymen, smiled at the populace of gods, and taught whatever reason could prove, or could admit, of the Divine nature. Their disciples were few; their faith was construed an infidelity.'

'If the pagan theology had not retired before the irresistible power of Christianity,—which it did, however, slowly and with manifest reluctance, and after having existed for a time, in its spirit at least, under new forms, assumed from the new religion,—it must have surrendered, with all its gods and goddesses, at the approach of modern science. Astronomy alone would have sufficed for its overthrow. The material universe it discloses requires other and greater gods; and a race of divinities who sojourned on this earth, who haunted its shady recesses, and tenanted its lofty mountains, must have ceased to be the objects of worship when surrounded by that enlarged and magnificent scene of creation which is now familiar to the minds, almost to the senses, of all men. The gods of paganism could not have occupied this new creation: there is no place for them in the universe according to Newton.

'It is worth while to observe that science, by transforming the very habitation in which we dwell, has rendered impossible that play of fancy, that anthropomorphism, which in the old world was so predominant. What we have of this kind is traditional, not native to our times. To us—in whom the first deceptive impression of the senses has been corrected, almost as soon as we could think, by knowledge it cost ages to acquire, and other ages to extend and circulate—to us, it is a curious and distinct effort of the imagination to conceive what manner of world this was to its earlier inhabitants. They lived—at least the multitude, and the multitude are in this matter everything—in a very straitened, circumscribed creation—a flat and stationary earth, arched over by the sky as by its natural roof. In this miniature of nature the human form was great. A God was invested in it without thought of violation to his dignity, and men assigned him for habitation a region just beyond the clouds, or else the waste and inaccessible places of their own world—the air, and the ocean, and tops of mountains, and caverns in the rock. The humanized divinity had a fit location, and could be supported in the imagination without much incongruity. But what if such forms had continued to exist till Science had worked her great transformation? When astronomy had dislodged the rounded world from its rest at the centre of all things, and sent it to revolve on its wide circuit, one only of a multitude of similar and far-scattered globes,—when that arch which so securely overbuilt it had expanded into a limitless vacancy, and left the earth diminished, and alone, and far from the gates of heaven—what place, what function, would have remained to the astonished gods of Olympus? Had they survived till our day of science, they must then have vanished like a dream. The popular imagination is gone for ever that

conducted the chariot-wheel of god or goddess over the blue firmament—there is no road for the horses of the sun—earth and heaven are no longer neighbour territories—and the clouds in our atmosphere can never again give support to ethereal messenger journeying to and from the celestial confines. The world is disenchanted for the abode of these fairy gods—the high mountain has sunk from its imposing, because heaven-reaching altitude—the throne of Jupiter is reversed for ever!’—*A Discourse on Ethics, by W. Smith, Esq.*

We are far from thinking, with the able writer just cited, that there is a power in modern science, or in modern civilization generally, sufficient of itself to preclude a return of the nations of the world to idol-worship. That worship, we believe, will never return in its old form; but, as we have before intimated, in the absence of Christianity we see not what is to prevent the return of its substance under forms only slightly altered. We see every day, that there is much in modern science which disposes men to halt in the forces and laws of nature, without looking higher; and if such were once to become the cast of thought with the multitude, the next step would be to demand emblematic representations of those forces; and the next, to bow down to such emblems, and to worship them. In this manner originated that worship of the elemental powers, and those gods in monstrous form representing them, which once covered the Eastern world, and which perpetuates itself so largely to *this day* beyond the Indus. The pantheistic doctrines now so openly avowed in some of our schools of philosophy, all incline towards such an issue. When nature becomes God, the worship of nature ceases to be idolatry, and becomes simply rational. It should be remembered, too, that some of our German friends have proceeded so far as to assure us that no higher worship is now left to humanity than the worship of genius; and that some among ourselves, who might have found wiser employment, have given themselves to elaborate exposition of this doctrine, under the name of ‘hero-worship.’ We must confess that we see in these signs of the times such a confluence of agencies tending towards a new deification of nature, that a return to idolatry, and to a strongly anthropomorphic form of it, would be, in our view, only a natural result from such causes, if left to their full force, without any check from Christianity. In such case, the great powers of nature, and the great men of the world, would soon come to be as gods; and worship in this form, as in every other, would be sure to call forth its temples, its ceremonies, its festivals, and its priesthoods.

But if the anthropomorphic character of the objects of worship in the ancient world may be traced, in the manner explained, to



the childlike ignorance of the physical universe then universal, assuredly the same cause must have been even more potent in the case of the patriarchs and the early Hebrews, and should be allowed to secure for them a large amount of favourable judgment at our hands. The being who permitted the state of ignorance and weakness, in which this tendency to humanize the objects of worship is inevitable, might surely condescend, without any loss of consistency or dignity, to adapt himself in some measure to it. The mystery with us is, not that the Supreme Being should so have done, but that his creatures should ever have been found in a condition to need his so doing. Hitherto, Naturalism has met this difficulty in no other way than by giving to the peoples of the earth the rabble of humanized divinities they are known to have worshipped. To our mind, the wonder is, not that the Creator, in his earlier converse with men, should so far have descended to human weakness as to have allowed his servants to think of him in forms of thought so much borrowed from the human—but rather, that there should be found running parallel with all these acts of condescension to human infirmity, so many announcements of the spirituality and greatness of his nature, of a kind adapted, not only to correct, almost of necessity, any undue anthropomorphic tendency in the mind of his worshippers, but to anticipate so largely that brighter light, which, in the fulness of time, was to come upon our race.

The texts in which the human form is attributed to the Deity are sufficiently guarded against misinterpretation by the fact, that it was made to be a deadly sin for any man to worship Jehovah under any similitude whatever. This is a foremost provision in the Decalogue itself,—‘Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of anything that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the waters under the earth: thou shalt not bow down thyself to them, nor serve them: for I the Lord thy God am a jealous God.’—(Ex. xx. 4.) And in Deut. iv. 15, the people are told that care had been taken, in the delivery of the law from the Mount, that there should be ‘no manner of similitude’ seen by them, lest they should have been tempted to fasten upon the human likeness, or some other likeness, through which to offer their worship. Look round now upon the nations in those days, and where do you find the idea of the human, or of materiality in any form, precluded from the mind of the worshipper, in reference to the object of his worship, as in these passages? In what manner could it have been more explicitly taught, that in all the instances in which the Divine Being had appeared under a human form in the earlier history of the world, that form had been an appearance only, assumed

for the time then present, and that nothing was to be further from the mind of the Hebrew, than the thought of the Divine Nature as really existing under any such resemblance? Had this been allowable, then the human likeness might have been innocently, and even laudably resorted to; and the Jehovah of the Hebrews would no doubt have been multiplied in images to as great an extent as the Osiris of the Egyptians, or the Jupiter of the Greeks. But what a contrast, on this point, between this nation and those—between this nation and all the nations of those times! ‘In the beginning, God created the heavens and the earth,’—matter, therefore, is not from everlasting—God only is eternal. He himself is not matter—he is the maker of it. He must not be confounded with the material, for he is before it. His name, accordingly, is, ‘I am’—the Self-existing One, of whose mysterious being all we can know is—*that it is*. The heavens are his—the hosts of them marshalled by his hand. The nations of the earth are all of him, dependent upon him, and have their allotments from him. ‘He is a rock, his work is perfect, a God of truth, and without iniquity, just and right is he.’ Men who contemplated the Divine Nature under such aspects, were surely in little danger of losing sight of the divine in the human to any very injurious extent.

We say, not to any ‘very injurious extent,’ because, among men, some elevation of the human into the place of the divine is indispensable to all thought of God that can be of any practical worth. The theological school in which Mr. Greg has received his training, is a school distinguished by the zeal with which it asserts the trustworthiness of our moral nature, insisting that the moral character of the Deity himself *must* be such as our own nature assures us it *ought* to be. Truth, justice, goodness—all these in God, must be strictly the same with the virtues we designate by those terms among men. It is also a favourite doctrine with some of the leaders in this school, that the power with which men perceive moral distinctions is not the power of the understanding, but the power of the soul; that is—if the language has any meaning—our knowledge on moral and spiritual subjects comes to us through our emotional, more than through our intellectual nature. It is not so much rational as instinctive. The men of this school are ever telling us, that they believe in the great truths of religion, not because they can *prove* them to be truths, but because *they feel* them to be such. It is what *they feel as men* that enables them to apprehend all they *know* of God *as God*. Their knowledge of the divine, accordingly, is at best only a higher knowledge of the human. They find in themselves everything that can be supposed to be in God, only subject

to certain limitations, and to a certain imperfection or faultiness, said to be naturally attendant on such limitations. Even more, while to attribute emotion in any sense to the Divine Nature is condemned as a kind of blasphemy, it is nevertheless, according to this doctrine, to the emotional nature of man that we must, in fact, be indebted for all we can know of the moral nature of God.\* But if this be the point from which divine truth is contemplated, and the only point from which it becomes an object of perception and faith with such men as Mr. Greg, Professor Newman, and the Rev. James Martineau, is it for these gentlemen to put scorn on the earlier generations of the Hebrew people, because, in the depth of their rudeness, they sometimes attribute more of human affection to the Divine Nature than the abstract verdict of the understanding would justify? Supposing it to be so—that it is the heart, the seat of the affections, that gives to us all our moral truth—is it to be wondered at, is it not rather to be expected as unavoidable, that men, especially the less intellectual portion of them, should transfer much of the affection proper to man to the nature of God? In this view, such conceptions of the Divine Nature seem to result from some of the most refined speculations of philosophy as truly and as naturally as from the experiences and feelings of common life. It is, in this respect, as we might expect it to be. The difference between the old Hebrew and his modern censor, is more a difference of mode and degree than of anything more radical. If the God of the Hebrew was often, to his imagination, only a higher form of manhood, the same may be said of the God of the Unitarian and the Naturalist in our own day. In both, the objective is the result of the subjective—it is what *Man* is that determines what *God* is.

\* To the range and development and inherent resources of intellect, it is impossible to assign any limit. What it must be in Deity, as the absolute Being, transcends our conception. We compare the Divine mind with ours, that we may have something within the grasp of our reason to dwell upon: but the finite cannot measure the Infinite, and did we not ascribe moral attributes to God which excite our sympathy, and which by implying consciousness and will include the idea of personality, God would be wholly incomprehensible. The Logos bridges over the chasm which separates him from us.—TAYLOR'S *Christian Aspect of Faith and Duty*, p. 71. 'We have faith in the *Moral Perfection of God*. This, indeed, is a plain consequence of our reliance on the natural sentiments of duty. For it is not, we apprehend, by our logical, but by our moral faculty, that we have our knowledge of God; and he who most confides in the instructor will learn the sacred lesson best. That one whom we may call the holiest rules the universe, is no discovery made by the intellect in its excursions, but a revelation found by the conscience on retiring into itself; and though we may reason in defence of this great truth, and these reasonings, when constructed, may look convincing enough, they are not, we conceive, the source, but rather the effect of our belief;—not the forethought which actually precedes and introduces the faith, but the afterthought by which faith seeks to make a friend and an intimate of the understanding.'—*The Five Points of Christian Faith*, by JAMES MARTINEAU.

Within certain limits, it should be thus—must be thus. Our charge against the Naturalist on this point, is not so much a charge of error, as of inconsistency and excess. He does not cede what he claims, nor does he know where to stop. That we should reason upwards from the human to the divine, in all our searches after truth, is a law of our condition. But that men who are ever doing this, after a manner natural to themselves, should affect to be deeply shocked at other men who do the same thing after another manner, a manner no less natural to them, is not exactly as it should be. If the uncultivated Hebrew erred in regarding the Divine Being as influenced by human passion, it is material to remember that the modern speculator is bound to admit, that the Divine conduct towards men, in their moral relations, is strictly such as we might expect to find it if the great Moral Ruler *were really so influenced*. To men in general, he must *be* a nature thus influenced, or he must be regarded as *though* he were thus influenced. When the God of the Pentateuch is described as repenting of what he has done, as changing his purpose, as wrathful, and as coming forth to take vengeance upon offenders, the description may not be acceptable to our taste. Nevertheless, that the Supreme Being should be regarded after some manner of this sort by the multitude in Israel, and by the multitude everywhere—for the multitude everywhere is really the same—has been absolutely necessary, if such minds were to be brought under any truly religious influences. In this respect, it is with us, at this hour, very much as it was with the Hebrew people four thousand years ago.

Mr. Greg would probably admit this, and deplore it. He has taken his own stand upon the old Stoic theory. In his view, the mission of man is to do right, and to bow in all things to the necessities of those physical and moral laws to which he is subject. Nothing remains for him but to go round with the great wheel of destiny. God, to him, is *afar off*,—a great mechanist, who has constructed his machine, and retired to a distance that he may see it go. To expect that he should disturb the action of this great engine, even in its smallest part, for our personal benefit, would be the height of the presumptuous and irrational; to pray to him that he would so do, would be nothing short of impiety. The pressure of an awful fatalism rests upon all things; and if Mr. Greg does not lose all sense of moral evil under the influence of such a creed, it is because his feeling comes in to save him from a result, from which his logic could never save him. In what passes about us, forces—laws—are everywhere;—God is nowhere. It may be instinctive in our nature to cry to him in distress, but he does not answer—he never hearkens.

We may flatter ourselves that prayer itself has been foreseen by him as an influence—a law, and reckoned as such in the first framing of his plans; but it is not so: one of the weakest of dreams is to suppose that it may possibly so have been. Be stronger than the strong, and you may prevail; be weaker, and there is no hope. The crush of his car is upon you. To suppose that the Deity forgives sin, is another of our day-dreams, and a dream pregnant with evil. God *cannot* forgive sin. To ask him so to do is to ask him to deny himself—to insult him—to blaspheme against him to his face. Sin is never forgiven. It is always punished. The offence and the penalty go together, as substance and shadow, by the force of laws that cannot be broken. In so far as retribution is concerned, there is no need of a hereafter. It always takes place here, and to the extent necessary for the purposes of a complete moral government. Men who can look on the consequences of a meditated sin, as they may be expected to come up in this life, and who can then choose the sin and abide the result, may so do. Sin is evil only in the measure in which the retributions of this life depict it as such. There is nothing *known*—nothing *certain* beyond. Surmises, probabilities, are the only lights seen in that direction.

We leave our readers to imagine what the effect of such a creed would be on the moral and religious feeling of the multitude in Canaan in the ancient time, or in Great Britain in our own time. Such, however, is the God presented to us by Mr. Greg, in the place of the God of Moses and Isaiah, of David and Paul. Such is the change for the better, when the creed of the ancient Hebrew is made to give place to that of the modern philosopher. History has shown, that a people whose views of the Divine Nature are more anthropomorphic than a sober understanding would warrant, may nevertheless rise high in moral and religious feeling; but it remains to be seen that it is in the power of such a creed as Mr. Greg would propagate among us to produce any such result. It is not in the nature of man to feel the claims of a God who is not supposed to feel for him. He will himself be careless, as you tell him he is the object of no care. You may preach that the laws about him are of God, but if they press upon him as dumb forces, that have no pity, it is not as preaching from such a text that you will beget devout hearers. Oh! these philosophers!—they have no bowels—nothing of the large heart, nothing of the genial spirit, that belongs to the true prophet. They see not the visions of the prophet. They are among us, but not of us. They discourse about us, but they know us not. Very hermits of Thebais are they, though they move in our most crowded places. They look upon our strongest and noblest

instincts with a cold scorn; and their punishment goes along with them, for they never interpret us aright, they never forecast about us aright. Religion, it is true, is something more than a particular form of selfishness, but it is something other than self-annihilation. We must say to these vain men, that we care very little about an escape from the wheels of the Juggernaut set up by superstition, if it be only that we may fall beneath the wheels of another set up by your philosophy. Let a man preach to us that we have no choice but between these, and we look him in the face, and from our full and strong heart we say—thou LIEST!—there *is*, there *must* be something wiser and better,—our very being is a lie, if such discoursing be not a lie!\*

Immeasurably more easy is it to suppose, that the Bible we have has become ours by inspiration of God, than to suppose that such a Bible as our author would substitute in its place could possibly have had such an origin. We know that the God of the Hebrews gave them command to ask treasure of the Egyptians when leaving that country, and that the people, either

\* We leave our readers to make their own comparison between Mr. Greg's view of man, and of the natural religion possible to him, and the following :—

'It is the first intuition of religion—conferred by Christianity, whose vital dogmas breathe its concentrated essence—that through the soul we have direct access to God, and by a trustful heart, and a submitted will, and a devoted service, may spiritually unite ourselves with Him. The precise relation, indeed, of man's will and agency to the Divine, is one of those mysteries which God has reserved to himself. We gaze upon it with solemn awe, and pass on; for it is inexplicable. All attempts to fathom it, involve the contradictions which rush in on the bewildered understanding, as soon as the finite seeks to grasp the Infinite. Let us be content to recognise, as landmarks in the illimitable field that spreads before us, one or two unquestionable facts that are clearly attested by the inner consciousness and verified by reflection, without presuming to determine the logical connexion between them, or lapsing into sceptical despair because we cannot trace it. We know from the sure witness within, that we *have* a power of voluntarily doing, or forbearing to do, that which presents itself to us, under the circumstances in which we are placed, as morally right or morally wrong—in a religious sense, of allying ourselves with, or opposing ourselves to, the spiritual agency in which we revere the sovereign legislation of the universe. That such acts are properly *our own*—that in performing them we are something more than passive instruments, mechanically set in action by a higher power, is proved to all men practically, beyond the possibility of dispute, by the effects of that inward reaction which produces self-approval in the one case, and self-condemnation or remorse in the other. Here, then, we have one great spiritual fact established—that of individual responsibility. Again, from reason we are equally sure that the results of our choice, whether it has been for or against the moral law, when they fall out of our minds into the vast tide of events which is rolling round us and sweeping past us in the external world, will be taken up by the great restorative processes of universal law, and wrought out by the Supreme Wisdom, from whatever moral influence they originally proceeded, into the unfailing issues of ultimate justice and mercy. Here we recognise another fact, which reason equally forbids us to question—the absolute sovereignty of God. On these two facts, incapable of perfect reconciliation in our limited view, yet each resting on unanswerable evidence of its own, is suspended the great problem of Divine Providence.

'The vital point in the question immediately interesting us now is this—the

under a divine guidance, or in their terror, did so, and thus made some small compensation for the wrong and plunder so long practised on their bondsmen—and is the God of Israel to be disowned for such a reason? We know also that he gave command that the Canaanites should be destroyed—and he has given the same command a thousand times since, sending invasion, captivity, civil discord, famine and pestilence upon peoples in the same low stage of corruptness, sweeping them utterly away, as without mercy—and is he to be no God, because he did that once by his special mandate, which he is ever doing by his general laws? Wherever the same corruptness comes, there the penalty in more or less of these forms is sure to follow—to follow from those fixed laws which are of God—which are as his voice and his hand. It were easy to pass thus over all the often-urged, and as often-answered objections to the inspiration of the Old Testament which Mr. Greg has brought together, and which he has presented, after the manner of his school, as if they were so many new and startling dis-

power of voluntary approximation to God, or voluntary recession from Him, which consciousness testifies we all possess, introduces a new element into the conception of Divine law, which meets the demands of many a devout soul for the consolations of a special Providence. The precise distinction between matter and mind, it may not be possible for us to explain; but this we can see, that they present a different subject to the action of God's Spirit; and that the Divine agency, though pervading the external as well as the mental world, and operating in both under the guidance of wise and benignant law, sustains, from the very nature of spirit, a more intimate relation to the latter than to the former, and in its effects upon it, must be modified by the moral condition of the recipient mind. There may be, therefore, from the mysterious correlation between the Divine and the human spirit involved in the fact of man's free agency, a special adaptation of Divine influences to the moral requirements of each individual case, without its being necessary to suppose that God ever acts arbitrarily, or otherwise than in strict accordance with uniform law. He may treat man in every instance as man, by his own deliberate effort or culpable negligence, has put himself in a condition to be treated; and thus there is a sense in which it may be philosophically true, that God exercises a special providence, every moment that we breathe, over the lives of all of us.' \* \* \* \* 'A good and pious man, in the fulness of his undoubting faith, prays to God for deliverance from the straits of adversity, and implores a blessing on the fruit of his labours. 'Help yourself,' says the scornful philosopher, 'and do not weary Heaven with your unavailing prayers. The means are in your own hands. Use them, and the effect will follow.' True, it will follow, but its productiveness must be in proportion to the energy of the will which prompts it, and the clear foresight which guides it to its destined end. Such is the union and sympathy of the mental with the material world, that a Divine influence streams out from one upon the other, and floods it with a superhuman energy. Men become new creatures, when they work in conscious harmony with God. They detect the secrets of the Omnipresent Spirit, and lay hold of its hidden springs. An inspiration comes over them, whose marvellous effects transcend the dull mechanism of worldly routine, and frustrate the selfish calculations of worldly prudence. History abounds with records of the calm success of men who have lived in the spirit of prayer and the power of faith, and sought no other wisdom than what they found in the prompting of an honest and religious heart.'—TAYLOR'S *Christian Aspects of Faith and Duty*, pp. 241-245.

coveries, unconscious — at least in appearance — of the fact of their having been worn threadbare in the service of the infidel, from the times of Celsus and Porphyry to our own. Most clear is it, that if Christianity had been destroyable by such means, it would have been destroyed long since.

Mr. Greg reminds us that the theism of the Bible is progressive — the views of the divine perfections becoming more just and elevated as the later among the inspired writers make their appearance. This we admit as a fact, though not exactly to the extent alleged, nor as warranting the inference which our author has deduced from it. We have seen that some of the sublimest descriptions of the Divine Being in the Old Testament occur in the Pentateuch: and in place of regarding the greater frequency of such descriptions in the later Scriptures as evidence of the purely natural origin of the Hebrew theology, we see in that fact simply a fulfilment of the declared purpose of the Author of the Bible. Everything in the Patriarchal age was preparatory to the settlement of the Israelites in Canaan; and everything in connexion with the Sinai covenant was preparatory to the 'new and better covenant' — that is, to the Gospel, which should not be thoroughly unveiled until the period called 'the fulness of time.' There is a law of progress determined from the beginning. It is not pretended that the Patriarchal or Mosaic dispensations of religion were anything more than imperfect dispensations. 'The glory that excellet' had not yet shone. In this manner of proceeding we see much that is consonant with the known ways of the Almighty in relation to our world. In fact, Mr. Greg himself is a firm believer in a principle of this nature, as designed to pervade the history of our race. The history of the world, in his view, is to be a history of progress: the work of each generation being to do what it may — or rather, to do what it *must* — towards the better condition of the next, and so on, until, through the force of natural but divinely-appointed causes, the destined development of humanity shall be perfected. It can hardly be an objection, therefore, to the claims of revelation, that in so far it should be found in conformity with the great law of Providence to which all things are supposed to be subject.

In the great physical processes which ended in giving to the earth its fitness as the abode of man, this step-by-step method, slow but orderly, certain, and ever tending towards its destined purpose, is clearly perceptible to the eye of science. As it was in this respect with the physical before the appearance of man, so has it since been with the social in the history of man; and why may it not be thus with regard to religion? In all things



material, the less perfect has preceded the more perfect. The inorganized has come before the organized, the animal before the rational. In all things social it has so been. In all things religious, accordingly, it may so be. The imperfect is of God as truly as the perfect—each in its own order. God is *eternal*—he can *afford* to be *slow*. Even the rudest physical processes have been allowed to absorb untold ages of time. Stratum has been laid slowly upon stratum; and the upbursts, and apparent retrocessions of nature, have been made to subserve the larger purpose of its Author. We also believe that, in the history of the spiritual in the world, it is the will of God it should so be; and believing this, we can look on a dispensation of religion as defective as that under which Abraham and Jacob were placed, and see nothing in it to prevent us from regarding it as of a divine origin. The Infinite One began at a lower point than that, when he determined to give being to this now glorious earth: and when the Christian millennium shall have come, it will be no marvel to the matured wisdom of those times, that the steps which led to it were so humble in the beginning, and so many in the intermediate stages. Our philosophical people, in the fulness of their pride, do not sufficiently remember that it belongs not to the Eternal to make haste, and that great and small are for us—that they have no place before the Infinite! It is admitted, then, that the theism of the Hebrews was progressive—and we argue that it would have been strange—strange for many reasons—if it had not so been.

But Mr. Greg states—what to many of our readers will be a novelty—that the early Israelites were not Monotheists. His words are these:—

‘There is no reason to suppose that Moses disbelieved in the existence of other gods; the God whom he serves is still ‘the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob;’ he is never asserted to be the *only* God; the existence and power of rival deities is never denied, but is even admitted by implication. All that Moses claims for Jehovah is, not that he is the *sole* God, but that he is superior to all others. ‘Who is like unto thee, Jehovah, among the gods.’—(Ex. xv. 11.) And he represents him to Pharaoh, by Jehovah’s own command, as the ‘God of the Hebrews,’ not as the Supreme Lord of heaven and earth. Even in the delivery of the commandments, the great foundation of the law, it is not said—‘There is no God but Jehovah:’ but only, I am the Lord thy God, which brought thee out of the House of Bondage; thou shalt have no other gods beside me (or before me.)’ The whole of the 24th chapter of Joshua confirms this view: he there urges the Israelites to choose Jehovah, not as the only God, whom to desert would be to become atheists, but as a God whose bounties to them had been so great that it would be black ingratitude not to

prefer Him to all others. The whole history of the lapses of the Jewish nation into idolatry also negative the idea of their having been really monotheists. The worship of the golden calf and of the Canaanitish gods was quite natural, on the supposition of Jehovah being a merely paramount and preferred God:—monstrous, if they had believed him to be the only one. Moreover, their idolatry is always spoken of as *infidelity*, not as *atheism*.’—pp. 73, 74.

Now, that the heathen who worshipped false gods supposed them to be true, no one, we presume, will deny. We can also readily understand that language expressive of that delusion would become conventional among the nations of Canaan in that age; and we scarcely see how the Israelites themselves, to whose ears this conventional style was naturally very familiar, should be able to avoid the use of it. No nation of monotheists could have lived in the midst of a group of nations, all given up to polytheism, without such forms of expression becoming common even in that nation. We could fill pages with extracts from the writings and discourses of missionaries among the heathen, that would suffice to prove everything against the Christian missionary in our day, that is said to be proved by such evidence against the ancient Hebrews. Every man knows that nothing is more common than that the missionary should speak of the gods of the Hindoo *as though* they were realities, even proceeding so far as to attribute to them all sorts of personal infirmities and vices. For one instance in which he pleads against them as nonentities, in a hundred he denounces them as if they *had* a real existence. He means, by so expressing himself, to say, that, *granted* their existence, it is manifest that they are gods open to such impeachments. He does not charge the Hindoo with having no god, or with saying there is no god; he simply charges him with idolatry—with having a false god. And we can imagine the blank amazement with which our missionary would look in the face of Mr. Greg, if that gentleman were to interrupt him in his discoursing by the sage observation—‘You believe, then, in the ‘reality of the gods worshipped by these people—and you do ‘not mean to say that the god you preach is the only true god, ‘but merely that your divinity is a higher divinity than theirs.’ The missionary, we think, on being thus addressed, would not be long in assigning the author a place with the class of persons who should never be abroad without a keeper.

Most of our readers, we doubt not, will be greatly astonished at what will appear to them as the extreme imbecility of our author’s reasoning on this subject. Nor is it strange to us that they should so feel. We are confident that Mr. Greg would never have learnt to reason in this manner, had he followed the

natural guidance of his own understanding. But this notion of the ancient Hebrews not being monotheists, has long been a pet notion with many German Rationalists; and coming to our author in the learned type of our neighbours—a type which with many possesses the strange power of converting the absurd into the profound—or coming, it may be, at second-hand, but through hands acknowledged as authorities, Mr. Greg has, in this instance, as in many beside, surrendered his English sense to Teutonic nonsense. Talk of Englishmen as reading their Bibles through ‘the spectacles of their theology,’—among the most abject creatures of authority we know we feel bound to class the school of modern Naturalists. Nothing can exceed the servility with which they repeat each other. Each man gives us the same string of objections, urged almost in the same language. Other men have their line of succession for priesthood; these have their line of succession for thought, science, learning, history, logic—all being valid when descending through the genuine anti-biblical channel, and all being distrusted whenever their pedigree can be traced to an opposite source. Such is the constancy with which these rules are acted upon, that you can always see from point to point what will come next, and often feel, from such foresight, the need of much more patience than you can command.

Every child knows that the Israelites frequently became worshippers of idols. But the question is,—Were not their declensions into polytheism so many declensions *from* monotheism? Multitudes have made creature-worship a part of Christianity; but is Christianity proper the less monotheistic on that account? Do we judge of Christianity from those who adhere to it in its purity, or from those who corrupt it down to their own level of worldliness and sensualism? The marvel is, that the monotheistic doctrine should have been so far preserved among such a people, required, as they were, to uphold it with the course of the world so strongly set against it. Jehovah says of them, by Moses (Deut. xxxii. 16, 21), ‘They provoked me to anger with strange gods. They have moved me to jealousy with that *which is not God*; they have provoked me to anger *with their vanities*’—language which, while it records their backsliding, denies all godhead to idols, and fixes the mark of ‘vanity’—emptiness, upon them. In the same chapter it is further written, ‘*I, even I, am He, there is no god with me.*’ (v. 39.) Mr. Greg, indeed, asserts that even at the delivery of the law, ‘it is not said,’ there is no God but Jehovah; but only, ‘I am the Lord thy God which brought thee out of the house of bondage, thou shalt have no other gods with me.’ But Moses himself, recounting all the things

done for Israel up to that point, says (Deut. v. 35), 'Unto thee 'it was showed, that thou mightest know that the Lord *he is God*; 'there is *none else beside him*.' So much for the assertion, 'All 'that Moses claims for Jehovah is, not that he is the *sole* God, 'but that he is superior to all others.' (p. 74.) Describing the humiliations that should come upon the people for their backslidings, when God should scatter them among the heathen, Moses further wrote, 'And there ye shall serve gods the work 'of men's hands, wood and stone, which neither see, nor hear, 'nor eat, nor smell.' (Deut. iv. 28.) Was this to admit, even by implication, that the gods of the heathen were realities? The only reality recognised is that of the 'wood and stone,' all beside was unreality—vanity. In this would be the humiliation of the penalty predicted. Again, the same Moses writes, 'When thou 'art come into the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee, 'thou shalt not learn to do after the abominations of those nations. 'There shall not be found among you any that maketh his son or 'his daughter to pass through the fire, or that useth divination, 'or an observer of times, or an enchanter, or a witch, or a 'charmer, or a consulter with familiar spirits, or a wizard, or a 'necromancer. For all that do these things are an abomination 'unto the Lord, and because of these abominations the Lord God 'doth drive them out from before thee.' (Deut. xviii. 9-13.) Here, all the practices of heathenism are denounced as so many 'abominations' before Jehovah, and those who practise them are an 'abomination' to him. Was this to tolerate, to sanction, to approve by implication, of the worship of other gods, even among heathen nations?

Were there no such direct texts in the Pentateuch, the fact that the creating and the disposing of all things are so often attributed to Jehovah, should have been enough to preclude this German folly, which Mr. Greg and some others are doing their best to naturalize among us, from finding its way into the head of any man of sense. Nor is it true, as alleged by Mr. Greg, that it is not until after the captivity that we find the supremacy of Jehovah, as the one and the only true God, largely recognised among the Hebrews. In the historical and devotional books which preceded that event, we find the doctrine given, and its antagonism to every form of idolatry asserted, as clearly and emphatically as in any of the later Scriptures of the Old Testament. See Psalms, xxiv. cxv. cxxxv. 2 Kings, i. 16. xix. 17, 18. 2 Chron. xiii. 9. Isaiah, xl. 18 *et seq.*; xlv. 6; xlv. 5; xlv. 9. Jer. ix. 14; x. 5, 15, 16; xxviii. 15. If the reader shall deem it worth his while to turn to these passages, and others parallel to them, he will, we think, account us justified

in saying, that gentlemen who take upon them to act the schoolmaster towards us, and with so much sharpness, should write with more caution—especially on so grave a subject.

We hope we have said enough to enable our readers to judge how far the morals or the theology of the Old Testament, as dwelt upon by Mr. Greg, may be said to present a valid argument against our faith in its Inspiration. We pretend not to see this subject as without difficulty. We admit that it may be strange, in some respects, that a Bible altogether such as we possess should have come to us from the hand of the Deity. But we deem it far more strange that a world altogether such as this in which we live should have come from that hand. Nevertheless, here it is: a world, which, to all but the weakest or the most prejudiced of mankind, must ever be, in not a few of its aspects, a most astounding mystery.

Mr. Greg, as we have seen, takes the ground commonly taken by the opponents of the doctrine of inspiration as regards the claims said to be made by the sacred writers themselves in this respect. In his view, the passages in which a claim of this sort seems to be made are singularly few and vague. We meet this objection simply by saying, the case is not so: it is not true that the passages in the Old and New Testaments, which relate to this subject, are either few in number, or uncertain in meaning. As we have said, our case is not about the terms in which this doctrine is set forth. Whether the word Inspiration—*θεόπνευστος*, ‘God-breathed,’ be frequently employed or not, is no point of moment with us. The question is—Do we find such expressions used as warrant the belief, that *there was a divine guidance with the mind of the sacred writers, to the effect commonly intended by the word Inspiration?* In the history of the sacred canon, the word, ‘God-breathed,’ may be a late and rare word; but is the idea of a God-directing presence with the human spirit in delivering God’s truth to men a late and rare idea? If it be not, and if we find frequent expressions to the effect that the instruction conveyed by the sacred writers is instruction to be received, not as participating in the fallibility of man, but as being unmixed truth from God, then the more varied the terms employed to set forth this doctrine the better. For it may be with this doctrine as we know it to be with almost every other distinctive of revelation, that its strongest evidence comes, not so much from direct statements in relation to it, as from the whole web of implied or indirect proof inseparable from the general language of Scripture. To fasten upon a single word as being alone expressive of the doctrine, and then to endeavour to thrust the doctrine wholly aside, because resting on so narrow

a basis, savours more of art than of honesty. Such, however, is the course taken all but invariably by our opponents; and the air of amazement assumed, that any man should be found capable of believing a doctrine of such moment on such slender testimony, is too subtle in its tendency not to produce much of its intended effect upon the unwary.

It will be proper that we should glance, in this place, at the character of the Scripture testimony in relation to this doctrine—to give it in all its variety and fulness would far exceed the limits at our disposal. We cite first, the language of prophets in the Old Testament. Nothing can be more clear than that the prophets claimed to be heard and obeyed as men who spoke, not their own word, but ‘the word of the Lord.’ What they gave forth had not originated with themselves, it had *come to them*—come to them *from God*. Thus, in Ex. iv. 14-16, Jehovah says, ‘I will be with *thy mouth* and with *his mouth*, and *will teach* you what ye shall do; and *Aaron spake all the words which the Lord had spoken unto Moses*.’ Was not this the action of the Divine upon the Human to the full sense of an inspired guidance? Again, Deut. xviii. 20 *et seq.*, ‘But the prophet which shall presume *to speak a word in my name which I have not commanded him to speak*, or that shall speak in the name of other gods, that prophet shall die.’ Thus a true prophet was a man, not self-moved, but God-moved; he could *speak* only what God had ‘*commanded him to speak*.’ The people to whom this language was familiar, must have been a people to whom the idea of Inspiration was familiar. The point, indeed, to be settled in this passage was, not that a prophet must be an inspired person—that was already sufficiently understood—but how to distinguish between a man really inspired, and a pretender to inspiration. In Jer. ix. 12, we read, ‘Who is he to whom *the mouth of the Lord hath spoken*, that he may declare it.’ Then follows a series of utterances, commencing with, ‘Thus saith the Lord—’ Therefore thus saith the Lord of Hosts,’ &c. &c. Again, xii. 15, ‘*Hear ye, and give ear*, be not proud, *for the Lord hath spoken*.’ Again, xxx. 4, ‘*And these are the words that the Lord spake* concerning Israel and concerning Judah.’ xl. 1, ‘*The word that came to Jeremiah from the Lord*.’ ‘The word that the Lord spake against Babylon, and against the land of the Chaldeans, *by Jeremiah the prophet*.’ Isaiah also writes, iii. 1, ‘*The Lord spake unto me also again, saying*.’ So Amos, iii. 1, ‘*Hear the word that the Lord hath spoken against you*, oh, children of Israel.’ What is thus asserted from time to time of the parts of the Old Testament, comes in its aggregate to be a testimony to the inspiration of the whole. The passages

we have cited are only as samples from multitudes like them. The instances are almost endless in which the prophets speak of 'the word of the Lord,' as 'coming' to them, see especially, 1 Kings, xii. 22. 1 Chron. xvii. 3. And not less numerous are the passages in which they speak of the word of the Lord as 'given' them; see Jer. vii. 1; xi. 1; xvii. 1; xxi. 1; xxv. 1; xxvii. 1; xxxi. 1. Isaiah, i. 2. Ezek. iii. 4, 10, 11. Hosea, i. Haggai, i. 1, 2. Malachi, i. 2. These instances, if referred to, will suffice to show what the *manner* of the prophets is in this respect. Now these men, by the all but perpetual use of this language, must have intended to convey to the mind of the Hebrew people the idea that the prophet's message was not from himself, but from the Lord. Did they, in so expressing themselves, speak truly or falsely? To suppose them to have spoken truly, is to admit the doctrine of Inspiration as settled; to suppose them to have spoken falsely, is to give up, not the doctrine of Inspiration merely, but Revelation itself in any form—inasmuch as men who could so err in this thing, must be unsafe guides in anything. We know the sense in which the Jews understood such language; and the manner in which our Lord appeals to the authority of the Old Testament, is such as clearly to show that the *general faith in its Inspiration was his own*.

In Matt. xix. 4, Jesus says, '*Have ye not read that He which made them at the beginning made them male and female,*'—language which supposes the statements given in Scripture *history* to be statements truly given. What you read there, you account as of undoubted verity—and so it is. Again, xxii. 31-32. 'But as touching the resurrection of the dead, *have ye not read that which was spoken to you by God, saying—I am the God of Abraham, &c.*' Was not this to tell them that whatever they found reported to them in their Scriptures as having been said by God, they might be assured had been said by Him? So in the record of the temptation, Matt. iv., Jesus is described in the fourth verse as saying 'It is written;' in the seventh verse, as repeating, 'It is written;' and in the tenth verse, as again saying, 'It is written.' In all these instances, the appeal is to Old Testament Scripture, and to that as an infallible authority. Often He reminds those about Him of what Moses had 'commanded,' and of what he had 'said,' fully in the manner of one who recognised in Moses an authority to whom all should submit. See Matt. viii. 4; xix. 8; xxii. 2. John, v. 45; vii. 19-22. He speaks also of Isaiah, of David, of Jonah, of Hosea, of Zechariah, as *prophets*—that is, as of men who professed, and truly, to speak, not their own word, but the word of the Lord. See Matt. viii. 17; xii. 17, 30; xiii. 35; xv. 7; xxi. 16, 42; xxii. 43; xxvi. 31. It is of the

writings bearing the names of these men that our Lord speaks, saying—‘Ye do err, not knowing the Scriptures (τὰς γραφὰς) nor the power of God’—‘Search the *Scriptures*, for they testify of me’—‘Did ye never read in the *Scriptures*, the stone which the builders rejected’—‘But then, how shall the *Scriptures* be fulfilled, that thus it must be’—‘Oh, fools, and slow of heart to believe *all that the prophets have spoken*, ought not Christ to have suffered these things and to enter into his glory. And *beginning at Moses*, and *all the prophets*, he expounded unto them *in all the Scriptures* the things concerning himself.’—Luke xxiv. 25-27. And it is added, ‘Then opened he their understanding that they might understand the *Scriptures*.’ Now is not this precisely the manner in which we should expect our Lord to appeal to Old Testament Scripture, supposing his faith in its inspiration to be such as is now common among Christians? Do not Christians, as the consequence of such faith in it, express themselves thus concerning it continually? Sometimes it is described by the singular term, ‘the Scripture;’ sometimes by the plural—‘the Scriptures;’ sometimes as the ‘Law,’ and sometimes as ‘the Law and the Prophets,’ or as ‘Moses and the Prophets’—but always in a manner to denote an authority nothing less than divine.—Matt. vii. 12; xxii. 40. Luke, xvi. 16; xxiv. 44. Matt. vii. 38, 42; xiii. 18; xvii. 12. John, x. 35. Had the faith of the Jewish people in this respect been an error, Jesus, who exposed their delusions on so many points, would hardly have been tolerant of it in this shape. But his words are ‘The Scripture *must be fulfilled*’—‘The Scripture *cannot be broken*’—‘Ye make void *the law of God* through *your traditions*.’ They had Scriptures that were *their own*, and they had Scriptures that were *of God*, and so careful was Jesus to keep up the distinction between the two.

We may turn now to the language of the apostles on this matter. Peter says, Acts, i. 16, ‘Men and brethren, this *Scripture* must needs have been fulfilled, which *the Holy Ghost* *by the mouth of David* spake before concerning Judas.’ So, again, Acts, iii. 18, Peter’s words are, ‘These things which *God had showed* before *by the mouth of all his holy prophets*, he *hath so fulfilled*.’ The church, also, in Acts, iv., prays thus: ‘Thou art God, who *by the mouth of thy servant David* hast said, —‘Why do the people rage,’ &c. Thus we have *God* speaking through the prophets, speaking through them *all*. Their word is not their own, it is given them, it is from the Lord.

The language of Peter is further to this effect, in 2 Ep. i. 19-21: ‘We have also a more sure word of prophecy—‘for the prophecy came *not* in old time *by the will of man*, but



'holy men of God *spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost.*' This reference must be, not merely to prophecy as spoken, but to prophecy as written, otherwise the apostle's allusion could have no meaning; and all prophetic writings are included under the term prophecy. The language of Paul on this subject is in strict accordance with that of Peter. In Rom. xv. 4, he writes, 'For whatever things were written aforetime were written for our learning, that we through patience and comfort of the Scriptures might have hope.' This statement is made in connexion with a reference to what is written in the 69th Psalm. This passage does not say that the Scriptures have become thus efficient through Inspiration; but it does say, that *from the purpose of God*, and by *some* means, they have become all to us that we might suppose Inspiration to have made them. The strict meaning of the passage is, that *everything* written in the Scriptures was written for our instruction. Fully to this effect is the language of the apostle in 1 Cor. x. 11. 'Now all these things happened to them for *examples*, and *were written for our instruction*, upon whom the *'ends of the world are come.*' We might also cite passages in which the Old Testament is described as τὰ λόγια τοῦ θεοῦ—the '*word of God*'—oracular announcements from God.—Rom. iii. 2; Heb. v. 12. We might appeal also to many passages in which what is said in Old Testament Scripture is described as said by the Holy Spirit. '*Well said the Holy Ghost by Esaius the prophet unto our fathers*'—'*As the Holy Ghost saith*, to-day if ye will,' &c.—'*The Holy Ghost thus signifying* that the way into the holiest of all was not yet manifest'—Wherefore also *the Holy Ghost is to us a witness*, for after that *he had said before*,' &c.—Acts, xxviii. 25. Heb. iii. 7; ix. 8; x. 15. In short, so thoroughly is the New Testament founded upon the Old, that in the Epistles of Paul alone there are more than 250 references to it; and in the whole of the Epistles, including the Apocalypse, the number of such references is nearly twice that amount. So much for the modern crotchet—that the first preachers of the Gospel cared little about a creed from a book, or from history.

Of course we must not omit in this place the language of Paul in 2 Tim. iii. 16, 'All Scripture *is* given by inspiration of God, and is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness, that the man of God may be perfect, thoroughly furnished unto all good works.' We adhere to the rendering of this text in our version. To read instead of it, 'All Scripture given by inspiration of God, and is profitable,' &c.—is to feel at once that the καὶ, 'and,' becomes a most awkward

expletive, and according to Middleton would be used, as it is not used in any other passage of the sacred text. The insertion of *ἐστὶ*, 'is,' before *θεοπνευστος* leaves the *καὶ* to do its proper office, and gives meaning to the whole. In either view of the text, however, it contains a distinct assertion of the doctrine of Inspiration. 'God-breathed' communications of the Old Testament *there are*—and all those communications are 'profitable' to the many purposes enumerated. But we do not take this low ground—the context shows that it would not be the just one. In the preceding verse, Paul has congratulated Timothy on his having known the Scriptures of the Old Testament from his youth, and he founds this congratulation on the fact, that those Scriptures—those Scriptures, without exception or limit of any kind—were God-breathed communications to mankind, and so communicated, that the moral and religious ends mentioned might be secured by their means. The comparison here clearly is, not between one portion of the Scriptures and other portions, but between the Scriptures as an inspired authority, and all other writings as being merely of human authority. So much, then, as to the fewness and vagueness of the testimonies to the inspiration of the Old Testament.

If the testimony to the Inspiration of the Old Testament be such as we have seen, it is reasonable to expect that the evidence as to the Inspiration of the New Testament will be even stronger. The New Testament is intended to give development and completeness to the theme of the Old. It belongs to what is called, on this account, 'the dispensation of the Spirit.' Here, accordingly, we expect the influence of the Spirit, in the way of inspiration, as in all other ways, to be especially conspicuous.

The language of our Lord on this subject must not be overlooked. His words are—'I will pray the Father, and he shall give you another Comforter, that he may abide with you for ever, even the Spirit of Truth'—'The Comforter, *which is the Holy Ghost*, whom the Father will send in my name, *he shall teach you all things*, and bring all things to your remembrance whatsoever I have said unto you.' 'When the Comforter is come, even the Spirit of Truth, *he shall testify of me*'—'*he shall guide you unto ALL THE TRUTH*, for he shall not speak of himself, but whatsoever he shall hear, that shall he speak.' John, xiv. 16, 17, 26; xv. 26, 27; xvi. 12, 13. Now by the 'all things' here mentioned, we must at least understand all things necessary to a clear and full perception of the truths of the Gospel. There are, it seems, only two ways of escape from the force of the above texts: one is, by denying that Jesus ever so spoke, ascribing the words to John, or to the writer

of the Gospel which bears his name; the other is, by describing the passages as being nothing more than an Oriental or figurative mode of saying, that when the apostles should give themselves to the preaching of the Gospel, after the departure of their Lord, such would be the wholesome influence of that employment on their spirit, that much which they had forgotten they would then remember, and much that had been obscure to them would then become clear! The first of these fancies is preferred by Mr. Greg; the second has the preference with Mr. Martineau:—If our pages come under the eye of a man capable of believing either, we can only exclaim, ‘Oh, reader, great is thy faith!’

But the apostles themselves—what is their claim in this respect on their own behalf? An ‘apostle’ is one sent—sent by a competent authority, and for a definite purpose. Here the authority sending is God, and the message sent is from God. In this case, accordingly, everything seems to say that the persons sent must have been qualified to discharge this trust with the strictest wisdom and fidelity. By what means they became thus qualified—whether by inspiration or otherwise—is a mere question of mode; about the fact there is no room for reasonable dispute. If you look to the terms in which the apostles express themselves in reference to their own office and authority at the commencement of their epistles, it will be seen, that if ever men have claimed the kind of authority to which all other men should submit, these men so did. In 1 Cor. xiv. 37, 38, Paul says, ‘If any man think himself to be a prophet, or spiritual, let him acknowledge that the things which *I wrote* unto you *are the commandments of God.*’ Here the mention is of things written, of these things in the most general manner; and of these things—all of these things, it is said, that they take with them the authority of ‘the commandments of God.’ Verily, if this man was not inspired, we have here something too much like the soarings of a Hildebrand. The same writer, in 1 Thess. iv. 8, urges the believers at Thessalonica to holiness of life; and, to give weight to his exhortation, he adds—‘He that despiseth, despiseth not man but God, who hath also given unto us his Holy Spirit.’ The Holy Spirit had been given to himself and to the other apostles, that they might speak with this authority. So, again, (ii. 13,) ‘The word of God which ye heard of us, ye received, not as the word of man, but as it is in truth, the word of God.’ And again, in the same epistle—‘If any man *obey not our word by this epistle*, note that man, and *have no company with him.*’ Thus, not to obey the word of an apostle was not to be a Christian, and to be justly disowned by Christians. Could a higher authority than this be given to the word of God himself—to any inspired word. If we suppose Paul to have been God-directed—inspired in what he

wrote, all is clear: to suppose anything short of that, is to subject his whole character to impeachment, and of necessity to surrender, not merely inspiration, but revealed religion altogether. See Rom. ix. 1, and xv. 15, 16; 1 Cor. ii. 7, 13, for strong expressions as to the fitness bestowed on the apostle to act with this kind of authority in the church. So, also, 1 John, iv. 6, 'We are of God. He that knoweth God heareth us: he that is not of God, heareth us not. *Hereby know we the spirit of truth and the spirit of error.*' Thus apostolic teaching was—in the fullest sense—the spirit of truth speaking among men. In 2 Pet. iii. 15, 16, we read, 'Even our beloved brother Paul also, according to the wisdom given unto him, hath written unto you. As also in all his epistles, speaking of these things, in which are some things hard to be understood, which they that are unlearned and unstable wrest, *as they do also the other Scriptures*, to their own destruction.' Thus the wisdom given to Paul was such as to place his writings on a level in authority with 'the other Scriptures.' In the same chapter we read, 'That ye may be mindful of the words that were spoken before by the holy prophets, and of the commandments of us the apostles of the Lord and Saviour.' Thus, the 'commandments' of apostles take their place with the 'words' of prophets. As to the Apocalypse, it is throughout a miraculous, inspired vision—the command to *write* and *what* to write, being often reiterated. It is quite natural that the opponents of the doctrine of inspiration should be shy of it.

It is a fact that there are passages in which Paul seems to distinguish between things delivered by him as specially from the Lord, and things delivered without such commandment. See 1 Cor. vii. *passim*. But if we suppose the apostle as meaning to say, in these instances, that the advice given was simply his own, this interpretation shuts us up to the conclusion, that the instruction of the apostle, whenever not coupled with any such expressed exception, was to be taken as not his own merely, but as truly of the Lord. Even in this view, the exceptions serve to establish the rule. We think, however, that it would be easy to show that the supposed exceptions are more imaginary than real; but we shall not allow ourselves to be detained for this purpose.

We now ask, then—Is it true that the sacred writers are silent as to their own inspiration? Do they, or do they not, lay claim to that authority to which they could have been justly entitled, only as we can suppose them to have been in the fullest sense inspired teachers? We confess it is our wish, by adducing the testimony of Scripture thus largely, to guard the unsuspecting against a tone of most unwarranted assertion, that has become prevalent with a certain class of writers on this subject. It

would almost seem as though the maxim of our opponents were—be sure to assert enough, and a goodly portion will be believed. We neither expect nor wish to see a doctrine of such moment resting on any one text, or on any one form of expression. It is fitting the evidence sustaining it should be such as it is—evidence in many forms, the parts being all more or less valuable, and the cumulative force of the whole being such as to command the assent of reasonable men.

Here we are met by an important question—viz., What is the NATURE and what the EXTENT of the Inspiration thus claimed?

To us, it is very clear that it does not extend, except in very rare cases, to the *words* of Scripture. In our judgment, the dispute about what is called 'Verbal Inspiration' is, in a double sense, very much a dispute about words. After bestowing our best attention on what has been written in favour of that theory, we feel obliged to regard its advocates as conceding in one form what they seem to deny in another, so that the difference between them and the writers who plead only for what is called *Plenary* inspiration, is much more imaginary than real. The defenders of the verbal theory have modes of harmonizing their doctrine with facts regarded as fatal to it; but the result, in our view, is a virtual, if not a formal surrender of the thing for which they contend. It is admitted, for example, that God did not unmake the *man* when he made the *prophet*. He simply consecrated the man, with all his individual qualities, to the new function. The characteristics of the sacred writers, accordingly, as men, whether natural or acquired—such as come out in their diction, style, and in their manner generally—were *not* the fruit of inspiration, but were *in the men before* the descent of the supernatural influence upon them. Divines may insist, for the sake of upholding a theory, that the manner, style, even the words used in such case, should be regarded as inspired by the Holy Spirit, inasmuch as the Spirit *appropriates* and *directs* all these individualities to his sacred purpose. But to appropriate is not to create—to direct is not to originate. Inspiration does not *precede* these individualities, for the purpose of giving them existence: it comes *after them*, for the purpose of directing them to a special use. In this view, the only sense in which they can be said to be inspired, is in the sense of their being in some special measure purified, elevated, or divinely guided; and that is readily ceded by the advocate of plenary inspiration, while perhaps strictly denying what is called verbal inspiration.

It is usual to remind the adherents to the verbal scheme, that the New Testament writers do not cite the Old Testament with verbal accuracy, and that their texts are often taken from the

Septuagint, and not from the original Hebrew. The superstitions of the Jews in favour of every iota of their sacred writings is well known: and the manner of the New Testament writers, when citing the Old, was such as to reprove, and not to encourage, a weakness of that nature. We have never seen any satisfactory answer to this objection.

It is further alleged, that if verbalism be a part of inspiration, then translations, as a matter of course, cannot be more than partially inspired writings. Strictly synonymous words cannot always be found in other tongues; and when of the same meaning, they are not the same words. The presumption is strong against that theory of inspiration being the most true, the benefits of which must be the most limited. The theory which regards the thoughts, sentiments, and facts of the sacred writings as being properly the inspiration of them; and which views these as admitting of conveyance with little, if any, loss of power, into the ever-shifting languages of the human family, seems to us much the most consonant with the divine wisdom and benevolence, and with the analogies of the divine dispensations.

It is said, indeed, that men always think in words—never without them; and that if this be the case with ordinary thoughts, much more would it so be with thoughts so extraordinary as those which come to the human mind by revelation. But admitting that it becomes very much a habit with most men to think in language, it would not be possible to show that they so do invariably; and the radical fact, that in the early experience of humanity words come as the offspring of thought, and not as conditions necessary to its existence, should not be overlooked. Besides which, is not the very elevation of the matters constituting the substance of revelation, a reason why they might come to the mind independently of human language, seeing that all such language in relation to such themes must be, to a great extent, the language of analogy and accommodation? In our view, it is enough that the inspiration which gives us the substance of revelation should so influence the mode of conveyance as to secure accuracy and truthfulness. It is, no doubt, revelation as *written*, that is before us as the inspired word of God; but the language is merely the vehicle of the thought, and may itself have been the result of nothing beyond a very general superintendence or direction.

Nor do we find that the texts of Scripture generally appealed to in support of the verbal theory are adequate to sustain it. The term ‘word,’ and ‘words,’ so common in Scripture, are often grossly misunderstood in this connexion. When our Lord says: ‘The *words* that I speak unto you, they are spirit, and they are

life,'—no one can doubt that the term 'words' is used to denote, not the *language*, but the *substance* or *matter* of his teaching. So, by the expressions—the word of the Lord—the word of God—we are to understand, not the words in which the Divine Being speaks, or in which his prophets speak, but the message, the thought, which so comes to us. Not to see this, is to be spell-bound by a most wretched literalism. We believe that 'ALL Scripture is given by inspiration of God,' but not all in the same sense,—very little of it in the sense which regards the words, as well as the thoughts, as having come to us from a supernatural agency. Whatever the sacred writers teach as truth, we regard as truth. Everything of that nature takes the divine authority along with it—but everything beyond that may take with it nothing more than the divine guidance, superintendence, or permission. Nor is 1 Cor. ii. 13, really more to the purpose of this theory: 'Which things also we speak, not in the words which man's wisdom teacheth, but which the Holy Ghost teacheth.' Here the words taught by the Holy Ghost stand in contrast to the words taught by human wisdom. Now, what is meant by this teaching of human wisdom? Does it mean the teaching of mere words? The reference is not so much to mere words, as to language, style—manner in the largest sense—to the literary, elaborate, and artistic style of oratory and authorship taught in the philosophical schools of those times. The meaning accordingly is, that the influence of the Holy Spirit, in so far as it was present with the apostles in relation to their manner as teachers, was with them to dispose them towards the simple and natural manner becoming their function;—not for the purpose of giving them, word by word, the terms they should use, nor to qualify them for emulating the artificial, ornate, and rhetorical style observable in the secular authorship and oratory of that day. There was a divine influence which affected their manner as teachers, but it did so by affecting their character as men, imparting, through that medium, to everything they did, the signs of sincerity and nature. Nor must we hesitate to say, that if inspiration had extended to the very words of Scripture, the Bible could scarcely have presented those different modes of statement, in relation to the same facts and truths, on which the sceptic has founded his charges of discrepancy and contradiction. It may be true that these alleged differences are greatly exaggerated, and often imaginary, but a dictation descending to words would have left no place for such diversities in more extended forms of expression and statement. In short, we do not see how the doctrine of inspiration is to be saved in reference to *any* part of Scripture, if it is to be extended thus literally to *every* part. Revelation, in

any form, is imperilled to the last degree, by identifying it in this manner with the mint and cummin of mere phrases and words. If this oneness of manner and diction had been necessary or expedient in a revelation, then the Bible should have come to us bearing, like the Koran, the impress of one mind only. But the Holy Spirit, in speaking to us through diversities of times, and circumstances, and agencies, has declared explicitly that it is not so much *one* manner, as '*divers* manners,' that befits a communication from the Deity to our race.

But we must now proceed further, and say, that the influence we intend by the word Inspiration, includes a difference as to *mode* and *degree*. Professor Gaussen, indeed, insists, that there is not the least warrant in Scripture for regarding any one portion of Scripture as being inspired *more* than another, or *differently* from another. In our view, such a manner of writing, on such a subject, betrays great wilfulness. In Exod. xxiv. 12, xxxi. 18, xxxii. 15, 16; Deut. xi. 5, we are told that the precepts of the Decalogue were '*written by the finger of God.*' Will it be said that all Scripture has come to us in this manner? But when God did employ human agency, how did he employ it? If in one mode, what was it? If in more than one, can we know the difference? We are charged with presumption in asking such questions—with attempting to make distinctions on a subject confessedly above our comprehension. Now, we admit that it does not become us to *make* distinctions on this subject; but if there be distinctions already *made*, and by the great Source of Inspiration himself, it becomes us to be carefully observant of what has been so done. Reason and analogy suggest, that the influence we designate by the word Inspiration would be varied in its mode and degree, according to the special purposes to be accomplished from time to time by it. Thus viewed, we should say it will lack nothing necessary to its efficiency, neither will it be in anything superfluous. Sometimes it may act with special force on one faculty, sometimes on another, and sometimes on the susceptibility of the man generally, both mental and physical. In its humblest measure, we suppose it to be supernatural; but this it may be, and still vary greatly. God never resorts to miracle without occasion, nor beyond occasion. Now, almost everything in Scripture is of a nature to sustain this view of inspiration. The manner in which the sacred writers speak of each other is to this effect, suggesting the prominence of the human element in all inspired writing. Thus, of the Old Testament writers, it is—'as David saith'—'as Esaias saith'—'as Moses saith.' So Peter of Paul—'as Paul hath written.' In like manner we speak daily of what has come to us, both by prophets



and apostles, in terms which, instead of ignoring the human element in Scripture, seem to recognise nothing else. The language we cite we give as that of Moses or Malachi, of Paul or John. Such are our expressions concerning the sacred penmen, whatever may be the nature of our theory concerning their inspiration.

It is clear, moreover, from the contents of the Scriptures, that there must have been a wide difference both in the nature and the measure of the influence under which they were written. Very much of what is given us by the sacred writers is given from their natural memory and observation, and no influence of a supernatural kind could have been necessary to enable them to place such things on record. Such influence may have been present with them so far as to have guided them in their selection from such materials, but could not have been necessary beyond that point. Surely Paul might write to a friend to bring a cloak with him, and certain parchments, without being under the influence requisite to enable him to give his revelations of the Man of Sin. He could not have discoursed to the Corinthians as he has done on the resurrection, without coming under a supernatural and special teaching; but he needed not that same teaching to qualify him for stating to the churches of Galatia that he went into Arabia, after his conversion, before going to Jerusalem. In the one of these cases, there could be no need of any direct inspiration at all; in the other, everything was dependent on it. In Nature and Providence, the presence of the divine power is everywhere regulated by the natural exigency. It is always to the occasion and necessity, both in kind and degree. It is so in the ordinary operations of grace. God worketh in us to will and to do, but it is in a manner so apportioned and so adjusted, as to enable us to work out our own salvation with fear and trembling. Why, then, should it be deemed unreasonable—almost irreligious—to suppose that the spirit of Inspiration came to men in old time after this manner? Assuredly there must be some safe halting-place between the position taken by those who leave no place to the supernatural element in revelation, and those who leave—or, at least, seem to leave—no place to the natural. Among the writers who do not hold that inspiration extended, in the manner alleged, to the very words of Scripture; and who, while they hold that all the parts of Scripture are in a sense inspired, do not hold that all those parts are inspired in the same sense, are such men as Baxter and Doddridge, Stennett and Parry, Pye Smith and Hartwell Horne, Knapp and Dick, Wilson and Henderson. The eminent learning, judgment, and piety of these men should suffice to protect them against

rash imputation on this subject. They are not infallible. We do not vouch for the strict consistency or accuracy of every statement made by them; but no man whose opinions are entitled to any consideration can hesitate to admit, that the authors named have earned a right to speak with some decision on this question, and that their known attachment to evangelical truth was such as to warrant us in believing that, had they found the more stringent theory of inspiration in the Scriptures, they would have been among the most resolute in the avowal of it.

In attempting to determine the kinds or degrees of the spiritual influence peculiar to the experience of the inspired writers, we may mention, as the highest form of it, *direct revelation*. All *prophecy* must have been of this nature. So must it have been also with all those facts which constitute the special doctrines of revelation. The Incarnation, the Atonement, and the work of the Holy Spirit—these are all facts. Reason may approve the moral purpose which these facts are intended to subserve, but the facts themselves must, from their very nature, have been the discoveries, not of reason, but of revelation. That God should manifest himself through Christ—that Christ should die for the purpose of securing pardon to the guilty—and that the Holy Spirit should be given to regenerate human spirits—these doctrines, while in a sense truths, are all truths embodied in facts. That the Divine Being should in some way reveal himself more fully to men—that he should in some way pardon the guilty, and renew the depraved—might have been conceived as possible; but men could not have *known* that the Deity *would* so do, and in this *manner*, except by revelation. These are the facts which Paul received as the truths that had come to him, ‘not of man,’ nor by man, but ‘by revelation (ἀποκαλύψεως) of Jesus Christ.’ In Ephes. iii. 1-5, we read thus:—‘For this cause I, Paul, the prisoner of the Lord Jesus Christ for you Gentiles, if ye have heard ‘of the dispensation of the grace of God which was given me to ‘youward, how that by revelation (κατὰ ἀποκάλυψιν) he made ‘known unto me the mystery; (as I wrote afore in few words, ‘whereby when ye read ye may understand my knowledge in ‘the mystery of Christ;) which in other ages was not made known ‘to the sons of men, as it is now revealed (ἀπεκαλύφθη) unto the ‘holy apostles and prophets by the Spirit.’ It is in the face of such language that some men tell us they cannot find a passage in the New Testament in which the Sacred Writers profess to give forth their doctrine or sentiments to mankind under a divine influence or direction. If to be able to boast of ‘revelations of the Lord,’ is not to be divinely assisted and guided—to be inspired, we know not what can be so described. That Christ is

enthroned in heaven—that he rules in his church while thus exalted—that he will come at the appointed time to judge the world—these points, and a multitude like them, are of such a nature, that no man could have authority to announce them as truths, except on the ground of having been supernaturally assured of them. Jesus himself could not so have spoken except by the light of prophecy; and Paul, who had not attended the ministry of Jesus, could so have spoken only by revelation from him, or by the Holy Spirit. The ends which these facts were designed to subserve may be strictly consonant with reason, but the facts themselves are such as cannot be classed among the discoveries of reason. Paul foretold the great ‘falling away,’ because the Spirit had spoken expressly to that effect. What had been a mystery—a something veiled—thus ceased to be so; and, thus placed among the common objects of our knowledge, might be described by our common language.

Next in importance to Inspiration in the way of direct revelation, we may place inspiration in the way of *Divine Guidance*. Our Lord promised the Holy Spirit to the apostles, that by his influence they might be led into all truth. The word employed to denote this operation of the Spirit is ὁδηγεῖν, which signifies to lead to a road, and, analogically, to teach or instruct. In the Septuagint, it is used to express the Hebrew terms which denote to show the way, to lead in a way, to cause to walk. Thus, by the coming of the Holy Spirit the misconceptions of the apostles were to be removed, and they were to see the truth they did not see before, or to see truth more clearly than before. To this end, it was not necessary, for the most part, that the aid vouchsafed should amount to a revelation;—it was enough that it should have been an influence giving a right direction, and a measure of help to their thoughts. The doctrines, the duties, the facts set forth by them were to be seen in their true lights, and the influence promised was influence sufficient to that purpose. This influence came to aid the consciousness proper to the man, not to supersede it.

We see enough in the Scriptures to warrant us in believing that this divine ‘revelation,’ and this divine ‘guidance,’ included a special *purification* and *elevation* of the mental and spiritual faculties. The memory, the perception, the sympathy with spiritual truth being thus aided, all that was needed would, in respect to many things, be secured. Reason suggests that where such influence would be sufficient, such influence only would be vouchsafed. The apostles, when expressing themselves in the language of ordinary Christian men, speak of some things in respect to which their memory failed them; of others in respect

to which they did not see or feel as they could wish, but when giving forth Divine truth in their writings or in their ministry, they always speak with the confidence of men who *know* that what they deliver as truth is truth.

The most limited sense in which the term inspiration may be used is in reference to mere *Superintendence*. In many connexions no further presence of the Divine Spirit would be necessary than might suffice to guard against mistake. Men act with their natural freedom in such cases, but the Spirit is so present, that the result, though so largely of man, may be said to be, in a sense, truly of God.

If the materials which constitute our Bible were of one kind, it would be reasonable to account the inspiration through which we have received them as being in that respect like them—of one kind. But so great a diversity as to matter—according to all the analogies of nature and grace—implies a diversity as to the mode of the influence affecting it. Not a little of the difficulty felt in relation to the doctrine of inspiration, is difficulty arising from misconception as to its proper limits and purpose. It is not designed to constitute each inspired writer a strict type of all the rest, in the sense commonly understood. We regard the doctrinal truth presented to the mind of the inspired writers as being always in substance the same, but this, it is manifest, was quite consistent with leaving each writer at liberty to contemplate that truth from different points, or in different relations, according to their respective individualities of character. The influence which was consistent with leaving to the sacred writers a diversity in style, was consistent with leaving to them a diversity much more considerable. In reference to the Gospels—it is well known that exception has been taken to these narratives, on the ground that the Christ presented in them is not so much the same Christ as another. The objection is not valid; but it would not have become so common, if there had not been appearances to give it some plausibility. It is unquestionable that our fullest conception of the character of Christ must be derived, not from any one of the Gospels taken separately, so much as from the whole taken conjointly. In respect to the deeper truths most characteristic of the nature and mission of our Lord, we might spare Matthew and Mark better than Luke, and even Luke better than John. It is the same as regards the apprehension of the doctrine of Christ on the part of the authors of the apostolical Epistles. It is clear the evangelists were not obliged to look at the character of Christ from exactly the same point. One might regard that marvellous manifestation more in its external aspects—another, more in relation to the inner mysteries which lay beneath it; but

though the lights and phases of the presentation were different, the great subject was the same. In like manner, the doctrine of Christ as presented by the apostles, does not come before us with all the parts in the same prominence or shadow. The truth is one, but the mode and measure in which the respective parts of the great scheme are developed, that is not one. In James the doctrinal element is very briefly given; it is to the practical that he aims to impart a sharpness and power of his own. In Peter, the two elements are in something nearer equal proportions; but he does not present the evangelical verities with the depth and emphasis of John, and still less in the manner of Paul. John's sympathies lie considerably on the side of the contemplative and devotional,—Paul's affinities connect his spirit with a wider range of doctrinal truth, and, in a large degree, with the more robust and practical tendencies of the Gospel.

Now, the Divine Being might have avoided all these varieties, as coming thus from the hallowed individualities of the sacred writers, by employing some one eminently full and gifted spirit to have given us a single Gospel, leaving us to deduce our Christianity from the one document of the one man. But such a course, while it would have precluded some of the objections now familiar to us, would have been open to others perhaps much more formidable. These varieties are in the writings of inspired men, because they are in the humanity to which those writings are addressed. By this means, not only may each mind have its own truth, but have its own truth in its own way,—that is, adapted to its individual temperament and tendencies. The Bible must be of God, or it is no Bible to us; but it must also be in a large sense of man, if it is to commend itself effectually to the differences, both natural and conventional, that are inseparable from the condition of man.

But if the inspiration of the Scriptures was not such as to preclude the sacred writers from viewing the doctrines of the Gospel with this measure of difference, it is reasonable to suppose that there will be a similar, and even a greater diversity in their record of *historical circumstances*. It rarely happens that any two witnesses regard the same event from the same point of view, or with the same feeling. Hence the historian finds that even his best materials are sure to be characterized by a variety in minor circumstances, which commonly takes with it the semblance, if not the reality, of discrepancy and contradiction. The same event does not suggest the same thought, or call forth the same feeling, in every man who may chance to witness it. It may suggest thought, and awaken feeling, in all witnesses; but not the same thought, not the same feeling. As the consequence,

one of these witnesses, on becoming a relater of the event, would give prominence to one circumstance or point of it, and another to another; and while one would probably give the story imperfectly, dismissing the picture with a few touches, another would dwell upon it longer, and give it with more detail and fulness. The result in this case may be, that with much variety as regards the selection of circumstances in a story, and in the manner of presenting them, we have substantial agreement and a real truthfulness. As regards the sacred writers, it is to be observed, that, even in respect to doctrine, they never profess to give you the whole of what they have to teach on that subject in any one place. What is more, they do not give us any one doctrine in its full scriptural completeness in any one connexion. This is the Oriental manner. Throughout the Scriptures, truth comes to us like pearls, each truth in its own separateness and value. It comes upon occasion more than by forecast, and is presented in mode and measure according to occasion. The intuitive faculty has had much more to do with what we find in the Bible than the logical. Much of its wisdom is given to us in proverbs, and nearly all of it in those brief and touching forms which allow of its lessons becoming as household words. Truth in the Bible, as in nature, may admit of being constructed into a system, but it is not there so disposed to our hands. It has been a characteristic of the genius of the East, that it should do its work after this manner—this, to us, uncertain, irregular, unsystematic manner. Who thinks of looking to that quarter of the world for an Aristotle in philosophy, or a Thucydides in history? The sacred writers teach in all things after the manner of their race, and it is a sorry criticism which expects them to do otherwise. Much of the incompleteness, the difference, the seeming inconsistency and contradiction in the inspired writings, is precisely what was to have been expected in the writings of such men. It is never their manner to seem to anticipate what the sceptical or captious may be disposed to urge against them. They speak with an authority and an earnestness which does not comport with their descending to circumlocution, discrimination, and delays for any such purpose. Brief, abrupt, are they, in their utterances, and at times very bold withal in their use of figures, after the manner no less natural to them as Orientalists. The Bible, accordingly, while free from real disagreements, is one of the easiest books in the world on which to get up a silly or a jesuitical show of disagreement.

Further: it is, we think, quite legitimate to say that the idea of inspiration does not oblige us to suppose that the historical statements contained in the Scriptures will be given in all cases

in exact *chronological order*. Among the Asiatic nations of antiquity, history in the scientific and philosophical sense was little understood. The writings of this nature possessed by them were few and singularly fragmentary. They consisted of rude jottings, or of hints given by the pencil only, rather than of a complete or continuous picture entitled to the name of history. The marvel with us should be, not that the Hebrew histories bear so little resemblance to the models of historical composition which classical antiquity has handed down to us, as that they should be found to suffer so little when brought into such comparison. Down to the time when these classical models made their appearance, no other nation had an historical literature that could be placed beside those models without suffering immeasurably more. Nevertheless, it is admitted that the Hebrew historians, and the evangelists also, often write with a measure of negligence as to dates, and the order of time, not accordant with our canons of criticism in such matters. The explanation here is, that where the exact relations of time were not of any moral significance, it was common with oriental scribes to pay little regard to them. On the whole, there is much less of this nature in the historical portions of the Bible than we might have supposed would be found there. Concerning dates there is often obscurity—sometimes difficulty in this shape is insuperable—and the differences between the Jewish modes of computation and our own often contribute to our perplexity; but nothing of moment, nothing that should affect an honest man's faith, has been left to depend on the settlement of such questions.

It will not, we think, be too much for us further to say—that should there be parts of the Sacred Writings which seem to present real discrepancy, or even contradiction, *the inspiration of these writings as a whole ought not to be rejected on that account*. When a known liar utters an apparent falsehood, we readily conclude that in all probability the apparent lie will prove to have been a real one. But should a man of known veracity be charged with having uttered a falsehood, we feel that the presumption is as a thousand to one on the side of the charge being a calumny. And is the Bible the only witness in whose case character is not to be thus regarded? Men there are, who, to vent their spleen against this book, do habitually refuse it the benefit of this rule of judgment. In the Hebrew and Christian Scriptures, while coming to us from so many hands, and through so many remote centuries, the obscure and the doubtful are as the dust of the balance compared with the clear and the manifestly truthful; and we hold that in such a case, it is no more than an

act of simple justice towards character to allow to the difficult passages of the Bible the benefit of any solution that may be offered with only a probable, or even a possible ground of truth to sustain it. It is true, if only one clearly erroneous statement could be proved against an inspired writer, the inspiration of the writer in relation to such matter as that statement might contain would fall. But it would not follow that he has not been inspired to write anything, because he has not been inspired to write everything he has written. We do not ourselves believe in the case here supposed, as a case existing, but we can easily conceive of such partial inspiration as a possibility. And supposing apparent error to present itself even in relation to the graver matters of the record, it would still behove us, if we would acquit ourselves as honest and devout men, carefully to inquire—Am I sure that this record is authentic—that it has not been corrupted by some later hand? Or am I sure that the statement which has to *me* the appearance of contradiction, has not this appearance purely from my ignorance of something else which the writer himself knew, or from its having relation to a matter above my comprehension?

Much of the difficulty felt in such connexions, springs from the assumption, that to suppose a revelation to be made to man at all, is to suppose an end to all perplexity in relation to the matters of which it treats. We find nothing in nature or providence to suggest any such conclusion—much rather to suggest the contrary. Our only warrant from that quarter is, that a revelation may be expected to abate some of our more pressing forms of difficulty; not that it will be found to remove difficulty altogether. We sometimes speak of the temple of truth in which man worshipped at the first as having been shaken and reduced to fragments by the fall. But if we suppose those fragments all restored to their place, and the edifice to be reconstructed, still this would be, if we may so speak, only *man's* truth in *this world*, it would not be *God's* truth as developed *through the universe*, still less would it be his truth as it has existed in *Himself* from eternity. Hence, from the fall of man, and the incoming of new truth by inspiration, to meet this new exigency, we should be prepared to expect glimpses into a much higher department of the Divine agency. But it is in the nature of glimpses to enlighten but in part, leaving much around them and beyond them in darkness and mystery. It belongs, also, to the light coming to us from such a region, that it should suggest new difficulties while abating the old. The known is ever thus related to the unknown. No creature can ever rise to a higher condition than that of a being dwelling in light which is ever verging upon darkness. The need of our existence is, that we



should have done with *sin*, not that we should have done with mystery. To be before the throne of the Infinite, is to be before an infinite—an everlasting mystery! In all things—in the natural, the moral, and the religious, we know but in part—*can* know but in part—and we often interpret truth as untruth, because we do not see it in its entirety. In all the steps of moral and religious inquiry men may err *if they will*. The Bible of the naturalist does not secure any man against that, nor the Bible of the Christian either. The only difference here is, that as the light in the latter case has been greater, so the guilt of the false reading has been greater. We repeat, therefore, that it behoves us to guard against supposing that we are at liberty to reject the inspiration of the Scriptures, because we find some passages there which need a light we do not possess to give to them a clear and consistent meaning. The accidents of time, or the necessary weakness of our nature, may have been the cause of such perplexity, and nothing really affecting the truth of things as contained in the Scriptures.

Of that class of alleged discrepancies which were the natural result of a gradually developed scheme of truth we have already spoken. And it is not needful, we hope, that we should say anything further in refutation of that shallow philosophy which takes offence at the acts of Divine condescension in the early history of the world, on the ground—virtually if not confessedly—that while it is quite consistent with the character of the Almighty that he should be the Maker of the small as well as of the large in the universe, it is to degrade him to suppose that he should heed either the fall of the sparrow, or the beauty of the lily, when he has created them. The microscope administers the best rebuke to such folly. It is true the Great Ruler does all by means of law; but what is law without himself to originate, sustain, impel, and regulate it? The power in all powers is, must be, his own.

In nothing relating to this question is discrimination more necessary than in our attempts to *distinguish between what is contained in the Scriptures simply as matters of HISTORY, and what is there given as INSPIRED TRUTH*. We do not say, with Mr. Greg, that 'every dogma of religion, every idea of Deity, every conception of Deity,' contained in the Bible, 'came from God, in the natural and unequivocal sense of the expression.' On the contrary, we know that in the Scriptures there are many things relating to doctrine, duty, and fact, which are there simply because they belong to history, and which may be, more or less, the contrary of the truthful, though found in a book which, in its great purport and substance, consists of inspired—that is,

of pure truth. The Bible is, as it should be, a record of the ignorance of remote times, no less than of its knowledge. Not only good men, but bad men—Satan himself, is allowed to speak in it; and all speak in it in their real character. Even the good men who speak there, do not always speak wisely. Job's friends utter much false doctrine; and the patriarch himself curses the day of his birth. Throughout the Scriptures there is much to the same effect. There is, accordingly, a material distinction to be observed between what the Bible gives us as pertaining to history merely, and as uttered by ordinary and uninspired men, and what it gives us as the personal and proper teaching of men endowed with the Spirit of Inspiration. In the former case, we have to do with the purely human element, and with all its liability to err; in the latter, with the human as brought under so much of influence with the divine, as to preclude error. Even in this view, which, carried out, relieves the doctrine of inspiration from a large amount of difficulty, it will be rejected by Mr. Greg; but a little more of that 'clerical' training, of which our author sometimes speaks so scornfully, would have enabled him to state with more clearness and justice, the doctrine which it is his great aim to demolish. We believe, that what the sacred writers give us, on their own authority, as doctrine or duty, should be so received; and that what they give us, after the same manner, as history or science, should be received as the truth in history, and as the truth in science. Nor do we find anything in Mr. Greg's elaborate argument to invalidate the claims of inspiration within these limits.

The Bible is not responsible for the notions of its uninspired men about SCIENCE. The errors of such men belong to history, and, as so much history, may be given in the pages of inspiration, without detracting at all from their authority. In this sense, the science of the Bible should be the science of the times in which it was written, and of the people among whom it was written. It is not too much to say, that to be true as history, it must be in a great degree false as science.

But a careful distinction must be made between what the inspired writers give us as the common *notions of their time*, and what they present *on their own authority*, as being really *truth* or *fact*. Even in stating scientific facts, it may have been needful, if their statements were to be at all rightly understood by their contemporaries, that they should not state them in the manner according with our views of strict accuracy. Between the conventional science of those times, and the real science of our own, there is so wide a difference, that glimpses of the latter when presented, were not likely to be apprehended, except as

blended in some degree with the former. Nothing can be more absurd than to seem to say that Moses and the prophets could not have been inspired to become our teachers in *religion*, without being qualified to do all that has been done for us by Newton. Had the Bible anticipated modern science after this manner, it could never have obtained credence among the people to whom it was first addressed; and, as the consequence, it could never have reached us. Nay, more, in that case, in place of coming in so as to harmonize with the progressive laws of Providence, it would have come in as a violent infraction of those laws, disturbing them everywhere most disastrously. In the records of the Creation and of the Deluge, we no doubt have, in substance, historical and scientific truth; but that truth given in a form which is not a little obscure to us, from its being adapted in the first instance to races of men whose views on such subjects were of necessity greatly different from ours. That it might be truth to them, in so far as they were prepared to receive it, it is sometimes very obscure truth, or, in appearance, even untruth to us. When this subject is viewed dispassionately and intelligently, the marvel is, not that the difference between the Mosaic cosmogony and our own should be such as it sometimes seems, but rather, that amid all the obscurity natural to such a very ancient record on such a subject, the substantial agreements should be such as we find. It was not possible that a description in strict accordance with the science of our time should have been credible, or even intelligible, to the man of that time. But terms, phrases, forms of thought proper to the men of that age, have not been so far conformed to, as to prevent the indication of some of those great laws of succession in the history of creation, which could not have been the discoveries of science then, but which are ranked among such results now. In facts of this nature, we have as large an amount of the consistent—of the manifestly truthful—in this department, as it would be reasonable to expect.

Nor are we at all surprised that the sacred writers should make use of the philosophical ideas of their time—though not ideas according to the truth of science, as now understood—for the purpose of illustrating spiritual truth. Whether a corn of wheat cast in the ground must die before it can vegetate, or not—whether man's nature consists of body and soul, or of body and soul and spirit, or not; if ideas of this nature were then common, the analogical use of them for religious purposes was, we must contend, consistent with wisdom, and with the strictest sincerity. That demoniacal possessions were a popular misconception, and that Jesus and his apostles confirmed the populace

in its delusion on that point, either from being themselves in the same state of ignorance, or that they might serve their own ends by that means, is a view of things announced with the utmost confidence in some quarters. But our own faith in Jesus would come to an end, if we could regard him as being either the imbecile or the hypocrite which this theory supposes. Demoniacal possessions do not happen now—of course they have never happened at all! The demons do not speak or act as they would have done if *we* had been their prompters—of course there could be nothing of the demon in what was said or done! The men were mad—simply mad; and Mr. Greg seems much pleased with the opportunity of informing us, that the finding of the long-promised Messiah in the person of Jesus of Nazareth is before us in history as the discovery of madmen! Verily, these Naturalists *are* most religious people—after a fashion!

What we say of the Science of the Sacred Writings, we say of their History—what is given as from man, is from man; what is given as from God, is from God. If we suppose history to be employed as the vehicle of revealed truth to man, it is anything but reasonable to suppose that the history in such case will be false. Dogmatic truth, if mixed up with historic falsehood, would be sure to suffer much from being found in such company. It is possible, indeed, that the dogma should be veracious, while the history is not so. But our question here is about the *probable*, not about the *possible*. Are we to suppose that the historical element has been left so loose as to become false—as to tell that certain things were said or done which were not said or done? For the greater part, the presence of the divine with the human, in such portions of Scripture, may have been simply negative—guarding against error, but leaving the natural knowledge, and the general integrity of the writer, in large freedom. In other cases, the divine influence would be necessary to aid the memory, and sometimes directly to reveal facts that could not otherwise have been known. Moses could not have written even on natural subjects as he has done, had not those subjects been revealed to him. In his account of the creation, tradition may have aided him, but it could have aided him only in part. In the case of the Evangelists, also, something more than an assistance of the memory was necessary, inasmuch as they record many things which they did not see or hear, and which they could not have reported to us truly except under a special guidance. But where that influence is at all—even in its negative form merely—the result to us, though in a large degree the word of man, is truly the word of God; that is, a record guaranteed as faithful by a divine intervention. The expression, ‘it is

written,' refers to what is written as being authoritative, final; and this must embrace all that has been written, so as to take the divine authority along with it—to history with the rest. We take the historical Scriptures in this manner along with the other Scriptures, because the inspired writers do all so take them. But in reference to historical fact, no less than in reference to a religious doctrine, it is important to observe whether the statement of it be made by an inspired writer, and on his authority as such, or by some uninspired person, and on no more than human authority. In the latter case, though found in the Scriptures, and found there even as proceeding from good men, it is not necessarily true. Good men do often fail in memory, and have no special security against being deceived; and the history of such men, to be faithful, must give us the fruit of their weakness, as well as of their strength. The historical Scriptures are designed to give us the character of the people among whom they were written, and of the times generally from which we have received them. On this ground, we can conceive of it as highly important that the sacred narrative should present to us much that is historically truthful, but which cannot be regarded as ethically just, or as religiously pure. In such cases, the general teaching of Scripture is at hand, to enable us to distinguish between the right and the wrong, the true and the false. But we see mischief, and mischief only, as consequent on the theory which supposes that the sacred writers may have been inspired as religious teachers, and at the same time liable to err egregiously as historians. The harmony of these views of Inspiration with the *contents* of the Scriptures will claim our attention presently.

We have said so much concerning the THEOLOGICAL element in the sacred writings, that we need not recur to that topic in this place, further than to observe, that it is a great mistake to suppose that the difficulty in reference to the doctrine of Inspiration is all but annihilated, by limiting that influence to the purely religious element. Is it possible, in all cases, to draw the line with clearness and certainty between the moral and religious, and that which may not be so described? Is it not, in fact, to the religious element of the Bible, more than to its subordinate material, that exception is taken by the opponents of inspiration? The sceptic may seem, for a season, to be directing his appliances mainly against the outworks of the Bible—its History and Science—but be assured of it, this is done, that, so much impediment being cleared away, the citadel itself, consisting of the moral and religious truth, may be brought to the ground. The scientific and the historical do not stand alone. The moral and religious arise out of them, are intertwined with them, are committed by

them. To attempt to separate these woven threads, is to be involved in hopeless perplexity.

We have touched, also, to some extent, on the **MORALITY** of the Sacred Scriptures in reference to the doctrine of Inspiration. No book can be true as to its religion, which is not true as to its morality. Man's moral obligations come from his moral nature, and that nature is of God. In dealing with those facts of Scripture to which exception has been taken on moral grounds, it is important, if possible, to seize on some general principles that may assist in the wise interpretation of them. Whatever the God of *Providence* is seen to do, the God of *Revelation* may be supposed to have been at full liberty to do; and what the God of revelation may consistently *do*, he may cause to be *recorded*; and what he causes to be recorded at all, he may cause it to be recorded by *inspiration*. This course of argument, if duly followed up, will suffice to meet nearly all the objections of the Naturalist, as relating to the theology or the morality of the Bible. Here, too, the principle already appealed to comes again into action—viz., that the Bible is not responsible for all that it **CONTAINS**, but only for what it **APPROVES**. This principle requires that we should distinguish between what is done by Scripture characters under the guidance of their own passions, and what is done by them in obedience to a divine command. Whatever we find in the lives of Scripture characters contrary to the clear and settled principles of Scripture morality cannot have been recorded for our imitation. Even in the case of inspired men themselves, we are not bound to regard all they *do* as done through inspiration, because certain things *said* or *written* by them were given forth under that guidance. Balaam was inspired, but it is written of him that he 'loved the wages of unrighteousness,' and we know that he was a party to acts of monstrous wickedness. We hold the Psalms of David to be among the most precious of inspired compositions; but is the life of David, in its earlier or later stages, a life of the faultless? Peter, even after the day of Pentecost, could dissemble, so that Paul felt it needful 'to withstand him to the face, because he was to be blamed.'

We repeat, therefore, that it is from the **CLEAR AND GENERAL TEACHING OF SCRIPTURE** that we must judge of *particular actions* in the lives of *good* or *bad* men. In many cases, the morality of what is done depends altogether on the special mandate enjoining it. The thing done, indeed, must, even in such cases, be something in itself right to be done: but the right of its being done by him who does it, may depend wholly on his being commissioned to the doing of it. The Canaanites deserved all that came upon them; but the Israelites would have done wrong in

dealing with them as they did, apart from the command given them to that end. God must always do right, but the means by which the right shall be done, it remains with him to choose. He may distribute his justice by conscious or unconscious agencies,—by the hands of man, or by the elements. Men may work retributively under his direction, but they must not presume to take such work unbidden out of his hand. Concerning the principles of morality, as directly and formally inculcated in the Scriptures, we need say little, inasmuch as the excellence of these has been generally admitted. The difficulty has been, how to reconcile particular facts with such principles. Our own feeling is, that where the special intervention of the divine authority does not furnish the solution, it will in general be supplied by the rule distinguishing between the matters of Scripture recorded as being *approved*, and those recorded only as *history*. In the application of this principle, there is room for considerable difference of judgment, consistently with an enlightened and firm hold on the doctrine of Plenary Inspiration. We have seen how we must deal with the book of Job—putting aside the false, as uttered by Satan; and the partially false, as uttered by the friends of the patriarch, and even by Job himself; that we may, at last, separate from these accumulations of error the residuum of inspired truth. But is this the only portion of the Old Testament where such discrimination is needed? The imprecatory portions of the Psalms, for example, how are we to deal with them? It may be said that they are prophetic. But can this be said to have been the case with *all* of them? And, *could* this be said, they were surely matters of literal history *at the time*. Can any man say that there is nothing in these breathings of vengeance that should not belong to his own daily habit of mind? Who, with the New Testament before him, does not feel that this cannot so be? How is it that devout persons, in their family reading, so commonly avoid these portions of the sacred records? When the captive Hebrew calls for vengeance on his Babylonian oppressors, for vengeance as terrible as those oppressors had inflicted on him and his nation, the poet-psalmist speaks as a man and a patriot; but no one, we suppose, will say that it becomes us to insist, after this manner, on having—upon the principle of the *lex talionis*, the principle of justice without mercy—an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth. Now, may it not have seemed good to the Holy Ghost that these expressions of natural feeling should be found in the Bible, without his intending to place them before us as exhibiting the spirit we should emulate? In so far as these imprecations were expressive of the judgments which God *would* bring on the wicked men or nations to which

they refer, they were prophetic and inspired; but in so far as they were expressive of the merely human feeling natural to the circumstances of the times, they may be regarded as having their place within the inspired records without being there as the result of direct and positive inspiration, or as being divinely approved. Thus the divine predictions, which consist of pure truth, may have been grafted upon elements in human history which partook in a measure of human infirmity. The ethical in such passages was in great part of man, and may not have been without fault; while the prophetic was of God, and consisted of truth only. The principle cannot be too carefully borne in mind in reading the Bible—that human feelings are not always given as examples of the virtuous, because they are given as facts in history.

There is no incident in the Old or New Testaments, we presume, presenting greater difficulty in this form than that with which the Song of Deborah is connected. (Judges, iv.) Even that incident, however, admits of being greatly softened, if not thoroughly vindicated, by an application of the fair principles of criticism; and ceases to be a stumbling-block at all, if it be regarded as coming within the compass of the rule now under consideration.

In itself, the story is by no means at variance with the rude notions of justice natural to such an early stage of civilization. Society, as it existed in Syria in those days, was of the order in which violence begets violence, and in which deeds that would be highly criminal among us, take with them scarcely any sense of evil. Deborah, indeed, is before us as a prophetess, at whose bidding the Hebrews go to war and victory; and Jael, who entices the defeated general Sisera to her roof, in violation of the acknowledged laws of hospitality, kills him while asleep. This happened, too, while there was peace between the country of Jael and the country of Sisera. Nevertheless, Deborah, in a national ode, subsequently written, pronounces Jael blessed among women, because of her deed in cutting off Sisera. Now, before judging of this fact, it is to be remembered that, for many long years, this Sisera had 'mightily oppressed Israel;' and that there is every reason to believe that the peace granted by this pitiless freebooter to the country of Jael had been of the sort which makes the extortions and oppressions of peace nearly as hard to bear as the horrors of war. There were, moreover, ties of affinity between Jael and her people, as descended from Jethro, the father-in-law of Moses, and the oppressed Israelites; and, on all these grounds, it was scarcely unnatural that both peoples should have looked with a feeling of common execration upon their common oppressor, in the day of his



reverses. Such rude forms of vengeance are natural in such conditions of society. It is clearly the law of Providence that it should be so, and that such deeds should come, in their season, upon the class of delinquents who identify themselves with those monstrous forms of wrong and tyranny which drive even the wise to madness. In much more civilized communities, we sometimes see manifestations of the power—the resistless power—which belongs to these retributive instincts of humanity. Let a Robespierre be brought to the ground, and nature's law seems to proclaim that judgment in such cases should be direct, summary, and pitiless. Such miscreants have lived in defiance of all law, and they die without the protections of law. The probability is, that Sisera richly deserved his fate, and that even from the hand of the people represented by Jael. But if even this fact, the most perplexing, perhaps, in its moral aspect of any in the sacred writings, admits of explanation so nearly, if not altogether satisfactory, it is easy to see what might be done with other incidents to which the same kind of exception has been taken.

This, however, is not all. We are entitled to ask—Is it certain that the song of Deborah should be regarded by us as consisting of inspired truth, simply because we find it in Scripture-history? It is true she was a prophetess, and we can suppose her to have been inspired in calling on Barak to go forth against Sisera, for in that she says the Lord was with her. But in the national ode commemorative of that event she does not so speak of the guidance under which she writes, and the question arises—may she not in this have given expression to the feeling of her people, and to nothing more? In this view, the ode of Deborah would have its place with the speeches of the friends of Job, or with the language of Job himself when under peculiar exercises of mind, leaving us to distinguish between the correct feeling found in it, and harmonizing with the general teaching of Scripture, and some excess of feeling at variance with that standard.

Some pious and well-meaning persons, whose idea of inspiration has been taken up without much consideration, from the language common among us on this subject, may feel a little apprehensive lest, by admitting this principle of interpretation, they should so unsettle the authority of Scripture as to prepare the way for much error. We sincerely respect this feeling. But it should be remembered by such persons, that *some* discrimination of this sort is unavoidable if we are not to fall into errors of a mischievous—a fatal description in the other extreme. The question here, accordingly, cannot be about the *principle*, it must be purely about the extent to which it may be applied.

It is quite true that ‘*all* Scripture,’ as being ours by inspiration of God, is ‘profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for

instruction in righteousness' (2 Tim. iii. 16); but it will not be said that *every* Scripture is profitable to *all* these ends, nor that *every* Scripture is designed to be useful after *the same manner*. Whatever the Scriptures contain, is there according to the will of the all-inspiring Spirit, and, in this view, is of 'the word of God;' but while some parts of Scripture give us the truth we should embrace, others set forth the errors we should reject; and while some encourage us by examples of virtue, others warn us by examples of the contrary. The point to be determined is, whether such sentiment, or such conduct, as we feel ought not to be our own, can have been recorded by inspiration in any case, so as to involve the Divine approval? In other words, are we to connect our idea of inspiration, in this direct and positive sense of it, with the Hebrew patriot who heaps curses upon his enemies, or with the mind of Christ when he says, 'bless your enemies—bless, and curse not?'

We all know that inspiration did not make the inspired one perfect, but that it accomplished its purpose through the human agent, notwithstanding the necessary infirmity of that agent. God may send a message of pure truth through one by no means free from mental or moral imperfection, and by one whose defects of this nature may come out conspicuously in connexion with the delivering of that message. It was so in a measure with Job, in a greater degree with Deborah and David, and in a greater degree still with Jonah and Balaam.

But having gone thus far, may we not safely go a little further, and ask—May not a man who is inspired as to what he *writes* or *delivers*, and not always as to what he *does*; and who gives utterance to some things by a *positive inspiration*, and to others only by a *negative guidance*, or permission—may not such a man, when speaking only in connexion with this latter influence, be sometimes allowed to speak so purely from himself, as to evince more of the infirmity of the man than of the inspiration of the prophet? Have we not a case manifestly to this effect in the history of Jonah? We may regard the message of the prophet to the people of Nineveh as an inspired message; but how much was said and done by the prophet, when sent to deliver that message, that cannot be regarded for a moment as proceeding from a good influence of any description? In this view, there is nothing that should surprise us in the language of Job or Deborah, or in those portions of the Psalms to which reference has been made. It is God condescending to engraft the perfect on the imperfect—the true upon the erring.

We should add, however, that in respect to the inspired writers of the New Testament, we do not see the need of any application of this rule of interpretation *beyond the limits in which it is*

*by common consent admitted.* It is in relation to those earlier Scriptures, which have descended to us from times so peculiar and remote, and in which the historical element is so much more conspicuous than the doctrinal, that this somewhat larger application of the rule explained seems to be demanded. Even in that connexion, we do not press it on those who do not feel their need of it; but we must say that, to ourselves, there is no comparison to be made between the difficulty of receiving the doctrine of inspiration subject to this restriction, and that of rejecting it altogether. Mr. Greg, indeed, will no doubt say, that, by placing this limit to the doctrine, we deprive it of all 'dogmatic value;' and that we go to the Scriptures, in this case, not for what we are to learn there, as being the matter of an external revelation, but for what we are to find there as being already revealed within ourselves. But it is not so. The written word, even in this view of it, possesses all the authority it need to possess. We receive its moral teaching, not because we have learnt it all before from what we find within us, but because it consists of doctrine embodied in facts which we could not otherwise have known; and in moral principles set forth so *clearly* and *constantly*, that to reject them as so conveyed would be to discard the entire volume as unmeaning. The moral *standard* thus supplied, is clear enough to determine all *exceptions*—and while it may *approve* itself to man, it *comes* from God. We are not ignorant of the device which would annihilate the claims of inspiration, by making it include so much as to become absurd, or so little as to be worthless.

We have thus given a much larger space than usual to the consideration of two points in relation to this subject:—first, to the testimony of Scripture concerning the Fact of the Inspiration of the sacred writers; and, second, to some inquiry respecting the Nature of the Inspiration under which they may be supposed to have written. But a third point now arrests our attention, and the point which, with Mr. Greg and all writers of his class, is of much greater weight than either of the preceding,—viz. the alleged inconsistency of this theory as to the origin of the Scriptures, regarding them simply as *documents of history*. If, as Mr. Greg contends, the evidence in respect both to the date and authorship of these documents is, for the most part, defective, and anything but satisfactory; and if they are disfigured almost throughout by improbabilities, discrepancies, and contradictions, then, of course, no assertion on the part of the writers themselves as to their own inspiration, and no speculation on our part as to the probable nature of the influence intended by the word inspiration, can be

of any value. In that case the doctrine falls to the ground, however clearly it may have been asserted, and however intelligible it may have been made to appear.

Mr. Greg's argument in this department fills more than half his volume. It consists of selections from all the stock material on this subject, now placed in such vigorous requisition in so many quarters. His censures on the theology and morality of the Hebrew Scriptures we have in some measure dealt with. His objections of an historical nature to the canon of the Old Testament agree in substance with those of Professor Newman in his 'Hebrew Monarchy,' and they are in a good degree answered by anticipation in our review of that publication.\* Here we have the old story about the Book of the Law as found in the time of Josiah; and about the Pentateuch as certainly not written by Moses, seeing that there are insertions in it by some other hand, and that would appear to point to a time later than the age of Moses. Here, too, we have the usual summary of objections founded on the alleged differences between what are called the Elohist and Jehovist documents, supposed to have been used in the composition of the Pentateuch. These objections are urged without the slightest attention to what has been done by such men as Hengstenberg and Haevernick to obviate them, and done for the most part so successfully. In conclusion, our author becomes very wroth with two great churchmen—Dr. Whewell and Dr. Buckland—because, in their simplicity, they have ventured to intimate that the commentators on the scientific notices of Scripture in a past age have not shown themselves infallible, and might possibly have modified their expositions of such passages if they had lived in our time! Not only must the Bible, it seems, be responsible for the errors of those who undertake to expound it—its interpreters must not share in any advantage from the progress of intelligence, but the weaknesses which have encrusted themselves upon the text once, must remain upon it for ever! Liberal sir! this is somewhat hard measure.

If we give a short space now to some examination of that 'higher criticism,' as it is called, which Mr. Greg has brought to test the 'origin and fidelity of the Gospel history,' it is because something of this nature is requisite to the completeness of our purpose in this paper, and because such discussions are now much forced upon us—and not on account of anything special in Mr. Greg's mode of dealing with the subject.

One of the objections frequently and strongly pressed, in the work before us, against the claims in the narratives of the Gospel is, that they include accounts of much that was said or done

\* Vol. viii., p. 26 *et seq.*

which the writers themselves could not have heard or seen. It is scarcely necessary to remark, that this is no more than may be said of nearly all history. As a rule, it is ours at second-hand—only as the exception from the immediate witnesses. We need not say anything of the candour of this objection, in this view; nor of the inference that must be deduced from it in reference to history generally, if it were admitted as valid. Mr. Greg's pages, show, moreover, that he does not need to be apprised of the fact, that incidents and conversations were preserved in an oral form in those days, and passed from man to man in that shape, with a degree of accuracy of which we in this age of writing and printing have no just idea. Beside which, who in our time shall say what the sources of information were to which the Evangelists had access in reference to things they did not see or hear? And not to dwell on such points, it should be manifest at a glance, that this objection begs the whole question of inspiration. For if the Evangelists were inspired, that influence may have given them a supernatural knowledge of the past, as well as of the invisible and the future.

It is not necessary that we should concern ourselves in this place with the question about the language in which Matthew wrote his Gospel. If written first in Hebrew, or Aramean, it is evident that the Greek Gospel which now bears his name, was known as εὐαγγέλιον κατὰ Ματθαῖον, and received as authoritative and sacred among Christians generally, so early as in the lifetime of the Apostle John. Papias, who, in the beginning of the second century, testifies to this effect, on the authority of John the Presbyter, was a hearer of that elder in the church at Ephesus, and the elder himself had been a *disciple of our Lord*. Mr. Greg refers us to the attempts of certain critics, German and English, to throw doubt over this inconvenient conclusion. Our author holds to the idea that Matthew wrote in Hebrew; and insists that we know not who translated the Hebrew Gospel into Greek—that we have no means of testing the fidelity of the translation, supposing it to have been made—and that evidence is not wanting to show that it is no translation at all, but an independent, and a very faulty production. For our present purpose, it is sufficient that Papias deposes to the existence of a Greek Gospel of Matthew as generally received at the beginning of the second century; and if that Gospel was not the same that we now possess, but another, it remains for Mr. Greg's critics to show when and where the change of the later for the earlier took place. This they have not done—have never attempted to do—cannot do. It remains for the said critics, moreover, to show why the testimony of antiquity should be taken so readily and so fully

as to the fact that Matthew did write his Gospel in Hebrew, and be rejected so uncereemoniously when speaking with quite as much explicitness of the Greek Gospel, as being the same, and of equal authority with, the Hebrew. The first Gospel *may* have been written in Hebrew, and may have been translated *by* Matthew, *under the direction* of Matthew, or *independently* of him, and the value of the document remain substantially the same. The testimony of Papias presents the authority of the Greek Gospel as settled in his time by the common judgment of Christians: all subsequent testimony is to the same effect, and that is sufficient for our purpose. Mr. Greg, indeed, as his manner is, rejects a testimony of Eusebius, which is favourable to the character of Papias, and accepts one which is unfavourable, and, writing him down as a weak man, straightway concludes that 'little reliance' can be placed on testimony as coming through such a channel, even when relating to facts of common notoriety!

Our author deals in the same light fashion with the testimony of Papias concerning Mark, and his alleged relation to Peter. Contrary to Mr. Greg, we think the probability is, that the three Marks mentioned in the New Testament were the same person. It is true, Mark does not appear to have been an eye-witness of the scenes he describes; but that he should have written, as he is said to have done, under the authority of Peter is strictly credible—not to say that, supposing him to have been *divinely* aided at all, we must suppose him to have been aided to a degree sufficient for the work assigned him.

That Luke was the author of the Gospel which bears his name is so manifest from history, that Mr. Greg's only objection to his authority is, that he, too, must have reported what he has transmitted to us from second-hand.

But in judging of the authorship of the fourth Gospel, Mr. Greg professes to be in so much difficulty as hardly to know what decision to adopt. Nevertheless, before he concludes, the scale turns, as usual, pretty strongly on the sceptical side. Some attempt is made to show that possibly the author of this Gospel was not John the apostle, who dwelt at Ephesus, but John the Presbyter, who had his home there. But the testimony of Irenæus (A.D. 178) is sadly in the way of this conclusion. Then great importance is attached to the fact, that scenes at which John was present, according to the other Gospels, are not described in his own Gospel; and this omission is interpreted as 'fatal either to the reality of the events in question, or to the 'genuineness of the fourth Gospel.'—(p. 87.) But might not the very fact that these scenes had been described before be the reason why they are not described again? Can Mr. Greg *never*

allow a little common discernment to do its office in *favour* of the Sacred Writers as well as *against* them? He adds:—

‘Thus much, however, seems certain and admitted;—that if the Gospel in question were the genuine composition of the Apostle John, it must have been written when he was at least ninety years of age—when his recollections of conversations and events which had passed sixty years before had become faint and fluctuating—when ill-digested Grecian learning had overlaid the simplicity of his fisherman’s character, and his Judaic education—and the scenes and associations of Ionia had overpowered and obscured the recollections of Palestine. It therefore becomes, as we shall see hereafter, an inquiry only of secondary moment. In this case also, as in that of Matthew, we may remark that the Evangelist relates events long past, and at which he was not present, as minutely and dramatically as if they had occurred yesterday, and in his presence.’—pp. 87, 88.

What Greek learning might possibly do for a needy fisherman we will not attempt to conjecture; but assuredly something very like inspiration *must*, in this case, have aided the *memory* of the man, if we suppose the history he has given us to be *true*; or his *genius*, if we suppose it to be for the greater part an *invention*. The Christ of John’s Gospel the invention of a self-educated fisherman! We are sorry to see Mr. Greg among the class of persons—too large in our day—who seem to be capable of believing anything rather than the Bible.

Mr. Greg next touches on the theories of critics as to the probable origin of the Gospels. For ourselves, we have no doubt that the Evangelists availed themselves freely of such memoranda and traditions concerning the life and teaching of their Lord as were accessible to them. Such was manifestly the course pursued by the Evangelist Luke;—‘Forasmuch as many have taken ‘in hand to set forth in order a declaration of those things that are ‘most surely believed among us, *even as they delivered them unto ‘us which from the beginning were eye-witnesses* and ministers of the ‘word.’ The influence vouchsafed to these persons was designed to *regulate* and *supplement* the exercise of all their natural capabilities in their search after truth, and not by any means to supersede such effort. Divine wisdom bestows the supernatural only at the point where the natural is found to be inadequate to the divine purpose. The question—the great question—here is, do we find the contents of the Gospels presenting those features of accuracy and truthfulness which may be expected to characterise documents inspired as we believe the Scriptures generally to have been? This question opens a wide field. Mr. Greg occupies about a hundred pages in his attempt to show that the Gospels and the Epistles exhibit so much that is discrepant,

contradictory, erroneous, and unworthy, as to demonstrate, not only that they have not come to us from a divine source, but that their purely human authorship was of a very imperfect description. To answer these objections fully, we should need to have similar space at our command—a few selections of a nature to indicate the character of our author's reasoning in this connexion must suffice; and in making these selections, we shall confine ourselves to the objections taken to the first of the Gospels, which present a fair sample of what follows, and will suffice to show how the whole may be disposed of.

Matthew wrote his Gospel mainly with a view to the edification of Jewish converts. As might be expected, he often cites the language of the Old Testament in its relation to the life of Jesus as the promised Messiah. In the early part of this narrative, four passages are given as containing prophetic intimations of events to be connected with the early history of the greater than Moses. One of these is in Isaiah, vii., 'a virgin shall conceive,' &c.: the second in Hosea, xi., 'out of Egypt have I called my son;' the third in Jeremiah, xxxi., 'In Rama there was a voice heard,' &c.; and the fourth in Judges, xiii., 'The child shall be a Nazarite,' &c. In the view of Mr. Greg—who herein, as elsewhere, is merely a follower of Strauss, De Wette, and others—the Evangelist in this connexion has taxed our credulity somewhat severely in many ways. First, he has put a meaning on these passages which no man of common sense would suspect as proper to them; second, he has imagined miracles, and would-be historical circumstances, that the passages so interpreted may not lack corroboration; and, finally, the things so imagined are in themselves in the highest degree improbable, if not manifestly untrue.

Here it is natural to inquire—if this be a just view of the matter, is it not strange that a Gospel, the verity of which was open to such easy and destructive impeachment, should have been received among Christians generally as truthful and authoritative, even while some who had been disciples of the Lord were still living? Is it not to be abundantly credulous in another direction to suppose, that the miraculous appearances connected with the Annunciation, the Conception, and the Flight into Egypt—that the latter event itself, the story of the Magi, and the story of the slaughter of the Infants by Herod, should all have been the inventions of Matthew, published within some fifty years after the death of Jesus, and while some who had listened to the instructions of Jesus still remained, and that notwithstanding all these astounding fabrications, if fabrications they were, the Gospel of Matthew should have been received, as



we see it to have been, before the close of the first century? The belief of Christians may have its difficulties—but is the unbelief of some other people without them? In relation to the first of Matthew's citations, Mr. Greg says—'The conclusion is 'unavoidable, that the events said to have occurred in fulfilment 'of a prophecy, which Matthew *wrongly* supposed to have reference 'to them, were imagined or modified by him into accordance 'with the supposed prophecy; since it is certain that they did *not*, 'as he affirmed, take place, in order that the prophecy might be fulfilled.' (p. 99.) This is positive writing. The italics are not ours. It remains, after all, to be proved, that the events said to have taken place did not take place; and it remains still further to be proved, that the language of a Hebrew prophet may not have had an ulterior and a prophetic meaning, beyond its immediate and literal application. It should never be forgotten that the Old Testament was in all things as the shadow and preparation for the New. Pursuing this line of inquiry, says Mr. Greg—

'We find many instances in which this tendency in Matthew to find in Jesus the fulfilment of prophecies, which he erroneously conceived to refer to him, has led him to narrate circumstances respecting which the other evangelists are silent, as well as to give, with material (but *intentional*) variations, relations which are common to them all—a peculiarity which throws great suspicion over several passages. Thus, in ii. 13—15, we are told that immediately after the visit of the Magi, Joseph took Mary and the child and fled into Egypt, remaining there till the death of Herod, 'that it might be fulfilled that was spoken of the Lord by the prophet saying, 'Out of Egypt have I called my son.' Here is an event related, very improbable in itself, flatly contradicted by Luke's history, and which occurred, we are told, that a prophecy might be fulfilled, to which it has no reference, of which it was no fulfilment, and which, in fact, was no prophecy at all.'—pp. 99, 100.

So it runs—the alleged prophecy was no prophecy at all, and the event said to have been a fulfilment of prophecy had no existence, even as a piece of history. But is it so? It is true Matthew makes mention of a flight into Egypt which is not mentioned by Luke; and Luke mentions a visit of Joseph and Mary to Jerusalem, about forty days after the birth of the Saviour, of which we have no mention in Matthew. So far, it is clear, the statements of both writers may be correct, if only sufficient time for the two occurrences be allowed. What we find, so far, on comparing the two, is not contradiction, but greater fulness. But Luke, speaking of what was done at Jerusalem, forty days after the birth of the Saviour, adds, that these things being done,

‘they returned into Galilee, to their own city, Nazareth.’ Here everything depends on the question, whether the language of Luke obliges us to suppose that the return to Nazareth was *immediate*, so as to preclude all space for a return to Bethlehem, and the subsequent flight into Egypt. We do not feel that the language of Luke forces this conclusion upon us. Both writers agree in stating, that Joseph and Mary took up their abode in Nazareth, so that Jesus grew up there, and was reckoned as of that city. This is all that Luke is concerned to state, and so far he agrees with Matthew. But Matthew, who wrote with an object different from that of Luke, apprizes us that before the settlement in Nazareth, and of course subsequently to the journey of Joseph and Mary to Jerusalem, the Magi visited the ‘house’ of Mary at Bethlehem, and that to escape from the jealousy of Herod the family fled for awhile into Egypt. Here, again, on comparing the two narrations, we have greater *fulness*, but we have no *contradiction*. Mr Greg, indeed, following De Wette, describes Matthew as being ‘flatly contradicted’ by Luke; while, in fact, the sole difference is, that there is less fulness in either of the narrations, taken separately, than in the two taken together. It is as though Paul, who went into Arabia for a time after his conversion, before going to Jerusalem, should speak, in some particular connexion, of his going to Jerusalem after the scene at Damascus, without the mention of his going to Arabia, and the *omission* of a mention of that fact should be construed as a *denial* of it. Strange havoc should we make in history, if this principle of the ‘higher criticism’ were admitted as valid—the omission of an incident by one historian, being deemed enough to demonstrate its falsehood as given by another! Mr. Greg, however, is very fond of this principle, and often speaks of what is stated by one Evangelist, and not mentioned—or, to use his own word on such occasions, *ignored* by another—as becoming from that circumstance suspicious and apocryphal. Our author has a very sorry opinion of the logic which theologians commonly bring to investigations of this nature—we regret to see that his own stands in so much need of amending.

As we have seen, the supernatural relating to the Annunciation, and the events at Bethlehem, is wholly discarded by Mr. Greg, as scenes ‘imagined or modified’ by the Evangelist. Strauss, in taking this ground, is especially offended by the resemblance of some of these incidents to others in the earlier history of the Hebrews, and in this likeness of the later record to the earlier, he traces the evidence of its being nothing more than so much imitation and invention. Supposing the first record to have been proved a fiction, this inference would not be without

weight—but here the point to be proved is assumed. Supposing that first record true, the legitimate inference is on the other side. It avails little to describe the sojourn in Egypt as ‘improbable;’ opinions on that point may be strong on opposite sides, but opinion can settle nothing on questions of this nature. Concerning the alleged slaughter of the infants, Mr. Greg expresses himself thus—

‘We are told of Herod, when he found ‘that he was mocked by the wise men, was exceeding wroth, and sent forth and slew all the children that were in Bethlehem, and in all the coasts thereof, from two years old and under’—an act which is not suitable to the known character of Herod, who was cruel and tyrannical, but at the same time crafty and politic, not silly nor insane—which, if it had occurred, must have created a prodigious sensation, and made one of the most prominent points in Herod’s history—yet of which none of the other Evangelists, nor any historian of the day, nor Josephus (though he devoted a considerable portion of his history to the reign of Herod, and does not spare his reputation) makes any mention. But this also, according to Matthew’s notion, was the fulfilment of a prophecy. ‘Then was fulfilled that which was spoken by Jeremy the Prophet, saying, In Rama there was a voice heard, lamentation and weeping and great mourning, Rachel weeping for her children, and would not be comforted because they are not.’—pp. 100, 101.

With this extract, we give the following from Neander on the same subject:—

‘The account of the massacre of the infants at Bethlehem cannot appear incredible, when we consider the character of the man to whom this act of blind and senseless cruelty, worthy of an insane tyrant, is ascribed.

‘It was that HEROD, whose crimes, committed in violation of every natural feeling, ever urged him on to new deeds of cruelty; whose path to the throne, and whose throne itself, were stained with human blood; whose vengeance against conspirators, not satiated with their own destruction, demanded that of their whole families; whose rage was hot, up to the very hour of his death, against his nearest kindred; whose wife, Mariamne, and three sons, Alexander, Aristobulus, and Antipater, fell victims to his suspicions, the last just before his death; who, in a word, certainly deserved that the Emperor Augustus should have said of him, ‘*Herodis mallem porcus esse, quam filius.*’ It was that HEROD, who, at the close of a bloodstained life of seventy years, goaded by the furies of an evil conscience, racked by a painful and incurable disease, waiting for death but desiring life, raging against God and man, and maddened by the thought that the Jews, instead of bewailing his death would rejoice over it as the greatest blessing, commanded the worthies of the nation to be assembled in the circus, and issued a secret order that, after his death, they should all be slain together, so that their kindred at least might have cause to weep for

his death! Can we deem the crime of sacrificing a few children to his rage and blind suspicion too atrocious for such a monster?"—pp. 27, 28.

Mr. Greg is not ignorant of this passage in Neander, but gives his own statement in the face of it, with what degree of judgment or impartiality we must leave our readers to determine. In this connexion Mr. Greg adds—

'In this place we must notice the marked discrepancy between Matthew and Luke as to the original residence of the parents of Jesus. Luke speaks of them as living at Nazareth *before* the birth of Jesus; Matthew, as having left their former residence, Bethlehem, to go to Nazareth, only after that event, and from peculiar considerations.'—p. 101.

Now, Matthew does not say that Bethlehem was the 'residence' of the parents of Jesus before his birth, but simply states the fact that Jesus was born there; nor does he say that the parents of Jesus had their home in Nazareth 'only after that event,'—he contents himself with saying that they did take up their abode there after the sojourn in Egypt, and that by their so doing a prophecy was fulfilled. In the above few lines, Mr. Greg has used expressions which insinuate three charges of false statement against the Evangelist, all of which are unauthorised. In fact, the 'marked discrepancy' turns out to be no discrepancy at all, for nothing is here said by one Evangelist that is not in harmony with what is said by the other. They do not contradict, they merely supplement each other.

Concerning the visit of the Magi, of course to those who do not believe in the supernatural, the narrative is open to much exception; but to those who do, it exhibits no more of condescension to human ignorance or infirmity than might be expected at such times, and to such persons. Such a foreshadowing of His benign influences, who should be 'a light to lighten the Gentiles as well as the glory of his people Israel,' may be without beauty to Mr. Greg, but it is not so in our eyes. We take another instance from our author.

'In ch. xi. 12, is the following expression: '*And from the days of John the Baptist until now, the kingdom of Heaven suffereth violence, and the violent take it by storm.*' Now, though the meaning of the passage is difficult to ascertain with precision, yet the expression 'from the days of John the Baptist until now,' clearly implies that the speaker lived at a considerable distance of time from John; and though appropriate enough in a man who wrote in the year A.D. 65, or thirty years after John, could not have been used by one who spoke in the year A.D. 30, or 33, while John was yet alive. This passage, therefore, is from Matthew, not from Jesus.'—p. 113.

The preaching of John formed an epoch in the divine dispensations preparatory to the preaching of Jesus. He came in the spirit and power of Elias. When Jesus appeared, he disappeared. What more natural than that the interval marked by Elias's preaching should have had some moral feature characteristic of it? This is all the passage supposes; and to deny to the interval its characteristic simply because it was brief, is to betray great weakness, or a sad tendency towards fault-finding. The importance of the divine proceedings does not depend on the one quality of duration.

Farther—the formula of baptism, given by Jesus to his disciples just before his ascension, is described as the language of Matthew, and not of Jesus, because it includes a mention of ‘the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost,’ in a manner not unusual among Christians some time later, but unknown among them, so far as our information extends, at that time (p. 117). But what is more easy than to suppose that Jesus, foreseeing that such forms of expression were about to become familiar to his disciples everywhere, through the labours of his inspired ministers, should somewhat anticipate that coming state of things by expressing himself in this manner. It may be that the brief records of the earlier baptisms in the history of the church do not show that this form was uniformly or fully used even by apostolic men. But the fact that men are said to have been baptized ‘into the name of the Lord Jesus’ is no proof that they were not baptized into the name of the Father and the Holy Spirit also. The distinctive feature of Christian baptism was its relation to Christ as the promised Messiah;—the doctrine of the Father and of the Holy Ghost came necessarily and manifestly along with that doctrine. In like manner, more than one passage beside in Matthew’s Gospel is accounted spurious by our author, because it includes the word ‘church,’ and Jesus must not be supposed to have foreseen the use that would be made of that word by his disciples immediately after his decease. We scarcely need say, that if criticisms of this sort are to be admitted, it must be easy to dispose of the authority of the New Testament, or of any other book.

Strauss makes himself merry, though after awkward fashion, upon his understanding of Matthew, as representing Jesus as riding into Jerusalem on two asses at once. Mr. Greg makes his use of this supposed blunder. The truth is, however, Matthew describes Jesus as riding into the city on more garments than one, and not on more quadrupeds than one. It is true, two animals were brought, but the one was the foal of the other; and it was natural, on that account, that the two should come together, whether the two were to be used or not. Thus,

an item of description caught at as a weakness becomes a trait of truthfulness. But we forbear to go further—the remainder is to much the same effect. We say not that the labours of Mr. Greg's predecessors in this field have failed to call up any real difficulty; but we do say, after reading all that our author has brought together on this subject, and a great deal more, that, all things considered, the wonder should be, that the passages which require an elucidation that we cannot bring to them should be so few. Compared with the great substance of the entire volume, they are as the dust of the balance. In connexion with such views of Inspiration as we have now endeavoured to expound, the Book may stand—will stand, we believe, so long as the world shall stand. Its authority in this view is broad, unbroken, sufficient to its great mission.\*

There is one portion of Mr. Greg's reasoning to which we must still make some reference: it is the argument from miracles. In this argument, it is assumed that those who confide in evidence from this source, confide in it as being in itself decisive of the whole question, both as to Inspiration and Revelation. And many orthodox writers have no doubt expressed themselves incautiously on this subject, so as to lend to this charge some

\* One fact is much dwelt upon just now as being of itself quite sufficient to preclude all faith in the supposed inspiration of the apostles.—They unanimously 'and unquestioningly believed and taught,' says Mr. Greg, 'that the end of the world was at hand, and would arrive in the lifetime of the then existing generation. On this point there appears to have been no hesitation in their individual minds, nor any difference of opinion amongst them.'—(p. 181.) The passages cited in support of this statement are—James, v. 8; 1 John, ii. 18; 1 Peter, i. 5, 20; 1 Thess. iv. 15, 16, 17; 1 Cor. viii. 29. The language of James, and Peter, and John, described as setting forth this doctrine, is so brief, and so fairly open to a different interpretation, as to be by no means sufficient to sustain a dogma of such moment. Had the end of the world in the lifetime of that generation been the doctrine of these writers at all, it would assuredly have been so much uppermost in their mind as to have found its place in some form or other in every page of their writings, instead of being left to peep out, as it were, through two or three obscure expressions. Paul, indeed, in the two passages above referred to, speaks so as to seem to warrant some idea of this sort. But it so happens that Paul has become his own commentator in reference to those portions of his writings, and he tells us expressly that those who understood him as speaking then, as Mr. Greg and others understand him as speaking now, erred greatly; that whatever he may have appeared to say, it was by no means his intention to say '*the day of Christ is at hand*.' 'Let no man deceive you,' he adds, 'by any means, for that day shall not come, except there come a falling away first, and that man of sin be revealed, the son of perdition.' What more of the future the apostle saw we do not know, but it is clear he saw a widely-developed apostasy as to take place before any such event as some of the first Christians were expecting would be realized. Nor was this any new light: the apostle says he had never taught anything contrary to this doctrine. Many writers who make a great use of the passages which were misconstrued in the manner deprecated by the apostle, would seem to be wholly ignorant of the care evinced by him to guard himself against being so misapprehended, and we are sorry to find Mr. Greg in the number of these persons. See 2 Thess. ii. 1-17.

appearance of truth. But the fact is, the men who have seemed to take this view have not in reality so done. The fact that they have appealed to what is called the *internal* evidence of Christianity, as well as to the *external*, demonstrates that their faith has been the result, not of evidence from miracles alone, nor of evidence from the nature of the message so attested alone, but from the joint influence of both. Mr. Greg avails himself of all the usual means to weaken testimony in relation to miracles. He disputes the evidence on which they rest as supposed phenomena of history; he subjects the apparently miraculous to the severest philosophical scrutiny; he insists that the supposed possession of supernatural powers was not in all cases, even according to the Scriptures themselves, the guarantee of personal infallibility; and he maintains that, even supposing the supernatural to be proved, or at least to be placed beyond our power of disproof, it would yet remain to be shown that the physical phenomena so presented has proceeded from a power to be taken as an unerring guide on moral and religious questions. Accordingly, the words of Locke are cited as expressive of his own conviction in this matter—viz., ‘that the miracle is to be judged by the doctrine, and not the doctrine by the miracle.’ Now, in distinction from all this, we hold that the true ground of conviction to the Christian is not in the attestation to the miracle, taken separately, nor in the nature of the doctrine, taken separately, but in each as being corroborative of the other. We do not believe that the real miracle and the false doctrine have ever gone together, or ever will go together; but we nevertheless hold that, in the case supposed, both the miracle and the doctrine should be subject to scrutiny. We do not leave the evidence from miracles without value, because we do not regard it as superseding all other evidence; nor do we regard the evidence from the nature of the doctrine as being everything, because we hold that there is a place for that also within the range of Christian testimony.\* But, as we have before seen, it is the manner

\* One instance of an attempt to show that miracles and false teaching did in some cases go together we shall notice in this place, as it is one which has been put into much requisition of late: ‘The possession of miraculous and prophetic power,’ says Mr. Greg, ‘is distinctly recognised in individuals who not only were not divinely-authorized agents or teachers, but were enemies of God and of his people. Passing over the remarkable but inconclusive narratives relative to the Egyptian magicians and to Balaam, we find in Deut. xiii. 1-5 an express warning to the children of Israel against being led astray by those who should employ *real* miraculous or prophetic gifts to entice them away from the worship of Jehovah—a warning couched in language which distinctly expresses that the miracle must be judged of by the doctrine of the thaumaturgist, not be considered to authenticate it: ‘If there arise among you a prophet, or a dreamer of dreams, and giveth thee a sign or a wonder, and the sign or the wonder come to pass, whereof he spake unto thee, saying, Let us go after other gods, which thou hast not known, and let

of Mr. Greg to overlook, or to seem to overlook, this characteristic of moral evidence, as being of necessity short of demonstration, and always cumulative; and, as the consequence, we find him ever ready to fall into the error of supposing, that the evidence which is not decisive in itself, as regards the matter to which it relates, must be valueless in relation to it. If there be a God, there may be a miracle; and thus the evidence in relation to a miracle comes to be a matter of experience and testimony, which may vary through all conceivable grades of probability. But with Mr. Greg, probability, even in its highest form, does not wholly preclude doubt; and where there is the smallest doubt, it is natural that faith should droop and become extinct. Such is the conclusion—the conclusion of an all but universal scepticism, to which the light of our author's logic has conducted him, and to which he would now fain conduct us all!

It is a significant fact, that on the question of this paper the extreme parties in speculation among us are very much at one. The Tractarian and the Romanist on the one side, and the Unitarian and the Naturalist on the other, agree in ceding a

'us serve them; thou shalt not hearken to the words of that prophet, or that dreamer of dreams; and that prophet or that dreamer shall be put to death.'—(p. 197.) The italics are Mr. Greg's. The prophet here intended is evidently a false prophet, one who should be put to death for his falseness; and it does not appear that the 'sign or wonder' mentioned amounted to anything more than such an appearance or coincidence as a skilful impostor might devise. The idea that the apparent miracle in such case might be '*real*,' is purely an assumption by Mr. Greg. 'The people were to resist such a wonder-worker, and to put him to death, 'because,' says the historian, 'he hath spoken to turn you away from the Lord, your God, which brought you out of the land of Egypt, and redeemed you out of the house of bondage, to thrust thee out of the way which the Lord thy God commanded thee to walk in.' So that the comparison here comes to be between God himself, as having spoken to this people, and this false prophet, as speaking to them; and between the wonders which had worked the deliverance from Egypt, and such low frauds as a deceiver might practise. It is clear the design of this passage was not to show that it does not belong to a miracle in any sense to authenticate a doctrine, but to point attention to the inferior weight of any sign that might be given by a pretender to a divine mission, who should aim to seduce them from their God, as compared with the signs which had attested the claims of Jehovah as the deliverer of his people. Our Lord supposes, precisely in the same manner, that his own miracles would be confronted by the doings of false prophets and false Christs. The conclusions which follow legitimately from the passage cited are—first, that miracles are a part of the proof of a divine revelation; second, that real miracles, such as were attendant on the deliverance of Israel from Egypt, do not go along with false doctrine; and, third, that only persons who are in an unsound state of religious feeling are in danger of being seduced by false signs into false opinions and practices. Our Lord claimed the faith of men partly on the ground of his doctrine, partly on the ground of his works. In like manner, the ancient Hebrew was to look well to the teaching, and to look well to the sign, and his faith was to be influenced by both. The pretence that the inspired writers attached small importance to miracles as an evidence of their authority, is one of those monstrous whims that are put forth by some men just now, as if for the purpose of seeing how much in the way of extravagant assertion some other men can bear.



kind of authority to the Bible; but it is an authority, the nature and limitations of which are to be determined by their own higher authority. Both have their doctrine of 'development'—a doctrine which is to present a fuller, a more *developed* Christianity than was present to the prophets when they prophesied of Christ, or to the apostles when they preached him. Of course, the Hebrew seers and the Galilean fishermen were in some sense inspired; but as the prophets prophesied in obscurity, seeing little of what was really to come to pass in that apostolic age towards which their predictions pointed,—so the apostles themselves prophesied only in part, seeing little of what the future would reveal as contained in the great system rudely promulgated by them. It belongs to every later age to be an interpreter of the foregoing ages. So it belongs to the mind of our age to look on the Christianity of all preceding ages as beneath that brighter light, and from those improved conditions of existence, which qualify it to act as a *corrective* power on the Christianity of the past, and as a *progressive* power in relation to the Christianity of the future. On the one side, the mind which is supposed to have this mission assigned to it is that of the 'Church'—the mind which finds its home in synods and councils, and its utterance in creeds and formularies. The mind so acting on the other side is the mind which has its domain in philosophy and poetry, and which finds its utterance in the free speculations and the general literature of the age. Prophets were inspired, and apostles were inspired; and so, in the opinion of the Tractarian and Romanist, is the modern Church; and so, in the opinion of the Unitarian and Naturalist, is modern mind. And as the kind of inspiration here intended is spread through all the ages, and is progressive, they who are latest in coming under this stream of illumination must be the most enlightened. Hence, to look to the authority of the past as ultimate, would be simply absurd, inasmuch as it would be to look to the world's infancy or childhood for the world's wisdom. It is true, the maxim of the sacerdotalists concerning their church is, *semper eodem*; but we only need compare the Christianity of the Acts of the Apostles with that of the twelfth century, to see the amazing flexibility of this maxim in such hands. On the other side, we have only to compare the Christianity of Mr. Greg—for he would still be regarded as bowing to the wisdom of Jesus more than to that of any other teacher—to see how small is the authority which the inspired philosophy of the present leaves to the inspired religion of the past. The maxim which proclaims 'the Bible, and the Bible alone,' as authoritative, is not more offensive to the Romanist than to the Naturalist; the sole difference is, that

the former accomplishes his purpose by consigning the Bible to secrecy, and by putting forth his own interpretations of it in its stead; while the latter leaves the book open to the fullest inspection, but mutilates it in open day and at pleasure, and encourages every man to separate for himself his own residuum of truth from the mass of the untrue or the doubtful.

These are the two great powers now at work in our Christendom, from one end of it to the other. We regret to say that it is by far the most influential mind of Christendom that is marshalled under the one or the other of these standards, and not under the standard of a Scriptural Christianity. Many millions in the nations of Christendom apprehend these principles clearly, and avow them without scruple; and many millions more are variously influenced by them, so as to have become lost to the Christianity taught by Jesus and Paul. In the face of such antagonisms, so strong on either hand, the Church of Christ has to keep her footing and to make her way.

On the Continent, a state of things to the above effect presents itself everywhere. In Great Britain, matters are tending more and more every day towards the same issue. What is worse, Evangelical Christians seem to be all but blind to these signs of the times. Amidst every sort of agitation as to the lesser doctrines, or the mere ritualism of Christianity, or as to the best means of upholding and diffusing it, few seem to be aware that there are agencies at work which threaten to put an end to all these broils *about* Christianity, by expelling the thing itself from the midst of us. Our great churchmen, above all, cannot afford to be thus inobservant of what is going on. Nonconformists, too, for the greater part, are far from seeing what manner of persons they ought to be, if the perils of these times are to be adequately met by them. Methodism, unless greatly changed, of which at present we see no sign, may be said to have done its work. Nor have we anything very flattering to say of Congregationalism. The educated, the energetic, the working mind of the community is becoming more and more lost to our churches, in common with all other churches. We scarcely touch the mass of the people beneath us, or the minds of reading, culture, and more free thought above us. We do something with the orderly, the well-to-do, and the comfortable people of our time, though even among these the proportion disposed to give heed to our doings seems to be gradually diminishing. Whence these many unsettled, disorderly, and sickly churches? Whence these heavy complaints about the feebleness and inadequacy of our existing ministry, and this small promise of improvement as regards the ministry of the future? The cause, in our view, is

simple and apparent—a leaven of scepticism has found entrance into the more instructed and energetic minds of the age, in all grades, leaving small space for thorough religious conviction of any kind, or for that thorough action that might proceed from it. We see this disastrous course of things coming over us so clearly—like a sweep of destiny—that had we the resources of what is called the religious world at our command, we should, we think, feel constrained to appropriate no small part of those means which are now expended, and with so little apparent result, on collateral and distant objects, to this life-struggle at our own door. But from whatever source the means may come, our aim should be to secure a more reasonable maintenance for our home ministry; a large increase of our home force; a much more varied adjustment of the means of instruction to the wants of the community; and a far more successful working of the press along with the pulpit.

## CRITICISMS ON BOOKS.

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| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Wilson's Life of Cavendish.</li> <li>2. Lee's Botany of Wild Flowers.</li> <li>3. Gregory on Animal Magnetism.</li> <li>4. De Castro's Spanish Protestants.</li> <li>5. Lardner's Natural Philosophy.</li> <li>6. The Pictorial Family Bible.</li> <li>7. Knowles' Idol Demolished.</li> <li>8. Bagster's Septuagint and Greek Testament.</li> <li>9. Wallace's Antitrinitarian Biography.</li> <li>10. Duncan's Law of Moses.</li> <li>11. White's Sacred History.</li> <li>12. Sortain's Life of Bacon.</li> <li>13. Rees's Providence and Prophecy.</li> <li>14. Kitto's Land of Promise.</li> <li>15. Prize Essays on the Working Classes.</li> </ol> | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>16. Campbell's Popery and Puseyism.</li> <li>17. D'Aubigne on Inspiration.</li> <li>18. Daily Bible Illustrations.</li> <li>19. Life and Letters of St. Paul.</li> <li>20. Olshausen on the Epistles.</li> <li>21. Dr. Vaughan's Sermons.</li> <li>22. Romanism in England.</li> <li>23. Hutton's Botanical Sketches.</li> <li>24. Cases of Conscience, by Pascal the Younger.</li> <li>25. Trivier's Motives for leaving Romanism.</li> <li>26. The Parent's Great Commission.</li> <li>27. Hussey on the Rise of the Papal Power.</li> <li>28. The Popular Historian.</li> <li>29. Hamon and Catar.</li> <li>30. English Synonyms.</li> </ol> |
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I. *The Life of the Honourable Henry Cavendish, including Abstracts of his more Important Scientific Papers, and a Critical Inquiry into the Claims of all the alleged Discoverers of the Composition of Water.* By GEORGE WILSON, M.D., F.R.S. E. 8vo. pp. 478. Printed for the Cavendish Society.

It was fitting that a book so much needed as a good life of Cavendish has long been, should be supplied by the Cavendish Society. Dr. Wilson has done honour to the Society, and added much to his own high reputation as a chemist, by the publication before us. It is one of those pieces of thoroughly good workmanship, that are of very rare occurrence in this age of hurried and superficial performances. The Edinburgh, the Quarterly, and the North British Reviews have all been occupied of late in discussions relative to the claims of Cavendish as a discoverer in chemistry, especially in relation to one point. On the point at issue, Dr. Wilson differs from these authorities, and as the substance of his views was first submitted to the public through the pages of this Journal, we naturally feel the more interested in the success with which he has sustained those views in the larger space opened to him in this volume, and from the larger sources of information to which he has since had access. As the work is 'printed,' but not 'published,' we give the following extracts from the author's preface, believing that they will be acceptable to our scientific readers:—

'Within a very recent period, Cavendish has been the occasion of the keenest controversy that has interested chemists for a long time, and much of this volume is occupied with its discussion. The controversy turns upon the question—Who discovered the composition of water; Cavendish, Watt, or Lavoisier? and it has been prosecuted at greatest length in reference to the rival claims of the English philosophers. The points in debate are not merely questions of priority, and of relative intellectual merit, but also of morality; for charges of plagiarism, and of unfair dealing toward each other, have been brought against the rivals, nor have their friends and acquaintances escaped reproach, including the entire

Royal Society at one period of its existence. Cavendish, in truth, has, during the last ten years, been the object of attack or of defence to a much larger number of writers of great eminence, belonging to different professions, than any one could have anticipated would interest themselves in the reputed author of a solitary discovery made eighty years ago. I have undertaken, accordingly, a delicate and difficult task, in writing a work which compels me to pass under review the judgments of men of such note in science and letters as Arago, Dumas, Itrougham, Brewster, Jeffrey, Harcourt, Whewell, and Peacock, at whose feet I have been accustomed to sit as a humble disciple; I may be allowed, therefore, to explain briefly, in what spirit I have undertaken my task.

'The volume consists essentially of three distinct portions. The first, a biographical narrative; the second, abstracts of scientific papers; the third, a criticism of the asserted merits of all the claimants of the discovery of the composition of water. This critical inquiry has, for convenience of reference, been printed immediately after the abstracts of the chemical papers, but those upon heat throw light upon it also. In the abstracts there is nothing polemical. It is otherwise with portions of the biography, and with the critical inquiry.

'It was open to me to write as a partizan, as an advocate, or as an historian. I have chosen the last character as the only befitting one. I do not pretend to bear witness to my own impartiality, of which others must be the judges, but I can at least testify to the spirit in which I have sought to write; and candid readers, I think, will acquit me of partizanship. The conclusions to which I have come in reference to Cavendish's priority and merits as a discoverer, and his integrity as a man, are such that I can rank myself among his most hearty admirers and defenders. Had I written, however, *only* as his advocate, I should have left much unnoticed which I have recorded. Thus, I have been at pains to point out the defects of his theories as well as their excellences, and to indicate the merits of his rivals as well as their faults. The reputation of Lavoisier and of Watt is as sacred a thing in my eyes as that of Cavendish; and I should be the first to regret, if the tone of this work should seem at variance with the catholic-spirit of esteem for all great philosophers, which is an essential element of vitality in associations like the Cavendish Society. Whilst thus, however, I have endeavoured to be impartial, and to make the biography a faithful sketch, not a eulogy, I have deemed it an essential part of my duty, as a biographer, to vindicate the moral character of Cavendish from even the shadow of suspicion. It has been impossible to do this, without censuring those who have called his good name in question. If, in uttering censure, I have forgotten what is due to great authorities in literature and in science, even when they are in error, I shall deserve and bow to reproof; but if I have only reluctantly fulfilled an imperative though invidious duty, and have justified my censures by showing that they are deserved, I shall hope to be vindicated at the hands of my readers.

'I count it a great advantage that I had studied all the earlier portion of the literature of what may be succinctly styled the Water Controversy, before I had any temptation to take a side in the dispute. I also congratulate myself on having been compelled to look at Cavendish's discoveries and character from two exactly opposite points of view. In 1845, Mr. Muirhead, the able editor of 'The Correspondence of the late James Watt, on his Discovery of the Theory of the Composition of Water,' was introduced to me; and by that gentleman—who is the most zealous of Watt's defenders, and the most unhesitating of Cavendish's assailants—I had everything that could be said in favour of Watt urged upon me in the strongest terms. The publication, also, of the 'Watt Correspondence,' in 1846, led to my obtaining the friendship of the late lamented Lord Jeffrey. He had known and esteemed Watt, and he welcomed the publication of the 'Watt Correspondence,' as furnishing a becoming occasion for exalting the honour of his old friend. Before his lordship published his judgment on the rival claims of Cavendish and Watt, in the 'Edinburgh Review' for 1848, I had many conversations with him on the subject. Chemistry was a science in which he had always taken great interest, and it continued to the last to engage his attention. With his estimate of the relative merits of Cavendish and Watt I could not concur, and he listened to my earnest defence of the former with all the frank courtesy and love of fair dealing which so eminently characterised him. Against Cavendish he entertained no animosity or prejudice, and he was most willing to praise him; but he thought that Watt had been wronged, and he was solicitous to see him righted; so that he pressed me with all the arguments which he perceived might be urged in favour of his great client, whose case he has so skillfully and eloquently pleaded. He did not even refuse to dissent (I may say, to debate) contested points with me, and I defended Cavendish in the strongest terms which courtesy sanctioned.

'My zeal in Cavendish's cause made no difference in Lord Jeffrey's kind dealings towards me, and he was the first in whose hands I purposed to place this volume, in which many of his conclusions are called in question.

'Having thus had the claims of Cavendish's English rival brought before me in the simplest way, I have been secured against under-estimating what may be said in favour of Watt. Lord Jeffrey's article, indeed, is by much the ablest defence of Watt that has appeared.

'After Lord Jeffrey's decease, the Rev. William Vernon Harcourt, the ablest of Cavendish's defenders, most kindly put himself in communication with me, and furnished me with his estimate of the position in which Cavendish's claims were placed by the publications in favour of Watt, which had appeared since 1846. I cannot concur in all Mr. Harcourt's conclusions, but I am indebted to him for many valuable suggestions, and for much assistance. In particular, I owe to him an introduction to the Earl of Burlington, who placed at my disposal the whole of Cavendish's papers in his possession, and obtained for me much information concerning his illustrious ancestor's personal history. The papers on Electricity which Cavendish left behind him are at present in the hands of that accomplished electrician, Sir W. Snow Harris, who, in the kindest manner, drew up for me an abstract of them, accompanied by a commentary. It is matter of great regret to me that I have not been able to print either the abstract or the commentary in this volume; but I trust that they will yet be made public.

'I have thus had access to many unpublished documents, which are fitted to throw light on Cavendish's merits and his personality, and I have largely availed myself of them. For the opinions expressed in this work, I alone am responsible. I have accepted and solicited information and assistance from every party known to me, willing or likely to furnish aid; but as it was manifestly impossible for a single writer to represent the diversified opinions of all the members of a large society upon a contested question, I requested the Council of the Cavendish Society to allow me to write in my own name. No one, accordingly, but myself is committed to the conclusions contained in this volume.'—pp. 6-10.

The only lengthened notices that have appeared in reference to Cavendish, since the publication of the 'Watt Correspondence' in 1846, have been Sir David Brewster's Article in the 'North British Review' for 1847, and Lord Jeffrey's Paper in the 'Edinburgh Review' for 1848. Both these writers, says Dr. Wilson,—

'Pronounce against Cavendish, and refer to the 'Watt Correspondence' as decisive of the merits of Watt; but I think it will appear from the following pages, that the admirers of Cavendish have every reason to congratulate themselves on the publication of the 'Correspondence,' and for my own part, I believe that it furnishes the most decisive evidence in favour of Cavendish, and as such I have constantly quoted from it.'

## II. *The Botanical Looker-Out among the Wild Flowers of England and Wales.* By EDWIN LEES, Esq., F.L.S. Fcp. pp. 564. Second Edition. Hamilton, 1851.

Mr. Lees tells us, *in limine*, that he does not here write to instruct the professional student of botany; that he does not aim to surprise his brother botanists by any new arrangements in classification or discoveries in physiology; but that his hope nevertheless is, that he may be in some degree *useful* in attracting the *many* to the pleasures afforded by an examination of plants in their wild localities, and thus, indirectly at least, subserve the cause of natural history, by enlisting recruits, whose enthusiasm may perchance be awakened by his incitations to observation and adventure. Our author complains, in the spirit of the true botanist, that many who must know *everything* about plants, often care so little about plants. The year he takes according to its months, and the botanical phenomena of each month come up in their season; and much is there in this succession of appearances, as dwelt upon by our author, that should be interesting to all dwellers in the country, and even to such as only get an occasional peep at it.

## III. *Letters to a Candid Enquirer on Animal Magnetism.* By WILLIAM GREGORY, M.D., F.R.S. F., Professor of Chemistry in the University of Edinburgh. Fcp. pp. 528. Taylor and Co., London, 1851. §

This is no place for entering on the vexed questions involved in the subject to which this series of letters relates. It consists of two parts—the first being restricted to a '*General Description and Analysis of the Phenomena*;' the second embracing '*Facts and Cases, with Observations.*' The drift of the volume will be best stated in the following summary, with which it concludes—

'I must now conclude, and I would do so by once more pointing out that my object has not been to explain the facts I have described, but rather to show that a large number of facts exist, which require explanation, but which can never be explained, unless we study them. I am quite content that any theoretical suggestions I have made should be thrown aside as quite unimportant, provided only the facts be attended to; because I consider it too early for a comprehensive theory, and because I believe that the facts are as yet but very partially known.

'But I think we may regard it as established; first, that one individual may exercise a certain influence on another, even at a distance; secondly, that one individual may acquire a control over the motions, sensations, memory, emotions, and volition of another, both by suggestions, in the conscious, impressible state, and in the magnetic sleep, with or without suggestion; thirdly, that the magnetic sleep is a very peculiar state, with a distinct and separate consciousness; fourthly, that, in this state, the subject often possesses a new power of perception, the nature of which is unknown, but by means of which he can see objects or persons, near or distant, without the use of the external organs of vision; fifthly, that he very often possesses a very high degree of sympathy with others, so as to be able to read their thoughts; sixthly, that by these powers of clairvoyance and sympathy, he can sometimes perceive and describe, not only present, but past, and even future events; seventhly, that he can often perceive and describe the bodily state of himself or others; eighthly, that he may fall into trance and extasis, the period of which he often predicts accurately; ninthly, that every one of these phenomena has occurred, and frequently occurs spontaneously, which I hold to be the fundamental fact of the whole inquiry; somnambulism, clairvoyance, sympathy, trance, extasis, insensibility to pain, and prevision, having often been recorded as natural occurrences. Tenthly, that not only the human body, but inanimate objects, such as magnets, crystals, metals, &c. &c., exert on sensitive persons an influence, identical, so far as it is known, with that which produces animal magnetism; that such an influence really exists, because it may act without a shadow of suggestion, and may be transferred to water and other bodies; and, lastly, that it is only by studying the characters of this influence, as we should those of any other, such as electricity or light, that we can hope to throw light on these obscure subjects.

'Let us, in the meantime, observe and accumulate facts; and, whether we succeed or not in tracing these to their true causes, the facts, if well observed and faithfully recorded, will remain, and, in a more advanced state of science, will lead to a true and comprehensive theory.'

IV. *The Spanish Protestants, and their Persecution by Philip II.* By SEÑOR DON ADOLFO DE CASTRO. Translated from the original Spanish, by THOMAS PARKER. Fep. pp. 386. Gilpin, London. 1851.

This is not a common-place production. A history of the Spanish Protestants by a Spaniard, and published in Cadiz in 1851, is a novel circumstance. In the preface to his work, as published in Cadiz, and in the Spanish, the author expresses himself as follows:—

'I am not the first author who has treated on this subject. In 1829, Mr. MacCrie published, in Edinburgh, a work, entitled 'History of the Reformation in Spain.' This gentleman, a person of great judgment and erudition, discharged his labours with much ability, notwithstanding his having had but few Spanish books at hand. Of these, he seems to have most followed the 'Ensayo de una Biblioteca de Traductores,' by Don José de Pellica, and the 'Historia Crítica de la Inquisición,' by Don Juan Antonio Llorente, the Catholic authors who wrote most respecting the Lutherans in Spain during the sixteenth century. Mr. MacCrie, although a very learned author, could not have before him the printed books and manuscripts which have supplied me with materials for my undertaking; and whoever compares my history with that of the crude Scotchman, will see that between the two there is no similarity.

'The history of the Spanish protestants, and their persecution by Philip II., which I now offer to the public, is entirely new, as well in regard to the opinions given, as to the facts stated. Take, for example, the life of the unhappy prince, Don Carlos de Austria, and the trial of the Archbishop of Toledo, D. Fr. Bartolomé de Carranza; indeed, it will appear evident that I differ entirely in opinion from all the historians, both ancient and modern, who have spoken of those two celebrated personages.

'Llorente wrote of Don Carlos, in his *Historia Crítica de la Inquisición*, with great want of judgment, and also of materials drawn from good sources; and in the affair of Carranza, he did nothing else than extract the process itself, which the Romans called *radix indigestæque moles*. This entire want of judgment, and his not having at hand the authentic docu-

ments of the defender, and of one of the judges, of that prelate, relative to the proceedings, render his labours of little use in clearing up the events which led to the imprisonment of the Archbishop in the secret cells of the Holy Office.

I have thought it desirable to place, at the commencement of the work, a picture of the true religious character of Spaniards in the sixteenth century, which affords a contrast to the vulgar opinion erroneously entertained by some learned authors. I consider it is the duty of a historian, before referring to events, to give an exact description of the age in which they occurred.

In the notes to my history I have cited, rather fully, passages from ancient authors, not with a view of affecting erudition, but merely to give authority to my labours, for I do not forget the saying of the celebrated Spanish physician, Gomez Peryra,—‘*En las ciencias humanas á ningun se ha de prestar fe, si no prueba lo que afirma.*’\*

Of the materials which I have collected for this work, I have suppressed more than I have given, for I do not wish to afford the malicious a pretext to put a false interpretation on my intentions, which have only been to elucidate the history of my country.

I would also observe, that although in this work I necessarily speak of both Roman-catholic and Protestant doctrines, it does not follow that I should analyse them, or discuss religious questions. My object has been, not to inquire into matters of faith, but only into facts.

What is meant by the statement in the last paragraph, in respect to his not having analysed doctrines nor discussed religious questions, will be understood when we add, in the language of the translator of the volume, ‘that although the day is gone by in Spain for burning, or even imprisoning, what Romanists call *heretics*, yet even now, in this enlightened era—in the year of our Lord 1851—there remains in the penal code of that country an article which says, ‘*He who shall publicly apostatize from the Catholic religion, shall be perpetually banished.*’ Bearing this fact in mind, the book is written with a singular freedom of spirit; and on this account, as well as from its being evidently a work of greater research and learning on the subject than has hitherto appeared in our language, it should be extensively read among us.

*V. Handbook of Natural Philosophy and Astronomy.* By DIONYSIUS LARDNER, D.C.L. 8vo, pp. 824. Taylor and Co., London. 1851.

This volume includes what is called a ‘first course’ under the above title—viz. on Mechanics, Hydrostatics, Hydraulics, Pneumatics, Sound, and Optics;—a second ‘course’ is intended to embrace—Heat, Electricity, Magnetism, and Astronomy. Nothing could be better for the purpose intended than the volume here published. It contains upwards of *four hundred* illustrations; and of his aim in preparing the work Dr. Lardner thus speaks:—

‘In the composition of this work, the author has had in view the satisfaction of those who desire to obtain a knowledge of the elements of physics, without pursuing them through their mathematical consequences and details. The methods of demonstration and illustration have accordingly been adapted to such readers.

The work has also been composed with the object of supplying that information relating to physical and mechanical science, which is required by the medical and law student, the engineer and artisan—by those who, having already entered upon the active pursuits of business, are still desirous to sustain and improve their knowledge of the general truths of physics, and of those laws by which the order and stability of the material world are maintained.’

*VI. The Pictorial Family Bible.* By J. KITTO, D.D. Quarto. Parts I. and II. Orr and Co., London.

This is a re-issue of a work well known. The peculiarity of this issue is, its remarkable cheapness. It will be completed in thirty parts, of one shilling each—being 2400 quarto pages, exclusive of the numerous engravings, for thirty shillings. Thus a book which, on its first publication, was regarded as a luxury for the rich, is made accessible almost to the poorest.

\* In the human sciences believe nobody, if he does not prove what he affirms.



VII. *The Idol Demolished by its own Priest.* By JAMES SHERIDAN KNOWLES. Fcp. pp. 310. Black. 1851.

The 'Priest' intended in this title-page is Dr. Wiseman, and the 'Idol' said to be demolished by him is Transubstantiation. To this subject the Cardinal has brought both his eloquence and his philosophy in his lectures, in the charitable hope of reconciling our heretical people to the reception of so salutary a dogma. Mr. Knowles writes with great clearness, acuteness, and force; and, strange to say, proves himself not only a better logician than the great ecclesiastic whom he assails, but a man more deeply read in patristic and priestly lore. Of the earnest style in which the book is written, our readers may judge from the following passage, with which it concludes:—

'Not a trace of any one Roman-catholic dogma is to be met with in Scripture! NOT A TRACE! Your claim, in virtue of Peter, is not to be found in Scripture. Moreover, it is damaged by your own fable of his connexion with Rome; in which he never so much as set foot! Your apostolic succession is not there; your secret oral tradition is not there; your purgatory, your penance, your indulgences, are not there; your invocation of the Virgin and of the Saints is not there; your baptismal regeneration is not there; your consecrated brick or stone, and mortar,—your holy water, holy oil, holy candles, baptism of bells and horses, are not there; your relics, crucifixes, beads, annulets, pictures, statues, and ward-ropes of costly trumpery, are not there; and, least of all, is your sacrifice there? with the blasphemous, indirectly damnnatory, and craftily monopolizing doctrine which you found upon it!—Eternal life is promised only to those who worthily partake of the blessed Eucharist!'

VIII. (1.) *The Greek Septuagint Version of the Old Testament, according to the Vatican edition, together with the real Septuagint version of Daniel and the Apocrypha, including the Fourth Book of Maccabees, and an Historical Introduction.* 8vo. pp. 776-1-166. Bagster.

(2.) *The New Testament, the 'Received Text,' with Selected Various Readings from Griesbach, Scholz, Lachmann, and Tischendorf; and References to Parallel Passages.* 8vo. Bagster.

These volumes are beautifully printed, and substantially bound in cloth. The Septuagint is given in a clear type in double columns. The type of the New Testament is large, and delightful to look upon—having a sufficient marginal space for a clear exhibition of the References, &c. The writer of 'The Introduction to the Septuagint,' in which he has given a clear and succinct account of the version from its origin, says, in conclusion:—'The present edition of the Septuagint may be briefly described. The publishers have adopted the Vatican text as most suitable for general utility. The real Septuagint of Daniel has been given (though commonly omitted in editions of the Septuagint), as being an integral part of the version, although the church at an early period substituted for it the version of Theodotian. This has also been given, as it is commonly inserted as part of the Septuagint. In the Apocrypha, the fourth Book of the Maccabees has been added to the three found in previous reprints of the Vatican text.'

IX. *Antitrinitarian Biography.* By ROBERT WALLACE, F.G.S., and Member of the Historico-Theological Society of Leipsic. Three vols. 8vo. Whitfield. London.

Mr. Wallace has here done a piece of service for his antitrinitarian brethren, for which they should be grateful. His work is designed to give a sort of biographical history of Unitarianism, both on the Continent and in this country, from the Reformation to the close of the seventeenth century. We had once thought of going somewhat carefully through these volumes, commending them for much that is commendable in them, but stating our reasons

or a difference of judgment on some points. The questions of this nature, however, that would arise, are such as our busy 'go-ahead' generation is not much disposed to concern itself with, and we abandoned our purpose. The materials for such a work were in a good degree accessible, but required to be used with judgment and impartiality. Bearing in mind the nature of the subject, and the avowed object of the writer, there is much less ground for the complaint of one-sidedness than might have been expected. In the case of Servetus and Calvin we have, of course, the usual prominence given to circumstances regarded as unfavourable to the Genevan Reformer, and the usual softening or suppression of the facts which bespeak the almost maniac extravagance and insolence that make against the saintly pretensions of the martyr. No protestant, now-a-days, attempts to defend the course taken by Calvin in that proceeding; but there are many who presume to think that he is entitled to fair dealing—a thing which he has never had yet at the hands of an antitrinitarian.—See *British Quarterly*, vol. ix. p. 443 *et seq.*

X. *The Law of Moses—its Character and Design.* By DAVID DUNCAN, Minister of the Gospel, Howgate. 12mo, pp. 411. Oliphant and Co. 1851.

The author of this volume states that it was no part of his object to defend the inspiration or the historical truthfulness of the Pentateuch against such as may be disposed to question either:—but adds, as the illustration of the excellence of the law of Moses, 'and its superiority to every system of human formation, furnishes a powerful though indirect argument in favour of its divine origin, so the exhibition of its design, by showing that all its precepts and institutions, however apparently diversified, are parts of a single system, all contributing to the same end, presents an equally powerful argument against the notion, that it is an aggregate of disconnected fragments gradually communicated.' Certainly the commentary to this effect on the Old Testament which is supplied by the New, may well contribute much to strengthen the faith of the Christian in the divine origin of the whole, and in the immutability of Him from whom the whole has proceeded. We want books of this description, which give you in a simple form the substance of older, larger, and more technical works, which few now-a-days will read.

XI. *Sacred History, for the Use of Schools.* By HENRY WHITE, M.A. Fcp. pp. 187. Oliver and Boyd. 1851.

Sacred history is in the Bible, but it is there like everything else which that book contains—not as something put together on a plan or system. We should by no means recommend that the Bible itself be read for the purpose of making the young acquainted with this portion of its contents. For that object we should greatly prefer such a book as Mr. White has here given us.

XII. *The Life of Lord Bacon.* By the Rev. JOSEPH SORTAIN, A.B., of Trinity College, Dublin. Fcp. pp. 300. Religious Tract Society. 1851.

We do not expect new materials in a Life of Bacon: but it is possible so to dispose of the materials that belong to it, and so to estimate them, as to make the history of that extraordinary man in a high degree interesting and instructive. Mr. Sortain has felt both the attraction and the difficulty of his subject, and has acquitted himself in reference to it with the taste of the scholar, and with the integrity becoming him as a Christian minister. It is a very neat volume in appearance, with a beautifully engraved portrait.

XIII. *Providence and Prophecy.* By the Rev. W. REES. Fcp. pp. 218. H. Hughes. London.

We can readily suppose that when the substance of this volume was delivered as a series of discourses in the Welsh language to Welshmen, the delivery was by no means without effect. Mr. Rees saw in the changes which so greatly disturbed everything political and ecclesiastical on the Continent in 1848, a series of events foreshadowed in prophecy. The powers which were then prostrated, are viewed as thus visited because of their sins, and a terrible indictment is here brought up against them, that the ways of Providence may be seen to have been retributive. Had these discourses been published in 1848, Mr. Rees might have been taken with more confidence as an interpreter of prophecy and providence. But the wheel of fortune has gone round since then; so that those who were first are now last, and those that were last are now first. But we believe, with Mr. Rees, that this will not last; and that the day will come to Europe when the free and generous sentiments so congenial to him, will be ascendant, not only among the people of Europe, but in all that shall concern them.

XIV. *The Land of Promise.* By JOHN KITTO, D.D. Fcp. pp. 320. Religious Tract Society.

This volume presents a topographical description of the principal places in Palestine, and of the country eastward of the Jordan, upon which Dr. Kitto has availed himself of the researches of the most recent travellers. The work is in clear type, handsomely bound, and illustrated with nearly sixty engravings.

XV. *The Glory and Shame of Britain.* By HENRY DUNCKLEY. 12mo. pp. 232. Religious Tract Society. 1851.

In 1849, the Religious Tract Society offered a premium of £100, and another of £50, for the best, and the next best, essays, 'On the Condition and 'Claims of the Working Classes, together with the Means of securing their 'Elevation.' The first of these premiums was obtained by Mr. Dunckley. The second by Mr. O'Hanlan, now of Belfast, for the essay entitled, '*The Operative Classes of Great Britain, their existing State, and its Improvement.*' Mr. Dunckley and Mr. O'Hanlan are dissenting ministers; and, as residents in Lancashire, have had good opportunity of knowing much concerning the operative classes from actual intercourse. This circumstance has been favourable to them, in so far as regards a knowledge of what is really existing among the working classes. The pictures given are substantially truthful; the suggestions, with a view to improvement, are mostly judicious; and the philosopher and the statesman may attend with advantage, after their own manner, to the facts thus placed before them.

XVI. *Popery and Puseyism Illustrated.* By JOHN CAMPBELL, D.D. Fcp. pp. xxvii. 196.

This volume is designed to supply the word in season on the subject of 'Popery and Puseyism,' both to Sunday-school teachers and to the heads of families. The author sees the signs of the times as they are, and has given himself, with his characteristic energy, to the use of the means on which protestants will do well mainly to depend, in their endeavours to counteract the devices of our Romanists or semi-Romanists. Dr. Campbell is quite right in his opinion, that Britain has little to fear from the number of open and professed Romanists among us; and he has done well in pointing attention to Puseyism, as the great school in which no pains are spared to seduce our

people so near to the confines of Romanism, as to prepare not a few of them for submitting to a setting-up of 'flat popery,' if the time for some attempt of that sort should seem, in the judgment of our 'church-principle' people, and our 'no-principle' people, to have come. The aim of Dr. Campbell is to meet this danger by constituting every Sunday-school and every Christian family a fortress against it. The book unmasks enormous errors, and presents momentous truths, with a Luther-like directness and force eminently adapted to its purpose.

**XVII. *The Authority of God: Four Discourses.*** By Rev. G. H. MERLE D'AUBIGNE, D.D. *With an Introduction written for this Edition.* Partridge & Oakey. 1851.

These discourses owe their origin to the controversy which has grown up of late among French protestants on the question of inspiration. They contain many good things very well put; but, as a whole, they do not deal with the subject in a way to meet the wants of English readers in relation to it. The author is more eloquent than logical; better skilled in historical painting, than in conducting processes of reasoning. The trouble that has befallen the Evangelical brethren at Geneva about inspiration, is a not unnatural reaction against their own narrow views concerning it. We have conversed with French pastors who cordially accept the results of Professor Gausson's argument, while taking grave exceptions to many things in the argument itself. It seems to be his pleasure to impart to his language, and to his whole manner, as much of the dogmatic, extravagant, and repulsive, as possible. We deeply regret this, inasmuch as the difference between himself and the great body of Evangelical believers is by no means so great as his manner of treating the subject suggests.

**XVIII. *Daily Bible Illustrations.*** By JOHN KITTO, D.D., F.S.A. 12mo. pp. 492. Oliphant. 1851.

These illustrations, as most of our readers are aware, are designed for family and daily reading. The illustrations of this volume are 'Solomon and the Kings,' and they bring the series of daily readings to the close of the year. But besides this series of three volumes, another of four volumes is to appear, including illustrations of—I. Job and the Poetical Books. II. Isaiah and the Prophets. III. The Life and Death of our Lord. IV. The Apostles and the Early Church.' We are glad to find that the success of the first series has been such as to warrant this promise of a second.

**XIX. *The Life and Letters of St. Paul.*** Edited by the Rev. W. CONY-BEARE, M.A., and the Rev. G. S. HOWSON, M.A. Quarto, Part I. Longman & Co.

This work is designed to present a complete biography of the Apostle Paul; with a translation of his letters, inserted in chronological order. It will also present numerous illustrations on steel and wood of the principal places visited by the Apostle, from original drawings made upon the spot by Mr. W. H. Bartlett, together with maps, charts, coins, &c. This first Part is occupied wholly with the life of the Apostle, including descriptions of the places visited by him in the discharge of his mission; and the present aspect of many of the scenes which have become thus sacred is given in a series of beautiful engravings. In so far as we have examined the memoir it appears to be written with much care and accuracy, and the publication altogether promises to be one of great elegance and worth. We may say more of it if we should see the remaining Parts.

XX. *Biblical Commentary on St. Paul's Epistles to the Galatians, Ephesians, Colossians, and Thessalonians.* By HERMANN OLSHAUSEN. 8vo, pp. 511. Clarke. Edinburgh. 1851.

The reputation of Olshausen as a commentator is a settled matter in the judgment of the best theologians in Christendom. We are happy to see such progress made in the effort to render his invaluable labours easily accessible to the English student. We know not what encouragement Mr. Clarke, the spirited publisher, is receiving, but he certainly *deserves* much.

XXI. *Sermons.* By CHARLES JOHN VAUGHAN, D.D., Head Master of Harrow School, &c. 8vo, pp. 250. Parker. 1851.

The first of these sermons is designed to prove 'The Personality of the Tempter'; the second, to show that 'The Eternity of Future Punishment' is the doctrine of Scripture. The mention of these subjects will be sufficient to indicate that the present Head Master of Harrow School is not a man of doubtful orthodoxy. The sermons of the volume, however, have a considerable mixture of the ecclesiastical with the theological, and, for their number, embrace a marked variety of topics. In them all we trace a hand of much skill and power.

XXII. *Romanism in England Exposed.* By CHARLES HASTINGS COLLETTE. Fcp. pp. 262. Second Edition. 1851. Hall & Co., London.

This is a most humiliating exposure of some of the lowest forms of papal superstition—as low as anything to be found in the Romanism of Genoa or Naples, but not too low to have obtained the sanction of the ecclesiastical authorities in England, or to be adopted by not a few of their votaries in the chief cities and towns of England in the year 1851.

XXIII. *Phyto-Theology; or, Botanical Sketches, intended to illustrate the Works of God in the Structure, Functions, and General Distribution of Plants.* By JOHN HUTTON BALFOUR, M.D., F.L.S., F.R.S.E. Johnstone.

The title of this neatly printed and admirably illustrated little volume sufficiently describes its object. Its author is 'Professor of Medicine and Botany in the University of Edinburgh,' and is desirous by this means to contribute something towards connecting religious thought with the observation of the processes which take place in the history of plants.

XXIV. *Cases of Conscience; or, Lessons in Morals for the Use of the Laity, extracted from the Moral Theology of the Romish Clergy.* By PASCAL TIE YOUNGER. 8vo, pp. 64. Bosworth. London. 1851.

This is a singularly able pamphlet, sustaining its many terrible allegations against Romanism, especially in its bearing upon morals and the confessional, by the most indisputable authorities. We know not a better production to put into the hands of our sentimental latitudinarians, who affect to think that all religious systems are very much the same.

XXV. *An Exposition of the Principles and Motives which induced me to Leave the Church of Rome.* By C. L. TRIVIER. Fcp. pp. 207.

C. L. Trivier, formerly a Catholic priest, and a person of good reputation at Clermont-Ferand, Pay-de-Dôme, Auvergne, has lately, in consequence of his days of secession to Rome, in the communion to which he belongs. In these

there are many, we presume, to whom this account of the steps by which some men bid farewell to it will not be unwelcome. Few Protestants conduct the argument against Romanism with discretion. It may almost be said, that it requires a good catholic education thoroughly to refute Catholicism. The calm and judicious exposure of the errors and devices of Romanism presented in this narrative, is from one possessing such qualification for the service to which he has given himself.

XXVI. *The Parent's Great Commission.* 12mo, pp. 184. Second edition. Longman & Co. 1851.

The author describes this work as consisting of 'essays on subjects connected with the higher part of education.' The essays intended are twelve in number, all on interesting topics connected with domestic training, and with that larger education which is proper to the family. On such a subject it would not be reasonable to expect novelty; but we may expect good sense, clearly presented, and imbued with Christian feeling—and these qualities the volume before us possesses.

XXVII. *The Rise of the Papal Power Traced, in Three Lectures.* By ROBERT HUSSEY, B.D., Regius Professor of Ecclesiastical History. 12mo, pp. 209. Parker, Oxford. 1851.

'Whoso boasteth himself of a false gift, is like clouds and wind without rain.' This is the proverb which Professor Hussey has fixed upon his title page. His aim is to show, and to show historically, that the pretensions of modern Romanism are a falsehood. This is done in a manner befitting the Regius Professor of Ecclesiastical History in Oxford, and in a space so limited, that we may safely recommend the perusal of the volume even to those with whom the perusal of a big book is ever a great burden. Much more will be done now-a-days by small effective treatises of this sort than by works of greater bulk and pretension.

XXVIII. *The Popular Historian and Fireside Friend.* Nos. I. & II. Simpkin & Marshall.

This is a monthly periodical, consisting of thirty-two closely-printed pages, in double columns, and sold for twopence. The matter is partly original and partly selected, and all is of a description to commend itself to good taste and right feeling. It is not the work it seems, as it is something much better. We shall be glad to find that the sale is such as to sustain it.

XXIX. *Hamor and Catar; or, the Two Races: a Tale.* Small 8vo, pp. 276. Simpkin & Co. 1851.

Pictures of 'the World before the Flood' must necessarily be vague, if derived purely from the notices which Moses has given us concerning that remote period in the history of the earth and of man; on the other hand, if what is wanting in Genesis is to be supplied by the creations of the poet, the ground for invention would seem to be ill chosen. This mixture of inspiration with fiction is too much like an attempt to mix the iron with the clay. It is true, the early poetry of all nations has been religious poetry, losing itself in the far-off shadows of history. But the historical, in connexion with such religions, bore small resemblance to the historical in connexion with ours; and the poetry which succeeded, even in those instances, would have made little impression on an age of realities, criticisms, and scepticisms like our own. These observations have reference to the book before us. The two races, of

whom Hamon and Catar may be taken as representatives, are the descendants of Cain and the descendants of Seth, who divide the old world between them, and exist in hereditary hostility. The Cainites are without religion, warlike, luxurious; the Sethites are bound together by their piety, and are simple and peaceful in their habits. The 'tale' opens with a soliloquy from Cain, descriptive of his remorse and mental misery. As a part of his punishment, he has a power given him to become invisible, and to see and hear what takes place among his descendants: what comes before him he relates, and of this relation the volume consists.

On reading the volume, our impression would be that it is the production of a writer young in authorship, but of extensive reading, and of much practice in composition. At present, the judgment of the author is the faculty least developed—as might be expected; but the resources of his imagination, his command of language, his power of description, and his earnest feeling, all contribute to assure us that the author of 'Hamon and Catar' is of the class of the young and gifted among us who *must* work, and who will grow mightily by working.

XXX. *A Selection of English Synonyms.* Small 8vo, pp. 142. Parker. London. 1851.

This little work is edited by Archbishop Whately, and has been carefully revised by him throughout. Concerning it, his Grace says:—'Though I am far from presuming to call it perfect, it is, I am confident, very much the best that has appeared upon the subject.' Our readers will feel that a book of which Dr. Whately thus speaks must be worth reading; and if they read they will not be disappointed.











